KORN FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP V HARBOR BUILDING CO
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
KORN FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP,
GALE KORN, SHELDON KORN, SHAUNA
KORN, and ASHLEY KORN,
UNPUBLISHED
January 29, 2008
Plaintiffs/Counter-DefendantsAppellants,
v
HARBOR BUILDING COMPANY, L.L.C.,
DISCOUNT HOMES, L.L.C., NORTHERN
EXCAVATING, GRADING & SEPTIC, L.L.C.,
ABINGTON DEVELOPMENT COMPANY,
L.L.C., BRIDESTONE DEVELOPMENT
COMPANY, L.L.C., CLARITA COMMONS
DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, L.L.C., and
LAWRENCE LENCHNER,
No. 272813
Charlevoix Circuit Court
LC No. 03-172319-CB
Defendants/Counter-PlaintiffsAppellees.
Before: Fitzgerald, P.J., and Markey and Smolenski, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs appeal by right a judgment entered after jury verdicts in defendants’ favor for
silent fraud in the amount of $1,070,000, for fraud and misrepresentation in the amount of
$250,000, and also $250,000 as exemplary damages. Plaintiffs also appeal the jury verdict of
$250,000 against Sheldon Korn and Gale Korn for breach of fiduciary duty.1 We affirm.
This litigation resulted when Lawrence Lenchner ended his business relationship with his
brother-in-law Sheldon Korn. Both Sheldon2 and Lenchner had backgrounds in residential
construction and real estate development. They began working together in real estate
1
Plaintiffs do not contest the jury’s award of $175,000 for unjust enrichment.
2
To avoid confusion individual plaintiffs are referred to by first name.
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development in 1995 or 1996. According to Lenchner’s theory of the case, although he and
Sheldon were supposed to be partners, Sheldon never made any capital contributions or assumed
any liability for any debts of the defendant business entities that Lenchner solely formed to
conduct real estate development. The other plaintiffs in this litigation are Sheldon’s wife, Gale,
two daughters, Shauna and Ashley, and the Korn Family Limited Partnership (KFLP). The
family partnership was apparently formed to evade the collection efforts of judgment creditors
from an earlier unrelated lawsuit. See Nationsbanc Mortgage Corp of Ga v Luptak, 243 Mich
App 560; 625 NW2d 385 (2001). Lenchner ended his association with the Korns on December
31, 2002.
The Korns and KFLP initiated this litigation on January 15, 2003, by filing suit against
Lenchner and the real estate development companies he had formed. Plaintiffs third amended
complaint alleged the following theories: (a) money owed on unpaid loans to the companies; (b)
conversion; (c) statutory liability (treble damages) under MCL 600.2919a for receiving and
concealing stolen or embezzled property; (d) fraudulent or innocent misrepresentation; (e) silent
fraud; (f) bad faith promises; (g) breach of fiduciary duty; (h) tortious interference with business
relationships; (i) unlawful discharge violating public policy, or alternatively, violating the
whistle blower’s protection act; (j) civil conspiracy; and (k) breach of contract. Lenchner and his
companies (hereafter, defendants) in essence claimed that the Korns looted the companies for
their personal benefit, alleging in a counterclaim: (a) conversion; (b) civil conspiracy to commit
conversion; (c) breach of fiduciary duty; (d) civil conspiracy to commit breach of fiduciary duty;
(e) fraud; (f) silent fraud; (g) innocent misrepresentation; (h) conspiracy to commit fraud, silent
fraud, and innocent misrepresentation; (i) promissory estoppel; (j) unjust enrichment; and (k)
constructive trust.
After a thirteen-day trial, the jury rejected all the Korns claims and rendered verdicts in
favor of defendants totaling $1,745,000 against all plaintiffs jointly and severally (with verdict
forms naming each plaintiff and/or the other plaintiffs), and an additional $250,000 awarded
against Sheldon Korn and/or Gale Korn in the amount of $250,000 for breach of fiduciary duty.
Specifically, the jury rejected Sheldon and Gale Korn’s claim of being Lenchner’s fifty-percent
partners in the various business real estate development entities. The jury also rejected all of
plaintiffs’ legal theories for damages. On defendants’ counterclaims, the jury found in favor of
defendants, awarding damages against all plaintiffs of $175,000 for unjust enrichment,
$1,070,000 for silent fraud, $250,000 for fraud & misrepresentation, and $250,000 as exemplary
damages. The trial court entered judgment on July 28, 2006, against KFLP and/or each
individual plaintiff for $1,745,000 and against Sheldon Korn and/or Gale Korn for an additional
$250,000; each award also included interest from the date of filing the counter-complaint. The
trial court subsequently denied plaintiffs’ motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict
(JNOV), remittitur, or new trial. Plaintiffs appeal by right the judgment and the order denying
post trial relief.
I
Plaintiffs first argue that the trial court erred by denying their motions for directed verdict
and JNOV regarding defendants’ claims of (A) fraud and (B) silent fraud. We disagree. We find
defendants’ legal theories that all plaintiffs are liable for fraud and silent fraud sound and
supported by evidence, which if viewed in the light most favorable to defendants, supports the
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jury verdicts. Plaintiffs’ legal arguments to the contrary fail. Consequently, the trial court did
not err in denying plaintiffs’ motions for directed verdict and JNOV.
This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s decision on both a motion for directed verdict
and a motion for JNOV. Foreman v Foreman, 266 Mich App 132, 135; 701 NW2d 167 (2005).
When reviewing the trial court’s decision on a motion for a directed verdict, we must view the
evidence presented up to the point of the motion and all legitimate inferences from the evidence
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party to determine whether a fact question existed.
Zantel Marketing Agency v Whitesell Corp, 265 Mich App 559, 568; 696 NW2d 735 (2005). A
directed verdict is appropriate only when no factual question exists upon which reasonable minds
could differ. Smith v Foerster-Bolser Construction, Inc, 269 Mich App 424, 427-428; 711
NW2d 421 (2006).
Similarly, a motion for JNOV should be granted only when there was insufficient
evidence presented to create an issue of fact for the jury. Merkur Steel Supply Inc v Detroit, 261
Mich App 116, 123; 680 NW2d 485 (2004). The trial court must view the evidence and all
reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and determine whether
the facts presented preclude judgment for the nonmoving party as a matter of law. Id. at 123124. If the evidence is such that reasonable people could differ, the question is for the jury and
JNOV is improper. Foreman, supra at 136.
A
As a general rule, actionable common-law fraud requires proof that: “(1) the defendant
made a material representation; (2) the representation was false; (3) when the defendant made the
representation, the defendant knew that it was false, or made it recklessly, without knowledge of
its truth as a positive assertion; (4) the defendant made the representation with the intention that
the plaintiff would act upon it; (5) the plaintiff acted in reliance upon it; and (6) the plaintiff
suffered damage.” M & D, Inc v McConkey, 231 Mich App 22, 27; 585 NW2d 33 (1998).
Plaintiffs correctly argue there can be no fraud without a false representation. Id.; Hord v
Environmental Research Inst (After Remand), 463 Mich 399, 404; 617 NW2d 543 (2000).
Further, “an action for fraudulent misrepresentation must be predicated upon a statement relating
to a past or an existing fact. Future promises are contractual and do not constitute fraud.” HiWay Motor Co v International Harvester Co, 398 Mich 330, 336; 247 NW2d 813 (1976). But
defendants rely on a recognized exception that “an unfulfilled promise to perform in the future is
actionable when there is evidence that it was made with a present undisclosed intent not to
perform.” Foreman, supra at 143, citing Rutan v Straehly, 289 Mich 341, 348-349; 286 NW 639
(1939); see, also, Crook v Ford, 249 Mich 500, 504-505; 229 NW 587 (1930).
Plaintiffs’ main argument is that all plaintiffs may not be found liable for any fraud that
Sheldon alone perpetrated. Plaintiffs assert defendants presented no evidence at trial that Gale,
Shauna, or Ashley made a false statement on which Lenchner or his companies reasonably
relied. This argument fails for several reasons. Defendants’ theorized that all Korns and KFLP
were acting in concert to loot defendant companies for personal benefit. In Kefuss v Whitley, 220
Mich 67; 189 NW 76 (1922), the plaintiff alleged that several people including Whitley and
Davey defrauded him. The Court opined:
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Where there is evidence that parties are acting in collusion, “Everything said,
done, or written by any one of the parties to the combination, in furtherance of the
common purpose, is deemed the act of all.” Gumberg v Treusch, 103 Mich 543,
554. In my opinion, the fair inference to be drawn from the proofs is that Mr.
Davey knew all about the deal with plaintiff and, having accepted the fruit of the
fraud, he may not complain of a decree which so far as possible places the parties
in statu quo. [Kefuss, supra at 88-89.]
Plaintiffs argue that defendants’ concert of action theory is unavailable because
defendants voluntarily dismissed separate independent claims of civil conspiracy. Although both
defendants and plaintiffs dismissed their civil conspiracy claims before sending the case to the
jury, this argument is unavailing. The Kefuss concert of action theory does not depend on
proving an independent claim of civil conspiracy. It requires evidence that parties knowingly
acted to further a common purpose, in this case, to siphon company assets for the Korn family’s
personal use and benefit. Here, there was evidence from which the jury could infer all Korns
knowingly participated in a common fraudulent scheme. There was testimony from Sheldon,
Gale, and Shauna from which the jury could infer that the Korn family operated as a unit in its
business dealings regarding the Lenchner companies. Further, there was testimony from which
the jury could infer that Sheldon, Gale and Shauna participated in the fraudulent scheme. For
example, there was evidence that Sheldon wrote checks to Gale for hundreds of thousands of
dollars on company accounts, that Gale deposited the funds into KFLP (comprised of all Korn
family members), and from which all family members could freely draw funds.
Moreover, for the reasons discussed more fully in part IV, plaintiffs affirmatively waived
any claim of error regarding a severable determination of liability as to each plaintiff. Here,
because of the “and/or” verdict form that all parties agreed to submit to the jury, even if only
Sheldon were liable for fraud, the verdict should be upheld.
Next, plaintiffs argue that defendants offered evidence at trial on a fraud theory that had
not been alleged in their counter-complaint. Specifically, defendants offered evidence that
Sheldon agreed to act like a partner but did not; this induced Lenchner to fund the companies
that the Korns looted. Plaintiffs’ claim of prejudice by lack of notice is without merit. The very
essence of plaintiffs’ claims against defendants was that Sheldon and Gale Korn were 50-50
partners with Lenchner in the various real estate development companies. Lenchner denied the
Korns were partners. Defendants’ pleadings stated that the Korns “engaged in a practice and
course of conduct that operated as a fraud and a deceit on the Lenchner entities.” Thus,
defendants’ theory of fraud was within the broad framework of the issues raised by both parties’
pleadings, and, indeed, went to the heart of the case: was there a partnership or was a fraud
perpetrated? Plaintiffs were not prejudiced by lack of notice.
Moreover, it was during the Korns’ counsel’s cross-examination of Lenchner that
testimony was elicited that established the fraud theory that Sheldon agreed to act like a partner
but did not. MCR 2.118(C)(1) provides: “When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by
express or implied consent of the parties, they are treated as if they had been raised by the
pleadings.” So if the pleadings were not broad enough to include this theory of fraud, the record
supports finding it was tried by implied consent of the parties. That defendants did not move to
amend their counterclaim is of no moment because (1) when issues are tried by implied consent
of the parties they “are treated as if they had been raised by the pleadings” and (2) an
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“amendment of the pleadings to conform to the evidence . . . may be made on motion of a party
at any time, even after judgment.” MCR 2.118(C)(1).
Next, plaintiffs contend this theory will not support a judgment of fraud because it was a
promise only actionable for breach of contract, not fraud. Plaintiffs are correct that in general,
“an action for fraudulent misrepresentation must be predicated upon a statement relating to a past
or an existing fact. Future promises are contractual and do not constitute fraud.” Hi-Way Motor
Co, supra at 336. But “an unfulfilled promise to perform in the future is actionable when there is
evidence that it was made with a present undisclosed intent not to perform.” Foreman, supra at
143. Here, the jury could have reasonably found that Sheldon’s promise to fully participate in a
partnership by contributing capital and agreeing to personally be responsible for company debts,
as Lenchner was, induced Lenchner to continue funding the companies from which the Korns
siphoned funds for the personal benefit of all Korns. More important, the jury could reasonably
have determined from the evidence that Sheldon never intended to fulfill his promise, intended
Lenchner to rely and act on it, and that Lenchner and his companies reasonably relied on the
false promise and were thereby defrauded.
Finally, plaintiffs argue that defendants’ theory of fraud cannot sustain a judgment
against all plaintiffs other than Sheldon because there was no proof of agency between Sheldon
and the other plaintiffs. Further, plaintiffs argue, even if Sheldon were the agent of the other
plaintiffs, there was no evidence Sheldon’s actions were within the scope of the agency. But as
discussed supra, and more fully in part III (A), defendants’ theory of the case was not agency;
rather, defendants posited that the Korns acted in concert to perpetrate a common fraudulent
scheme. Evidence was presented at trial that supported defendants’ theory of the case and on
which reasonable people could disagree. Thus, the trial court properly denied plaintiffs’ motions
for directed verdict and JNOV with respect to defendants’ counterclaim of fraud and
misrepresentation. Foreman, supra at 135-136.
B
Michigan recognizes a cause of action for silent fraud. Lumber Village, Inc v Seigler,
135 Mich App 685, 699-670; 355 NW2d 654 (1984), citing United States Fidelity & Guaranty
Co v Black, 412 Mich 99; 313 NW2d 77 (1981). “[T]o establish a claim of silent fraud, there
must be evidence . . . [of] some sort of representation that was false.” McConkey, supra at 25.
But, “[a] misrepresentation need not necessarily be words alone, but can be shown where the
party, if duty-bound to disclose, intentionally suppresses material facts to create a false
impression to the other party.” Id. Thus, “in order to prove a claim of silent fraud, a plaintiff
must show that some type of representation that was false or misleading was made and that there
was a legal or equitable duty of disclosure.” Id. at 31, citing Black, supra at 125, 127. Where a
duty of disclosure exists, a party’s action or conduct “can be actionable as silent fraud if that
action or conduct is intended to create a misimpression to the opposing party.” McConkey, supra
at 33. Silent fraud, like other forms of fraud, also requires a plaintiff to establish reliance on the
false or misleading impression created by the non-disclosure. Lumber Village, supra at 700.
From the evidence presented at trial, the jury could have found that a fiduciary
relationship existed between defendants and Sheldon and Gale Korn with respect to the operation
of the defendant companies’ Northern Michigan real estate business operations. Further, the jury
could reasonably have concluded from the evidence that Sheldon and Gale created a false
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impression that company checks written to Gale on business accounts were for reimbursement of
business expenses. Likewise, the jury could well have found that the Korns created a false
impression that other purchases and payments made on business accounts were for business
purposes. Further, there was evidence that promises were made, especially by Sheldon, that
questionable company expenditures would be documented and accounted for as business
expenses. And, the jury could easily have concluded from the evidence that Gale and Sheldon
Korn never intended to account for their expenditure of company money but instead intended to
suppress the true nature of the expenditures. Finally, the jury could reasonably have concluded
that Lenchner reasonably relied on the false impression created by the Korns, so he continued
funding the companies, and as a result, sustained over a million dollars in damages.3 Because
reasonable people could disagree regarding the import of the evidence at trial, the trial court did
not err in denying plaintiffs’ motion for directed verdict and JNOV. Foreman, supra at 135-136.
Plaintiffs’ argument that the silent fraud verdict is unsustainable against all plaintiffs fails
for the same reasons as discussed in subpart A. Further, plaintiffs’ argument that the Korns’
expenditure of company funds could have been to reimburse business expenses, or loans, or
capital draws that were merely reclassified after the fact as “theft losses” merely reinforces the
conclusion that questions of fact were presented at trial for the jury to resolve. Hence, the trial
court properly denied plaintiffs’ motions for direct verdict and JNOV. Id.
II
Next, plaintiffs argue that the verdict against Gale for breach fiduciary duty must be set
aside because no evidence showed defendants relied on Gale’s advice and judgment. We
disagree.
The evidence at trial established that Gale Korn received numerous substantial checks
written by both Sheldon and Lenchner ostensibly for business purposes on company accounts.
From financial records presented at trial and the testimony of defendants’ financial expert,
reasonable jurors could have concluded that Gale did not properly account for the company
funds entrusted to her. Indeed, the jury could have found that Gale was a key participant in a
scheme to divert company funds to KFLP for the use and personal benefit of the Korn family.
Moreover, plaintiffs agreed to submit this claim and the rest of defendants’ counterclaims to the jury on the basis that liability could be imposed if either Gale Korn or Sheldon
Korn breached a fiduciary duty owed to defendants. As discussed in part IV, plaintiffs waived
any claim of error regarding the “and/or” verdict forms all parties agreed to submit to the jury.
III
Next, defendants argue that the trial court erred by (A) not sua sponte instructing the jury
regarding the law of principal and agent, and (B) instructing the jury it could award exemplary
3
Defendants’ financial expert testified that company records reflected $1,418,451.49 in
undocumented expenditures by the Korns.
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damages because they are not permitted where economic damages are sought.
forfeited the first claim and waived the second; manifest injustice did not result.
Plaintiffs
This court reviews claims of instructional error de novo. Cox v Flint Bd of Hospital
Managers, 467 Mich 1, 8; 651 NW2d 356 (2002). MCR 2.516 governs jury instruction
procedure in civil cases. MCR 2.516(C) provides:
A party may assign as error the giving of or the failure to give an instruction only
if the party objects on the record before the jury retires to consider the verdict (or,
in the case of instructions given after deliberations have begun, before the jury
resumes deliberations), stating specifically the matter to which the party objects
and the grounds for the objection. Opportunity must be given to make the
objection out of the hearing of the jury.
Thus, to preserve an alleged error regarding jury instructions for appeal, a party must
request the instruction before deliberations begin or must object to the instructions given within
the same timeframe. Id.; Leavitt v Monaco Coach Corp, 241 Mich App 288, 300; 616 NW2d
175 (2000). “This Court will review an unpreserved issue concerning an error in jury instruction
only when necessary to prevent manifest injustice. Manifest injustice results where the defect in
instruction is of such magnitude as to constitute plain error, requiring a new trial, or where it
pertains to a basic and controlling issue in the case.” Mina v General Star Indemnity Co, 218
Mich App 678, 680-681; 555 NW2d 1 (1996), rev’d in part on other grounds 455 Mich 866; 568
NW2d 80 (1997) (citations omitted).
In some circumstances, a party may waive alleged instructional error. A waiver is an
intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right. Grant v AAA Michigan/Wisconsin,
Inc (On Remand), 272 Mich App 142, 148; 724 NW2d 498 (2006), citing People v Carter, 462
Mich 206, 215; 612 NW2d 144 (2000). “‘One who waives his rights under a rule may not then
seek appellate review of a claimed deprivation of those rights, for his waiver has extinguished
any error.’” Carter, supra at 215 (citation omitted). Moreover, a party that expressly agrees
with an issue in the trial court cannot then take a contrary position on appeal. Grant, supra at
148. In the context of a jury instruction, when a party agrees with the trial court’s instructions as
given, the party is not entitled to relief regarding the instruction on appeal. Chastain v General
Motors Corp (On Remand), 254 Mich App 576, 591; 657 NW2d 804 (2002).
A
The record discloses that plaintiffs had more than ample opportunity to request jury
instructions and object to the instructions that the trial court actually read. Plaintiffs filed
requests for jury instructions with the court some six months before trial. After the parties had
rested their cases and the trial court decided the parties’ motions before arguments, the court and
counsel turned their attention to proposed jury instructions. Plaintiffs counsel indicated that “we
. . . need a minute to discuss them.” The essence of the colloquy between the court and counsel
was that the parties’ counsel needed a moment to put the final instructions in a form that could be
copied to submit to the jury. The trial court then stated, “Let’s take a break, and you can see
what you can clean up between the two of you so that we’ll spend less time in chambers. Let me
know when you’re ready.” Id. The court was then in recess for over an hour, after which
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plaintiffs’ counsel delivered his closing argument. The trial was then adjourned to the next day
with the jury to return the next morning at 9:00 A.M.
The next morning at 9:43 a.m., the trial court opened the record by assuring the jury that
“we were all working diligently.” The court’s comment clearly suggests to seasoned trial
lawyers that counsel and the court were addressing last minute concerns with jury instructions or
verdict forms. Defendants’ counsel then delivered his closing argument, and plaintiffs’ counsel
presented his rebuttal. At the close of rebuttal, and after a 14-minute recess, the trial court began
reading the final jury instructions. During the course of instructing the jury, defense counsel
requested and was granted a bench conference. After the court’s charge was completed, the
bailiff sworn, and the jury excused, the trial court asked counsel, “anything further for the
record?” Counsel for both sides indicated there was nothing. This record supports defendants’
contention that both parties’ counsel met with the trial court in chambers and agreed on jury
instructions. At a minimum, the record establishes plaintiffs’ counsel had ample opportunity to
object but did not. So, alleged instructional was not preserved. MCR 2.516(C).
With respect to the merits of plaintiffs’ claim that the trial court should have instructed
the jury regarding agency, plaintiffs mischaracterize defendants’ argument. Defendants did not
argue that Sheldon acted as the agent of the other Korn family members. Rather, defendants
argued that the evidence supported the finding that all plaintiffs knowingly acted in concert to
perpetrate a common fraudulent scheme. See Kefuss, supra. On this basis, defendants contend
that all Korns are bound by Sheldon’s deeds and words in carrying out the common fraudulent
scheme.
Defendants’ theory of the case was not the same as the issue involved in Smith-Douglas v
Walch, 391 Mich 201; 215 NW2d 142 (1974), on which defendants rely. In that case, the
question at trial was whether a buyer who bought from a retailer could be liable to the
manufacturer on the basis that the retailer was acting as the manufacturer’s agent. The SmithDouglas Court held that agency was “the controlling legal issue supported by the testimony
presented to the jury” and because no instruction was given, a new trial was required. Id. at 203204. Whether the other plaintiffs authorized certain actions by Sheldon is not the same question
as whether all plaintiffs, including Sheldon, were participating in a common fraudulent scheme.
The distinction is perhaps subtle, but real. Compare MRE 801(d)(2)(D) & (E). While both sides
dismissed independent tort claims of civil conspiracy before submitting the case to the jury, this
did not lessen the principle of Kefuss regarding joint liability of codefendants for each others’
acts (in this case co-plaintiffs) when engaged in a common fraudulent scheme. In sum, the legal
rules pertaining to principal and agent were not basic and controlling in this case. Consequently,
manifest injustice did not result from the failure to instruct the jury on agency principles. Mina,
supra at 680-681. Plaintiffs’ claims on this issue fail.
B
Plaintiffs waived any error regarding the trial court’s instruction regarding exemplary
damages. Plaintiffs’ counsel acknowledged during post-trial motions that all parties had agreed
to the verdict forms submitted to the jury. Indeed, each party submitted claims against the other
for exemplary damages, and mirror verdict forms were submitted to the jury with respect to
plaintiffs’ claims against defendants and defendants’ claims against plaintiffs. As noted,
plaintiffs’ counsel specifically approved the verdict forms. The trial court read its instruction
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regarding exemplary damages to apply equally to the parties’ claims against each other. Thus,
the record indicates that plaintiffs’ counsel affirmatively agreed with the trial court’s instruction
regarding exemplary damages. Plaintiffs have waived this alleged instructional error. Chastain,
supra at 591. “A party who expressly agrees with an issue in the trial court cannot then take a
contrary position on appeal.” Grant, supra at 148. Even if forfeited, defendants present a
persuasive argument that the claims and evidence in this case would support an award of
exemplary damages. Veselenak v Smith, 414 Mich 567, 573-575; 327 NW 261 (1982); McPeak
v McPeak (On Remand), 233 Mich App 483, 490; 593 NW2d 180 (1999). Thus, manifest
injustice did not result. Mina, supra at 680-681.
IV
Plaintiffs next argue that the trial court committed plain error by not instructing the jury
with M Civ JI 41.014 and M Civ JI 41.02.5 This error, plaintiffs argue, was compounded by the
“and/or” verdict form used here and resulted in manifest injustice. We disagree and again
conclude that plaintiffs have waived any error.
A waiver is an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right. Grant,
supra at 148, citing Carter, supra at 215. Here, plaintiffs’ counsel included M Civ JI 41.01 and
M Civ JI 41.02 in requested jury instructions submitted to the trial court well in advance of trial.
So plaintiffs’ counsel was clearly aware of these instructions. Also, the record clearly shows
plaintiffs’ counsel affirmatively agreed to use the incompatible “and/or” verdict form. Thus, the
record reflects that although aware of M Civ JI 41.01 and M Civ JI 41.02, plaintiffs’ counsel
abandoned his request for those instructions and also affirmatively approved the “and/or” verdict
format. An abandonment of a known right constitutes a waiver. Grant, supra at 148. “‘One
who waives his rights under a rule may not then seek appellate review of a claimed deprivation
of those rights, for his waiver has extinguished any error.’” Carter, supra at 215 (citation
omitted). “A party who expressly agrees with an issue in the trial court cannot then take a
contrary position on appeal.” Grant, supra at 148. Accordingly, plaintiffs are not entitled to
relief on this issue. Chastain, supra at 591.
V
Next, plaintiffs contend exemplary damages were in excess of actual damages and are not
recoverable as a matter of law. Further, plaintiffs argue the “and/or” verdict form permitted the
4
M Civ JI 41.01 (Two or More Defendants - Separate Consideration - Repeating Instructions)
provides: “There are [number] defendants in this trial. Each defendant is entitled to separate
consideration of [his / or / her] own defense. I shall not repeat my instructions for each
defendant. Unless I tell you otherwise, all instructions apply to each defendant.”
5
M Civ JI 41.02 (Damages Where There Is No Allocation of Fault Between Defendants)
provides: “If you find one of the defendants to be liable, you shall determine the amount of
damages [he / or / she] caused and return a verdict in that amount. If you find more than one of
the defendants to be liable, you shall return a separate verdict for the amount of damages you
determine each defendant caused.”
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jury to award exemplary damages without finding the requisite malicious, willful, and wanton
conduct. Finally, plaintiffs contend the evidence did not support awarding exemplary damages
against Gale, Shauna, Ashley and KFLP. We conclude plaintiffs’ arguments do not merit relief.
Exemplary damages may be awarded in intentional tort cases, including fraud, where
they compensate for injured feelings even though compensation is also awarded for economic
loss. “As a practical matter, the conduct we have found sufficient to justify the award of
exemplary damages has occurred in the context of the intentional torts, slander, libel, deceit,
seduction, and other intentional (but malicious) acts.” Veselenak, supra at 575.
Plaintiffs’ argument that the trial court’s instruction permitted awarding exemplary
damages in excess of defendants’ “whole” injury fails. First, as discussed already, plaintiffs at a
minimum forfeited, if they did not, in fact, waive, alleged error regarding the jury instructions.
Second, jury instructions must be read as a whole and not piecemeal. Bachman v Swan Harbour
Ass’n, 252 Mich App 400, 424; 653 NW2d 415 (2002). Here, the court instructed the jury, “You
may add to the award of actual damages an amount you agree is proper as exemplary damages.”
Read in the context of the court’s entire charge, “actual damages” patently refers to amounts the
jury might have awarded as economic damages on claims of fraud, silent fraud, breach of
fiduciary duty, and so forth. Although “actual damages” may now include both economic and
non-economic damages, historically “actual damages” were synonymous with only economic
damages. See Veselenak, supra at 573-574. Nonetheless, the court’s charge read as a whole did
not permit double recovery or more compensation than the injuries defendants suffered.
Finally, plaintiffs apparently concede by not arguing to the contrary that the evidence at
trial supported an award of exemplary damages against Sheldon. Because plaintiffs waived any
error regarding the “and/or” verdict form and a determination of each individual plaintiff’s
liability, plaintiffs’ argument regarding exemplary damages fails.
VI
Finally, plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in not granting their motion for remittitur
or new trial because the jury verdicts were excessive with respect to Gale, Shauna, Ashley and
KFLP. Again, we find plaintiffs’ arguments do not merit relief.
When a jury awards damages that appear excessive because of the influence of passion or
prejudice, or the jury award is clearly or grossly excessive, a court may grant a new trial. MCR
2.611(A)(1)(c)-(d). Alternatively, a trial court may offer the prevailing party an opportunity to
consent to judgment in the highest amount the court finds is supported by the evidence. MCR
2.611(E)(1). This Court reviews a trial court’s decision regarding a motion for remittitur or new
trial for an abuse of discretion. Grace v Grace, 253 Mich App 357, 367; 655 NW2d 595 (2002).
An abuse of discretion occurs when a court chooses an outcome that is not within the principled
range of outcomes. McManamon v Redford Twp, 273 Mich App 131, 138; 730 NW2d 757
(2006). This Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
Wiley v Henry Ford Cottage Hosp, 257 Mich App 488, 499; 668 NW2d 402 (2003). The trial
court, having witnessed the testimony and the evidence as well as the jury’s reactions, is in the
best position to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses and make an informed decision.
Consequently, we must accord due deference to the trial court’s decision. Phillips v Deihm, 213
Mich App 389, 404; 541 NW2d 566 (1995). Moreover, as pertinent here, a verdict should not be
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set aside merely because the method the jury used to compute damages cannot be determined.
Diamond v Witherspoon, 265 Mich App 673, 694; 696 NW2d 770 (2005).
In this case, after ruling that defendants waived any issues regarding the “and/or” verdict
forms by approving them, the trial court denied defendants’ motion for JNOV, or remittitur, or
new trial by reasoning as follows:
And it was also my impression, based upon Sheldon Korn’s testimony
primarily, that he was emphatic that it was a family unit that operated through the
family, Korn Family Trust. And I think he explained why to a certain extent and
that he was avoiding a judgment creditor. But he was emphatic that he involved
the whole family equally in this entire business relationship.
And so there was some evidence at least to raise an issue. The jury has
made its decision, and the Court will not set that decision aside, will not grant the
motion for remittitur and will not grant the motion for a new trial.
Plaintiffs’ arguments that the trial court abused its discretion lack merit. First, for the
reasons already discussed, plaintiffs waived any claim of error that an assessment of liability as
to each individual plaintiff was not made.
Second, for the reasons discussed in parts III (B) & V, the award of exemplary damages
did not render the verdicts excessive by awarding more than defendants’ economic and noneconomic damages.
Third, plaintiffs’ argument that the methodology of defendants’ expert witness, Janice
Smolinski, was suspect does not support finding the verdict excessive. Although, perhaps,
defendants could have argued that Smolinski’s testimony should not have been admitted under
MRE 702, they did not raise such a claim in their questions presented on appeal, so it has been
waived. MCR 7.212(C)(5); Hammack v Lutheran Social Services, 211 Mich App 1, 7; 535
NW2d 215 (1995). The only other argument that Smolinski’s testimony might affect pertains to
whether remittitur or new trial should have been granted. That is, the trial court in deciding the
motion for remittitur or new trial should have concluded that Smolinski’s testimony was not
credible or not deserving of any weight. This argument is meritless because in deciding a motion
for remittitur or new trial, the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party. Wiley, supra at 499.
Plaintiffs’ remaining arguments also fails. That Ashley or Shauna, from plaintiffs’
perspective of the evidence, only received limited personal financial benefits from defendant
companies is immaterial to the assessment of the damages defendants sustained. The only
verdict that is based on benefits plaintiffs received is that for unjust enrichment. Because
plaintiffs waived an individual assessment of damages as to each plaintiff, this argument cannot
be grounds for concluding the verdicts were excessive.
Plaintiffs present the same agency argument regarding KFLP that we found lacked merit
in Part III (A). As discussed already, plaintiffs mischaracterize defendants’ argument.
Defendants did not argue that Sheldon acted as the agent for KFLP. They claimed that that the
evidence supported finding that all plaintiffs knowingly acted in concert to perpetrate a common
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fraudulent scheme. The evidence supports defendants’ theory of the case that all Korns
participated in a fraudulent scheme of siphoning assets from the defendant companies and funnel
those assets through KFLP for the use and personal benefit of all Korns.
Defendants’ arguments with respect to Gale fail for the same reasons discussed in part II.
From the evidence presented at trial, the jury could have found that Gale was a key participant in
a scheme to divert company funds to KFLP for the use and personal benefit of the Korn family.
As discussed in part IV, plaintiffs waived any claim of error regarding the “and/or” verdict forms
all parties agreed to submit to the jury.
Plaintiffs lament that this litigation should have been handled more amicably as a simple
accounting process. Aside from there being no basis for finding that the verdicts were excessive,
plaintiffs ignore the reality of this litigation. Plaintiffs initiated this litigation, and all parties
chose to submit their respective claims to a jury. Plaintiffs clearly “rolled the dice” and lost.
Either here or at the trial court level, they have failed to demonstrate a meritorious reason for
now granting them a new trial.
According due deference to the trial court because it witnessed the testimony and was in
the best position to evaluate witness credibility and thus make an informed decision whether the
evidence supported the jury verdicts, Phillips, supra at 404, we conclude that plaintiffs have not
shown that the trial court’s decision denying their motion for remittitur or new trial was an abuse
of discretion. McManamon, supra at 138; Grace, supra at 367.
We affirm.
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
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