PEOPLE OF MI V REINALDO CLAUDIO
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 18, 2007
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 273007
Kent Circuit Court
LC No. 06-001272-FH
REINALDO CLAUDIO,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Bandstra, P.J., and Meter and Beckering, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from his convictions by a jury of assault with intent to do
great bodily harm less than murder, MCL 750.84, and first-degree home invasion, MCL
750.110a(2). Defendant was sentenced as an habitual offender, second offense, MCL 769.10, to
concurrent terms of nine to 30 years’ imprisonment for first-degree home invasion and five to 15
years’ imprisonment for assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder. We affirm.
Defendant first argues that the prosecutor failed to present sufficient evidence from which
a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant committed assault
with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder. We review challenges to the sufficiency of
the evidence de novo and, in doing so, “view the evidence in a light most favorable to the
prosecution to determine whether the [trier of fact] could have found that the essential elements
of the crime were proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” See People v Sherman-Huffman, 241
Mich App 264, 265; 615 NW2d 776 (2000). Circumstantial evidence and the reasonable
inferences that arise therefrom can constitute sufficient proof of the elements of a crime. People
v Lugo, 214 Mich 699, 710; 542 NW2d 921 (1995). A conviction of assault with intent to do
great bodily harm less than murder requires proof of: “(1) an attempt or threat with force or
violence to do corporal harm to another (an assault), and (2) an intent to do great bodily harm
less than murder.” People v Parcha, 227 Mich App 236, 239; 575 NW2d 316 (1997). A
defendant's intent may be inferred from all the facts and circumstances surrounding the crime.
See Lugo, supra at 709-710. The intent to do great bodily harm less than murder “has been
defined as an intent to do serious injury of an aggravated nature.” People v Mitchell, 149 Mich
App 36, 39; 385 NW2d 717 (1986).
Defendant argues that the prosecutor failed to produce evidence showing that defendant
intended to inflict great bodily harm on the victim, because the injuries were not serious.
Although defendant testified that he did not possess a knife, the victim testified that defendant
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took his knife and stabbed him in the stomach with it. The physicians who treated the victim
observed a “puncture wound” in his stomach. This Court has previously determined that the
intent to do physical harm can be inferred from the fact that a defendant used a dangerous
weapon. People v Crane, 27 Mich App 201, 204; 183 NW2d 307 (1970). Furthermore, the
victim’s girlfriend testified that, shortly before the assault occurred, codefendant Donnell
Williams informed her during a telephone conversation that “it was curtains for” the victim,
because Williams and his roommate, defendant, “were going to jump him” because of some
stolen drugs. A reviewing court must make credibility choices in support of the jury's verdict.
People v Nowack, 462 Mich 392, 400; 614 NW2d 78 (2000). Given the difficulty of proving
state of mind, minimal circumstantial evidence is sufficient to prove that an actor had the
requisite intent. People v Strong, 143 Mich App 442, 452; 372 NW2d 335 (1985). The evidence
presented at trial supported the jury’s verdict that defendant had the requisite intent to do great
bodily harm less than murder.
Defendant next argues that the prosecutor failed to present sufficient evidence from
which a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant committed
first-degree home invasion. The elements of first-degree home invasion are: (1) the defendant
broke and entered a dwelling or entered the dwelling without permission; (2) when the defendant
did so, he intended to commit a felony, larceny, or assault, or he actually committed a felony,
larceny, or assault while entering, being present in, or exiting the dwelling; and (3) another
person was lawfully present in the dwelling or the defendant was armed with a dangerous
weapon. People v Sands, 261 Mich App 158, 162; 680 NW2d 500 (2004); MCL 750.110a(2).
On appeal, defendant solely asserts that the prosecutor failed to present sufficient
evidence to prove the element of entry without permission. “Without permission” means
“without having obtained permission to enter from the owner or lessee of the dwelling or from
any other person lawfully in possession or control of the dwelling.” MCL 750.110a(1)(c).
Defendant argues that the evidence at trial showed that codefendant Williams generally had
permission to enter the victim’s apartment, and that, on the night of the incident, the victim’s
girlfriend implicitly allowed defendant and Williams to enter her apartment when she instructed
codefendant Williams to discuss his accusations against the victim directly. However, at trial,
the victim’s girlfriend denied that she granted Williams or defendant permission to enter her
apartment during a telephone conversation and denied that they had permission to enter her
apartment “unannounced.” A victim's testimony alone may be sufficient evidence to support the
elements of a crime. People v Taylor, 185 Mich App 1, 8; 460 NW2d 582 (1990). It is the
jury’s duty to determine the credibility of the witnesses, and this Court will not interfere with
that determination. People v Williams, 268 Mich App 416, 419; 707 NW2d 624 (2005). This
Court resolves all conflicts regarding the credibility of witnesses in support of the jury's verdict,
Nowack, supra at 400, and not in the light most favorable to defendant. We reject defendant’s
sufficiency of the evidence argument.1
1
In the context of his sufficiency of the evidence arguments, defendant makes additional
arguments concerning the submission of an armed robbery charge to the jury and concerning a
particular jury instruction. We decline to address these arguments because they were not
properly submitted as separate issues or properly raised in the statement of questions presented
(continued…)
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Defendant next argues, in propria persona, that he was denied his due process right to a
fair trial by prosecutorial misconduct. We disagree. Generally, this Court reviews claims of
prosecutorial misconduct on a case-by-case basis, examining the prosecutor’s remarks in context
to determine whether the defendant received a fair and impartial trial. People v Watson, 245
Mich App 572, 586; 629 NW2d 411 (2001). However, because the alleged errors were not
preserved by contemporaneous objections and requests for a curative instruction, appellate
review is for plain error. Id. To avoid forfeiture under the plain error rule, three requirements
must be met: (1) an error must have occurred; (2) the error must have been clear or obvious; and
(3) the error must have affected the defendant’s substantial rights, which generally requires the
defendant to show that the error affected the outcome of the lower court proceedings. People v
Carines, 460 Mich 763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). Reversal is warranted only when plain error
resulted in the conviction of an actually innocent defendant or seriously affected the fairness,
integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id. at 763-764. Further, no error requiring
reversal will be found if a curative instruction could have prevented any prejudicial effect.
Watson, supra at 586.
Defendant first argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct by bringing multiple
charges against him for one criminal transaction. “A prosecutor has broad discretion when
charging defendants, and it is generally permissible [for a prosecutor] to charge in a single
information all offenses which do arise out of a single criminal transaction or occurrence.”
People v Goold, 241 Mich App 333, 342; 615 NW2d 794 (2000) (internal citations and quotation
marks omitted); see also People v Venticinque, 459 Mich 90, 100-101; 586 NW2d 732 (1998).
A prosecutor is prohibited from artificially dividing a single major offense into an unreasonable
number of related components, because the division is likely to have a coercive effect on the
jury. People v Wells, 102 Mich App 122, 132; 302 NW2d 196 (1980). However, this Court will
not find that a prosecutor abused the power of charging where there is evidence to support each
charged crime. See, generally, People v Nichols, 262 Mich App 408, 415; 686 NW2d 502
(2004).
The evidence presented at trial supported each of the charged counts, and those counts
were distinct. Our Legislature intended to allow multiple punishments if a defendant commits
first-degree home invasion and another crime in the same incident. People v Conley, 270 Mich
App 301, 311-312; 715 NW2d 377 (2006). Under the circumstances, where defendant was
charged only with the home invasion and distinct crimes that occurred in the same incident, the
prosecutor did not abuse his power in issuing the charges. See People v Barksdale, 219 Mich
App 484, 488; 556 NW2d 521 (1996) (discussing prosecutorial discretion).
Defendant next argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct by bolstering the
testimony of the victim when, during his opening statement, the prosecutor discussed his theory
regarding the use of the knife. Improper bolstering of the credibility of a prosecution witness
may constitute prosecutorial misconduct. People v Malone, 180 Mich App 347, 361; 447 NW2d
157 (1989). Defendant has not shown that any alleged bolstering occurred during the
prosecutor’s opening statement. The opening statement fulfilled its purpose, to inform the jury
(…continued)
for appeal. See People v Miller, 238 Mich App 168, 172; 604 NW2d 781 (1999); see also MCR
7.212(C)(5).
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of the facts the prosecutor intended to elicit. People v Moss, 70 Mich App 18, 32; 245 NW2d
389 (1976). Contrary to defendant’s argument, the prosecutor’s opening statement did not
contain a suggestive, misleading statement involving a pocketknife’s being connected to the case
when it was not. The testimony of the victim indicated that the knife was used in the crime.
Next, defendant argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct by introducing false
testimony by the victim. The prosecution has a constitutional duty to report the false testimony
of its witnesses and may not knowingly use false testimony to obtain a conviction. People v
Lester, 232 Mich App 262, 276; 591 NW2d 267 (1998). Absent proof that the prosecution knew
that the trial testimony was false, however, there is no due process violation. People v Herndon,
246 Mich App 371, 417-418; 633 NW2d 376 (2001). Defendant does not establish that any of
the victim’s testimony was false or that the prosecutor knowingly used false testimony.
Furthermore, this Court has previously determined that the mere fact that a witness's testimony
conflicts with earlier statements does not establish that a prosecutor knowingly presented
perjured testimony. People v Parker, 230 Mich App 677, 690; 584 NW2d 753 (1998).
Next, defendant argues on appeal that his right to be free from multiple punishments for
the same offense was infringed upon by his conviction for both first-degree home invasion and
assault with intent to do great bodily harm. Because defendant failed to properly preserve this
issue, this Court reviews for plain error, which affected defendant’s substantial rights. People v
Barber, 255 Mich App 288, 291; 659 NW2d 674 (2003). Both the United States and Michigan
Constitutions prohibit placing a defendant twice in jeopardy for a single offense. US Const, Am
V; Const 1963, art 1, § 15.
The Double Jeopardy Clause affords individuals three related protections:
(1) it protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; (2)
it protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and
(3) it protects against multiple punishments for the same offense. The first two
protections are generally understood as the “successive prosecutions” strand of
double jeopardy, while the third protection is commonly understood as the
“multiple punishments” strand. [People v Smith, 478 Mich 292, 299; 733 NW2d
351 (2007) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).]
The first-degree home invasion statute provides that the imposition of a penalty for home
invasion "does not bar imposition of a penalty under any other applicable law." MCL
750.110a(9). This Court already determined that the Legislature clearly intended, by that
language, to impose multiple punishments. Conley, supra at 311-312; People v Shipley, 256
Mich App 367, 378; 662 NW2d 856 (2003). Thus, defendant’s sentences for first-degree home
invasion and assault with intent to do great bodily harm did not violate defendant’s right to be
free from multiple punishments for the same offense.
Defendant next argues that the trial court committed plain error in scoring defendant’s
sentencing guidelines. Defendant first argues that prior record variable (PRV) 1, MCL 777.51,
was scored inaccurately because the trial court based its decision to score 25 points on an armed
robbery conviction that occurred in 1992, which was more than ten years before the instant
crime, in violation of MCL 777.50. Defendant received 25 points for PRV 1, which reflects that
defendant had one prior high severity conviction. MCL 777.51(1)(c).
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The presentence investigation report (PSIR) indicates that, on April 23, 1993, defendant
was convicted of one count of armed robbery and one count of burglary, in Illinois. For the
count of armed robbery, defendant was sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment. Significantly,
the pertinent ten-year period runs from defendant’s date of discharge of that conviction. MCL
777.50. Defendant has failed to establish that his discharge occurred outside of the ten-year
period. Defendant has not established the existence of plain error.
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in scoring 25 points for offense variable
(OV) 1, MCL 777.31, involving aggravated use of a weapon. However, the trial court sustained
defendant’s objection to the scoring of 25 points for OV 1 at the sentencing hearing and instead
scored ten points for OV 1. MCL 777.31 provides that a trial court should score ten points for
OV 1 if “[t]he victim was touched by any other type of weapon.” There was evidence that
defendant received a puncture wound in his stomach when defendant thrust a knife at him during
the assault. There was also evidence that defendant used a chair to strike the victim. A trial
court's scoring decision will be upheld if there is any evidence in the record to support it, as there
is here. People v Kegler, 268 Mich App 187, 190; 706 NW2d 744 (2005).
Defendant also argues that the trial court erred in scoring five points for OV 2, MCL
777.32. OV 2 is to be assessed at five points if “[t]he offender possessed or used a pistol, rifle,
shotgun, or knife or other cutting or stabbing weapon.” MCL 777.32(1)(d). As mentioned
above, there was evidence that the victim received a puncture wound in his stomach when
defendant thrust a knife at him during the assault. Again, a trial court's scoring decision will be
upheld if there is any evidence in the record to support it, as there is here. Kegler, supra at 190.
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in scoring ten points for OV 3, MCL
777.33, which provides that a trial court is required to score ten points if the victim suffered
bodily injury requiring medical treatment. MCL 777.33(1)(d). While defendant argued that the
injuries suffered by Jaworowicz did not require medical treatment, the evidence produced at trial
showed that somebody telephoned emergency services after the assault to request treatment and
that Jaworowicz was kept in the hospital for 24 hours after the assault. Thus, there was evidence
in the record to support the trial court’s scoring determination, and we therefore affirm it.
Kegler, supra at 190.
Defendant next argues that the complaint should have been quashed, because the victim
did not personally sign the complaint. However, the complaint contained the substance of the
accusations against defendant and the name and statutory citation for the charged offenses, which
is all that is required. MCL 764.1d; MCR 6.101(A). Furthermore, the complaint was signed by
the complaining witness, Detective Les Smith. Personal knowledge of the complaining officer is
not necessary if the officer's testimony comes from information and belief. MCL 764.1a(3).
Therefore, defendant’s argument is without merit.
Defendant finally argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. We
disagree. The right to the effective assistance of counsel is substantive and focuses on the actual
assistance received. People v Pubrat, 451 Mich 589, 596; 548 NW2d 595 (1996). To establish a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must demonstrate: (1) that his counsel’s
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under current professional
norms; (2) that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, the result of
defendant’s trial would have been different, and (3) the proceedings were fundamentally unfair
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or unreliable. People v Toma, 462 Mich 281, 302-303; 613 NW2d 694 (2000); People v Mack,
265 Mich App 122, 129; 695 NW2d 342 (2005); People v Rodgers, 248 Mich App 702, 714; 645
NW2d 294 (2001). “Effective assistance of counsel is presumed, and the defendant bears a
heavy burden of proving otherwise.” People v Solmonson, 261 Mich App 657, 663; 683 NW2d
761 (2004).
Defendant asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the alleged
prosecutorial misconduct, for failing to move for a mistrial based on the alleged double jeopardy
violations, for failing to move the trial court to rule, as a matter of law, that the victim’s puncture
wound was caused by the leg of a chair, for challenging the trial court’s scoring of defendant’s
guidelines, and for failing to move to quash the complaint. As mentioned above, those claims
lack merit. Therefore, any objection would have been futile. Defendant’s trial counsel will not
be deemed ineffective for failing to make a futile objection. People v Thomas, 260 Mich App
450, 457; 678 NW2d 631 (2004).
Affirmed.
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ Jane M. Beckering
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