JAMES A HOLMES V KAREN M ROMAN-HOLMES
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
JAMES A. HOLMES,
UNPUBLISHED
December 18, 2007
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
KAREN M. ROMAN-HOLMES, a/k/a KAREN
M. BURCHFIELD,
No. 271936
Kent Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 97-005874-DM
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Bandstra, P.J., and Meter and Beckering, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals by leave granted from the trial court’s order awarding plaintiff his
unpaid attorney fees. We reverse.
Defendant argues that, because her alleged “wrongful conduct” of moving Devon, the
parties’ minor daughter, 98.86 miles from Grand Rapids to Ludington was legal, the trial court
erred in awarding plaintiff attorney fees. We review a trial court’s decision to grant attorney fees
for an abuse of discretion. Reed v Reed, 265 Mich App 131, 164; 693 NW2d 825 (2005). A trial
court abuses its discretion when it fails to select a principled outcome. Maldonado v Ford Motor
Co, 476 Mich 372, 388; 719 NW2d 809 (2006).
The trial court awarded plaintiff attorney fees based on defendant’s “wrongful conduct.”
A trial court may award a party attorney fees if the fees “were incurred because the other party
refused to comply with a previous court order, despite having the ability to comply.” MCR
3.206(C)(2)(b). Similarly, a trial court may award attorney fees if the requesting party was
forced to incur the fees because of the other party’s unreasonable conduct. Borowsky v
Borowsky, 273 Mich App 666, 687; 733 NW2d 71 (2007).1
1
MCR 3.206(C)(2)(a) indicates that an attorney fee award may be justified if one “party is
unable to bear the expense of the action, and . . . the other party is able to pay,” but the trial court
did not rely on this provision to award the fees in this case.
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The court stated as follows regarding the award of attorney fees:
The rationale for this ruling is what I perceive to be Ms. Burchfield’s
wrongful conduct.
Ms. Burchfield indicates that she believes that she complied with joint
custody provisions that are required under law. It is my impression, which I
believe has been strongly supported by the testimony, that nothing could be
further from the truth.
Ms. Burchfield’s actions have been vindictive, not been child centered,
and focused on tearing down a daughter/father relationship.
I would like to highlight a portion of the testimony where Ms. Burchfield
called the Kent County Sheriff’s deputies to retrieve Devon less than a month ago,
and felt that this was appropriate conduct. When asked to re-evaluate that action,
she indicated that she would do it again.
I can think of nothing more detrimental to this beautiful girl who has
survived within this chaotic[] dysfunction than the punitive decisions her mother
continues to make without much thought of the impact on Devon.
Ms. Burchfield enjoys a lifestyle with two beautiful homes, current
vehicles, and vacations paid for by her new husband, and has the wherewithal to
pay this amount in full since she alleged that one reason for the move was higher
paying jobs.
I don’t find that Ms. Burchfield’s actions have been child centered nor in
Devon’s best interests. I find that Ms. Burchfield has been hurtful and
inappropriate, and that this matter could have been resolved with more
appropriate conduct and conversations.
Further, Ms. Burchfield appears to follow only those orders that are
convenient to her, and that meet her stated desire to move to Leelanau.[2]
I do believe that a full award of attorney fees is necessary in this case after
a review of the testimony and exhibits.
Although the court was not entirely clear regarding how defendant’s actions were
wrongful, it appears that the court viewed defendant’s move from Grand Rapids to Ludington as
unreasonable. We note, however, that defendant’s conduct of moving Devon the 98.86 miles
from Grand Rapids to Ludington was legally permitted by statute. MCL 722.31(1) allows a
2
Defendant initially wanted to move to Leelanau, but this request was objected to by plaintiff,
and she moved instead to Ludington.
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custodial parent to change the legal residence of a child if the new home is less than 100 miles
from the child’s residence at the time the complaint for divorce was filed. Accordingly, the
move itself was not a permissible basis on which to award attorney fees to plaintiff.
However, the joint custody provision of the judgment of divorce required that plaintiff
and defendant consult and attempt to agree before making major decisions regarding Devon’s
education. It is arguable that the court awarded attorney fees because it believed that defendant
acted unreasonably in changing Devon’s school from a Catholic school in Grand Rapids to a
public school in Ludington. However, defendant informed plaintiff in a July 2005 letter that the
public school was the only option in Ludington and invited plaintiff to research the school. This
letter demonstrated that plaintiff was acting reasonably and inviting input with regard to the issue
of schooling. Plaintiff then moved the trial court to order that Devon continue her Catholic
schooling, and the trial court eventually ruled that Devon had to be enrolled at a Catholic school
in Manistee, near Ludington. This Court overturned this ruling, indicating that an evidentiary
hearing needed to be held on the schooling issue. After this Court’s ruling, and before the
evidentiary hearing in February 2006, defendant enrolled Devon in the Ludington Public School
System. We cannot conclude that this action by defendant was unreasonable such that an
attorney-fee award was justified, given that Devon needed to attend school and given that this
Court had reversed the trial court’s initial ruling ordering that Devon attend the Catholic school
in Manistee.
The only other apparent basis for the trial court’s award of attorney fees was defendant’s
behavior in calling the police to retrieve Devon when plaintiff was late one time in dropping off
the child. Plaintiff claimed that he had not received the information that the drop-off time had
been changed to 5:00 p.m. from 7:00 p.m. While it may have been wiser to avoid police
involvement in light of the child’s young age, we simply cannot conclude that defendant’s
actions in enforcing the changed drop-off time was so unreasonable as to justify the award of
attorney fees in this case. Nor did defendant’s behavior in this regard force plaintiff to incur the
attorney fees at issue. Borowsky, supra at 687.
The court simply did not identify a valid basis for the award of attorney fees. The court
abused its discretion in awarding the fees, and we therefore reverse the trial court’s order.
Reversed.
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ Jane M. Beckering
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