PEOPLE OF MI V AMEIR T HARRIS
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 20, 2007
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 273685
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2006-208559-FH
AMEIR T. HARRIS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Saad, P.J., and Owens and Kelly, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
After a jury trial, defendant was convicted of one count of felon in possession of a
firearm, MCL 750.224f, and one count of possession of a firearm during the commission of a
felony (felony-firearm), MCL 750.227b. The trial court sentenced defendant as a fourth habitual
offender, MCL 769.12, to 1 to 20 years’ imprisonment for the felon in possession conviction and
a consecutive sentence of two years’ imprisonment for the felony-firearm conviction.1
Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm.
I. Facts
About 10:30 p.m. on April 30, 2006, Pontiac police officers Raymond Wiggins and
Joseph Miller noticed a van driving without its headlights on. The officers ran a LIEN check on
the license plate and discovered the plate was registered to a Chevy Malibu and expired. The
officers activated their overhead lights, pointed the spotlights toward the vehicle, and made a
traffic stop. Before the van pulled over, both officers observed the passenger reach behind the
driver’s seat, toward the back, near the floorboards. After the van pulled over, Wiggins
approached the driver’s side of the van and spoke with defendant, who was driving. When
asked, defendant admitted that he did not have a valid operator’s license. Wiggins told
defendant to exit the van, walked him back to the patrol vehicle, patted him down, handcuffed
him, and sat him in the patrol car.
1
Before trial, defendant pleaded guilty to operating a vehicle while his license was suspended,
revoked or denied, MCL 257.904(1), and was sentenced to 93 days’ incarceration.
-1-
Meanwhile, Miller approached the passenger door of the van and asked the passenger,
Rasheed Hatton, to exit the vehicle. Miller then placed Hatton in the patrol car and searched the
van. Miller discovered a box of 30-30 express core lock ammunition behind the front passenger
seat. The box of ammunition held 20 rounds, but two rounds were missing. Miller also
discovered a bottle of Seagram’s whiskey and what appeared to be a black bar protruding from
under the passenger seat located directly behind the driver’s seat. The bar was wedged in the
seat mechanism, touching the driver’s seat. When Miller removed the bar, he realized that it was
an unloaded Winchester 30-30 rifle with a western field scope, a typical hunting rifle used for
shooting long distances. When Miller completed the search and returned to the patrol car,
defendant stated, unsolicited, that he was on parole and “couldn’t catch a gun charge.”
Hatton later admitted that the rifle was his and claimed that he had concealed the rifle in
his oversized black jogging pants from the time he entered the van until after Wiggins removed
defendant from the van, when, he claimed, he hid the rifle in the van. Both Hatton and defendant
claimed that defendant was unaware that Hatton was carrying the rifle.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Defendant argues on appeal that the prosecution presented insufficient evidence to
support his conviction for felon in possession of a firearm because there was no nexus, beyond
proximity, between him and the weapon. We disagree. We review claims of insufficient
evidence in a criminal trial de novo. People v Lueth, 253 Mich App 670, 680; 660 NW2d 322
(2002). We do not consider whether any evidence existed that could support a conviction;
rather, we must determine whether a rational trier of fact could find that the evidence proved the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 513514; 489 NW2d 748 (1992).
“A person convicted of a specified felony shall not possess, use, transport, sell, purchase,
carry, ship, receive, or distribute a firearm in this state . . .” until he has fulfilled certain
requirements, including successfully completing all conditions of probation or parole imposed
for the violation. MCL 750.224f(2). The parties stipulated at trial that defendant is a felon,
previously convicted of delivery of a controlled substance less than 50 grams, and ineligible to
carry a firearm. The only question for the jury was whether defendant had possession of the
firearm.
The term “possession” includes both actual and constructive possession. People v
Burgenmeyer, 461 Mich 431, 438; 606 NW2d 645 (2000) (citations omitted). “[A] defendant
has constructive possession of a firearm if the location of the weapon is known and it is
reasonably accessible to the defendant. Physical possession is not necessary as long as the
defendant has constructive possession.” Id., quoting People v Hill, 433 Mich 464, 470-471; 446
NW2d 140 (1989). Defendant argues there was insufficient evidence to establish that he had
possession of the rifle because Hatton claimed that the rifle was his, that he had concealed the
weapon in his oversized black jogging pants, and that he did not tell defendant that he was
carrying the weapon because, had defendant known, he would not have given Hatton a ride.
However, both officers testified that they watched the passenger in the van reach behind the
driver’s seat before the van stopped, and Miller explained that he discovered the rifle in the area
behind the driver’s seat. Miller also opined that a Winchester 30-30 rifle with a western field
scope could not be carried concealed under one’s clothing. Further, a reasonable juror could find
-2-
that Hatton’s claim that he concealed a rifle approximately half his height under his clothing
while entering and sitting in a van was incredible.2 The jurors apparently found the officers’
testimony more credible than either defendant’s or Hatton’s testimony, and we “will not interfere
with the trier of fact’s role in determining the weight of the evidence or the credibility of
witnesses.” People v Williams, 268 Mich App 416, 419; 707 NW2d 624 (2005). Viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we conclude that the prosecution
presented sufficient evidence that defendant knew that the weapon was in the van and had access
to the weapon to support his convictions.
III. Double Jeopardy
Defendant also argues that his constitutional protection against double jeopardy was
violated because a conviction for felony-firearm does not require proof of any element beyond
the elements necessary to convict for felon in possession of a firearm and, therefore, they must
be the same offense. We disagree. Our Supreme Court discussed this issue in People v Mitchell,
456 Mich 693; 575 NW2d 283 (1998). It began by describing the scope of the double jeopardy
clause as follows:
Where multiple punishment is involved, the Double Jeopardy Clause acts
as a restraint on the prosecutor and the Courts, not the Legislature. Brown v Ohio,
432 US 161; 97 S Ct 2221; 53 L Ed 2d 187 (1977). Where “a legislature
specifically authorizes cumulative punishment under two statutes, regardless of
whether those two statutes proscribe the ‘same’ conduct . . . , a court’s task of
statutory construction is at an end and the prosecutor may seek and the trial court
or jury may impose cumulative punishment under such statutes in a single trial.”
Missouri v Hunter, 459 US 359, 368; 103 S Ct 673; 74 L Ed 2d 535 (1983).
Where the issue is one of multiple punishment rather than successive trials, the
double jeopardy analysis is whether there is a clear indication of legislative intent
to impose multiple punishment for the same offense. If so, there is no double
jeopardy violation. People v Robideau, 419 Mich 458, 469; 355 NW2d 592
(1984). 1 Gillespie, Michigan Criminal Law & Procedure (2d ed), § 102, p 285.
[Id. at 695-696.]
Our Supreme Court then held, “the Legislature’s intent in drafting the felony-firearm statute was
to provide for an additional felony charge and sentence whenever a person possessing a firearm
committed a felony other than those four explicitly enumerated in the felony-firearm statute.” Id.
at 698. In reaching this conclusion, our Supreme Court stated that the Legislature listed specific
exceptions in the felony-firearm statute and used no language that would give a court an
opportunity to expand the total number of exceptions. Id. Accordingly, defendant’s convictions
for both felony-firearm and felon in possession of a firearm do not constitute double jeopardy.
2
Hatton is five feet six inches tall. The rifle is between two-and-a-half and three feet long.
-3-
Affirmed.
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Donald S. Owens
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
-4-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
