PEOPLE OF MI V PHILLIP JON FAHRNER
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 27, 2007
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 269255
Grand Traverse Circuit Court
LC No. 05-009872-FH
PHILLIP JON FAHRNER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Donofrio, P.J., and Sawyer and Cavanagh, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his jury conviction of first-degree child abuse, MCL
750.136b(2). We affirm.
Defendant first argues that his counsel was ineffective in part because he was distracted
from fully representing defendant by his own personal legal issues. Defendant further argues
that counsel did not conduct adequate research to effectively defend the case, and that he
unlawfully delegated said research to his paralegal, whom he neglected to supervise. Defendant
does not cite specific examples of how counsel improperly delegated research, but states that the
paralegal would be willing to testify as to these alleged improprieties.
In order “to find that a defendant’s right to [the] effective assistance of counsel was so
undermined that it justified reversal of an otherwise valid conviction, a defendant must show that
counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and that the
representation so prejudiced the defendant as to deprive him of a fair trial.” People v Pickens,
446 Mich 298, 302-303; 521 NW2d 797 (1994). The defendant must further demonstrate a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, the result of the proceedings would have been
different, and that the attendant proceedings were fundamentally unfair or unreliable. People v
Rodgers, 248 Mich App 702, 714; 645 NW2d 294 (2001) (citations and emphasis omitted). But,
effective assistance of counsel is presumed and the defendant bears a “heavy burden” of proving
otherwise. Id.
With regard to defendant’s claim that defense counsel did not vigorously defend his case
because of his issues with the bankruptcy court, defendant states that the United States Supreme
Court has held that an attorney is presumptively ineffective when he labors under an actual
conflict of interest. In support of this claim, defendant cites the Court’s opinion in Strickland v
Washington, 466 US 668; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984); however, defendant
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misrepresents the Court’s holding. In Strickland, the Court stated that “prejudice is presumed
when counsel is burdened by an actual conflict of interest.” Id. at 692. The Court found that a
conflict of interest occurs in situations where counsel has breached the “duty of loyalty,” but
cautioned that prejudice will be “presumed only if the defendant demonstrates that counsel
‘actively represented conflicting interests’ and that ‘an actual conflict of interest adversely
affected his lawyer’s performance.’” Id. at 692, quoting Cuyler v Sullivan, 446 US 335, 348,
350; 100 S Ct 1708; 64 L Ed 2d 333 (1980). Defendant has not met the burden set forth by the
Court in Strickland.
Defendant states that he was prejudiced by counsel’s interest in litigating his case
“quickly and quietly” so as to escape the notice of his lawful creditors. However, defendant does
not provide evidence for this claim, nor does he show that his defense was hampered in any way
by counsel’s ostensibly unrelated professional or financial problems. Defendant’s trial was
litigated over three days, and defense counsel presented witnesses and cross-examined the
prosecution’s witnesses. There is no evidence in the record that the trial should have gone on
longer but for defense counsel’s negligence and desire to hurry the case to its conclusion. In
People v Smith, 456 Mich 543, 557; 581 NW2d 654 (1998), our Supreme Court held that
there is no automatic correlation between an attorney’s theoretical self-interest
and an ability to loyally serve a defendant. . . . [W]e recognize the potential for
an attorney’s self-interest to conflict with the representation of a defendant and
that in such a case a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel would be
warranted. If a convicted defendant believes that his attorney’s representation
was below an objective standard of reasonableness, the appropriate procedure is
to seek a Ginther[1] hearing.
In the instant case, a Ginther hearing was held, and the trial court made a decision on the
record that counsel was not presumptively ineffective based on his personal issues with creditors,
because there was no actual conflict of interest involved in hiding money from creditors and
effectively representing defendant. This finding is not clearly erroneous and, accordingly,
defendant has not established an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on the purported
conflict of interest.
Defendant also argues that his counsel was ineffective because he did not conduct
adequate research to effectively defend the case, and because he delegated his research duties to
an unsupervised paralegal. The issue of defense counsel’s preparation was also addressed at the
Ginther hearing, with the court making extensive findings on the record regarding counsel’s
performance at trial. The court stated in regard to defense counsel’s cross-examination of one of
the prosecution’s medical experts, “[t]hese are not questions asked by somebody who failed to
prepare on the issue of infant death due to blows or being shaken. He obviously had done some
preparation on the subject.” The court also found that counsel’s opening statement and closing
argument “reflect[ed] preparation and thought as to how to argue the case.” Defendant does not
1
People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).
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offer any evidence that the trial court’s findings were in error. Thus, his claim that he was
denied the effective assistance of counsel fails. See Pickens, supra at 302-303.
Next, defendant objects to the testimony of Dr. Annamaria Church (a medical expert
witness for the prosecution) as unduly prejudicial and argues that her opinions were admitted as
evidence in violation of Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc, 509 US 579; 113 S Ct
2786; 125 L Ed 469 (1993). Defendant is correct in indicating that Michigan evidentiary law has
effectively adopted the Daubert standard, as our Supreme Court has referred to the current
version of MRE 702 as having been adopted “explicitly to incorporate Daubert’s standards of
reliability.” Gilbert v Daimler-Chrysler Corp, 470 Mich 749, 781; 685 NW2d 391 (2004).
MRE 702 provides:
If the court determines that scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a
fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise if
(1) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the
product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the
principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Dr. Church’s expert testimony as to the
cause of Cameron’s injuries.
Dr. Church was the interim head of the child protection team at DeVos Children’s
Hospital. She began a residency in pediatrics in 1979 and, since May 1981, had been involved in
working with children who were victims of child abuse. Dr. Church was also involved in
teaching and training residents in pediatrics. Her conclusions based on the medical evidence as
to the cause of Cameron’s injuries—essentially that they were not accidentally caused and that
they were caused by the use of substantial physical force against him—appear to have been
rationally based on her examination of him and other medical evidence as to his injuries
considered in light of her knowledge, skill, experience, training, and education as a highly
experienced pediatrician with substantial expertise in treating abused children. Even if some of
her conclusions could be debated or questioned, this Court has observed with regard to the
admissibility of evidence under MRE 702 and Daubert that “the trial court’s role as gatekeeper
does not require it to search for absolute truth, to admit only uncontested evidence, or to resolve
genuine scientific disputes.” Chapin v A & L Parts, Inc, 274 Mich App 122, 127; 732 NW2d
578 (2007).2 Rather, the proper role of a trial court in a Daubert analysis
is to filter out expert evidence that is unreliable, not to admit only evidence that is
unassailable. The inquiry is not into whether an expert’s opinion is necessarily
2
The portions of Chapin we cite are from Judge Davis’ lead opinion in that case. Judge Meter,
in his separate opinion in Chapin, stated that he concurred in Judge Davis’ opinion, Chapin,
supra at 141 (Meter, J., concurring), but he provided some additional observations. Accordingly,
Judge Davis’ lead opinion constituted a majority opinion of this Court.
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correct or universally accepted. The inquiry is into whether the opinion is
rationally derived from a sound foundation. [Id. at 139.]
It is apparent that Church’s testimony as to the cause of Cameron’s injuries was rationally
derived from the sound foundation of her expertise and the medical evidence. Thus, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in admitting that testimony.
Next, defendant argues that he is entitled to a new trial because “critical evidence” was
not presented to the jury for its deliberation, and new evidence has been discovered that was not
available prior to trial. After review for an abuse of discretion of the trial court’s decision to
deny defendant’s motion for a new trial, we disagree. See People v Cress, 468 Mich 678, 691;
664 NW2d 174 (2003).
At the hearing on his motion for new a trial, defendant’s appellate counsel cited reports
from his experts that found that the complainant’s victim had “mixed density blood” in his
system following his admission to the hospital. According to defendant’s experts, this condition
indicated the presence of both old and new injuries. The court noted that a physician who had
operated on the victim attributed the mixed fluids to the presence of spinal cord fluid in his
blood, not to an old injury; however, appellate counsel argued that whatever the explanation for
the fluid, the matter should have been submitted to the jury. On appeal, defendant argues that the
reports of his experts should be submitted to the court as part of a second motion for a new trial.
Our Supreme Court has stated that in order “[f]or a new trial to be granted on the basis of
newly discovered evidence, a defendant must show that: (1) ‘the evidence itself, not merely its
materiality, was newly discovered’; (2) ‘the newly discovered evidence was not cumulative’; (3)
‘the party could not, using reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced the evidence at
trial’; and (4) the new evidence makes a different result probable on retrial.” Cress, supra at
692, quoting People v Johnson, 451 Mich 115, 118 n 6; 545 NW2d 637 (1996). Defendant has
not met the burden required for any of the four elements of the test.
First, defendant has not shown that the evidence is newly discovered. Defendant alleges
that the victim’s x-rays and brain images were not given to the defense until after trial.
Defendant does not claim, however, that he was unable to access these medical records prior to
trial. Second, this purported newly discovered evidence was cumulative with regard to
defendant’s claim that the subdural hematoma suffered by the victim was a re-bleed of an old
injury in that Dr. John Kopec did acknowledge during defense counsel’s cross-examination that
possibility. Third, as mentioned above, there is no indication that defendant could not have
produced this evidence during trial. Finally, in light of these circumstances, a different result on
retrial is not probable. In addition to the fact that the alleged evidence of a re-bleed was
available during trial, ample evidence was provided at trial suggesting that defendant was
responsible for the child’s injuries. Admission of the experts’ reports would not negate the
testimony from the investigating officer regarding defendant’s evolving stories of how the
child’s injuries occurred, nor would it likely override defendant’s testimony about how those
injuries occurred.
Incidentally, defendant also argues on appeal that other “critical evidence” was not
presented to the jury and that evidence presented by the prosecution was not effectively
challenged by defense counsel. Therefore, defendant argues, he should be afforded an
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opportunity to go before the lower court for an evidentiary hearing to consider the “several flaws
in the State’s [medical] evidence” cited by defendant’s “multiple experts.” This argument is
both vague and unsubstantiated by defendant’s brief and the record. “It is not enough for an
appellant in his brief simply to announce a position or assert an error and then leave it up to this
Court to discover and rationalize the basis for his claims, or unravel and elaborate for him his
arguments, and then search for authority either to sustain or reject his position.” Mudge v
Macomb Co, 458 Mich 87, 105; 580 NW2d 845 (1998). Thus, we reject this claim.
Finally, defendant argues that he is entitled to resentencing because the trial court
improperly scored him under the guidelines. We disagree.
First, defendant claims that offense variable (OV) 7 was improperly scored at 50 points.
We disagree. We review a trial court’s scoring decision for an abuse of discretion and a scoring
decision will be upheld if there is any evidence in support of it. People v Hornsby, 251 Mich
App 462, 468; 650 NW2d 700 (2002).
MCL 777.37 governs OV 7, aggravated physical abuse, and provides that 50 points may
be scored if “[a] victim was treated with sadism, torture, or excessive brutality or conduct
designed to substantially increase the fear and anxiety a victim suffered during the offense.”
MCL 777.37(1)(a). Defendant claims that his conduct, as characterized by the prosecution, was
that of someone merely “out of control,” and not the conduct addressed by the variable. At his
sentencing, defendant argued that the only part of the statute that potentially applied was
“excessive brutality,” which was already covered by the charge of child abuse because child
abuse inherently involves a certain amount of brutality. We disagree.
The evidence included that (1) defendant struck the 11 month old child victim with an
open hand hard across the left side of his face after the child threw his bottle to the floor, (2)
while the child was crying after being slapped, defendant allowed the child to stand up on or near
a coffee table and fall, striking his head on the table, (3) defendant then let the child fall again
and strike his head on the floor, (4) after the child laid on the floor crying for minutes, defendant
picked up the child who vomited on defendant, (5) defendant then “tossed” the child onto the
floor from a height of over four feet causing the child to strike the back of his head on the
kitchen floor, and (5) as defendant was exiting the house to take the child, who was exhibiting
signs of serious injury, to a neighbor for assistance, defendant allowed the child’s head to hit a
door and then the door to hit the child in the head, a second time, while defendant was carrying
the child.
“Brutality” is not defined in the statute, but Random House Webster’s College Dictionary
(1995) defines it as “the quality or state of being brutal,” and “brutal” as “savage; cruel;
inhuman.” We cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion when it determined that
OV 7 should be scored at 50 points considering the numerous and varied forceful impacts to the
child’s head and body, as well as defendant’s callus and repeated disregard for the child’s wellbeing. See People v Babcock, 469 Mich 247, 269; 666 NW2d 231 (2003) (an abuse of discretion
occurs when the result is outside the principled range of outcomes).
Next, defendant claims that he is entitled to resentencing because the court departed from
the sentencing guidelines without articulating a substantial and compelling reason for its upward
departure. We disagree.
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A court may depart from the sentencing guidelines range if it has a substantial and
compelling reason to do so, and states on the record the reasons for departure. MCL 769.34(3);
People v Hegwood, 465 Mich 432, 439; 636 NW2d 127 (2001). A court may not depart from a
sentencing guidelines range based on an offense or offender characteristic already considered in
determining the guidelines range unless the court finds, based on facts in the record, that the
characteristic was given inadequate or disproportionate weight. MCL 769.34(3). Factors
meriting departure must be objective and verifiable, must keenly attract the court’s attention, and
must be of considerable worth. Babcock, supra at 257-258. To be objective and verifiable, the
factors must be actions or occurrences external to the mind and must be capable of being
confirmed. People v Abramski, 257 Mich App 71, 74; 665 NW2d 501 (2003). With regard to
such departures, we review the existence of a particular factor supporting departure for clear
error, the determination whether that factor is objective and verifiable de novo, and whether a
reason is substantial and compelling for an abuse of discretion. Babcock, supra at 264-265.
Here, among other reasons, the trial court stated that it was departing from the guidelines
because of their failure to adequately address the severity of the victim’s injuries as relates to the
impact those injuries have on the victim’s mother and other family members. The reasons given
by the trial court for its departure exist, are objective and verifiable, and are substantial and
compelling. Defendant’s conduct resulted in the severe and permanent mental and physical
impairment of the child victim. Although the victim’s injuries are at least partially addressed by
the statute governing defendant’s conviction, the impact of the crime on the victim’s family was
not addressed. Certainly the severe and permanent nature of the injuries sustained by the 11
month old child victim caused his mother considerable psychological distress as well as other
significant hardships associated with providing almost constant care to the child—as she
discussed at sentencing. Because this factor was not considered by the guidelines, the court’s
sentencing departure was not improper.
Finally, defendant argues that he is entitled to resentencing because the trial court relied
on facts that were neither admitted to by defendant nor found beyond a reasonable doubt by the
jury. Defendant relies on Blakely v Washington, 542 US 296; 124 S Ct 2531; 159 L Ed 2d 403
(2004), for the argument that Apprendi v New Jersey, 530 US 466; 120 S Ct 2348; 147 L Ed 2d
435 (2000), requires a jury to find all facts underlying sentencing beyond a reasonable doubt.
However, our Supreme Court has determined that Blakely does not apply to Michigan’s
sentencing scheme. People v McCuller, 479 Mich 672, 676; 739 NW2d 563 (2007). Therefore,
this argument must be rejected.
Affirmed.
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
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