PEOPLE OF MI V SHAWN MICHAEL VESCOSO
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 18, 2007
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 272404
Kalamazoo Circuit Court
LC No. 05-001350-FH
SHAWN MICHAEL VESCOSO,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Davis, P.J., and Murphy and Servitto, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant Shawn Michael Vescoso appeals as of right his jury trial convictions for six
counts of distributing or promoting child sexually abusive material, MCL 750.145c(3); six
counts of possession of child sexually abusive material, MCL 750.145c(4); and two counts of
using a computer to commit a crime, MCL 752.796, MCL 752.797(3)(d). Defendant was
sentenced to 12 months in jail and 5 years’ probation for each of the fourteen criminal counts.
We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
In October of 2003, an investigator in Wyoming was conducting an Internet investigation
related to the downloading of child pornography on computers. His investigation revealed that
child pornography had been downloaded to an Internet address, later determined to be used by
defendant. The software installed and used on defendant’s computer to download the child
pornography also allowed the images to be downloaded onto other computers through peer-topeer file sharing networks (allowing one computer to share information with another without
having to go through a central server). After the investigator downloaded the images from
defendant’s computer to his own using the file sharing, he informed police in Michigan of his
findings. Michigan police went to the residence defendant shared with his girlfriend and
defendant indicated to police that he had downloaded file-sharing software and was using it to
download both adult and child pornographic images. The police confiscated the computer and,
after determining that the computer contained a significant amount of child pornography,
charged defendant in the instant matter.
Defendant first argues that the trial court improperly instructed the jury about the
elements of the crime of distributing or promoting child sexually abusive activity. Specifically,
defendant contends that the trial court did not instruct the jury on an essential element of the
charges of distributing or promoting child sexually abusive activity that must be proven by the
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prosecution; to wit, that the defendant must have distributed or promoted the material with
criminal intent. Defendant thus contends he is entitled to a reversal of his convictions for those
crimes.
To preserve an instructional issue, a party must object to the instruction before the jury
deliberates. MCR 2.516(C). By affirmatively expressing satisfaction with the trial court’s jury
instructions, a party waives review of those instructions to which he accedes at trial. People v
Taylor, 159 Mich App 468, 488; 406 NW2d 859 (1987). See also, People v Carter, 462 Mich
206, 215; 612 NW2d 144 (2000) (expressing satisfaction with the trial court’s instructions
constitutes a waiver that extinguishes any error regarding the instructions).
At the close of the instructions in the present matter, the trial court asked the parties
whether they had “any corrections” regarding the instructions. Neither party offered any
corrections. The trial court then specifically asked each party whether they had “any objection to
the instructions as read” by the trial court. Defendant’s trial counsel stated, “[n]one, your
Honor.” At first blush, it would appear, then, that defendant waived any right to appellate review
on this issue.
In People v Allensworth, 401 Mich 67; 257 NW2d 81 (1977), and People v Reed, 393
Mich 342; 224 NW2d 867 (1975), the trial courts effectively removed from the juries’
consideration some elements of the crimes by instructing that a felony murder in Allensworth and
a premeditated murder in Reed had indeed taken place, with the jurors simply needing to
determine whether it was the defendants who committed the murders. Our Supreme Court
reversed the convictions in both cases because the trial courts had intruded on the province of the
juries to determine all the elements of the crimes, thereby depriving the defendants of their
constitutional rights. In both cases, there was some indication in the record that defense counsel
had agreed or conceded that the crime of murder did occur, but reversal was nevertheless
mandated where there was no “understandingly tendered waiver.” Allensworth, supra at 69-70;
Reed, supra at 349. Here, it is readily apparent that defense counsel, as well as the trial court,
were unaware of the full extent of the elements of the crime as previously and recently
enunciated in People v Tombs, 472 Mich 446, 465; 697 NW2d 494 (2005), which we shall
address below. Therefore, while there was technically a waiver, it was ineffective because it was
not an “understandingly tendered waiver.” Without an effective waiver, the appropriate analysis
would entail application of the plain-error test under People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763-764;
597 NW2d 130 (1999).1
1
While defendant claims that automatic reversal would be warranted because the lacking
instruction presents a “structural error,” only a failure to instruct on the elements of a crime
altogether constitutes a structural defect warranting automatic reversal (See People v
Duncan, 462 Mich 47; 610 NW2d 551 (2000). An instructional error regarding one element of a
crime, whether by an incorrect description or by omission, is nonstructural. Duncan, supra at 51,
citing Neder v US, 527 US 1; 119 S Ct 1827 (US Fla, 1999) and People v Carines, supra.
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To avoid forfeiture of a constitutional right under the plain error rule, three requirements
must be met: 1) error must have occurred, 2) the error was plain, i.e., clear or obvious, 3) and the
plain error affected substantial rights. Id. Reversal is warranted only when the plain, forfeited
error resulted in the conviction of an actually innocent defendant or when an error “ ‘seriously
affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings' independent of the
defendant's innocence.” Id. at 763-764. Even if jury instructions are imperfect, there is no error
if they fairly presented the issues to be tried and sufficiently protected the defendant's rights.
People v Clark, 274 Mich App 248, 255-256; 732 NW2d 605 (2007). And no error results from
the omission of an instruction if the instructions as a whole covered the substance of the omitted
instruction. People v Kurr, 253 Mich App 317, 327; 654 NW2d 651 (2002).
MCL 750.145c(3), which prohibits the distribution or promotion of child sexually
abusive material, requires that an accused be shown to have had criminal intent to distribute or
promote. Tombs, supra. Due process requires proof of this intent beyond a reasonable doubt. Id
at 459, 465.
In this matter, the trial court instructed the jury, in relevant part:
The defendant is charged with the crime of child sexually abusive material
distributing or promoting. To prove this charge, the prosecutor must prove each
of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
First, that the material in question is child sexually abusive material;
Second, that the defendant distributed the material in question;
Third, that the defendant knew or had reason to know or should reasonably be
expected to know the subject of the image was a child or that the defendant did
not take reasonable precautions to determine the age of the child in the image.
The court did not instruct the jury that in order to convict defendant of distributing or
promoting child sexually abusive material it must find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant
possessed the requisite criminal intent to distribute or promote the material. That an error
occurred and that the error was plain is thus beyond dispute. Remaining for resolution, then, is
whether the error affected defendant’s substantial rights.
In Tombs, supra, our Supreme Court discussed at great length the necessity of criminal
intent to support a conviction of promoting or distributing child sexually abusive activity. In that
case, an employee leaving his employment was required to return a company-issued laptop
computer. The employee had downloaded child pornography onto the laptop and did not delete
the material before the laptop was returned. At his trial on charges of, among other things,
distributing or promoting child sexually abusive activity, evidence revealed that the images had
been “buried” in the computer and that when company laptops were returned, the hard drives
were deleted without anyone viewing what was contained within them (a policy known by the
defendant). The Court, in reversing the defendant’s conviction of the charge expressed its
concern that criminal liability could attach even though the action of distribution or promotion
was inadvertent or unknowing: “For instance, a person might accidentally attach the wrong file
to an e-mail sent to another. The person might intend to send an innocent photograph, but
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accidentally send a pornographic photograph of a child instead. Also, the person might not
intend that the recipient recognize or even see the material that he transferred.” Tombs thus
announced that it must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant criminally intended
that the materials be distributed or promoted in order to sustain a conviction for distributing or
promoting child sexually abusive activity.
The instructions in this matter, as given, would allow for the jury to convict defendant of
the crime at issue, even if he inadvertently or unknowingly allowed the pornography contained
on his computer to be downloaded by other computer users—the very type of conviction that
concerned the Tombs court. According to the given instructions, that images were able to be
shared and that the Wyoming investigator did, in fact, obtain the images from defendant’s
computer through a file sharing program, would be sufficient to support a conviction regardless
of whether defendant knew the files were obtainable by others or intended that they be so
available.
On the record, it is impossible for this Court to determine whether the jury did or could
have found that defendant intended to distribute the images to others. The lack of an instruction
regarding intent was magnified during closing arguments, when the prosecutor stated:
Now you’re going to notice that the judge isn’t going to say that the
person had to knowingly distribute. All he’s going to say is that the person
distributed. Now he’s going to tell you later on that the person had to know the
nature of the material that they [sic] were distributing; that they [sic] knew that it
was child sexually abusive material; that it involved somebody. But he’s not
going to tell you that the defendant had to know that he was distributing. So I
suspect that maybe defense [sic] might try and convince you that that’s something
that you have to find in this case, that he knew that he was actually sending it out
to people; but that’s not something that has to happen. You only have to find,
number one, that it was distributed and, number two, that it was child
pornography or child sexually abusive material.
Notably, the jury later sent out a note during deliberations requesting a more concise definition
of the charge of distributing or promoting child sexually abusive material. It is impossible to say
that had the jury been properly instructed, the outcome would be the same, particularly given that
little, if any, evidence concerning defendant’s knowledge of the mechanics and abilities of the
file sharing software was introduced at trial. Because the lack of appropriate instruction
regarding defendant’s intent sent the jury to deliberate without the benefit of knowing, and thus
being able to consider, perhaps the most essential element of the charged crime, this error
seriously affected the fairness and integrity of the verdict. Defendant’s convictions for
distributing or promoting child sexually abusive material, MCL 750.145c(3), must therefore be
reversed and defendant granted a new trial on these charges. Defendant’s conviction for using a
computer to commit the crime of distribution or promotion of child sexually abusive activity
(Count XIV) arising from the same facts of the conviction for distributing or promoting child
sexually abusive material, it too must be reversed.
Next, defendant argues that the prosecutor failed to present sufficient evidence for a
rational jury to determine beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant possessed the child sexually
abusive images that formed the basis for counts VII, IX through XIII, and XV. We review de
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novo claims of insufficient evidence. People v Lueth, 253 Mich App 670, 680; 660 NW2d 322
(2002). In so doing, we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution in order to
determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the elements of the charged offenses
beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Johnson, 460 Mich 720, 723; 597 NW2d 73 (1999).
MCL 750.145c(4)2 provides, in relevant part:
A person who knowingly possesses any child sexually abusive material is
guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 4 years or a fine
of not more than $10,000.00, or both, if that person knows, has reason to know, or
should reasonably be expected to know the child is a child or that the child
sexually abusive material includes a child or that the depiction constituting the
child sexually abusive material appears to include a child, or that person has not
taken reasonable precautions to determine the age of the child.
Defendant argues on appeal that the images that form the basis of the possession of child
sexually abusive material charges were found either in the area of Burger’s computer containing
the “temporary Internet files,” or in the area of Burger’s computer containing deleted material.
Defendant, citing People v Girard, 269 Mich App 15, 20-21; 709 NW2d 229 (2005), argues that
the prosecutor was required to show more than “just the presence of child sexually abusive
material in a temporary Internet file or a computer recycle bin to prove that defendant knowingly
possessed the material.” Defendant, however, mischaracterizes the evidence that was presented
at trial.
The police officer who examined the computer used by defendant testified that he found
the images that formed the basis of the counts of possession of child sexually abusive material in
compressed files that were “available to a user.” We note, however, that even if the material had
been found only in the temporary Internet file or in the area of the computer containing deleted
material, Girard, supra, does not support defendant’s argument. In that case, this Court
explicitly avoided ruling whether the presence of a document in a temporary Internet file or
recycle bin (the area where deleted material is stored) constituted knowing possession:
We need not address whether the mere presence of a document or image
in a temporary Internet file or in the computer recycle bin would be sufficient to
prove knowing possession beyond a reasonable doubt because the evidence
adduced below, viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, showed that
defendant's possession reached beyond such circumstances. [Id. at 23.]
Here, there was ample evidence presented at trial supporting that defendant knowingly
possessed child sexually abusive material. A Federal Special Agent who conducted an
investigation of the distribution of child sexually abusive material on “peer-to-peer” file sharing
networks testified that defendant distributed child sexually abusive material to him over the
2
Count XV, using a computer to commit a crime, MCL 752.796, MCL 752.797(3)(d), was
derivative of the convictions for possessing child sexually abusive material. Therefore, this
Court’s determination of the issue regarding those counts is applicable to Count XV.
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Internet, by making it available to users of the Kazaa software program. When police
confiscated the computer used by defendant, he admitted that he used the Kazaa software to
“download pornographic images,” including one image “of a girl [defendant] believed to be
about ten years old that was holding a male penis.” Defendant admitted that he did not delete
that image. Furthermore, the officer who searched the computer observed “approximately 714”
images that he identified as “potentially being suspected child pornography” in the area of the
computer containing deleted material, and 225 “suspected child pornographic images” in the
“compressed files” of the computer. In addition, in the Kazaa registry of the computer, there was
a list of the 25 most recently used “search terms” affiliated with the user account titled “Shawn,”
including the terms “pedo boys,” “Vicki and kiddy,” and “very young teens,” which were similar
to search terms that an officer observed in previous cases involving child sexually abusive
material. The recovered images that formed the basis of the charges, were “available to a user,”
according to Sergeant Cruz, who testified at trial. On the record, this evidence constituted
sufficient evidence that defendant knowingly possessed the child sexually abusive material that
formed the basis of his convictions.
Defendant next argues that the computer used by defendant was illegally seized by the
police. Because defendant failed to preserve this issue, this Court reviews for plain error
affecting defendant’s substantial rights. People v Carines, supra, 460 Mich 750, 763. Reversal
is warranted only when plain error resulted in the conviction of an actually innocent defendant or
seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Carines,
supra at 763, 774.
The federal and state constitutions protect against unreasonable searches and seizures,
and a search conducted without a warrant is generally considered unreasonable. People v
Brzezinski, 243 Mich App 431, 433; 622 NW2d 528 (2000). A consent to search, however,
permits a warrantless search and seizure when the consent is unequivocal, specific, and freely
and intelligently given. People v Galloway, 259 Mich App 634, 648; 675 NW2d 883 (2003).
The validity of a consent search is determined by the totality of the circumstances, and the
prosecutor has the burden of proving that the person granting consent was authorized to do so
and did so freely. People v Malone, 180 Mich App 347, 356; 447 NW2d 157 (1989); Galloway,
supra, at 648. Generally, consent must come from the person whose property is being searched,
or from a third party who possesses common authority over the property. People v Jordan, 187
Mich App 582, 587; 468 NW2d 294 (1991).
On the record before us, defendant has not shown that the computer was seized illegally.
The evidence produced at trial showed that defendant granted the police consent to take the
computer and search its contents. A police detective testified to this fact. Defendant
acknowledged at trial that he granted the police consent to take the computer. During the direct
examination of defendant, the following exchange occurred:
Q. All right. And at some point did you allow [the police] to take the computer?
A. Yes.
Q. And were you threatened in any manner, or was it completely voluntary on
your part?
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A. No, it was voluntary.
The record does not support that defendant consented to the taking of the computer but not the
subsequent search. Moreover, we note that the subsequent search was conducted only after a
search warrant was issued.
Defendant also argues that the initial investigation involving the distribution of child
sexually abusive material on peer-to-peer file sharing networks constituted an illegal search of
the computer. However, defendant has provided no legal support of his position. Moreover, the
Federal officer who conducted the initial investigation testified that his search involved material
that was available for anybody using the Kazaa software over “peer to peer” networks, over the
Internet. Defendant’s argument on this issue thus fails.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Alton T. Davis
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Deborah A. Servitto
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