PEOPLE OF MI V DAVID BRIAN BINIENDA
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
January 24, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 273485
Macomb Circuit Court
LC No. 2006-001701-FH
DAVID BRIAN BINIENDA,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Whitbeck, P.J., and Owens and Schuette, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant David Binienda appeals as of right his conviction by a jury of assault with
intent to do great bodily harm less than murder.1 The trial court2 sentenced Binienda as a third
habitual offender3 to a prison term of 4 to 20 years, with credit for 136 days served. The charge
arose from an altercation during which Binienda allegedly slashed Kenneth Valentine’s face with
a knife. We affirm.
I. Basic Facts And Procedural History
Douglas Finkle testified that on April 4, 2006, he was eating lunch at a Salvation Army
lunchroom when Binienda walked up behind Finkle and punched him in the back of the head.
Finkle said that he had known Binienda for a couple months before the incident and had bought
marijuana from Binienda in the past. Finkle claimed that Binienda became angry with Finkle
when he stopped buying marijuana after Binienda doubled the price. After Binienda hit him,
Finkle finished eating and left the building, but Binienda followed him.
Kenneth Valentine testified that he saw Binienda punch Finkle in the back of the head
and followed Binienda out of the building. Valentine asked Binienda not to bother Finkle
because he “recently had a stroke and hitting him in the head wasn’t the smart thing to do[,]” but
Binienda threw a punch at Valentine. Valentine then punched Binienda. Finkle said that
1
MCL 750.84.
2
Macomb Circuit Judge Roland L. Olzark (retired).
3
MCL 769.11.
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Valentine did not have anything in his hand when he punched Binienda and denied that
Valentine had a pipe or brass knuckles. Valentine similarly denied that he hit Binienda with
anything other than his fist. Finkle, Valentine, and Timothy Roberts then all left in Finkle’s
Jeep.
The men drove to a convenience store where Finkle bought a twelve pack of beer, and
they drank some of the beer in Valentine’s driveway. Finkle said that he drank one beer and that
Valentine and Roberts each had two or three beers, but on cross-examination, Finkle said that he
had drunk two beers. Finkle said that he believed that Roberts had been drinking before Finkle
met him.
After drinking, Finkle was driving his Jeep, with Roberts in the passenger seat and
Valentine in the back seat, when he decided to check his apartment because Binienda knew
where he lived, and he feared that Binienda might break a window or try to break in. When
Finkle turned into his apartment complex, he saw Binienda walking through a park across the
street from his complex, carrying a yellow bag in one hand and a knife in the other. Finkle
further testified as follows:
[Binienda] ran around the front of my Jeep, and my window was down. And he
came up beside the window and he started screaming at me. And then all of the
sudden the knife came in and I had my hand on the door handle and I opened it,
and I hit him with the door handle. I closed it. I did not close the window. . . .
the knife and his fist came in and hit me in the side of the face.
Finkle said that he did not get cut, but he noticed later at the hospital that his hat had been cut.
According to Finkle, Valentine then yelled from the backseat, “You want a piece of me?”
Binienda answered, “yes[,]” ran to the back of the Jeep, and Valentine exited the vehicle.
Through the rearview mirror, Finkle saw Binienda cut Valentine down the left side of his face.
Binienda then ran off. Finkle denied that Valentine had been armed with anything. Valentine
testified that he did not notice a knife when Binienda reached into the Jeep. Valentine said that
he exited the vehicle and said, “Look this is it. Stop bothering the man.” Valentine said that he
first saw the knife when Binienda tried to slash his neck but managed instead to cut him “from
my left ear down to my jaw bone just under my chin.” Valentine denied that he was armed when
Binienda cut him. Roberts called 911 on his cell phone, and they met the police at a hospital.
Binienda testified that he had a meal at the Salvation Army on the day of the incident and
denied that he hit Finkle, but he admitted that he pushed Finkle. Binienda said that while talking
on the phone, he felt something steel hit him in the back of the head and turned to see Valentine
attacking him with brass knuckles; Valentine hit him two or three times with the brass knuckles.
Binienda claimed that Valentine had also assaulted him under a bridge about a week before. An
ambulance took Binienda to the hospital.
Constance Lamb testified that she was working in the emergency room at Mt. Clemens
Regional Hospital when Binienda came in by ambulance with a bleeding two-inch laceration
over his right eye. She said that Binienda smelled of alcohol when he arrived and described him
as upset and “verbally abrasive.” She said that security had to be called so she could examine
the injury. She also said that, at one point, Binienda stood up, went to a sink and mirror,
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pounded his fist while looking into the mirror, and said that “he was going to find the n----- that
did this to him and slice him.”
Binienda said that he left the hospital at 3:30 or 4:00 p.m., bought a beer, and went under
a bridge to drink the beer. According to Binienda, Valentine and Roberts lived under the bridge.
Binienda threw Roberts and Valentine’s mattresses in the river and picked up Valentine’s knife.
While under the bridge, Binienda “got a feeling” that Finkle and Valentine were looking for him,
armed himself with Valentine’s knife, and started walking home. While Binienda walked home,
Finkle, Valentine, and Roberts pulled up to him in a car, and Valentine got out and went after
Binienda. Binienda denied reaching into the vehicle and said he took out the knife, backed
away, and said, “Look, man, I have a knife.” He said he could not run away because he was
hurting too much from the earlier assault. Valentine dove at Binienda and cut himself on the
knife that Binienda was holding.
Macomb County Sheriff’s Deputy Dan Durrani testified that he found a knife near the
alleged crime scene. Another officer, Daniel Barbuela, testified that while looking for a white
male in a brown leather jacket, he spotted Binienda near the crime scene, cuffed him, and placed
him in the back of a patrol car. Officer Barbuela said that Binienda was “highly aggravated” and
“very irate[,]” that Binienda appeared intoxicated, and that he could smell intoxicants on
Binienda’s breath. Officer Barbuela said that Binienda “kept swearing at [him]” during the
entire time they were at the scene. Binienda tried several times to kick out the driver’s side
window while in the patrol car and told Officer Barbuela that he was going to kick him in the
head when he got out of the car. When asked if Binienda said anything about the person that he
claimed had assaulted him, Officer Barbuela said that Binienda asked him, “What are we going
to do about the n-----[?]”
The jury found Binienda guilty of assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than
murder.4
II. Substitution Of Counsel
A. Standard Of Review
Binienda argues that the trial court committed error requiring reversal when it denied his
request to replace appointed counsel. “A trial court’s decision regarding substitution of counsel
will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.”5
B. Legal Standards
Although an indigent defendant is guaranteed the right to appointed counsel, he is not
entitled to have appointed counsel replaced for any reason merely desired by the defendant.6
4
MCL 750.84.
5
People v Traylor, 245 Mich App 460, 462; 628 NW2d 120 (2001).
6
Id.
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“Appointment of a substitute counsel is warranted only upon a showing of good cause and where
substitution will not unreasonably disrupt the judicial process.”7
C. Applying The Standards
Although Binienda recites the procedural history of the proceedings below, he does not
argue or explain how the trial court erred in denying his request to replace appointed counsel.
Therefore, this argument is abandoned.8
Nevertheless, we conclude that Binienda’s expressions of dissatisfaction with how
defense counsel was handling his case did not adequately demonstrate a breakdown in the
attorney-client relationship to warrant substitution of counsel. Moreover, as will be discussed
below, good cause was not supported by Binienda’s allegations that defense counsel was
ineffective. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Binienda’s request for substituted counsel.
III. Prosecutorial Misconduct
A. Standard Of Review
Binienda argues the prosecutor engaged in numerous instances of prosecutorial
misconduct. Because Binienda did not object to the alleged instances of prosecutorial
misconduct below, these issues are not preserved.9 “[A] defendant’s unpreserved claims of
prosecutorial misconduct are reviewed for plain error.”10
B. Legal Standards
The propriety of a prosecutor’s remarks depends on all the facts of the case.11
Prosecutorial comments must be read as a whole and evaluated in light of defense arguments and
the relationship they bear to the evidence admitted at trial.12
7
Id. (citations omitted).
8
People v Mackle, 241 Mich App 583, 604 n 4; 617 NW2d 339 (2000) (“A party may not
merely state a position and then leave it to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for the
claim.”).
9
People v Pipes, 475 Mich 267, 277; 715 NW2d 290 (2006).
10
People v Watson, 245 Mich App 572, 586; 629 NW2d 411 (2001).
11
People v Rodriguez, 251 Mich App 10, 30; 650 NW2d 96 (2002).
12
People v Brown, 267 Mich App 141, 152; 703 NW2d 230 (2005).
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C. Applying The Standards
(1) Witness Credibility
Binienda argues that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by (1) implying that he
should not be believed based on the inconsistency of his statements and (2) by vouching for the
credibility of Finkle’s and Valentine’s testimony. We disagree.
A prosecutor may not vouch for the credibility of a witness to the effect that he has
special knowledge regarding the witness’s testimony.13 However, “[a] prosecutor may argue
from the facts that a witness, including the defendant, is not worthy of belief, and is not required
to state inferences and conclusions in the blandest possible terms.”14
Although the prosecutor argued that Finkle and Valentine had been truthful and that
Binienda was lying, the prosecutor never argued that he possessed special knowledge regarding
any witnesses’ credibility and based his argument regarding credibility solely on the evidence.
Accordingly, the prosecutor’s comments regarding credibility did not amount to prosecutorial
misconduct.
(2) Badgering Witness
Binienda argues that the prosecutor badgered him when the prosecutor used a police
report of an alleged prior assault against Binienda to impeach him and asked Binienda if he could
read. Because the prosecutor made this comment in response to Binienda’s claim that he told the
police that Valentine assaulted him with brass knuckles a few hours before the alleged crime at
issue, the comment was not improper. Moreover, even assuming the question was improper, this
isolated comment was not outcome determinative.15
(3) Use Of Hearsay Testimony
Binienda argues that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by admitting the police report
because it was hearsay and that his conviction should be reversed because it was supported by
inadmissible hearsay. However, the police report was not admitted as evidence but was used to
impeach Binienda’s testimony as a prior inconsistent statement and a party admission.16 The
other incident that Binienda argues constitutes inadmissible hearsay concerns use of the police
report solely to refresh the recollection of an officer who was testifying, which is also
13
People v Bahoda, 448 Mich 261, 276; 531 NW2d 659 (1995).
14
People v Launsburry, 217 Mich App 358, 361; 551 NW2d 460 (1996) (citations omitted).
15
Watson, supra at 586.
16
MRE 801(d)(1), (2).
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permissible.17 “[P]rosecutorial misconduct cannot be predicated on good-faith efforts to admit
evidence.”18
(4) Use Of Perjured Testimony
Binienda argues that the prosecutor introduced perjured testimony because Finkle and
Valentine testified that the alleged crime occurred near Binienda’s apartment, but police reports
indicated that the crime occurred on a certain street corner. Binienda does not cite where the
record would show that the location described in the police report is distinguishable from the
area near Finkle’s apartment. This Court need not consider an allegation when an appellant fails
to cite where the record would support it.19 Moreover, even if the police reports differed from
the witnesses’ testimony, such a discrepancy would effect the weight of the evidence and not its
admissibility.
(5) Use Of Other Acts Evidence
Binienda argues that the prosecutor admitted other act evidence without proper notice in
violation of MRE 404(b) when he elicited testimony and admitted evidence that Binienda
attempted to cut Finkle with a knife before assaulting Valentine. The evidence did not amount to
other act evidence under MRE 404(b) because it concerned Binienda’s behavior during the crime
at issue.
“[W]here a witness has testified to a fact or transaction which, standing alone and
entirely unconnected with anything which led to or brought it about, would appear
in any degree unnatural or improbable in itself, without reference to the facts
preceding and inducing the principal transaction, and which, if proved, would
render it more natural and probable; such previous facts are not only admissible
and relevant, but they constitute a necessary part of such principal transaction—a
link in the chain of testimony, without which it would be impossible for the jury
properly to appreciate the testimony in reference to such principal transaction.”[20]
Here, the alleged assault on Finkle occurred just seconds before the assault at issue, and
requiring exclusion of this evidence would have amounted to presenting the prosecution’s case in
a vacuum.
Binienda also argues that Finkle’s hat, which was purportedly cut with a knife was
published to the jury but “[t]his admission has been deleted from transcript to prevent review by
this Court.” Binienda cites no reason why the hat should not have been shown to the jury
beyond his argument that the evidence was inadmissible as prior-act evidence, which lacks merit
17
MRE 803(5).
18
People v Noble, 238 Mich App 647, 660; 608 NW2d 123 (1999).
19
Mackle, supra at 604 n 4.
20
People v DerMartzex, 390 Mich 410, 413-414; 213 NW2d 97 (1973), quoting People v
Jenness, 5 Mich 305, 323-324 (1858) (emphasis by DerMartzex).
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for reasons already considered. Binienda also provides this Court with no evidence to support
his allegation. Even assuming that the prosecutor somehow altered the transcripts, Binienda has
failed to show that such conduct would have been outcome determinative because the jury heard
testimony that the hat was cut, and any alleged alteration of the transcripts would have occurred,
if at all, after the trial.
(6) Use Of Expert Medical Testimony
Binienda argues that the prosecutor personally offered expert medical testimony when he
argued during closing argument that Valentine’s wound was an offensive wound. “A prosecutor
may not make a statement of fact to the jury that is unsupported by evidence, but she is free to
argue the evidence and any reasonable inferences that may arise from the evidence.”21
Considering the prosecutor’s comment in light of Binienda’s testimony that Valentine cut
himself on the knife when Binienda merely held it in front of him, the prosecutor’s comment was
a reasonable inference based on the evidence.
(7) Misrepresentation Of Record
Binienda argues that the prosecutor misrepresented the record when he argued that
Binienda had been searching for Valentine, changed his story that Valentine hit him with a pipe
and could not get his story straight, did not act in self-defense and did not retreat. For reasons
already considered, these arguments were reasonable assertions based on evidence and were not
improper.
(8) Violation Of Attorney-Client Relationship
Binienda argues that the prosecutor intruded on the attorney-client relationship by
meeting with Binienda before trial without his attorney and threatening and trying to intimidate
him into taking a plea bargain. Even assuming Binienda’s allegations are correct, Binienda’s
statement to the judge at the start of trial regarding the issue demonstrates that the alleged
incident occurred before trial. Binienda does not explain how the incident before trial could have
affected the outcome of the trial, so his argument lacks merit.
IV. Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel
A. Standard Of Review
Binienda argues that his defense counsel denied him the effective assistance of counsel
for numerous reasons, each of which we address in turn. “When no Ginther[22] hearing has been
conducted, our review of the defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is limited to
mistakes that are apparent on the record.”23
21
People v Ackerman, 257 Mich App 434, 450; 669 NW2d 818 (2003).
22
People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).
23
People v Mack, 265 Mich App 122, 125; 695 NW2d 342 (2005).
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B. Legal Standards
To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must demonstrate
that defense counsel’s performance was deficient in that it fell below an objective standard of
professional reasonableness, and that it is reasonably probable that, but for counsel’s ineffective
assistance, the result of the proceeding would have been different.24 “Defendant must overcome
the strong presumption that counsel’s performance was sound trial strategy.”25
C. Applying The Standards
(1) Misstatements During Opening Statement
Binienda argues that trial counsel denied him the effective assistance of counsel because
defense counsel misstated Binienda’s version of the confrontation during his opening statement.
Binienda argues that, if defense counsel had communicated with Binienda, he would not have
presented a version of events that was inconsistent with Binienda’s testimony. We disagree.
Although defense counsel stated during opening statement that Valentine attacked
Binienda earlier in the day with a pipe, and Binienda testified that Valentine used brass knuckles,
defense counsel’s statement was consistent with the police report and with police testimony.26
Because Binienda elected to take the stand, it is likely that the discrepancy between Binienda’s
statement in the police report and his testimony would have been raised during crossexamination even if defense counsel had not mentioned it. Thus, there is no reasonable
probability that defense counsel’s statement made any difference.
(2) Failure To Argue Self-Defense During Closing Argument
Binienda argues that defense counsel was ineffective because he failed to argue
Binienda’s self-defense claim during closing argument. We disagree. Defense counsel’s failure
to mention self-defense during closing argument did not violate an objective standard of
professional reasonableness, nor did it likely make a difference in the outcome because defense
counsel had requested and received a self-defense instruction. Because “jurors are presumed to
follow their instructions[,]”27 the jury considered whether Binienda acted in self-defense even
without defense counsel mentioning it during closing argument.
24
People v Rodgers, 248 Mich App 702, 714; 645 NW2d 294 (2001).
25
People v Dixon, 263 Mich App 393, 396; 688 NW2d 308 (2004).
26
When asked about the discrepancy, Binienda explained that he was disoriented when he made
the police statement and that the pipe he had referred to was actually used during an incident a
week earlier.
27
People v Graves, 458 Mich 476, 486; 581 NW2d 229 (1998).
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(3) Failure To Investigate Or Call Witnesses
Binienda argues that defense counsel failed to investigate or call requested defense
witnesses. “[W]hether to call or question witnesses are presumed to be matters of trial
strategy.”28 It cannot be said, based on the existing record, that defense counsel did not
interview the witnesses that Binienda lists in his supplemental brief, that any of the witnesses
were available, or that they would have offered testimony favorable to Binienda.
“Furthermore, the failure to call witnesses only constitutes ineffective assistance of
counsel if it deprives the defendant of a substantial defense.”29 With the exception of Tim
Roberts, none of the proposed witnesses were present when Binienda allegedly acted in selfdefense. Indeed, Binienda does not provide the names for many of his proposed witnesses and
argues that defense counsel should have knocked on doors to find favorable witnesses. It is not
apparent from the existing record that Roberts would have testified favorably to Binienda, and
Roberts’ written statement that Binienda provides to this Court is not part of the lower court
record and, thus, not subject to this Court’s consideration.30 In any event, the statement indicates
that Roberts would have offered testimony similar to Valentine and Finkle regarding the assault
for which Binienda was convicted and that Binienda had been walking toward Finkle’s
apartment when the assault occurred, which Binienda had denied. Accordingly, failure to call
Roberts did not deny Binienda a substantial defense.31
Binienda also argues that defense counsel should have called his cellmate to testify
essentially that Binienda was not a racist. Failing to call the cellmate did not deprive Binienda of
a substantial defense because Binienda had not been charged with a racially motivated crime.
Further, declining to call a character witness was a matter of trial strategy because such
testimony would have opened the door to rebuttal testimony regarding Binienda’s character.32
(4) Failure To File Pretrial Motions
Binienda argues that defense counsel failed to file appropriate pretrial motions because,
after Binienda requested on July 19, 2006, that the trial court address his motions that were filed
on May 22, 2006, the trial court stated that the motions had not been filed. The trial court was
mistaken when it stated that no motions had been filed because two motions were filed in the
lower court record on May 24, 2006. Further, the motions were filed less than two weeks before
28
Dixon, supra at 398.
29
Id.
30
Detroit Leasing Co v Detroit, 269 Mich App 233, 237; 713 NW2d 269 (2005).
31
Although Binienda interprets Roberts’ written statement to the police as saying that Roberts
witnessed the alleged assault at the Salvation Army, Roberts’ statement suggests that he was told
about the alleged assault, which would have been inadmissible hearsay, and it cannot be said,
based on the existing record, that defense counsel did not determine that such testimony would
have been inadmissible and that Roberts’ only admissible testimony could have only supported
the prosecutor’s case.
32
MRE 404(a)(1).
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Binienda entered a Cobbs plea,33 and Binienda complained they had not been heard just one
week after Binienda withdrew the plea. Thus, Binienda has not shown that defense counsel’s
alleged delay violated an objective standard of professional reasonableness because the motions
would have been moot if the plea bargain had been successful.
Regarding Binienda’s arguments that defense counsel failed to bring other motions,
Binienda does not explain what motions should have been brought. “A party may not merely
state a position and then leave it to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for the
claim.”34 We also note that when requesting a continuance to consider Binienda’s proposed
motions, defense counsel said that he would review them and file motions that were legally
proper, and we cannot say based on the existing record that Binienda’s other proposed motion
would have been legally proper.
Binienda also argues that defense counsel abandoned the motion to suppress prearraignment statements because he had been arrested and not Mirandized.35 Binienda does not
explain what statements should have been suppressed. “A party may not merely state a position
and then leave it to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for the claim.”36 Binienda
may be referring to a question Binienda posed to Officer Durrani that used a racial slur in
reference to Valentine. Durrani’s testimony indicates that the question was volunteered, and
“statements volunteered by Binienda need not be suppressed at trial, even if the remarks were not
preceded by Miranda warnings.”37 There is also no indication that Binienda was subjected to
custodial interrogation, so there is simply no basis on the record to bar any statements Binienda
may have made before his arraignment.38 Further, Binienda’s argument that his conviction
should be reversed because of unspecified statements obtained in violation of Miranda similarly
lacks merit.
(5) Defense Counsel “Discrediting” Himself
Binienda argues that defense counsel “discredited himself” by arguing that Valentine did
not realize that he was injured until someone pointed it out to him. Because Valentine testified
33
People v Cobbs, 443 Mich 276, 277; 505 NW2d 208 (1993). Before trial, Binienda pleaded
guilty before Judge Richard L. Carretti under a Cobbs agreement that would have capped his
sentence at one year in the Macomb County Jail. When the trial court asked whether he
understood the plea bargain agreement, Binienda answered, “It’s a year in county jail and it has
to be approved by you on sentencing date. And if you don’t approve it, I have the right to
withdraw the plea.” After the trial court ruled that it would not sentence Binienda to a year or
less in jail given Binienda’s record, Binienda stated that he wished to withdraw the plea and
proceed to trial.
34
Mackle, supra at 604 n 4.
35
Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966).
36
Mackle, supra at 604 n 4.
37
People v Fisher, 166 Mich App 699, 708; 420 NW2d 858 (1988).
38
See id.
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that he did not immediately realize the severity of his injury and that his roommate shook his
head when he asked to just go home, Binienda’s argument that defense counsel discredited
himself lacks merit, nor do we find that there is any reasonable probability that the statement
could have made any difference to the trial outcome.
(6) Failure To Cross-Examine Witnesses
Binienda argues that defense counsel failed to cross-examine witnesses but gives only
one example, arguing that defense counsel should have better cross-examined Officer Anderson
when he identified Binienda in a photo depicting his injuries and described Binienda’s injuries.
Because Binienda has not provided this Court with the photo at issue, Binienda has not
demonstrated an error that is apparent on the existing record. The prosecutor also argued that the
photo was relevant because it was arguably inconsistent with Binienda’s claims that he had been
repeatedly hit with either a pipe or brass knuckles. Moreover, the jury was in the best position to
view the photos and determine the probative value of the photo or whether the photo was too
dark to depict anything.
(7) Failure To Test Prosecutor’s Case
Binienda argues that defense counsel failed to “subject the [p]rosecutor’s case to
meaningful adversarial testing,” but does not explain his theory, abandoning the issue.39
(8) Failure To Notify Binienda Regarding Plea
Binienda argues that defense counsel failed to tell Binienda that the trial court had
communicated to defense counsel when Binienda entered his plea that it might not accept the
one-year cap provision of Binienda’s Cobbs plea. Binienda explained to the trial court when he
took the plea that he understood that the trial court did not have to accept it. Even assuming
error, Binienda has not shown a reasonable probability that the alleged error could have affected
the outcome.
(9) Failure To Object To Prosecutorial Misconduct
Binienda argues that defense counsel denied him the effective assistance of counsel by
failing to object to the prosecutor’s misconduct. Binienda’s arguments of prosecutorial
misconduct are without merit or did not effect the outcome for reasons already considered. A
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be predicated on an alleged failure to pursue a
meritless or futile position.40
39
Mackle, supra at 604 n 4.
40
People v Jordan, 275 Mich App 659, 668; 739 NW2d 706 (2007); Mack, supra at 130.
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V. Brady Violation
A. Standard Of Review
Binienda argues that the prosecutor withheld exculpatory evidence.
decision on discovery requests is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.41
A trial court’s
B. Legal Standards
Under Brady v Maryland,42 the prosecutor must turn over all evidence within its
possession that is favorable to the accused and material to guilt or punishment.43
In order to establish a Brady violation, a defendant must prove: (1) that the state
possessed evidence favorable to the defendant; (2) that he did not possess the
evidence nor could he have obtained it himself with any reasonable diligence;
(3) that the prosecution suppressed the favorable evidence; and (4) that had the
evidence been disclosed to the defense, a reasonable probability exists that the
outcome of the proceedings would have been different.[44]
C. Applying The Standards
Binienda requests many documents that may not exist, and even requests a police report
that Binienda was familiar with at trial and an ambulance report that he testified that he and his
attorney or his attorney had a copy of. Further, Binienda has not proven that any of the requested
evidence would have been favorable to him or that he could not have obtained the documents
himself with reasonable diligence.
Binienda argues that the prosecutor should turn over the video of the trial proceeding
because it would show Officer Amro altering a police report, which Binienda purportedly saw
him do. Binienda has not proven that the prosecutor possessed the evidence, that Binienda could
not have obtained it, or that the evidence would have been favorable, and Binienda provides no
evidence that would support this allegation.
Affirmed.
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Donald S. Owens
/s/ Bill Schuette
41
People v Fink, 456 Mich 449, 458; 574 NW2d 28 (1998).
42
Brady v Maryland, 373 US 83, 87; 83 S Ct 1194; 10 L Ed 2d 215 (1963).
43
Accord People v Stanaway, 446 Mich 643, 666; 521 NW2d 557 (1994).
44
People v Lester, 232 Mich App 262, 281; 591 NW2d 267 (1998).
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