PEOPLE OF MI V TIMOTHY PAUL BENNETT
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 18, 2007
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 273236
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 06-006396-01
TIMOTHY PAUL BENNETT,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Jansen, P.J., and O’Connell and Fort Hood, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from his jury convictions of assault with intent to do great
bodily harm, MCL 750.84, discharge of a weapon at a dwelling or occupied structure, MCL
750.234b, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm), MCL
750.227b. Upon resentencing, the trial court sentenced defendant to concurrent terms of four to
ten years for the assault conviction, eighteen months to four years for the discharging a weapon
conviction, and to a consecutive two-year term for the felony-firearm conviction. We affirm.
Defendant first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions. In
reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we “evaluate the evidence in the light most favorable
to the prosecution and determine whether a rational trier of fact could find that the essential
elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v Osantowski, 274 Mich
App 593, 613; 736 NW2d 289 (2007). “Assault with intent to commit great bodily harm less
than murder requires proof of (1) an attempt or threat with force or violence to do corporal harm
to another (an assault), and (2) an intent to do great bodily harm less than murder.” People v
Parcha, 227 Mich App 236, 239; 575 NW2d 316 (1997). A trier of fact may infer the necessary
specific intent from a defendant’s conduct. Id. Furthermore, because of the inherent difficulties
with directly proving a defendant’s thoughts and unspoken purposes, minimal circumstantial
evidence is sufficient to support a finding that a defendant acted with a specific intent in mind.
People v McRunels, 237 Mich App 168, 181; 603 NW2d 95 (1999).
Here, the evidence would allow a rational trier of fact to find the elements of assault with
intent to do great bodily harm beyond a reasonable doubt. Various witnesses indicated that
defendant and the victim engaged in an altercation, and while the victim was pinned to the
ground, defendant requested a gun, which was handed to him. The victim testified that he
grabbed the barrel of the gun and, while he and defendant were tussling over it, the gun went off,
firing a shot above and to the side of the victim’s head. One witness testified that defendant fired
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the gun at the victim during the struggle, and another testified that he fired it while merely
swinging the pistol at the victim. No matter which version of the episode is adopted, defendant’s
assault with the pistol raises the legitimate inference that he intended to do the victim great
bodily harm.
The evidence was also sufficient to establish that, on another occasion, defendant fired a
gun at a dwelling or occupied structure. Anyone who “intentionally discharges a firearm at a
facility that he or she knows or has reason to believe is a dwelling or an occupied structure” is
guilty of this crime. MCL 750.234b(1). Here, the structure was undeniably a house, and various
witnesses testified that individuals had fled inside during the relevant sequence of events that
encompassed defendant’s act of firing shots at the building. When the resident of the home
emerged, he noticed that the screen door was shattered and the porch light was out. A neighbor
testified that she saw defendant and another individual fire at the house, handing a gun back and
forth. On appeal, defendant argues that the testimony of the neighbor is inconsistent with the
testimony of other witnesses and should be disregarded. However, this Court will not interfere
with the jury’s role of determining the weight of the evidence or the credibility of the witnesses.
People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 514-515; 489 NW2d 748, amended 441 Mich 1201 (1992).
Therefore, the prosecutor presented sufficient evidence to support defendant’s conviction of
discharging a weapon at a dwelling or occupied structure.
Defendant also asserts on appeal that a new trial should have been granted because the
jury’s verdicts were contrary to the weight of the evidence. “The test to determine whether a
verdict is against the great weight of the evidence is whether the evidence preponderates so
heavily against the verdict that it would be a miscarriage of justice to allow the verdict to stand.”
People v Musser, 259 Mich App 215, 218-219; 673 NW2d 800 (2003). On appeal, a trial court’s
decision to grant or deny a new trial is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v Lemmon,
456 Mich 625, 648 n 27; 576 NW2d 129 (1998). Although defendant cites inconsistencies in the
testimony supporting his assault conviction, the cited inconsistencies do not seriously damage
the validity of the verdicts. For example, the witnesses essentially agreed that defendant
requested a gun while the victim was pinned to the ground, that a firearm was handed to him, and
that the gun then discharged at some point while defendant was swinging it or firing it at the
victim. Regarding his conviction for firing a weapon at a dwelling, the question of credibility is
for the jury unless the testimony supporting the conviction has been deprived of all probative
value or the jury could not believe it. Id. at 642-643. The testimony of the witness who
identified defendant as a shooter was not so impeached that it was deprived of all probative value
nor so infallibly contradicted that it could never be reasonably credited. Therefore, the trial
court’s denial of defendant’s motion for new trial was not an abuse of discretion. Id. at 648 n 27.
Defendant next asserts that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel by his
attorney’s failure to call him as a witness.
To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must
show both that counsel’s performance was deficient and that counsel’s deficient
performance prejudiced the defense. In order to demonstrate that counsel's
performance was deficient, the defendant must show that it fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms. In so
doing, the defendant must overcome a strong presumption that counsel’s
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performance constituted sound trial strategy. [People v Riley (After Remand), 468
Mich 135, 140; 659 NW2d 611 (2003), citations omitted.]
Regarding the factual basis for defendant’s claim, the trial court rejected defendant’s
assertion, embodied in an affidavit, that he wanted to be called as a witness at trial. The trial
court found the claim “unpersuasive, and quite frankly, not credible.” The court noted that the
record did not contain anything that could be construed as an indication by defendant that he
wanted to testify, and defendant did not indicate at sentencing that he had been denied an
opportunity to testify. We do not find anything in the record that could supply any basis to
conclude that the trial court’s factual determination in this regard was clearly erroneous. People
v LeBlanc, 465 Mich 575, 579; 640 NW2d 246 (2002). Furthermore, if defendant had testified in
accordance with his post-trial affidavit, there is no reasonable probability that the jury would
have chosen to believe his account. The bare statements in the affidavit were conclusory and
entirely at variance with the testimony of all the other witnesses. Therefore, defendant has failed
to demonstrate any actual prejudice from his trial attorney’s strategic recommendation that he
refrain from testifying. Riley, supra.
Defendant next claims that the trial court erred by denying his motion for directed verdict
on a charge of assault with intent to murder, for which he was acquitted. In a related argument,
defendant asserts that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by opposing a directed verdict on
the charge of assault with intent to murder, by requesting an instruction on the lesser offense of
assault with intent to do great bodily harm, and by then conceding in closing argument that the
greater offense had not been proven. Because defendant failed to make a contemporaneous
objection to the alleged prosecutorial misconduct and did not request a curative instruction, our
review is limited to determining whether the trial court committed plain error that affected
substantial rights. People v Callon, 256 Mich App 312, 329; 662 NW2d 501 (2003). Whatever
the prosecutor’s intention in making the comments in question, defendant was not denied a fair
trial because the evidence that defendant aimed and shot at the victim was adequate to support
the instruction on assault with intent to murder. Moreover, any error did not affect defendant’s
substantial rights because the lesser charge for which he was convicted was also clearly
supported by the evidence.
Finally, defendant challenges his sentences, first asserting that two offense variables were
improperly scored. The trial court’s scoring of sentencing guidelines is reviewed for clear error.
People v Hicks, 259 Mich App 518, 522; 675 NW2d 599 (2004). Regarding offense variable one
(OV1), MCL 777.31, defendant was given 25 points because “a weapon was discharged at or
toward a human being . . . .” The testimony clearly supported this determination. On OV14,
MCL 777.44, defendant was given 10 points on the ground that he “was a leader in a multiple
offender situation.” This scoring is also supported by the record, which indicates that defendant
requested a gun while he was holding the victim down and that another individual gave him one.
Defendant also asserts that the trial court’s reasons for departing from the sentencing
guidelines were neither “objective and verifiable” nor “substantial and compelling.” People v
Babcock, 469 Mich 247, 256-258; 666 NW2d 231 (2003). In reviewing a departure from the
guidelines range, the existence of a particular factor is reviewed for clear error, a determination
that a factor is objective and verifiable is reviewed de novo, and a determination that the factor
constituted substantial and compelling reason for departure is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. Id. at 264-265. The trial court articulated objective and verifiable reasons for its
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departure, specifically that the victim only avoided serious injury or death by his own actions,
and that defendant shot at the house after seeing individuals flee into it. The trial court’s
identification of these factors as objective and verifiable was not clear error because they were
substantially supported by record evidence. Because the factors cited in support of departure are
verified in the witnesses’ accounts of events, the trial court did not err by considering these
factors to be objective and verifiable. Id.
Finally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that these factors constituted
substantial and compelling reasons for departure. Defendant argues that the fact that individuals
were in the house is an essential element of the crime of shooting at a dwelling or occupied
structure, so they were already taken into account in the sentencing guidelines. See id. at 258, n
12; MCL 769.34(3)(b). We disagree. “Dwelling” is defined as “a facility habitually used by 1 or
more individuals as a place of abode, whether or not an individual is present in the facility,”
MCL 750.234b(5)(a), so the elements of the crime would also be satisfied by shooting at an
unoccupied dwelling. The trial court correctly found that defendant’s act of shooting into a
house into which people had recently fled was not accounted for in the guidelines. Similarly, the
fact that potential injury or death was only averted by the quick actions of the victim is not
accounted for in the offense variables. The supplemental details of the events amplify the
gravity of the crimes charged, keenly demonstrating defendant’s serious lack of concern for
human life. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ruling that these
considerations warranted deviation from the sentencing guidelines.
Affirmed.
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
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