PEOPLE OF MI V TYRONE COOPER
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 18, 2007
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 272071
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 06-005227-01
TYRONE COOPER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Saad, P.J., and Owens and Kelly, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
After a jury trial, defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree criminal sexual
conduct (CSC I), MCL 750.520b(1)(a) (sexual penetration of another person under 13 years of
age), and one count of second-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC II), MCL 750.520c(1)(a)
(sexual contact with a person under 13 years of age). The trial court sentenced defendant to
25 to 50 years’ imprisonment for each CSC I conviction and 5 to 15 years’ imprisonment for his
CSC II conviction. Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm.
I. Facts
In February 2006, defendant began living with Billy J. Taylor III and his 11-year-old son,
the victim in this case.1 Taylor and defendant had been friends for years. After moving in,
defendant often baby-sat the victim when Taylor was at work. He also bought the victim treats
that Taylor could not afford (such as candy and snacks). The victim testified that on more than
three occasions when his father was away from the house, defendant would tickle him until he
turned away. Then, defendant would place his hand inside the victim’s boxer shorts and digitally
penetrate his anus. The victim claimed that these instances in which penetration occurred took
place in both the Kentucky Street and Prairie Street homes. At first, the victim did not tell his
father about these incidents because he was afraid his father would think was he was gay and
because defendant told him after each instance of abuse that his father would punish and “whop”
him. The victim also testified that on one occasion after defendant penetrated him, he saw
defendant take a penis pump from a black bag and place the pump on his penis. Following this,
1
Defendant, Taylor, and the victim lived on Kentucky Street in Detroit until March 2006, when
they moved to a house on Prairie Street.
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defendant invited the victim to meet him in the bathroom, where the victim saw defendant sniff
the finger he used to penetrate him, masturbate, and ejaculate on the toilet.
When Taylor arrived home one evening in late April 2006, he saw the victim run to his
room wearing only boxer shorts, although the victim was not allowed to wander the house in his
underwear. At first, Taylor threatened to “whop” the victim, but he then thought that the
situation “wasn’t right.” Taylor checked the victim’s buttocks and asked if defendant touched
him. Although the victim said that defendant had not touched him, Taylor noted that the victim’s
buttocks looked as if they were “standing open.” Taylor took the victim to his sister’s house.
There, the victim was asked if something had happened when he was alone with defendant. The
victim claimed that “he didn’t know.” Taylor then took the victim to another relative’s house,
where the victim told him about the abuse. Taylor contacted the police, who later arrested
defendant.
At the time of defendant’s arrest, police confiscated a black bag belonging to defendant
and found a yellow penis pump inside. When the bag was later searched at the Wayne County
Jail, no penis pump was found.
In contrast to this version of events, defendant testified that he never initiated sexual
contact with the victim, but noted that the victim “poked [him] in the butt with his finger” on two
occasions. Defendant claimed that the victim lied about the abuse because defendant was
planning to tell Taylor that the victim had poked him. Defendant also denied owning any type of
sexual device such as a penis pump. He thought that Taylor was a strict parent and that the
victim was afraid of his father. Regardless, the jury convicted defendant of two counts of CSC I
and one count of CSC II.
II. Motion for Adjournment
Defendant first argues that the trial court’s denial of his motion for an adjournment
denied him his right to present a defense. We disagree. We review a trial court’s ruling on a
motion for an adjournment or continuance for an abuse of discretion. People v Coy, 258
Mich App 1, 17; 669 NW2d 831 (2003). Defendant’s claim that he was denied his right to
present a defense is unpreserved, so we review this claim for plain error affecting defendant’s
substantial rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763-764, 774; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).
In challenging the denial of a motion for an adjournment, a defendant must show both
good cause and due diligence, and that denial of the motion would prejudice the defendant. Coy,
supra at 18-19. “‘Good cause’ factors include ‘whether defendant (1) asserted a constitutional
right, (2) had a legitimate reason for asserting the right, (3) had been negligent, and (4) had
requested previous adjournments.’” Id. at 18, quoting People v Lawton, 196 Mich App 341, 348;
492 NW2d 810 (1992).
In claiming he was precluded from presenting a defense, defendant contends that as a
consequence of the denial of his motion for an adjournment, his counsel was unable to
adequately investigate potential witnesses who would testify regarding the victim’s credibility
and was unprepared for trial. This argument fails. “Although the right to present a defense is a
fundamental element of due process, it is not an absolute right. The accused must still comply
with ‘established rules of procedure and evidence designed to assure both fairness and reliability
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in the ascertainment of guilt and innocence.’” People v Hayes, 421 Mich 271, 279; 364 NW2d
635 (1984), quoting Chambers v Mississippi, 410 US 284, 302; 93 S Ct 1038; 35 L Ed 2d 297
(1973).
With respect to his claim that the denial of his motion for an adjournment precluded him
for presenting witnesses at trial, although defendant was not negligent in investigating witnesses
and had not requested previous adjournments, the denial of his motion was proper.
“MRE 608(b) generally prohibits impeachment of a witness by extrinsic evidence regarding
collateral, irrelevant, or immaterial matters . . . .” People v Spanke, 254 Mich App 642, 644; 658
NW2d 504 (2003). Extrinsic evidence is “[e]vidence that is calculated to impeach a witness’s
credibility, adduced by means other than cross-examination of the witness.” Black’s Law
Dictionary (8th ed). Here, because defendant claimed that an adjournment was necessary for
further investigation of witnesses whose testimony would impeach the victim, any further
investigation would have yielded extrinsic evidence. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion when it denied the motion on these grounds. In addition, defendant has failed to show
prejudice. Indeed, despite his claim that more time was needed for investigation, defendant still
presented the testimony of two school employees who testified that the victim had a reputation
for fabricating stories. Thus, this aspect of defendant’s claim fails.
Also, defense counsel had more than “mere days” to prepare, as defendant argues on
appeal. Indeed, not only had defense counsel represented defendant since the preliminary
examination, which occurred over a month-and-a-half before trial, but defense counsel also
admitted that he had obtained all discoverable material in the case. Moreover, defense counsel
identified potential defense witnesses and proffered their testimony to the court on the first day
of trial, indicated that he was prepared to present his case in chief on the second day of trial, and
did not begin presenting his case until the third day of trial, five days after the court denied his
motion for an adjournment. In light of this, it appears that defense counsel was adequately
prepared for trial. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion, prejudice defendant or
deprive defendant of his right to present a defense when it denied defendant’s motion to adjourn
the trial.
Defendant also claims that he was denied his right to present a defense because the denial
of his motion for an adjournment precluded him from taking a polygraph examination. We
disagree. Initially, we note that MCL 776.21(5) provides that a defendant charged with criminal
sexual conduct has the right to a polygraph examination if he requests it. This right continues
until “the presumption of innocence has been displaced by a finding of guilt, i.e., when an
accused is no longer ‘alleged’ to have committed the offense.” People v Phillips, 469 Mich 390,
396; 666 NW2d 657 (2003). However, defendant’s failure to receive a polygraph examination
does not constitute reversible error.
In cases involving preserved, nonconstitutional error, a defendant must
demonstrate, “‘after an examination of the entire cause,’” that it “is more probable
than not that the error was outcome determinative.” People v Lukity, 460 Mich
484, 495-496; 596 NW2d 607 (1999). The reviewing court must examine the
nature of the error and assess its effect “‘in light of the weight and strength of the
untainted evidence.’” Id. at 495 (citation omitted). [Id. at 396-397.]
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It is not more probable than not that any error in this case resulting from defendant’s
failure to receive a polygraph examination was outcome-determinative. First, the evidence
supporting defendant’s conviction was relatively strong: the victim provided detailed statements
concerning defendant’s sexual misconduct and had little motive to falsify his testimony. Further,
even if defendant had taken and passed a polygraph examination, the results would not have been
admissible at trial. Id. at 397. Also, defendant had previously been given the opportunity to take
a polygraph examination and had refused. He again requested a polygraph examination during
the pretrial hearing, six days before his trial was scheduled to begin. Even if defendant had
received a polygraph examination immediately before trial, it is unlikely that his counsel would
have had time to use any information gathered from the examination to find additional witnesses
to testify for defendant. Finally, defendant testified in his defense at trial, giving the jury the
opportunity to hear his testimony and determine the credibility of his assertions of innocence.
Accordingly, defendant’s failure to receive a polygraph examination does not constitute
outcome-determinative error requiring reversal of his convictions.
Defendant also contends that as a consequence of the court’s denial of his motion for an
adjournment, he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. The determination whether
defendant has been deprived of effective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of fact and
law. People v LeBlanc, 465 Mich 575, 579; 640 NW2d 246 (2002). The trial court must first
determine the facts and then decide whether these facts constitute a violation of the defendant’s
right to effective assistance of counsel. Id. We review factual findings for clear error and review
constitutional determinations de novo. Id. “Effective assistance of counsel is presumed, and the
defendant bears a heavy burden of proving otherwise.” People v Rodgers, 248 Mich App 702,
714; 645 NW2d 294 (2001). We limit our review to mistakes apparent on the existing record.
People v Matuszak, 263 Mich App 42, 48; 687 NW2d 342 (2004).
The United States and Michigan Constitutions guarantee a defendant the right to effective
assistance of counsel. US Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art 1, § 20. To establish ineffective
assistance of counsel, “a defendant must show that counsel’s performance was below an
objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms and there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceedings would have
been different.” People v Effinger, 212 Mich App 67, 69; 536 NW2d 809 (1995). As noted
above, the denial of the motion for an adjournment did not prejudice defendant. Further, given
that defense counsel presented witnesses supporting his theory of the case, twice moved for a
polygraph examination at defendant’s request, and thoroughly prepared for trial, defendant has
not shown that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Id.
Thus, this claim fails.
III. Requests for Substitute Counsel
Defendant next argues that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to appoint
substitute counsel. Specifically, he claims that the trial court failed to investigate whether a
breakdown in the attorney-client relationship occurred and whether there was good cause to
appoint new counsel. We disagree. We review a trial court’s decision regarding the substitution
of counsel for an abuse of discretion. People v Traylor, 245 Mich App 460, 462; 628 NW2d 120
(2001). “An indigent defendant is guaranteed the right to counsel; however, he is not entitled to
have the attorney of his choice appointed simply by requesting that the attorney originally
appointed be replaced.” People v Mack, 190 Mich App 7, 14; 475 NW2d 830 (1991). A
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defendant is entitled to appointment of substitute counsel “only upon a showing of good cause
and where substitution will not unreasonably disrupt the judicial process. Good cause exists
where a legitimate difference of opinion develops between a defendant and his appointed counsel
with regard to a fundamental trial tactic.” Id. (citations omitted). Although claims that defense
counsel is not “adequate or diligent” or where defendant asserts that “his lawyer is disinterested”
may establish good cause, People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436, 441-442; 212 NW2d 922 (1973),
mere allegations that defendant lacks confidence in counsel do not establish good cause to
substitute counsel, Traylor, supra at 463.
Defendant first requested substitute counsel on the ground that he and his counsel were
“not getting along” because his counsel failed to ask certain questions at the preliminary
examination. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied this motion. Defendant
explained the basis of his disagreement with counsel at the arraignment only after the trial court
required defendant to specify the basis of his disagreement. Thus, defendant’s contention that
the trial court failed to properly investigate his claim is wrong on its face. Regardless, defendant
has not identified on appeal the questions that he claims defense counsel failed to ask, and he
“may not leave it to this Court to search for a factual basis to sustain or reject his position.” Id.,
quoting People v Norman, 184 Mich App 255, 260; 457 NW2d 136 (1990). Thus, this claim
fails.
Regarding defendant’s second request for substitute counsel, defendant claimed that a
substitution was necessary because he was “not getting the result that [he was] looking for” and
because his counsel had failed to communicate with him and provide information about the case.
Before the trial court ruled on this motion, defense counsel interjected that he had provided
defendant with all the discovery materials that he had received and that had filed motions for an
investigator and for additional discovery. In light of this, it was unnecessary for the trial court to
inquire further into defendant’s request for new counsel because it was clear that defendant’s
claim was baseless. Further, defendant’s complaints did not involve a legitimate difference of
opinion regarding a fundamental trial tactic. Mack, supra at 14. Defendant’s request expressed
nothing more than a vague lack of confidence in his counsel. This, however, is insufficient to
support a showing of good cause. Traylor, supra at 463. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse
its discretion when it denied this request for new counsel.
III. Jury’s Request to Rehear Testimony
Defendant next argues that the trial court’s response to the jury’s request to rehear
testimony effectively foreclosed the possibility that the jury would be permitted to rehear
testimony later. We disagree. Counsel failed to challenge the trial court’s instructions to the
jury. Accordingly, this issue is unpreserved, and we review for plain error affecting substantial
rights. People v Carter, 462 Mich 206, 214; 612 NW2d 144 (2000); Carines, supra at 763-764,
774.
Regarding a jury’s request to review testimony during deliberations, MCR 6.414(J)
provides:
If, after beginning deliberation, the jury requests a review of certain
testimony or evidence, the court must exercise its discretion to ensure fairness and
to refuse unreasonable requests, but it may not refuse a reasonable request. The
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court may order the jury to deliberate further without the requested review, so
long as the possibility of having the testimony or evidence reviewed at a later time
is not foreclosed.
During its deliberations, the jury requested trial transcripts. In response, the trial court
explained that a transcript of the whole trial was not immediately available, which was why the
jurors were permitted to take notes and use their collective memories to recall testimony, and that
it would take “quite a bit of time” for the court reporter to transcribe a portion of the trial should
the jury make a request for particular testimony. The court then ordered the jury to continue its
deliberations. This did not amount to a denial to rehear testimony or a foreclosure of the
possibility that the jury’s request could be granted. Instead, the court merely explained to the
jurors that a transcription was not readily available and if they requested a specific portion of
testimony, it would take time to prepare the transcript. Thus, defendant has failed to show plain
error.
IV. Claims of Error Raised in Standard 4 Brief
A. Prosecutorial Misconduct
Defendant argues that he was denied a fair trial because of prosecutorial misconduct. We
disagree. At trial, defendant challenged the prosecution’s opening statement and questioning of
the victim. We review these preserved issues of prosecutorial misconduct de novo “to determine
if the defendant was denied a fair and impartial trial.” People v Thomas, 260 Mich App 450,
453; 678 NW2d 631 (2004). We review defendant’s remaining claims for plain error affecting
his substantial rights. People v Aldrich, 246 Mich App 101, 110; 631 NW2d 67 (2001), citing
Carines, supra at 763. If a curative instruction could have alleviated any prejudicial effect, we
will not find error requiring reversal. People v Ackerman, 257 Mich App 434, 449; 669 NW2d
818 (2003).
Defendant claims that the evidence presented at trial did not support the prosecutor’s
opening statement and closing argument. However, defendant fails to articulate any specific
impropriety by the prosecutor. Thus, defendant has abandoned this argument. People v
Kevorkian, 248 Mich App 373, 389; 639 NW2d 291 (2001). However, in light of the fact that
defendant raised this argument in propria persona, we will briefly discuss his allegations of error
on the merits.
During his opening statement, the prosecutor merely stated what he expected to prove at
trial, i.e., that defendant digitally penetrated the victim and warned the victim not to tell his
father. Informing the jury what the evidence will show is the appropriate function of an opening
statement. People v Johnson, 187 Mich App 621, 626; 468 NW2d 307 (1991). During his
closing argument, the prosecutor recounted the evidence presented at trial and argued that this
was sufficient for the jury to convict defendant of the charges beyond a reasonable doubt. This
argument was proper because a prosecutor may argue the evidence as well as all reasonable
inferences arising from it as they relate to the case. People v Bahoda, 448 Mich 261, 282; 531
NW2d 659 (1995). Also, during closing argument, the prosecutor noted that, contrary to
defendant’s claim, the victim did not fabricate his testimony. “[A] prosecutor may comment on
his own witnesses’ credibility during closing argument, especially when there is conflicting
evidence and the question of the defendant’s guilt depends on which witnesses the jury
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believes.” Thomas, supra at 455. Accordingly, both the prosecutor’s opening statement and
closing argument were proper.
Regardless, the trial court instructed the jury that the attorneys’ arguments were not
evidence. Given that jurors are presumed to follow their instructions, People v Graves, 458
Mich 476, 486; 581 NW2d 229 (1998), these instructions would have eliminated any potential
for prejudice from the prosecution’s remarks, People v Rodriguez, 251 Mich App 10, 30; 650
NW2d 96 (2002). Therefore, the prosecutor’s remarks did not violate defendant’s substantial
rights. See Carines, supra at 763-764.
Defendant also argues that the prosecution presented misleading and false evidence. This
claim fails. Although “the prosecutor may not knowingly use false testimony to obtain a
conviction . . . [and] has a duty to correct false evidence[,]” People v Lester, 232 Mich App 262,
277; 591 NW2d 267 (1998) (citations ommitted), defendant has failed to show how any of the
evidence presented was misleading or false other than by reference to his own affidavits attached
to his brief on appeal. Notwithstanding that it is impermissible to expand the record on appeal,
People v Powell, 235 Mich App 557, 561 n 4; 599 NW2d 499 (1999), defendant’s affidavit
indicating that the victim’s father was not at work on one of the days on which he abused the
victim hardly establishes that the prosecutor knowingly presented misleading or false evidence.
Indeed, the victim’s father testified that he was away from the house because he was going to a
casino, not because he was at work.
In addition, defendant’s bare assertion that the victim fabricated his testimony does not
establish that the prosecution knowingly presented false evidence, let alone that the victim was
untruthful. Also, even though the prosecutor elicited testimony that a police officer found a
sexual device in defendant’s bag at the time of his arrest, the prosecutor also stipulated that a
search of defendant’s bag at the jail did not reveal this item. Thus, the prosecutor did not
knowingly present misleading or false evidence.
Defendant also claims that the prosecution asked improper leading questions of the
victim. We disagree. MRE 611(c)(1) states that “[l]eading questions should not be used on the
direct examination of a witness except as may be necessary to develop the witness’ testimony.”
Regarding the development of testimony, this Court has held that “a considerable amount of
leeway may be given to a prosecutor to ask leading questions of child witnesses.” People v
Watson, 245 Mich App 572, 587; 629 NW2d 411 (2001). Here, the prosecutor’s leading
questions reiterated testimony that the victim had already provided in response to open-ended
questions. This was proper. Indeed, not only was the victim 11 years old at the time of trial, but
the subject matter of his testimony was also of a graphic and sexual nature. Given that the
victim’s rendition of events was somewhat disjointed, the prosecutor’s leading questions merely
provided continuity to the victim’s testimony. In light of this, the questioning of the victim was
proper.
B. Jurisdiction
Next, defendant next argues that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over him in
this case. We disagree. Again, we review unpreserved issues for plain error affecting
defendant’s substantial rights. Carines, supra at 763-764, 774. Personal jurisdiction is “vested
in the circuit court upon the filing of a return of the magistrate . . . ‘before whom the defendant
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had been examined.’” People v Goecke, 457 Mich 442, 458-459; 579 NW2d 868 (1998),
quoting Genesee Prosecutor v Genesee Circuit Judge, 391 Mich 115, 119; 215 NW2d 145
(1974). Following the preliminary examination, the district court bound defendant over for trial
and filed a return to the circuit court. Thus, the circuit court properly acquired personal
jurisdiction over defendant.
Defendant contends that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because the complaint
mistakenly referred to another individual with the same name as defendant. However, there is no
evidence in the record to support this claim. Regardless, MCR 6.101(A) provides, “A complaint
is a written accusation that a named or described person has committed a specified criminal
offense. The complaint must include the substance of the accusation against the accused and the
name and statutory citation of the offense.” The complaint filed against defendant comported
with all requirements of MCR 6.101(A). Thus, defendant has failed to establish any deficiencies
in the complaint that deprived the trial court of personal jurisdiction.
In addition, defendant contends that the trial court “rushed” his trial by not allowing
further investigation of this case and failing to appoint substitute counsel. However, as noted
above, the trial court did not abuse its discretion regarding these matters. Defendant also claims
that the trial court permitted the introduction of inadmissible evidence. However, defendant has
failed to specify any evidence that was inadmissible. Therefore, he has abandoned this
argument. Kevorkian, supra at 389.
C. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Defendant contends that insufficient evidence was presented to support his convictions.
This claim fails. Due process requires the evidence to show guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to
sustain a conviction. People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 515; 489 NW2d 748 (1992), amended 441
Mich 1201 (1992). When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged, we review the evidence
“in a light most favorable to the prosecutor to determine whether any trier of fact could find that
the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v Robinson,
475 Mich 1, 5; 715 NW2d 44 (2006).
Defendant was convicted of two counts of CSC I for sexual penetration with another
person under 13 years of age. MCL 750.520b(1)(a). Sexual penetration is defined, in relevant
part, as “sexual intercourse . . . or any other intrusion, however slight, of any part of a person’s
body or of any object into the genital or anal openings of another person’s body, but emission of
semen is not required.” MCL 750.520a(p). Defendant was also convicted of CSC II for sexual
contact with another person under 13 years of age. MCL 750.520c(1)(a). Sexual contact is
defined as “the intentional touching of the victim’s or actor’s intimate parts or the intentional
touching of the clothing covering the immediate area of the victim’s or actor’s intimate parts, if
that intentional touching can reasonably be construed as being for the purpose of sexual arousal
or gratification . . . .” MCL 750.520a(o). Intimate parts include “the primary genital area, groin,
inner thigh, buttock, or breast of a human being.” MCL 750.520a(d).
Here, the victim testified that on more than three occasions and in two different
residences, defendant tickled him and, when the victim turned away, defendant placed his hand
inside the victim’s underwear and digitally penetrated his anus. Defendant also placed a sexual
device on his penis and summoned the victim into the bathroom where the victim saw defendant
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sniff his finger and masturbate. The victim was 11 years old. In light of these facts, a reasonable
juror could conclude that defendant penetrated and touched the victim (i.e., when defendant
tickled the victim and placed his hand inside the victim’s underwear) for purposes of sexual
arousal or gratification. Thus, sufficient evidence existed to support defendant’s convictions.
Defendant argues that because no DNA evidence was discovered linking him to the
offenses, insufficient evidence existed to support his convictions. Defendant also notes that there
were discrepancies throughout the victim’s testimony. However, a victim’s testimony need not
be corroborated to sustain the offense with which defendant was charged. MCL 750.520h.
Further, it is the role of the jury, rather than this Court, to assess witness credibility. Wolfe,
supra at 514-515. In this case, the jury evidently found the victim credible. Therefore, DNA
evidence was unnecessary to sustain a conviction. Consequently, this claim fails.
D. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Last, defendant claims that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel where
counsel failed to present DNA evidence and adequately cross-examine the victim. We disagree.
Our review is limited to errors apparent on the record. People v Pratt, 254 Mich App 425, 430;
656 NW2d 866 (2002). We presume that defense counsel’s decisions regarding what evidence
to present or whether to call and question witnesses are matters trial strategy, “which we will not
second-guess with the benefit of hindsight.” People v Dixon, 263 Mich App 393, 398; 688
NW2d 308 (2004). Moreover, counsel’s failure to call witnesses or present other evidence only
constitutes ineffective assistance “if it deprives the defendant of a substantial defense.” Id. A
substantial defense is one that might have made a difference in the outcome of the trial. People v
Hyland, 212 Mich App 701, 710; 538 NW2d 465 (1995), vacated in part on other grounds 453
Mich 902 (1996).
Given the nature of the offenses (i.e., digital penetration and sexual contact), the decision
not to present testimony regarding DNA would have made no difference in the outcome of this
case where identity was not even an issue. Similarly, in contrast to defendant’s bare assertion
that his counsel’s cross-examination of the victim was inadequate, the record reveals that defense
counsel raised issues concerning the victim’s credibility throughout his cross-examination. Thus,
defendant has failed to show that his counsel’s actions were not sound trial strategy, let alone
that he was denied a substantial defense.
Defendant also argues that his counsel failed to challenge the jurisdiction of the trial court
and instances of prosecutorial misconduct. Notwithstanding that defense counsel objected
during the prosecution’s opening statement and direct examination of the victim, defendant’s
claims of prosecutorial misconduct and jurisdiction are meritless, as noted previously. “Defense
counsel is not required to make a meritless motion or a futile objection.” People v Goodin, 257
Mich App 425, 433; 668 NW2d 392 (2003). Defendant also argues that his counsel failed to
obtain and provide him with discovery and to adequately prepare for trial. However, defense
counsel obtained and provided defendant with all discovery materials and was thoroughly
prepared for trial. Further, the record is devoid of any support for defendant’s claim that his
counsel failed to adequately meet with him before trial. Therefore, defendant has failed to
establish a factual predicate showing that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel.
People v Hoag, 460 Mich 1, 6; 594 NW2d 57 (1999) (a defendant must establish a factual
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predicate to support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel). Thus, defendant was not
denied the effective assistance of trial counsel.
Defendant also contends that he was denied the effective assistance of appellate counsel.
“The test for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is the same as that for trial counsel.”
Pratt, supra at 430. Although defendant bases this claim on the alleged failure of appellate
counsel to raise relevant issues on appeal, defendant has failed to enumerate any such issues.
Thus, defendant has failed to establish a factual predicate supporting his claim. Hoag, supra at
6. Regardless, defendant submitted a Standard 4 brief on appeal. Each issue raised is that brief
lacks merit. The failure to raise meritless claims does not constitute ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel. People v Reed, 449 Mich 375, 402; 535 NW2d 496 (1995) (Boyle, J.).
Therefore, defendant’s claim fails.
Affirmed.
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Donald S. Owens
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
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