PEOPLE OF MI V CONNY GEORGE MORITZ
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
January 10, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 275210
Macomb Circuit Court
LC No. 03-000991-FC
CONNY GEORGE MORITZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Fitzgerald, P.J., and Markey and Smolenski, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals by right from his consecutive sentences of 18 years, nine months to 50
years for kidnapping, MCL 750.349, and seven years, 11 months to 20 years for first-degree
home invasion, MCL 750.110a(2). We affirm.
A jury convicted defendant of kidnapping, first-degree home invasion, carrying a
dangerous weapon with unlawful intent, MCL 750.226, four counts of felonious assault, MCL
750.82, and three counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL
750.227b. Initially, the trial court sentenced defendant to 23 years, nine months to 50 years for
kidnapping, 11 years, eight months to 20 years for first-degree home invasion, two to five years
for carrying a dangerous weapon, two to four years for each count of felonious assault, and two
years for each count of felony-firearm. The trial court ordered the sentence for first-degree home
invasion to run consecutively to the sentence for kidnapping.
Thereafter, the trial court granted defendant’s motion for resentencing and resentenced
defendant to consecutive terms of 23 to 50 years in prison for kidnapping, and 11 to 20 years for
first-degree home invasion. Both minimum terms constituted an upward departure from the
guidelines.1 Defendant’s other sentences remained the same.
This Court consolidated defendant’s appeals from the original sentencing and his
resentencing, and in People v Moritz, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals,
1
The statutory guidelines recommended a minimum sentence range of 135 to 225 months for
kidnapping, and 57 to 95 months for first-degree home invasion.
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issued August 3, 2006 (Docket Nos. 251265, 258436), this Court affirmed defendant’s
convictions but reversed his sentences for kidnapping and first-degree home invasion and
remanded for further proceedings. In Docket No. 258436, this Court rejected defendant’s
assertion that in imposing sentence, the trial court erred by relying on facts not determined by the
jury, in violation of Blakely v Washington, 542 US 296; 124 S Ct 2531; 159 L Ed 2d 403 (2004).
The Moritz Court reversed defendant’s sentences for kidnapping and first-degree home invasion
on the ground that the trial court failed to articulate substantial and compelling reasons for
exceeding the guidelines and remanded the matter to the trial court for resentencing.2 Id. at 3-5.
At the resentencing hearing, the trial court indicated that it would impose minimum terms
within but at the high end of the guidelines ranges. The trial court sentenced defendant to 225
months to 50 years for kidnapping and to a consecutive sentence of 95 months to 20 years for
first-degree home invasion. After the trial court announced the sentences, defendant asked if he
was allowed to speak. The trial court inquired, “What do you want to say?” Defendant stated
that he wanted to speak on the record about a letter that he had sent to the trial court. The trial
court said, “Tell me about it.” When defendant asked if he should read the letter, the trial court
said, “No. I want you to talk to me. What are you asking me to do?” Defendant indicated that
he wished to challenge his conviction of kidnapping on the basis that he was the legal guardian
of the victim, an incapacitated person. The trial court noted that was a legal issue that the court
had already decided. Defendant agreed it was a legal question, and he “wanted to do an
interlocutory appeal on that.” The court advised defendant his remedy was to appeal to the Court
of Appeals. Defendant continued to argue stating, “it’s impossible to charge me with kidnapping
my wife when she’s in my care.” After the trial court read defendant his appeal rights, defendant
complained about the availability of transcripts and also referred to all three sentencing
proceedings as “sham sentences.”
On appeal, defendant, through appointed counsel, argues that he is entitled to another
resentencing on his convictions of kidnapping and first-degree home invasion because the trial
court scored the guidelines based on facts not found beyond a reasonable doubt by the jury as
required by Blakely, supra, and other cases. We disagree.
Defendant raised this argument in his previous appeal, and this Court rejected it. Moritz,
supra, slip op at 3 n 2, citing People v Drohan, 475 Mich 140, 164; 715 NW2d 778 (2006). The
principles articulated in Blakely, supra, do not apply to Michigan’s indeterminate sentencing
scheme. See Drohan, supra at 159-164. The law in Michigan has not changed since our prior
opinion. See People v McCuller, 479 Mich 672, 677-678; 739 NW2d 563 (2007), and People v
Harper, 479 Mich 599, 615; 739 NW2d 523 (2007). Thus, in addition, the law of the case
doctrine bars defendant’s argument. People v Herrera (On Remand), 204 Mich App 333, 340;
514 NW2d 543 (1994).
2
This Court also opined that as an alternative to resentencing the trial court could articulate on
the record a substantial and compelling reason for its guidelines departures. Moritz, supra, slip
op at 4-5, citing People v Babcock, 469 Mich 247, 258-259; 666 NW2d 231 (2003).
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Next, defendant argues through appointed counsel that the trial court abused its discretion
by ordering his sentence for first-degree home invasion to run consecutively to his sentence for
kidnapping. Defendant asserts that because he received minimum terms at the high end of the
guidelines for both convictions, consecutive sentencing was unnecessary. We disagree.
We review a trial court’s decision to impose consecutive sentences for an abuse of
discretion. People v St. John, 230 Mich App 644, 646; 585 NW2d 849 (1998).
MCL 750.110a(8) provides:
(8) The court may order a term of imprisonment imposed for home
invasion in the first degree to be served consecutively to any term of
imprisonment imposed for any other criminal offense arising from the same
transaction.
Defendant did not preserve this issue; therefore, our review is for plain error. People v
Kimble, 470 Mich 305, 312; 684 NW2d 669 (2004). MCL 769.34(10) states in part: “If a
minimum sentence is within the appropriate guidelines sentence range, the court of appeals shall
affirm that sentence and shall not remand for resentencing absent an error in scoring the
sentencing guidelines or inaccurate information relied upon in determining the defendant’s
sentence.” Because we have rejected defendant’s arguments regarding guidelines scoring and
defendant does not argue his sentences were based on inaccurate information, and because each
consecutive sentence is within the appropriate guidelines sentence range, it is doubtful defendant
may appeal this issue. See Kimble, supra at 310-312. Moreover, defendant has not
demonstrated plain error occurred. Id. Defendant was convicted of serious offenses: he drove
from Tennessee to Michigan, kidnapped his estranged wife at gunpoint, and wounded two
children while firing a gun in a vehicle. Consecutive sentences were not outside the range of
principled outcomes, People v Babcock, 469 Mich 247, 269; 666 NW2d 231 (2003), and thus did
not constitute an abuse of discretion.
Next, defendant, acting in propria persona, argues that he is entitled to be resentenced
before a different judge because the trial court denied him the right to engage in allocution before
imposing sentence. We disagree.
“At sentencing, the court, must, on the record: . . . (c) give the defendant, the defendant’s
lawyer, the prosecutor, and the victim an opportunity to advise the court of any circumstances
they believe the court should consider in imposing sentence.” MCR 6.425(E)(1)(c). The
determination of the applicability and scope of the common-law right to allocute is a question of
law that we review de novo. People v Petty, 469 Mich 108, 113; 665 NW2d 443 (2003).
Here, at resentencing, the trial court stated that when it had imposed sentence in the
second proceeding, it had intended to stay within the sentence guidelines. The court then
pronounced sentence, without first asking the parties if they desired to advise the court of any
matter of which the court should take consideration before imposing sentence. After the trial
court pronounced sentence, defendant requested that he be permitted to speak, and the colloquy
already noted occurred.
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This Court has held that affording a defendant the right to allocute after sentence has
been imposed effectively denies the right. See People v Parks, 183 Mich App 647, 649; 455
NW2d 368 (1990). But in so holding, the Parks Court applied the predecessor of the current
court rule, MCR 6.101(G)(2), and also relied in part on People v Berry, 409 Mich 774; 298
NW2d 434 (1980), which in turn applied the even earlier version of the court rule, GCR 1963,
785.8. See Parks, supra at 649, and People v Petit, 466 Mich 624, 631; 648 NW2d 193 (2002).
As the Petit Court observed, “[t]he principal difference between the former and the present court
rule is that the latter no longer provides that ‘failure to comply shall require resentencing.’”
Petit, supra at 632. Instead, “‘[w]hether failure to comply with a provision in this subrule will
entitle a defendant to resentencing [now] depends on the nature of the noncompliance and must
be determined by reference to past case law or on an individual case basis.’” Id., quoting MCR
6.425, 1989 Staff Comment.
There is no doubt that the right of allocution is an important one the denial of which will
generally merit reversal. Petty, supra at 119-120. But we conclude that on the facts and
circumstances of this case, remand for resentencing is unnecessary even though the trial court
did not offer defendant the opportunity of allocution until after announcing the sentences. First,
the sentencing proceeding currently under review was defendant’s third opportunity to advise the
trial court of any factors defendant believed were important for the court to consider in imposing
sentence. Second, when defendant expressed his desire to speak, the trial court allowed him to
do so. The trial court in the past had demonstrated its willingness to reconsider whether its
decisions were correct and to take appropriate corrective action. For example, the trial court
granted resentencing after the first sentencing and acknowledged it had erred regarding the
sentence guidelines with respect to the second sentencing proceeding. Consequently, we
conclude the trial court’s query to defendant - - “What are you asking me to do?” - - was neither
a sham nor meaningless. Third, when defendant did speak, his comments had nothing to do with
his sentence. Instead of arguing for some mitigation of the sentence, defendant only sought to
argue the legal merits of his conviction. Then, the trial court properly noted that defendant’s
remedy in that regard was to perfect his appeal in this Court. The transcript of the proceeding
plainly reflects the events. For these reasons, we conclude resentencing is not warranted.
We affirm.
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
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