PEOPLE OF MI V DAVID RIGGINS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 20, 2007
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 271929
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 06-000456-01
LEWIS HARRIS,
Defendant-Appellant.
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 272070
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 06-000456-02
DAVID RIGGINS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Schuette, P.J., and Hoekstra and Meter, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a joint bench trial, defendants Lewis Harris and David Riggins were both
convicted of armed robbery, MCL 750.529, two counts of felonious assault, MCL 750.82, and
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b.1 Harris was also
convicted of felon in possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f. Harris was sentenced as an
habitual offender, second offense, MCL 769.10, to concurrent prison terms of 11 to 22 years for
the robbery conviction, one to six years for each assault conviction, and 1 to 7-1/2 years for the
felon in possession conviction, to be served consecutively to a five-year term of imprisonment
for the felony-firearm, second offense, conviction. Riggins was sentenced to concurrent prison
terms of seven to 15 years for the robbery conviction and one to four years for each assault
1
Harris was convicted of felony-firearm, second offense.
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conviction, to be served consecutively to a two-year term of imprisonment for the felony-firearm
conviction. Both defendants appeal as of right. We affirm.
Defendants’ convictions arose from the armed robbery of Peter Sibinovski, a motel desk
clerk, and the subsequent assaults on police officers John McCleod and James Johnson, who
pursued defendants immediately after the robbery; gunshots were fired at the officers during the
chase.
I. Docket No. 271929
Harris first argues that the trial court’s verdict was against the great weight of the
evidence.2 This Court reviews a trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law in a bench
trial under the clearly erroneous standard. MCR 2.613(C). “In the application of this principle,
regard shall be given to the special opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the
witnesses who appeared before it.” Id. “[C]onflicting testimony, even when impeached to some
extent, is an insufficient ground for granting a new trial.” People v McCray, 245 Mich App 631,
637-638; 630 NW2d 633 (2001) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
The trial court found that Harris aided or abetted an armed robbery. Armed robbery
involves “(1) an assault, (2) a felonious taking of property from the victim’s presence or person,
(3) while the defendant is armed with a weapon described in the statute.” People v Carines, 460
Mich 750, 757; 597 NW2d 130 (1999) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); MCL
750.529. To find that a defendant aided or abetted a crime, the prosecution must show that
(1) the crime charged was committed by the defendant or another person, (2) the
defendant performed acts or gave encouragement that assisted in the commission
of the crime, and (3) the defendant intended the commission of the crime or had
knowledge that the principal intended its commission at the time he gave aid and
encouragement. [Carines, supra at 757 (internal citation and quotation marks
omitted).]
An aider and abettor’s state of mind may be inferred from all the facts and circumstances of the
crime. Id. “Factors that may be considered include a close association between the defendant
and the principal, the defendant’s participation in the planning or execution of the crime, and
evidence of flight after the crime.” Id. at 757-758 (internal citation and quotation marks
omitted). “Mere presence, even with knowledge that an offense is about to be committed or is
being committed, is insufficient to show that a person is an aider and abettor.” People v Wilson,
196 Mich App 604, 614; 493 NW2d 471 (1992).
Although we agree that Harris was not identified as an occupant of the Dodge Intrepid in
which two other suspects were seen arriving at the motel, there was other evidence connecting
him to that vehicle. An unidentified person was observed driving the Intrepid. The Intrepid
2
We note that in cases “tried without a jury, the appellant need not file a motion for remand to
challenge the great weight of the evidence in order to preserve the issue for appeal.” MCR
7.211(C)(1)(c).
-2-
belonged to Harris’s girlfriend, who testified that Harris had possession of the vehicle on the
night of the charged offenses and who also testified that Harris’s cellular telephone was on the
seat of the Intrepid in a picture of the vehicle shown to her by the prosecutor.
Additionally, shortly after Sibinovski was robbed, two police officers arrived at the motel
and observed Riggins and Harris exiting the motel. According to McCleod, the men were armed
with blue steel automatic handguns. The officers pursued the two defendants on foot and both
officers testified that one of them fired a gun toward the officers during the pursuit. Harris was
later found hiding in a yard one or two blocks from the motel. A residue test was performed on
Harris and tested positive for the presence of gunshot residue on his hands.
In light of this evidence, the trial court’s conclusion that Harris was guilty of aiding and
abetting in the robbery of Sibinovski was not against the great weight of the evidence.
Similarly, the trial court’s conclusions with respect to Harris’s felonious assault
convictions were not against the great weight of the evidence. The crime of felonious assault
contains the following elements: “(1) an assault, (2) with a dangerous weapon, and (3) with the
intent to injure or place the victim in reasonable apprehension of an immediate battery.” People
v John Davis, 216 Mich App 47, 53; 549 NW2d 1 (1996) (internal citation and quotation marks
omitted). In light of the evidence that Harris was observed leaving the motel with Riggins, that
Harris was observed to be armed with a handgun, that shots were fired at the two officers as they
were pursuing Harris and Riggins, and that Harris subsequently tested positive for the presence
of gunshot residue on his hands, the trial court’s finding that Harris was guilty of feloniously
assaulting McCleod and Johnson was neither clearly erroneous nor against the great weight of
the evidence.3
We reject Harris’s argument that the trial court’s verdict was against the great weight of
the evidence because spent shell casings were not recovered from the alley and because there
could be other explanations for the presence of gunshot residue on his hands. Neither of these
factors renders the officers’ testimony so inherently implausible, or so patently incredible, that it
could not be believed. People v Lemmon, 456 Mich 625, 643-644; 576 NW2d 129 (1998). As
the trial court also observed, the fact that Harris was found hiding in a backyard in the vicinity of
the robbery, during the early hours of a cold December morning, was evidence of his
consciousness of guilt.
In a pro se supplemental brief, Harris also argues that the evidence was insufficient to
support his convictions. We disagree.
[A] challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence in a bench trial is reviewed by
considering the evidence presented in a light most favorable to the prosecution
3
Harris also suggests that his convictions of felony-firearm and felon in possession of a firearm
were against the great weight of the evidence. In light of the evidence supporting his robbery
and assault convictions, and in light of the fact that Harris stipulated that he had previously been
convicted of a felony that prohibited him from carrying or possessing a firearm on the date of the
instant offenses, we reject Harris’s argument.
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and determining whether a rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. [People v Daniels, 172
Mich App 374, 378; 431 NW2d 846 (1988).]
As previously discussed, the evidence showed that one of the suspects in the robbery
arrived in a Dodge Intrepid, and there was evidence linking Harris to that vehicle. Additionally,
Harris and Riggins were both identified fleeing from the motel while armed with weapons. Two
uniformed police officers directed them to stop, but they ignored the command and started
running through an alley. When the officers chased after the two men, one of them turned and
fired a gun at the officers. Harris was later found hiding in a nearby backyard, and he
subsequently tested positive for the presence of gunshot residue on his hands. Viewed in the
light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of
fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Harris participated in the robbery of Sibinovski, that
he feloniously assaulted the two officers during the foot chase, and that he possessed a firearm
during the offenses.4 Thus, there was sufficient evidence to support Harris’s convictions.
Next, Harris argues that the trial court erroneously denied his motion for an in camera
review of McCleod’s Internal Affairs file relating to McCleod’s having been indicted by a
federal grand jury for allegedly falsifying reports in other cases.5 We disagree.
The decision whether to conduct an in camera review of information to determine if it is
discoverable is discretionary with the trial court, and this Court reviews that decision for an
abuse of discretion. People v Laws, 218 Mich App 447, 455; 554 NW2d 586 (1996); see also
People v Stanaway, 446 Mich 643, 677; 521 NW2d 557 (1994).
There is no right to the discovery of information protected from disclosure by
constitution, statute, or privilege. MCR 6.201(C)(1).6 Instead, where privileged information is
requested, the trial court may conduct an in camera hearing to determine whether there is a
reasonable probability that the records are likely to contain material information necessary to the
defense. Laws, supra at 455. However, a hearing is required only if the defendant first shows
that he has a “good-faith belief, grounded on some demonstrable fact, that there is a reasonable
probability that the records are likely to contain material information necessary to the defense.”
Stanaway, supra at 677; see also MCR 6.201(C)(2) and People v Fink, 456 Mich 449, 455; 574
NW2d 28 (1998).7
4
As indicated in footnote 3, Harris stipulated that he was previously convicted of a felony that
prohibited him from carrying or possessing a firearm on the date of the instant offenses.
5
We note that the trial court did grant Harris’s and Riggins’s motions for discovery of the
Internal Affairs file relating to the instant case.
6
We note that neither Harris nor Riggins argues that the file was not privileged.
7
Harris urges this Court to follow United States v Henthorn, 931 F2d 29 (CA 9, 1991), and hold
that the prosecution was required to produce the file without a showing of its materiality. We
decline to do so. Other federal courts have declined to follow Henthorn, see United States v
Quinn, 123 F3d 1415, 1421-1422 (CA 11, 1997), and that decision is inconsistent with the
(continued…)
-4-
Harris failed to demonstrate any articulable facts establishing the materiality of the
Internal Affairs records, assuming they exist. There was no evidence that McCleod had falsified
his reports or planted evidence in the instant case. Moreover, and significantly, it is undisputed
that the federal charges against McCleod were dismissed. On appeal, Harris simply argues that
the file might reveal information related to McCleod’s credibility. Such a claim amounts to a
mere “fishing expedition,” which is insufficient to justify an in camera hearing. For these
reasons, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Harris’s request for an in camera
review of the records.
II. Docket No. 272070
Riggins also argues that the trial court erroneously refused to conduct an in camera
review of McCleod’s Internal Affairs file related to his federal indictment. Riggins did not
identify any basis for an in camera review that had not been raised by Harris. Accordingly, for
the reasons previously explained in our discussion of this issue with respect to Harris, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to conduct an in camera hearing.
Riggins next argues that the on-the-scene identifications by Johnson and McCleod were
unduly suggestive and, therefore, should have been suppressed.
This Court will not reverse a trial court’s decision to admit identification evidence
unless it finds the decision clearly erroneous. Clear error exists when the
reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake was
made. [People v Hornsby, 251 Mich App 462, 466; 650 NW2d 700 (2002).]
This Court has recognized the benefits of prompt on-the-scene identifications to ensure
reliability in apprehending suspects; the procedure allows the police to apprehend the right
suspect and release improperly detained individuals. See People v Libbett, 251 Mich App 353,
361-363; 650 NW2d 407 (2002). However, an on-the-scene identification procedure can violate
a defendant’s right to due process if it is “so impermissibly suggestive that it gives rise to a
substantial likelihood of misidentification.” People v Gray, 457 Mich 107, 111; 577 NW2d 92
(1998). The fairness or suggestiveness of an identification procedure is reviewed in light of the
total circumstances. Hornsby, supra at 466. Relevant factors to consider include: (1) the
witness’s opportunity to view the suspect at the time of the crime, (2) the witness’s degree of
attention, (3) the accuracy of a prior description from the victim, (4) the witness’s level of
certainty at the time of the pretrial identification, and (5) the amount of time between the crime
and the confrontation. People v Colon, 233 Mich App 295, 304-305; 591 NW2d 692 (1998). A
statement suggesting or telling a victim that the police have apprehended the right person, or
somehow singling out one person, can lead to an impermissibly suggestive identification. Gray,
supra at 111. If a procedure is found to be impermissibly suggestive, an in-court identification
by the witness is inadmissible unless the prosecution can demonstrate, by clear and convincing
evidence, that the witness had an independent basis for the identification. Id. at 114-115.
(…continued)
established law in this state that requires a defendant to show materiality before the government
has an obligation to provide discovery.
-5-
The trial court did not clearly err in denying Riggins’s motion. There was no substantial
likelihood of misidentification here. Riggins does not contend that he did not match the general
descriptions of the suspects provided by the officers before he was apprehended. Riggins was
wearing a hat, fashioned into a ski mask, at the time of his arrest. He also had clothing and
gloves consistent with the description provided by the robbery victim. He was found hiding
under a vehicle at approximately 5:30 a.m. on a cold, snowy December morning, and a handgun
was found in close proximity to this location. Because Riggins was apprehended under
circumstances indicating that he was not simply an innocent bystander, there was no substantial
likelihood that the on-the-scene identification led to his misidentification.
Moreover, although Riggins was handcuffed and placed in a police vehicle for viewing
by both officers, and other officers told the victims that they had apprehended the “guy” who
shot at them, considering that the victims were trained police officers, we conclude that the
procedures and comments in this case were not so impermissibly suggestive as to lead to a
substantial likelihood of misidentification.
Furthermore, the trial court did not err in failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing
concerning this issue. A trial court is not required to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine
the constitutional validity of an identification procedure. People v James Johnson, 202 Mich
App 281, 285-287; 508 NW2d 509 (1993). Here, an evidentiary hearing was requested because
defendant did not have the benefit of complete discovery at the time the motion to suppress was
made. The prosecutor agreed to provide the requested discovery materials, which Riggins’s
counsel appeared to agree would be satisfactory. Counsel never subsequently indicated that an
evidentiary hearing was necessary. Under the circumstances, there has been no showing that an
evidentiary hearing was necessary.
Riggins next argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. We
disagree.
Although Sibinovski could not identify the gunman involved in the robbery, Riggins was
observed running from the motel by McCleod while armed with a weapon. During his escape,
either Riggins or Harris fired at the officers who were pursuing them. Riggins was later
discovered hiding underneath a car. He was wearing a cap made into a ski mask, dark clothing,
and gloves, consistent with Sibinovski’s description of the gunman who robbed him, and a
handgun was found nearby.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence was sufficient to
allow a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Riggins participated in the
robbery of Sibinovski. Additionally, the evidence that he was armed with a gun during the
offense supports his conviction of felony-firearm.
The evidence also supports Riggins’s felonious assault convictions. Even though the
evidence generally pointed to Harris as the person who fired the shots at the two officers as they
were chasing both defendants, Riggins properly could be convicted under an aiding and abetting
theory based on his participation in the armed robbery with Harris and their joint escape from the
police, given that Harris’s conduct in attempting to escape from the scene was a natural and
probable consequence of that crime. People v Robinson, 475 Mich 1, 3; 715 NW2d 44 (2006).
Thus, the evidence was sufficient to support Riggins’s convictions.
-6-
Affirmed.
/s/ Bill Schuette
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
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