ROBERT S CAMERON V J & J HOSPITALITY INC
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
ROBERT S. CAMERON,
UNPUBLISHED
December 20, 2007
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 275380
LC No. 06-000241-NO
J & J HOSPITALITY, INC., d/b/a BIG BOY
RESTAURANT, and RED ROOF INNS, INC.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Donofrio, P.J., and Sawyer and Cavanagh, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this premises liability action arising from a slip and fall, plaintiff, Robert S. Cameron,
appeals as of right from the trial court order granting summary disposition in favor of defendants,
J & J Hospitality, Inc. (Big Boy) and Red Roof Inns, Inc. (Red Roof). Because the water on the
tile foyer constituted an objectively open and obvious danger as a matter of law, and no special
aspects were present, we affirm.
On January 2, 2005, plaintiff was injured when he slipped and fell on wet tile in the
common foyer between defendant businesses. There was a wet floor sign in the foyer about six
feet or more from the entrance door indicating that the floor was wet. Plaintiff stated that he
would have been walking toward the sign when he first entered, but he did not see the sign or the
floor before falling because he was not looking down when he entered the foyer. Instead,
plaintiff stated that he immediately looked up at the ceiling as he entered because there was a
leak in the ceiling and the sound of the running water distracted him. The leak was not directly
over the area where plaintiff fell, but was in the foyer about ten to fifteen feet away. Plaintiff
testified that when he exited the restaurant after about 30 to 45 minutes, he saw a five-gallon,
overflowing bucket below the ceiling leak located behind a half-wall.
Big Boy brought a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), arguing
that plaintiff presented no evidence that his fall was caused by the wet floor. Red Roof also
brought a MCR 2.116(C)(10) motion, arguing that the condition was open and obvious, that no
special aspects were present, and that there was no distracted-customer exception to the open and
obvious doctrine. The trial court granted summary disposition in defendants’ favor, finding that
there was “no specific proof that the plaintiff did in fact slip on water.” The trial court also
concluded that the danger presented was open and obvious and that the dripping water served as
a warning to plaintiff. The trial court held alternatively that Big Boy owed plaintiff no duty
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because it was not responsible for maintenance of the common foyer. Plaintiff now challenges
the trial court’s grant of summary disposition.
We review de novo a trial court’s grant of summary disposition under MCR
2.116(C)(10). Spiek v Dep't of Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998). The
pleadings, affidavits, depositions, admissions, and other admissible documentary evidence
submitted by the parties must be considered in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
MCR 2.116(G)(5); Kennedy v Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co, 274 Mich App 710, 712; 737
NW2d 179 (2007). “Summary disposition is proper under MCR 2.116(C)(10) if the affidavits
and other documentary evidence show that there is no genuine issue concerning any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id.
Because plaintiff was an invitee, defendants had a duty to maintain the premises in a
reasonably safe condition and to warn him of any unreasonable risk of harm that defendants
knew about or should have known about, and which a reasonable person might not discover upon
casual inspection. Novotney v Burger King Corp (On Remand), 198 Mich App 470, 474-475;
499 NW2d 379 (1993). However, a premises possessor is generally not required to protect an
invitee from open and obvious dangers unless special aspects elevate the otherwise open and
obvious danger to an unreasonably dangerous one. Lugo v Ameritech Corp, 464 Mich 512, 517519; 629 NW2d 384 (2001). Special aspects exist when the danger, although open and obvious,
is effectively unavoidable or imposes a uniquely high likelihood of harm or severity of harm. Id.
at 518-519. “It is the aggregate of factors that the trial court must analyze to determine if there
are special aspects that give rise to a uniquely high likelihood of harm or severity of harm if the
risk is not avoided.” O'Donnell v Garasic, 259 Mich App 569, 578; 676 NW2d 213 (2003).
Plaintiff argues that the sight and sound of water dripping from the ceiling either rendered
the danger not open and obvious due to the distraction caused, or constituted special aspects that
elevated the danger presented. In determining whether a condition is open and obvious, the
focus is on the condition itself and whether an average person would have noticed it on casual
inspection, not whether the plaintiff himself was looking at it. Lugo, supra at 524; Bertrand v
Alan Ford, Inc, 449 Mich 606, 611; 537 NW2d 185 (1995); Hughes v PMG Bldg, Inc, 227 Mich
App 1, 11; 574 NW2d 691 (1997). When considering whether a danger is open and obvious, we
address whether the circumstances existing before the accident would make a dangerous
condition obvious to a reasonable person. See Joyce v Rubin, 249 Mich App 231, 238-240; 642
NW2d 360 (2002).
According to plaintiff's contentions, and with the evidence viewed in the light most
favorable to plaintiff, he slipped on wet tile because as he entered the foyer he immediately
looked up at the ceiling since the sight and sound of a leak in the ceiling distracted him. Our
review of the record reveals that the danger presented by the water on the tile floor in the foyer
would have been readily apparent to a casual observer. The record illustrates that the incident
occurred in early January in Michigan, plaintiff testified that the sidewalk leading to the foyer
was wet with either slush or melting snow, and a wet floor sign was present in the foyer only six
feet away from where plaintiff slipped in the entryway. Plainly, plaintiff would have seen the
wet floor itself, or the wet floor sign had he made a casual inspection by looking at the floor in
the entryway. See Lugo, supra at 523-524. Further, a reasonable person hearing and seeing
water drip from a ceiling would be alerted that a slippery condition might be present on the tile,
would anticipate the danger presented by the leak, and would stop or look down to ensure that
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the path to be traversed was free of water. See Joyce, supra at 238-243. We conclude that the
general surrounding conditions would have alerted a reasonable person to the possibility that
defendants’ foyer was potentially treacherous. Lugo, supra at 524.
Next, we address plaintiff’s assertion that the sight and sound of water dripping from the
ceiling caused plaintiff to be distracted and thus constituted a special aspect. “[S]pecial aspects
are not defined with regard to whether a premises possessor should expect that an invitee will not
discover the danger or will not protect against it, but rather by whether an otherwise open and
obvious danger is effectively unavoidable or imposes an unreasonably high risk of severe harm
to an invitee.” Mann v Shusteric Enterprises, Inc, 470 Mich 320, 331-332; 683 NW2d 573
(2004), citing Lugo, supra at 518. The critical inquiry is whether there was something unusual
about the danger itself, which because of its “character, location, or surrounding conditions . . .
gives rise to an unreasonable risk of harm.” O'Donnell, supra.
We are not persuaded that the that the sight and sound of water dripping from the ceiling
ten to fifteen feet away from the entryway substantially increased the likelihood that severe harm
would occur to patrons who entered defendants’ foyer. Adopting plaintiff’s argument would
require us, contrary to Lugo, supra at 518 n 2, to lose our focus on the state of the premises and
focus instead on the effect the condition had on this specific plaintiff. The record reflects that
plaintiff could have avoided injury had he looked at the floor tile or observed the wet floor sign
and more carefully traversed the entryway area instead of focusing on the ceiling leak. Indeed, a
ceiling leak would put a reasonable person on notice that water may have accumulated beneath it
or around it, thus making a slippery condition even more obvious than it otherwise might have
been to a casual observer. Therefore, with regard to the distraction plaintiff experienced because
of the ceiling leak, he has failed to demonstrate that it either posed an unavoidable danger or a
danger that carried with it an unreasonable risk of severe harm.
Finally, defendant also contends that special aspects existed because the standing water
was in the sole entrance to the business for invitees. This Court held in Robertson v Blue Water
Oil Co, 268 Mich App 588, 593-595; 708 NW2d 749 (2005) that an open and obvious danger
was effectively unavoidable when an invitee had to encounter it to enter a business. However,
here, plaintiff testified that the water on the tile where he fell was “spotty with puddles.” He
stated there “wasn’t a continuous sheet of water” and that there were dry parts of the exposed
tile. There was also a mat on a portion of the foyer floor. Plaintiff also presents no evidence
suggesting that he could not have safely negotiated the tile had he looked down. And we have
found nothing in the record suggesting that plaintiff could not have avoided the wet areas on the
tile while walking into the restaurant had he noticed the condition. Moreover, plaintiff claims to
have slipped when he stepped off of a mat. Thus, arguably, the mat provided a safe haven within
the foyer where plaintiff could have paused in safety to inspect his surroundings before
continuing into the restaurant. Hence, a jury could only speculate that plaintiff could not have
avoided the danger had he made a casual inspection, and speculation and conjecture are
insufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact. Detroit v Gen Motors Corp, 233 Mich
App 132, 139; 592 NW2d 732 (1998).
In sum, we conclude that the trial court did not err in finding that the danger was open
and obvious as a matter of law and no special aspects were present. Because defendants owed
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plaintiff no duty under the circumstances, we need not address plaintiff’s assertion that the trial
court erred in dismissing the claims against Big Boy because it was not responsible for foyer
maintenance.
Affirmed.
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
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