PEOPLE OF MI V ANDRE DELL SIMMONS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 18, 2007
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 269555
Wayne Circuit Court
LC Nos. 05-010936-01
05-010937-01
05-010938-01
ANDRE DELL SIMMONS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Jansen, P.J., and O’Connell and Fort Hood, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his jury-trial convictions of one count of fourth-degree
criminal sexual conduct (CSC IV), MCL 750.520e(1)(a), three counts of third-degree criminal
sexual conduct (CSC III), MCL 750.520d(1)(a), and three counts of first-degree criminal sexual
conduct (CSC I), MCL 750.520b(1)(b). Pursuant to MCL 769.11, defendant was sentenced as a
third habitual offender to concurrent terms of 25 to 48 months’ imprisonment for the CSC IV
conviction, 20 to 40 years’ imprisonment for each of the CSC III convictions, and 427 to 720
months’ imprisonment for each of the CSC I convictions. We affirm.
Defendant first argues that the trial court improperly denied him the opportunity to
present witnesses at his Ginther1 hearing. However, upon review of the record, we find that the
trial court did not prevent defendant from calling his witnesses. Rather, defendant unequivocally
agreed with the trial court that the witnesses did not need to testify. Accordingly, defendant has
waived any error on appeal, and we need not address the merits of this issue. See People v Riley,
465 Mich 442, 448-449; 636 NW2d 514 (2001).
Defendant next argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Effective
assistance of counsel is presumed and a defendant bears a heavy burden to prove otherwise.
People v Rockey, 237 Mich App 74, 76; 601 NW2d 887 (1999). To prevail on a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that (1) counsel’s performance fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) but for defense counsel’s errors, there is a
1
People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436, 443-444; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).
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reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different. People v
Carbin, 463 Mich 590, 599-600; 623 NW2d 884 (2001). The defendant must affirmatively
demonstrate that counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable and so prejudicial as to
deprive the defendant of a fair trial. People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 303; 521 NW2d 797
(1994). A defendant must also overcome the presumption that the challenged action might be
considered sound trial strategy. People v LaVearn, 448 Mich 207, 216; 528 NW2d 721 (1995).
Defendant first argues that trial counsel was ineffective for not investigating his case by
contacting and interviewing witnesses, and for failing to call those witnesses at trial. A
defendant is entitled to have his counsel “prepare, investigate, and present all substantial
defenses,” and a substantial defense is “one that might have made a difference in the outcome of
the trial.” People v Kelly, 186 Mich App 524, 526; 465 NW2d 569 (1990). But decisions
concerning what evidence to present and whether to call or question witnesses are presumed to
be matters of strategy. People v Dixon, 263 Mich App 393, 398; 688 NW2d 308 (2004). Failure
to call a witness constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel only if it deprives the defendant of a
substantial defense. Id.
From the record, it is apparent that none of the people defendant proposed as witnesses
could have provided a substantial defense. Collectively, their testimony would have been
minimally relevant. Because trial counsel’s failure to investigate the proposed witnesses did not
deprive defendant of a substantial defense, defendant has failed to show that trial counsel was
ineffective. See Pickens, supra at 303. Moreover, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to
call these people as witnesses at trial because the potential witnesses would have offered little to
defendant’s defense. Dixon, supra at 398.
Defendant also argues that trial counsel’s performance was deficient because counsel did
not perform any meaningful pretrial discovery. Defendant points to the facts that trial counsel
did not file any pretrial motions and did not file a witness list. However, defendant does not
describe what type of pretrial motions trial counsel should have filed, nor does he allege how he
would have benefited had trial counsel filed pretrial motions. Defendant has the burden of
establishing the factual predicate for his ineffective assistance claim. People v Hoag, 460 Mich
1, 6; 594 NW2d 57 (1999). He has not done so in this regard. Further, as discussed above, none
of the people defendant suggested as witnesses could have supplied a substantial defense. See
Dixon, supra at 398. It follows, then, that trial counsel’s failure to file a witness list was not
ineffective assistance.
Defendant also argues that trial counsel should have explored the possibility of hiring an
expert witness. Defendant alleges that trial counsel deprived him of his “only potential defense,”
which “would have been to obtain an expert who would identify that children make
misrepresentations after their parents divorce.” The decision to call an expert witness is a matter
of trial strategy. People v Ackerman, 257 Mich App 434, 455; 669 NW2d 818 (2003). Trial
counsel chose, based on his trial strategy, to forgo hiring an expert witness and to pursue an
alternative defense by attacking the victims’ credibility on cross-examination. “This Court will
not substitute its judgment for that of counsel regarding matters of trial strategy, nor will it assess
counsel’s competence with the benefit of hindsight.” Rockey, supra at 76-77. Defendant has
failed to overcome his burden of showing that trial counsel’s performance was not sound trial
strategy. Defendant has not shown that trial counsel was ineffective for declining to call an
expert witness.
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Defendant next contends that trial counsel was ineffective because he coerced defendant
not to testify. At the Ginther hearing, trial counsel testified that he spoke to defendant about
testifying at trial. Trial counsel asserted that he described the consequences of testifying or
deciding not to testify, and advised defendant concerning what he should do. According to trial
counsel, after the conversation defendant indicated that he did not want to testify. Trial counsel
also produced a letter defendant wrote him before trial. In the letter, defendant stated that he did
not want to testify unless trial counsel thought it was necessary.
Defendant gave a different account of his conversation with counsel. Defendant testified
at the Ginther hearing that he told trial counsel that he thought he needed to testify and that he
wanted to tell the jury his side of the story. According to defendant, trial counsel told him he did
not need to testify. Defendant asserted that he then asked trial counsel to consult his family
members, who were watching the trial. According to defendant, counsel told him that his family
agreed that he should not testify. However, after trial, defendant’s family members were angry
and apparently indicated to defendant that they never told counsel that defendant should not
testify. Defendant submitted affidavits from family members, stating that they told trial counsel
that defendant should testify.
Ultimately, it was for the trial court to determine whose Ginther hearing testimony was
most credible. The trial court found that counsel had advised defendant of his right to testify,
and that defendant had freely opted not to testify. We defer to the trial court’s superior ability to
evaluate the credibility of the witnesses, People v Canter, 197 Mich App 550, 561; 496 NW2d
336 (1992), and we must also defer to the trial court’s findings at a Ginther hearing, People v
Grant, 470 Mich 477, 485 n 5; 684 NW2d 686 (2004). We conclude that the trial court did not
clearly err in making its factual findings following the Ginther hearing in this case because we
are not left with “a definite and firm conviction” that the court mistakenly evaluated the
witnesses’ credibility. See People v Johnson, 466 Mich 491, 497-498; 647 NW2d 480 (2002).
We accordingly affirm the trial court’s ruling that trial counsel’s advice to defendant about his
right to testify did not render his performance ineffective.
Defendant’s last argument on appeal is that the prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges
to remove only African-American jurors violated his constitutional right to equal protection of
the law. We disagree.
In Batson v Kentucky, 476 US 79, 84; 106 S Ct 1712; 90 L Ed 2d 69 (1986), modified by
Powers v Ohio, 499 US 400; 111 S Ct 1364; 113 L Ed 2d 411 (1991), the United States Supreme
Court determined that the use of a peremptory challenge to strike a veniremember solely on the
basis of race violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, US Const Am
VIX, § 1. The Batson Court developed a three-step test to determine whether a peremptory
challenge has been used improperly to disqualify a veniremember on the basis of race. Id. at 9698.
First, the party contesting the peremptory challenge must make a prima facie showing of
discrimination on the basis of race. People v Bell, 473 Mich 275, 282; 702 NW2d 128, amended
474 Mich 1201 (2005). After the contesting party makes a prima facie showing of
discrimination, the burden shifts to the party exercising its peremptory challenge to present a
race-neutral explanation for using the challenge. Id. at 283. If a race-neutral explanation is
proffered, the trial court must then decide if purposeful discrimination occurred. Id.
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In this case, the prosecutor offered race-neutral explanations for the removal of
veniremembers Heath and Washington, and the trial court decided that purposeful discrimination
had not occurred. “[I]f the proponent of the challenge offers a race-neutral explanation, and the
trial court rules on the ultimate question of purposeful discrimination, the first Batson step
(whether the opponent of the challenge made a prima facie showing) becomes moot.” People v
Knight, 473 Mich 324, 338; 701 NW2d 715 (2005).
Turning to the second Batson step, we find that the prosecutor’s explanations for removal
were race-neutral as a matter of law. “Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the
prosecutor’s explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral.” Id. at 337, quoting
Purkett v Elem, 514 US 765, 768; 115 S Ct 1769; 131 L Ed 2d 834 (1995). Here, the prosecutor
said that she had excused veniremember Heath because of Heath’s body language and demeanor.
This reason is not inherently racially biased, and is therefore race-neutral as a matter of law. Id.
The fact that it is not a particularly compelling reason for dismissal is irrelevant, because the
reason merely has to be nondiscriminatory. Id. The prosecutor stated that she had excused
veniremember Washington because Washington expressed doubts about whether the criminal
justice system had treated her brother fairly. Again, this reason is not discriminatory on its face
and is also race-neutral as a matter of law. Id.
The third Batson step requires us to determine whether the trial court properly decided
that there was no purposeful discrimination. When deciding whether purposeful discrimination
has occurred, the trial court determines whether the race-neutral reason proffered by the
proponent of the peremptory challenge is credible or merely a pretext for a racially motivated
removal. Id. at 337-338. “If a prosecutor’s proffered reason for striking a black panelist applies
just as well to an otherwise-similar nonblack who is permitted to serve, that is evidence tending
to prove purposeful discrimination to be considered at Batson’s third step.” Miller-El v Dretke,
545 US 231, 241; 125 S Ct 2317; 162 L Ed 2d 196 (2005).
Defendant argues that the prosecutor’s reason for removing veniremember Heath was
pretexutal and that the prosecutor did not provide a sufficient explanation for removing Heath.
However, as discussed above, the prosecutor’s reason for excusing Heath was race-neutral. The
prosecutor satisfied her burden by offering a race-neutral reason for removing Heath; she was not
obligated to provide further explanation.
Defendant argues that the prosecutor’s reason for removing veniremember Washington
was pretextual because the reason could have been applied to otherwise-similar nonblack
veniremembers—specifically including veniremembers Sellers, Haroutinian and Carpenter, who
were permitted to serve on the jury. Defendant is correct that we will infer discrimination when
a similarly situated nonblack veniremember is allowed to serve. Id. However, defendant has
failed to establish that Sellers, Haroutinian and Carpenter were nonblack veniremembers, nor can
we determine their race from the record. Moreover, Sellers, Haroutinian and Carpenter were not
“otherwise-similar” within the meaning of Miller-El, supra. Sellers was not allowed to serve on
the jury; he was excused for cause. Haroutinian was not “otherwise-similar” to Washington
because although she reported that her husband’s half-brother had committed a felony, she did
not express any doubts about whether her husband’s half-brother had been treated fairly by the
criminal justice system. Finally, even though Carpenter was “otherwise-similar” to Washington
by way of his relationship to a felon, he likewise expressed no doubts concerning whether his
brother had been fairly treated by the criminal justice system.
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With respect to veniremember Washington, defendant has failed to demonstrate that
nonblack “otherwise-similar” veniremembers were allowed to serve on the jury. Consequently,
no inference of discrimination arises from the circumstances of Washington’s removal from the
jury. Reversal is not required on this ground.
Lastly, defendant argues that the prosecutor failed to proffer a reason for removing
veniremember Martin, and that the trial court erred by failing to ask the prosecutor to provide a
reason. Defendant did not attempt below to make a prima facie case of discrimination with
respect to Martin’s removal. It is only upon a showing of a prima facie case of discrimination
that the proponent of the peremptory challenge must proffer a reason for removal. Bell, supra at
283. Because defendant did not attempt to make out a prima facie showing with respect to
Martin, the prosecutor was not obliged to provide a race-neutral explanation for veniremember
Martin’s removal.
Affirmed.
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
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