IN RE ALEXANDER MINORS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of JOSEPH ELWOOD
ALEXANDER and LINDSEY MARIE
ALEXANDER, Minors.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
UNPUBLISHED
December 20, 2007
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 278530
Oakland Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 06-716050-NA
JAMES ROBERT ALEXANDER,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
VALETA ALEXANDER,
Respondent.
Before: Saad, P. J., and Owens and Kelly, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent1 appeals as of right from an order terminating his parental rights to his minor
children pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)(ii) (desertion for more than 91 days by a parent who
has not sought custody during that period), (c)(i) (182 days have passed since adjudication and
conditions continue to exist), (g) (failure to provide proper care or custody and no reasonable
expectation that parent will be able to provide within reasonable time), and (j) (reasonable
likelihood that the children will be harmed if returned to the home of the parent). We
conditionally affirm but remand for proper notice to any interested Indian tribe pursuant to the
Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), 25 USC 1901 et seq.
1
Respondent, Valeta Alexander, did not file an appeal regarding the termination of her parental
rights. Therefore, throughout this opinion, we will refer to respondent, James Robert Alexander
as “respondent.”
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I. Basic Facts and Proceedings
This case arises from a petition alleging that (1) respondents continuously left the minor
children at the home of their maternal grandmother without advising her of their whereabouts,
(2) respondents were unemployed and lacked stable housing, (3) respondents engaged in
domestic violence in the presence of the minor children, (4) the maternal grandmother suspected
respondents of using drugs, (5) respondents used a false address to obtain assistance from
petitioner, Department of Human Services, and (6) respondents failed to cooperate with
appointments with petitioner. At the first pretrial hearing, petitioner indicated that respondent
had Indian ancestry and was affiliated with the Chippewa Tribe in Standish. However, the trial
court record does not reflect whether the tribe was notified of the proceedings. After the minor
children were placed in foster care, a parent-agency agreement was adopted. Respondent was
incarcerated and when he was released, he failed to comply with the parent-agency agreement.
Respondents pleaded no contest to the allegations in the petition, and the trial court terminated
their parental rights.
At the best interests hearing, the evidence showed that respondent had recently begun
complying with the parent-agency agreement as follows: he had completed substance abuse
counseling, he had five negative drug screens during the previous month, he had been attending
domestic violence counseling classes, he had been working part-time for two months, and he had
completed parenting classes. Respondent admitted that he had not complied with the agreement
before the beginning of 2007 because he had been unemployed. Respondent acknowledged that
he had significant mental health issues that needed to be addressed, including posttraumatic
stress disorder, bipolar disorder, and depression, and a psychological evaluation from the prior
year indicated that it would not be appropriate to place the children with him because his issues
would not be resolved in the short term. Because the children had been in foster care for 16
months, the trial court found that respondent’s recent compliance had begun too late for it to
conclude that termination would hurt the minor children.
II. Standard of Review
This Court reviews a trial court’s decision to terminate parental rights for clear error.
MCR 3.977(J); In re Sours, 459 Mich 624, 633; 593 NW2d 520 (1999). If the trial court
determines that petitioner established the existence of one or more statutory grounds for
termination by clear and convincing evidence, the trial court must terminate respondent’s
parental rights unless it determines that to do so is clearly not in the children’s best interests. In
re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 353-354; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). A finding of fact is clearly erroneous
if the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake was made. In re
Terry, 240 Mich App 14, 22; 610 NW2d 563 (2000). In applying the clearly erroneous standard,
the Court should recognize the special opportunity the trial court has to assess the credibility of
the witnesses. MCR 2.613(C); In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989).
III. Compliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act
Respondent argues that the trial court erred in failing to ensure that petitioner complied
with the notice provisions of the ICWA. We review de novo issues involving the application of
the ICWA because they are questions of law. In re Fried, 266 Mich App 535, 538; 702 NW2d
192 (2005).
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The record does not reflect whether the trial court ensured compliance with the notice
requirements of the ICWA after it learned that respondent was a member of the Chippewa tribe
in Standish, Michigan. This Court has held that the notice provisions of the ICWA are
“mandatory, regardless of how late in the proceedings a child’s possible Indian heritage is
uncovered.” In re TM, 245 Mich App 181, 188; 628 NW2d 570 (2001) (citation omitted).
Further, we recognize that failure to comply with the requirements of the ICWA may invalidate
proceedings terminating a parent’s rights. 25 USC 1914; TM, supra at 187; In re NEGP, 245
Mich App 126, 131; 626 NW2d 921 (2001).
This Court has held that where a respondent’s parental rights have otherwise been
properly terminated under Michigan law, but the petitioner and the trial court failed to comply
with the ICWA’s notice provisions, reversal is not necessarily required. TM, supra at 187; In re
IEM, 233 Mich App 438, 450; 592 NW2d 751 (1999). Instead, the remedy adopted in IEM was
to “conditionally affirm the [trial] court’s termination order” but remand the matter “so that the
court and [petitioner] may provide proper notice to any interested tribe.” Id. (citation omitted).
Here, as in IEM, the “sole deficiency at this time is in notice and there has been no determination
that the ICWA otherwise applies to this proceeding.” Id. (citation omitted). Therefore, we
follow the remedy fashioned in IEM, supra, in this case. Accordingly, if after proper notice
pursuant to 25 USC 1912(a) and MCR 3.980, the tribe does not seek to intervene, or, after
intervention, the trial court concludes that the ICWA does not apply, the original orders will
stand. IEM, supra at 450. If the trial court does conclude that the ICWA applies, further
proceedings consistent with the ICWA will be necessary. Id.
IV. Best Interests Determination
Respondent challenges the trial court’s finding that termination was not against the
children’s best interests. We disagree.
Respondent pleaded no contest to the allegations in the termination petition, and the trial
court conducted a best interests hearing. The trial court did not err in its best interests
determination. The minor children were five and six and a half years old at the time of the best
interests hearing. They had come into care because respondent and the minor children’s mother
had been leaving them in the care of their maternal grandmother and would not inform the
maternal grandmother where they were going and when they would be back. Respondent did not
have a job, did not contribute to the support of the minor children, and did not have a stable
home. He admitted to using drugs, had a significant mental health history including depression,
bipolar disorder, and posttraumatic stress disorder resulting from a brutal event that occurred in
1999, and he had a history of domestic violence. Respondent pleaded to some of the allegations
in the initial petition and was given the opportunity to work on a parent agency agreement.
Respondent did not initially comply with any of the requirements of the parent agency agreement
and, shortly after signing it, was incarcerated for several months on a probation violation. While
he was incarcerated, a psychological evaluation was completed, wherein the psychologist
concluded that his mental health issues were significant and that placing the children with him
was not appropriate.
Shortly after respondent was released from jail, he moved upstate to live with a girlfriend
and still failed to comply with the requirements of the parent agency agreement. After a
termination petition was filed and respondent pleaded to the allegations in the termination
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petition, he made some efforts to comply. He completed a substance abuse program, completed
parenting classes, entered into a domestic violence program, provided random drug screens that
were negative, and obtained employment. At the time of the best interests hearing, respondent
had shown good effort for several months, and he asserts that he was not given enough time to
maintain compliance, namely his sobriety and stability. However, the children had been in
temporary care for 16 months, and respondent had not spoken to them in three or four months.
He had not addressed his significant mental health issues, admitted that he could not sleep for
more than two or three hours a night, and he needed medication. However, he did not get the
appropriate medication and support to help him address these significant issues, and he had just
begun to address the substance abuse issue that he had been dealing with for at least 15 years.
The court did not commit clear error when it found that respondent had done too little too late,
that the minor children needed stability, and that they would not suffer any detriment if
respondent’s parental rights were terminated.
We conditionally affirm the order terminating respondent’s parental rights, IEM, supra at
450, but remand for the purpose of providing proper notice to any interested Indian tribe
pursuant to the ICWA. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Donald S. Owens
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
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