PEOPLE OF MI V NATHANIEL TYRONE GILBERT
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 20, 2007
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 273644
Macomb Circuit Court
LC No. 2006-000173-FC
NATHANIEL TYRONE GILBERT,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Whitbeck, C.J., and White and Zahra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his conviction of first-degree felony murder, MCL
750.316(1)(b). The jury also convicted defendant of third-degree criminal sexual conduct
(victim aged 13 to 15), MCL 750.520d(1)(a), but the trial court vacated that conviction on the
prosecutor’s motion. Defendant was sentenced to life in prison. We affirm.
Defendant first argues that there was insufficient evidence of malice to support his
conviction. In reviewing this issue, we must determine whether, viewing the evidence in a light
most favorable to the prosecution, a reasonable trier of fact could find each element of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Lundy, 467 Mich 254, 257; 650 NW2d 332 (2002). Any
murder, including first-degree felony murder, includes the element of malice - - the intent to kill,
do great bodily harm, or create a high risk of death or great bodily harm with knowledge that
death is the probable result. People v Dumas, 454 Mich 390, 396-397; 563 NW2d 31 (1997). In
this case, a reasonable trier of fact could find the required intent beyond a reasonable doubt
based on defendant’s statement to police that he submerged the victim’s head in water, strangled
her, and disposed of her body, and the medical examiner’s testimony that the death required neck
compression for at least four minutes.
Defendant also argues that the death and the felony (CSC) were insufficiently connected
to support a conviction of felony murder. We disagree. First-degree felony murder is “murder
committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate” certain enumerated felonies, including
third-degree criminal sexual conduct. MCL 750.316(1)(b). While defendant urges us to
conclude that there was insufficient evidence that the CSC and the murder involved an unbroken
chain of events uninterrupted by an intervening act, we are satisfied that there was ample
evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that “defendant’s felony dictated his
conduct which led to the homicide,” LaFave & Scott, [Criminal Law, § 71, p 557], cited with
approval in People v Gillis, 474 Mich 105, 127; 712 NW2d 419 (2006), quoting People v
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Goddard, 135 Mich App 128, 135-136; 352 NW2d 367 (1984), rev’d on other grounds 429 Mich
505 (1988), and that the murder was part of the unbroken chain of events surrounding the CSC.
Gillis, supra at 125. The murder occurred in the same location as the CSC, in the same relatively
short period, and in an apparent attempt to avoid the victim’s reporting what happened. While
defendant maintains that the sex was consensual, and that the homicide was the result of a desire
that the victim not tell others that defendant tried to kill her when she accidentally hit her head on
the tub, the jury was free to reject defendant’s account of the events. Further, defendant fails to
explain on appeal what intervening event broke the sequence of events that led from the sex to
the murder. The connection between the felony and the murder was no more attenuated than in
People v Thew, 201 Mich App 78, 87; 506 NW2d 547 (1993), where defendant pleaded guilty of
felony-murder on the basis that he ran over the eleven-year-old CSC victim ten or fifteen
minutes after consensual intercourse, after the defendant and the victim got into an argument
about unrelated events. This Court found that defendant’s admission that at the time he ran over
the victim, he was concerned about the victim telling others about the intercourse, was sufficient
to support an inference that the argument was part of a continuous transaction that resulted in the
victim’s death. Here, defendant’s admission that he strangled the victim shortly after the
intercourse supports the same inference. The evidence was sufficient for a reasonable trier of
fact to determine that the death occurred in the perpetration of the felony.
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred when it admitted a photograph of the
victim’s body as it was found. A trial court’s decision to admit evidence is reviewed for an
abuse of discretion. People v Johnson, 474 Mich 96, 99; 712 NW2d 703 (2006). The proper
analysis for admission of a photograph is whether the evidence was relevant, MRE 401, and
whether that probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
MRE 403. People v Mills, 450 Mich 61, 66, 76; 537 NW2d 909 (1995). Photographs are not
excluded merely because a witness could testify regarding the information, nor are they excluded
merely because they are gruesome. Id. at 76. The photograph here was relevant to corroborate
and demonstrate the medical examiner’s testimony regarding the victim’s appearance. The
marks on her body, the state of her clothes, and how dry or damp her head and hair were, gave
the jurors relevant information about what happened, and whether defendant’s statement was
credible. Further, although there was some risk of unfair prejudice inherent in the nature of the
photograph, that risk did not substantially outweigh its probative value. Therefore, the trial court
did not abuse its discretion when it admitted the photograph. See MRE 403; Mills, supra at 66,
76.
Finally, defendant argues that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for mistrial
after the victim’s mother collapsed in court. A trial court should grant a mistrial only for an
irregularity that impairs a defendant’s ability to receive a fair trial. People v Bauder, 269 Mich
App 174, 195; 712 NW2d 506 (2005). An emotional outburst is grounds for a mistrial only
when it was so egregious that the prejudicial effect can not be cured. Id.; People v Gonzales, 193
Mich App 263, 266; 483 NW2d 458 (1992). In the present case, the record states that the jurors
left the courtroom before the victim’s mother received medical attention, and the trial judge
believed the jurors did not even know who collapsed. After the incident, the trial court instructed
the jurors that they must not let sympathy or prejudice influence their decision. Juries are
generally presumed to follow instructions. Bauder, supra at 195. This incident was not so
egregious that a cautionary instruction could not cure the prejudicial effect. Therefore, the trial
court did not err when it denied the mistrial motion.
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Affirmed.
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Helene N. White
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
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