IN RE TREVOR CLOCK MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of TREVOR CLOCK, Minor.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
UNPUBLISHED
December 18, 2007
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 278342
Kalamazoo Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 06-000040-NA
DAVID CLOCK and CINDY JOHNSON,
Respondents-Appellants.
Before: Davis, P.J., and Murphy and Servitto, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondents appeal from the trial court’s order terminating their parental rights to the
minor child under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) and (ii), (g), and (j). Because statutory grounds for
termination were proven by clear and convincing evidence and termination of respondents’
parental rights was not contrary to the children’s best interests, we affirm.
The minor child came under the jurisdiction of the trial court based upon allegations of
respondents’ failure to provide proper care or custody for Trevor, including respondent-mother’s
alcohol abuse, their lack of appropriate housing, their failure to provide any financial support for
Trevor’s care since August 2005, and their refusal to participate with services and unwillingness
to address their alcoholism and mental health issues. After conducting a termination trial (nearly
two years later) the court found that clear and convincing evidence supported termination of
respondents’ parental rights.
In order to terminate parental rights, the trial court must find that at least one of the
statutory grounds for termination in MCL 712A.19b(3) has been met by clear and convincing
evidence. In re Jackson, 199 Mich App 22, 25; 501 NW2d 182 (1993). We review the trial
court’s determination for clear error. In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 356-357; 612 NW2d 407
(2000). A finding is clearly erroneous if, although there is evidence to support it, we are left
with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. In re JK, 468 Mich 202, 209210; 661 NW2d 216 (2003).
Respondents first claim on appeal that the evidence failed to clearly and convincingly
establish the statutory grounds for termination. We disagree.
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The primary conditions that caused the child at issue to come within the court’s
jurisdiction were respondents’ homelessness, respondent-mother’s substance abuse, and
respondent-father’s mental health issues, which clearly impacted their ability to effectively
parent the child. Respondents were able to successfully address their housing issue during the
proceedings. However, the evidence showed that they clearly failed to rectify their substance
abuse and mental health issues, despite having almost one year since the court entered its
dispositional order and approximately 20 months since services began, to comply.
In fact, respondent-mother failed to even minimally comply with any of the substance
abuse services provided to her. She failed to regularly attend substance abuse treatment and/or
AA meetings, did not comply with random alcohol/drug screens, and continued to use alcohol
during the proceedings.1 Likewise, although respondent-father attended individual counseling
and parenting classes as recommended, the evidence showed that he did not fully benefit from or
make substantial progress in those services. Most notable, however, was his refusal throughout
the proceedings to consider taking medication to improve his mental health contrary to the strong
recommendations by the experts to do so.
In light of their past failure and their apparent lack of motivation to address their issues,
despite services, we find no reasonable likelihood that respondents would be able to rectify their
issues within a reasonable time to enable them to provide proper care and custody and a safe
environment for the child. MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) and (g). This is especially so, considering
the child’s young age and the lengthy period of time (almost two years) he had already been
outside of respondents’ care. Respondents’ recent motivation to take advantage of services and
treatment options to address their issues, although commendable, came too late in the
proceedings considering the child’s serious need for permanency and stability. Accordingly,
despite respondents’ noteworthy efforts towards compliance with their housing issue during the
proceedings, we find no clear error in the trial court’s decision to terminate their parental rights.
Trejo, supra at 356-357. Termination is proper even if a respondent partially complies with the
parent/agency agreement where that compliance remains insufficient to rectify the conditions
that caused the child to come within the court’s jurisdiction. Jackson, supra at 27. Here, the
evidence clearly and convincingly established that respondents’ failure to successfully address
their substance abuse and/or mental health issues, placed the child at a continued risk of
emotional and physical harm if he were returned to their home. MCL 712A.19b(3)(j).
Next, respondent-father argues that the trial court clearly erred in terminating his parental
rights because petitioner failed to provide adequate services and assistance in light of his mental
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Respondent-mother attributed her failure to comply with substance abuse services to her
transportation problems. Although it was apparent that transportation was an issue during the
proceedings, testimony indicated that it did not prevent her from complying with services. To
the contrary, testimony revealed that the caseworker offered transportation assistance to her in
the form of bus passes and services, yet she failed to take advantage of them. Had she taken
advantage of the transportation services offered to her, she likely would have been able to attend
substance abuse services and perhaps made progress towards addressing her problem. Instead,
she failed to do so, which suggests a lack of motivation on her part.
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limitations. We disagree. We review a trial court’s factual findings for clear error. MCR
3.977(J); In re Terry, 240 Mich App 14, 22; 610 NW2d 563 (2000).
It is apparent from our review of the record that petitioner attempted to accommodate
respondent-father’s needs by referring him to psychological and psychiatric evaluations and the
specific services and treatment recommended by his evaluators. It is also apparent that
respondent-father’s own actions in resisting the strong recommendation to take medication to
improve his mental health hindered petitioner’s ability to assist him towards reunification.
Respondent-father’s inability to rectify his mental health issues, therefore, could not be attributed
to a lack of reasonable efforts to assist him. Instead, he failed to take full advantage of the
available services and recommended treatment options. On this record, we find no clear error in
the trial court’s finding that petitioner made reasonable efforts towards reunification. Terry,
supra at 22. Although petitioner had a duty to make reasonable efforts to rectify the conditions
that caused the child’s removal, MCL 712A.18f(1), (2), and (4), it could only do so if
respondent-father took advantage of the services.
Lastly, respondents challenge the trial court’s determination regarding the best interest
inquiry. Under MCL 712A.19b(5), “[o]nce a ground for termination is established, the court
must issue an order terminating parental rights unless there exists clear evidence, on the whole
record, that termination is not in the child’s best interests.” Trejo, supra at 354; MCL
712A.19b(5). We review the trial court’s determination for clear error. Trejo, supra at 356-357.
Although undisputed evidence showed that the child and respondents were clearly
bonded and respondents loved and missed him and desired him to return to their care, that
evidence did not “clearly overwhelm,” Trejo, supra, 462 Mich 364, their failure over the almost
two years that the child was outside of their care to address or fulfill the necessary requirements
so that they could provide him with the stability and permanency he urgently needed. We find
noteworthy the report by the child’s therapist indicating that she supported a “prompt”
termination decision and reunification with respondents only if they had addressed their issues,
which, unfortunately, they were unable to accomplish. On this record, we find no clear error in
the trial court’s determination that the evidence failed to show that termination was clearly not in
the children’s best interests. Trejo, supra at 356-357.
Affirmed.
/s/ Alton T. Davis
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Deborah A. Servitto
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