PEOPLE OF MI V CHESTER WILLIAMS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 18, 2007
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 267951
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 05-008891-01
CHESTER WILLIAMS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Wilder, P.J., and Borrello and Beckering, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his jury trial convictions of second-degree murder, MCL
750.317, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b. The
trial court sentenced defendant to 25 to 40 years’ imprisonment for the second-degree murder
conviction and to two years’ imprisonment for the felony-firearm conviction. We affirm
defendant’s convictions, but vacate the portion of the judgment of sentence requiring him to pay
attorney fees, and remand for further proceedings.
Defendant fatally shot Charles Franklin on July 19, 2005, in the home of his fiancé
Lynette Sanderson. On the night of the shooting, defendant used cocaine with Sanderson,
Sanderson’s friend Nadine Cook, and Franklin in Sanderson’s living room. Defendant
subsequently left the living room and entered Sanderson’s bedroom. Franklin followed. Shortly
thereafter, Sanderson and Cook heard a gunshot and saw Franklin stagger away from the
bedroom. Defendant left the scene immediately after the shooting. Police arrested defendant
almost one month later.
I
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for directed verdict
on the first-degree murder charge against him because there was insufficient evidence of
premeditation and deliberation. Additionally, defendant argues that the evidence presented by
the prosecution was insufficient to support his second-degree murder conviction and to overcome
his claim of self-defense. We disagree. We review a trial court’s decision on a motion for
directed verdict and claims on the sufficiency of the evidence de novo to determine whether the
evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, could persuade a rational trier of
fact that the essential elements of the charged crime were proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
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People v Tombs, 472 Mich 446, 459; 697 NW2d 494 (2005); People v Aldrich, 246 Mich App
101, 122; 631 NW2d 67 (2001).
To establish first-degree murder under MCL 750.316, the prosecutor must show that the
defendant intentionally killed the victim and that the act of killing was premeditated and
deliberate. People v Saunders, 189 Mich App 494, 496; 473 NW2d 755 (1991). Premeditation
and deliberation require sufficient time to allow a reasonable person to take a second look,
People v Gonzalez, 468 Mich 636, 641; 664 NW2d 159 (2003), and they can be inferred from the
circumstances surrounding the victim’s death, Saunders, supra at 496. In People v Bowman, 254
Mich App 142, 151-152; 656 NW2d 835 (2002), this Court ruled that evidence of the victim’s
manner of death may be used to establish premeditation. Premeditation may also be established
through evidence of: 1) the parties’ prior relationship; 2) the defendant’s prior actions; 3) the
circumstances of the killing; and 4) the defendant’s actions after the killing. People v Schollaert,
194 Mich App 158, 170; 486 NW2d 312 (1992).
We find that the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to persuade the jury that
defendant killed Franklin with premeditation and deliberation. First, a reasonable juror could
have inferred that defendant had a motive to kill Franklin. Although not an essential element of
a crime, proof of motive in a prosecution for murder is always relevant. People v Rice (On
Remand), 235 Mich App 429, 440; 597 NW2d 843 (1999). According to Sanderson and Cook,
defendant was jealous of Sanderson’s friendship with Franklin and defendant believed that they
were having an affair. Further, it is undisputed that on the night of the shooting, defendant
conversed with Franklin about Franklin’s relationship with Sanderson. Based on this evidence, a
reasonable juror could have inferred that defendant killed Franklin because he believed Franklin
had an affair with his fiancé. Cf. People v Fisher, 449 Mich 441, 453; 537 NW2d 577 (1995)
(holding that marital discord may be motive for murder, or may serve as circumstantial evidence
of premeditation and deliberation).
Defendant’s statements and conduct after the shooting also support a finding of
premeditation and deliberation. When Sanderson and Cook asked defendant why he shot
Franklin, defendant said, “I ain’t no joke,” or “I’m not a joke,” and “I am not to be played with.”
The meaning of defendant’s statements presented a question of fact to be resolved by the jury,
People v Reigle, 223 Mich App 34, 37; 566 NW2d 21 (1997), and a juror could reasonably find
defendant’s statements incriminating. Further, the testimony at trial established that defendant
fled the scene immediately after the shooting and that the police were unable to locate him for
almost a month. Although flight alone is insufficient to warrant conviction, it is admissible to
show consciousness of guilt. People v Coleman, 210 Mich App 1, 4; 532 NW2d 885 (1995). “It
is true that ‘flight from the scene of a tragedy may be as consistent with innocence as with guilt;’
but it is always for the jury to say whether it is under such circumstances as to evidence guilt.”
People v Cutchall, 200 Mich App 396, 398; 504 NW2d 666 (1993), quoting People v Cipriano,
238 Mich 332, 336; 213 NW 104 (1927). Defendant’s evasive conduct following the shooting
supports an inference of premeditation and deliberation. See People v Haywood, 209 Mich App
217, 230; 530 NW2d 497 (1995).
On the record before us, viewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion for directed verdict.
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Furthermore, contrary to defendant’s contention on appeal, the evidence presented at trial
was clearly sufficient to support his conviction for second-degree murder. To prove second
degree murder, under MCL 750.317, the prosecution must show that there was: (1) a death, (2)
caused by an act of defendant, (3) with malice, and (4) without justification or excuse. People v
Mendoza, 468 Mich 527, 534; 664 NW2d 685 (2003). “Malice is defined as the intent to kill, the
intent to cause great bodily harm, or the intent to do an act in wanton and willful disregard of the
likelihood that the natural tendency of such behavior is to cause death or great bodily harm.”
People v Goecke, 457 Mich 442, 464; 579 NW2d 868 (1998). Malice can be inferred from
evidence that the defendant “intentionally set in motion a force likely to cause death or great
bodily harm.” People v Bulls, 262 Mich App 618, 626; 687 NW2d 159 (2004).
Defendant does not dispute that he caused Franklin’s death. Rather, defendant argues
that there was insufficient evidence to establish that he shot Franklin with malice. We disagree.
The prosecution presented ample evidence that defendant intended to kill Franklin. As
previously indicated, a reasonable juror could have inferred from the testimony at trial that
defendant intentionally shot Franklin because he believed that Franklin had an affair with his
fiancé. See Fisher, supra at 453. Defendant’s statements after the shooting, that he was not a
joke and that he was not to be “played with,” also implied that the killing was intentional. More
importantly, however, defendant admitted that after Franklin approached the bedroom, he
grabbed a shotgun, deliberately pointed the shotgun at Franklin, and then shot Franklin in the
chest. We believe that this evidence was more than sufficient to find that defendant intentionally
set in motion a force likely to cause death. See Bulls, supra at 627 (stating that malice may be
inferred from the use of a deadly weapon).
Defendant alternatively argues that the prosecution presented insufficient evidence to
overcome his theory of self-defense. We disagree. “Once evidence of self-defense is presented,
the prosecutor bears the burden of disproving it beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v James,
267 Mich App 675, 677; 705 NW2d 724 (2005) (citations omitted). The killing of another
person in self-defense is justifiable homicide only if the defendant honestly and reasonably
believes that he is in imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm. People v Riddle, 467
Mich 116, 127; 649 NW2d 30 (2002). In deciding whether the defendant feared for his safety,
the jury must consider the circumstances as they appeared to the defendant at the time, People v
Perez, 66 Mich App 685, 692; 239 NW2d 432 (1976), but the defendant’s belief that he is in
danger must be a reasonable belief, Riddle, supra at 127; People v George, 213 Mich App 632,
634-635; 540 NW2d 487 (1995).
Defendant testified that Franklin had a reputation for violence and aggression and that he
saw a metal object in Franklin’s pocket on the night of the shooting. At the time, defendant
believed that the object might be a gun. When Franklin approached defendant in Sanderson’s
bedroom, he asked defendant for cocaine. When defendant said that he had no cocaine, Franklin
called him a “bitch” and hit him in the face. Defendant then grabbed the shotgun, pointed it at
Franklin’s chest, and told him to leave. Defendant claimed that Franklin lunged toward him,
attempted to grab the shotgun with one hand, and reached into his pocket with the other hand.
Defendant then shot Franklin in the chest. Defendant now claims that he fired the shotgun
because he believed that his life was in danger. Franklin’s autopsy, however, revealed that
defendant shot Franklin from a distance of at least four to six feet. This evidence contradicts
defendant’s testimony that Franklin lunged forward to grab the shotgun. Furthermore, neither
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Sanderson nor Cook heard any fighting before the shooting took place and they both testified
that Franklin did not have a gun that night. After the shooting, police found a screwdriver in
Franklin’s pocket. Based on this evidence, a reasonable juror could conclude that defendant’s
belief that his life was in danger was dishonest or unreasonable. Riddle, supra at 127; George,
supra at 634-635. Questions of credibility are properly resolved by the trier of fact. People v
Lemmon, 456 Mich 625, 646; 576 NW2d 129 (1998). Accordingly, we find that there was
sufficient evidence presented at trial to overcome defendant’s theory of self-defense.
II
Defendant further argues that the trial court erred in denying his request for a jury
instruction on voluntary manslaughter. We disagree. Issues of law arising from jury instructions
are reviewed de novo on appeal, but a trial court’s determination whether an instruction was
applicable to the facts of the case is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v Gillis, 474
Mich 105, 113; 712 NW2d 419 (2006). If the trial court’s decision results in an outcome within
the range of principled outcomes, it has not abused its discretion. See Maldonado v Ford Motor
Co, 476 Mich 372, 388; 719 NW2d 809 (2006).
Because voluntary manslaughter is a necessarily included lesser offense of murder,
defendant was entitled to such an instruction if supported by a rational view of the evidence.
Mendoza, supra at 542. “To show voluntary manslaughter, one must show that the defendant
killed in the heat of passion, the passion was caused by adequate provocation, and there was not
a lapse of time during which a reasonable person could control his passions.” Id. at 535. The
provocation necessary to mitigate a homicide from murder to manslaughter is that which causes
a defendant to act out of passion rather than reason. People v Sullivan, 231 Mich App 510, 518;
586 NW2d 578 (1998). The provocation must be that which would cause a reasonable person to
lose control. Id.
Here, a rational view of the evidence does not support a voluntary manslaughter
instruction. As discussed infra, defendant’s testimony about the shooting, that Franklin picked a
fight with defendant, lunged toward the shotgun, and reached into his pocket to retrieve his own
gun, was not supported by credible evidence. Furthermore, even if the jury believed defendant’s
version of the events, defendant testified that he grabbed the shotgun, deliberately pointed it at
Franklin’s chest, and asked Franklin to leave before Franklin lunged toward him or reached into
his pocket. This evidence indicates that the shooting was deliberate, rather than the result of
uncontrollable passion. Defendant’s explanation for the shooting, that he was not a joke and that
he was not to be “played with,” further negates any inference that he lost control and acted out of
the heat of passion rather than reason. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding
that the evidence failed to support a voluntary manslaughter instruction.
III
Defendant next argues that the trial court improperly suppressed evidence of Franklin’s
previous acts of violence and aggression. We agree. The decision whether to admit or exclude
evidence is within the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a
clear abuse of discretion. People v Lukity, 460 Mich 484, 488; 596 NW2d 607 (1999). Even if a
trial court abuses its discretion in excluding evidence, reversal is warranted only if it
affirmatively appears, after review of the entire record, that it is more probable than not that the
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court’s error was outcome determinative. Id. at 495-496; People v McLaughlin, 258 Mich App
635, 650; 672 NW2d 860 (2003).
During cross-examination, Sanderson testified about Franklin’s reputation in the
community. Sanderson claimed that Franklin was known as an “aggressive type person” who
“would take people’s money,” and that she told defendant about specific instances when Franklin
exhibited aggressive or violent behavior. The prosecution objected, however, when defense
counsel attempted to question Sanderson about the specific acts of aggression and violence
committed by Franklin that she related to defendant. The trial court excluded the evidence. The
court found that defense counsel could question defendant, but no other witnesses, about
Franklin’s specific acts of violence and aggression that defendant was personally aware of and
that directly related to the shooting in this case.
When a defendant charged with murder claims self-defense, evidence of the victim’s
character trait for aggression is admissible. MRE 404(a)(2). MRE 405 provides that “testimony
as to reputation” may be used to prove a person’s character in all cases in which evidence of the
person’s character is admissible. MRE 405(a). But, “specific instances of that person’s
conduct” may only be used to prove character when the person’s character “is an essential
element of a charge, claim, or defense.” MRE 405(b). In applying MRE 405 to the facts in
People v Harris, 458 Mich 310, 319; 583 NW2d 680 (1998), our Supreme Court held that when
a defendant claims self-defense, specific instances of violent or aggressive conduct on the part of
the victim may not be used to show that the victim was the aggressor, “since the aggressive
character of the victim is not an essential element of the defense of self-defense.” The Harris
Court further found, however, that specific instances of violence or aggression on the part of the
victim may be admitted to establish that the defendant had a reasonable apprehension of harm,
since the defendant’s state of mind is material to a claim of self-defense. Id. at 316, 319, citing
People v Cooper, 73 Mich App 660, 664; 252 NW2d 564 (1977). The victim’s acts of violence
and aggression must be known to the defendant in order for the defendant to show that he had a
reasonable apprehension of harm. Id. at 316-317.
The trial court abused its discretion in excluding Sanderson’s testimony about Franklin’s
specific acts of violence and aggression. Because defendant raised a claim of self-defense,
evidence of Franklin’s character trait for aggression was admissible. MRE 404(a)(2). Sanderson
testified that she was aware of specific instances when Franklin demonstrated aggressive or
violent behavior and that defendant was aware of the same instances. Therefore, according to
our Supreme Court’s decision in Harris, supra, Sanderson’s testimony was admissible to show
that defendant had a reasonable apprehension of harm.
We are convinced, however, that the trial court’s error was harmless. The trial court
allowed defendant to testify about Franklin’s specific acts of violence and aggression. During
direct examination, defendant described at least three instances when Franklin “jumped,” fought,
or slapped people prior to the shooting. Considering that more than one person testified at trial
that Franklin had a reputation for violence and aggression and that defendant testified about
Franklin’s specific acts of violence and aggression, there is no basis on which we can conclude
that the trial court’s exclusion of additional specific-acts testimony affected the outcome of the
case. See Lukity, supra at 495-496; McLaughlin, supra at 650 (holding that reversal is required
only if it is more probable than not that the trial court’s error was outcome-determinative).
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IV
Defendant additionally argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct. We review
defendant’s unpreserved claim of prosecutorial misconduct for plain error affecting his
substantial rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763-764; 597 NW2d 130 (1999); People v
Ackerman, 257 Mich App 434, 448; 669 NW2d 818 (2003). Where a curative instruction could
have alleviated any prejudicial effect, reversal is not warranted. Id. at 449; People v Watson, 245
Mich App 572, 586; 629 NW2d 411 (2001).
First, defendant argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct by making statements
during her closing argument that were unsupported by the evidence. The test for prosecutorial
misconduct is whether the defendant was denied a fair and impartial trial. Id. Prosecutorial
comments must be read as a whole and evaluated in light of defense arguments and the
relationship they bear to the evidence admitted at trial. People v Brown, 267 Mich App 141,
152; 703 NW2d 230 (2005). A prosecutor may not make a statement of fact to the jury which is
unsupported by the evidence, Ackerman, supra at 450, but she is free to argue the evidence and
all reasonable inferences arising from it as they relate to her theory of the case, People v Bahoda,
448 Mich 261, 282; 531 NW2d 659 (1995); Ackerman, supra at 450.
Defendant asserts that the prosecutor committed misconduct by stating that, “Nadine
[Cook] told you it was a matter of seconds from when the victim walked back to that bedroom to
when that boom we heard [sic]. Lynette [Sanderson] told you it was five to ten minutes and then
we heard from Officer [Lance] Newman that during the interview [Sanderson] had with himself
and myself, in fact, she said a few seconds from the time the victim walked back there.”
Contrary to defendant’s position, we find that the prosecutor’s statements were supported by the
evidence. At trial, Cook testified that she heard a loud boom or a gunshot a few seconds after
Franklin walked to the bedroom and Sanderson testified that she heard the gunshot five to ten
minutes after he walked to the bedroom. But, according to Officer Newman’s testimony,
Sanderson reported to him that she heard the gunshot within seconds after Franklin went to the
bedroom. Therefore, based on the record before us, we cannot conclude that the prosecutor
committed misconduct.
Defendant asserts that the prosecutor committed further misconduct by stating that, “In
[defendant’s] testimony on direct, he first said it was [Franklin’s] left hand that went into his
pocket. Then he switched it on cross and said it was his right hand.” We agree that in making
this statement, the prosecutor mischaracterized defendant’s testimony. Defendant first testified
that, “when [Franklin] tried to grab the shotgun with his left hand, he was going into his pocket.”
Later, on cross-examination, defendant indicated that Franklin attempted to grab the shotgun
with his left hand and that he reached for his pocket with his right hand. Clearly, there was no
discrepancy in defendant’s testimony. Defendant has failed to establish, however, that the
prosecutor’s misconduct was outcome determinative. Carines, supra at 763. A prosecutor’s
isolated statement, even when improper, is subject to harmless error analysis. See People v
Armentero, 148 Mich App 120, 134; 384 NW2d 98 (1986). As discussed infra, the evidence
presented at trial was more than sufficient to support a conviction of second-degree murder.
Furthermore, the trial court instructed the jury that, “the lawyers’ statements and arguments are
not evidence,” and that it must “only accept things the lawyers say that are supported by the
evidence.” In providing these limiting instructions, the trial court alleviated any prejudice to
defendant. Ackerman, supra at 449; Watson, supra at 586.
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Additionally, defendant argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct by suppressing
or negligently losing potentially exculpatory evidence. We disagree. There is no general
constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case. People v Elston, 462 Mich 751, 765; 614
NW2d 595 (2000). Due process does, however, require a prosecutor to disclose evidence that is
both favorable to the defendant and material to the determination of guilt or punishment. Brady
v Maryland, 373 US 83, 87; 83 S Ct 1194; 10 L Ed 2d 215 (1963); People v Fink, 456 Mich 449,
453-454; 574 NW2d 28 (1998). Accordingly, a defendant has a due process right to exculpatory
evidence in the prosecution’s possession. Brady, supra at 87. But the loss of evidence of
unknown probative value, “of which no more can be said than that it could have been subjected
to tests, the results of which might have exonerated the defendant,” does not violate due process
unless the police lost the evidence in bad faith. Arizona v Youngblood, 488 US 51, 57-58; 109 S
Ct 333; 102 L Ed 2d 281 (1988); People v Cress, 250 Mich App 110, 155; 645 NW2d 669
(2002), vacated in part on other grounds 468 Mich 678 (2003). The defendant bears the burden
of showing that the police acted in bad faith. People v Johnson, 197 Mich App 362, 365; 494
NW2d 873 (1992).
Defendant asserts that Franklin’s tee shirt was destroyed before testing could be done to
determine if Franklin was shot at close range and that the test results may have been exculpatory.
While it is undisputed that Franklin’s tee shirt was destroyed before any testing occurred,
defendant has failed to meet his burden of showing bad faith. Youngblood, supra at 57-58;
Johnson, supra at 365. According to Officer Newman, the police normally receive a victim’s
clothing from the morgue. In this case, however, the morgue released Franklin’s clothes to the
funeral home immediately after his autopsy and the clothes were destroyed at that time. The
police were never in possession of Franklin’s tee shirt. Thus, there is no basis on which to
conclude that the police acted in bad faith.
Furthermore, defendant cannot establish that the prosecution’s failure to preserve the
evidence affected the outcome of the case. See People v Lester, 232 Mich App 262, 281-282;
591 NW2d 267 (1998) (stating that evidence is only material and exculpatory if it is favorable to
the defendant and there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would
have been different if the evidence had been admitted). The forensic examiner who conducted
Franklin’s autopsy, Dr. Melissa Pasquale-Styles, testified that she examined Franklin’s tee shirt
and determined that it did not exhibit evidence of close-range firing. She opined, based on the
shape of Franklin’s fatal wound, that he was most likely shot from a distance of four to six feet.
Dr. Pasquale-Styles further testified that, although clothing can absorb some of the soot and
unburned gunpowder particles, “in this case it’s really the pattern of the entrance wound that is
much more telling than the absence of close range evidence.” Therefore, because defendant
failed to show that the police acted in bad faith and that the loss of Franklin’s tee shirt affected
the outcome of the case, his claim of prosecutorial misconduct must fail.
V
Defendant next argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel.
We disagree. Because the trial court was not presented with and did not rule on defendant’s
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we are left to our own review of the record in
evaluating his assertions. People v Rodriguez, 251 Mich App 10, 38; 650 NW2d 96 (2002).
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To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must show that defense
counsel’s performance was so deficient that it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness
and denied him a fair trial. People v Henry, 239 Mich App 140, 145-146; 607 NW2d 767
(1999). Furthermore, defendant must show that, but for defense counsel’s error, it is likely that
the proceeding’s outcome would have been different. Id. at 146. Effective assistance of counsel
is presumed; therefore, defendant must overcome the presumption that defense counsel’s
performance constituted sound trial strategy. Id.
Defendant first argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to have a sound
strategy for admitting evidence of Franklin’s previous acts of violence and aggression. Contrary
to defendant’s argument on appeal, defense counsel implemented a sound strategy to admit the
evidence. As discussed infra, the trial court abused its discretion in excluding Sanderson’s
testimony about the specific acts of violence and aggression committed by Franklin. We cannot
find that defense counsel’s strategy for admitting the evidence was unsound simply because it
was unsuccessful at trial. See People v Rodgers, 248 Mich App 702, 715; 645 NW2d 294 (2001)
(stating that this Court will not substitute its judgment for that of trial counsel regarding matters
of trial strategy, even if the strategy backfired). Furthermore, considering that more than one
person testified that Franklin had a reputation for violence and aggression, and that defendant
testified about Franklin’s specific acts of violence and aggression, defendant cannot establish
that a lack of additional character evidence affected the outcome of the case. Henry, supra at
146.
Defendant next argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object when the
prosecutor made statements unsupported by the evidence to the jury. Considering that the
prosecutor’s statements about the timing of the shooting were supported by the evidence, any
objection by defense counsel would have been futile. “Counsel is not ineffective for failing to
make a futile objection.” People v Thomas, 260 Mich App 450, 457; 678 NW2d 631 (2004).
Furthermore, while the prosecutor mischaracterized defendant’s testimony about which hand
Franklin used to reach into his pocket, defendant cannot establish that defense counsel’s failure
to object affected the outcome of the case. Henry, supra at 146. As discussed infra, the
evidence presented at trial was more than sufficient to support a conviction of second-degree
murder and the trial court’s cautionary instructions to the jury alleviated any prejudice to
defendant.
Next, defendant argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel in
regard to the prosecution’s failure to produce Franklin’s tee shirt. According to defendant,
defense counsel should have filed a motion to compel, moved to dismiss the charges against him,
and requested an adverse inference instruction. We disagree. In light of the fact that Franklin’s
tee shirt was destroyed almost immediately after his autopsy, a motion to compel would have
been futile. Further, considering that defendant cannot establish that the loss of the tee shirt
affected the outcome of the case, a motion to dismiss the charges against defendant would also
have been futile. Defense counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to make futile
motions. People v Milstead, 250 Mich App 391, 401; 648 NW2d 648 (2002). Additionally,
because defendant failed to show that the police acted in bad faith, an adverse jury instruction
was not warranted. See People v Davis, 199 Mich App 502, 515; 503 NW2d 457 (1993)
(holding that an adverse inference instruction need not be given where the defendant has not
shown that the prosecutor acted in bad faith in failing to produce the evidence). Consequently,
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counsel was not ineffective for failing to request such an instruction. People v Snider, 239 Mich
App 393, 425; 608 NW2d 502 (2000) (stating that trial counsel is not required to advocate a
meritless position).
Additionally, defendant argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call a
firearms expert to testify at trial because “it might well be that the prosecutor’s medical expert
grossly mischaracterized and overstated the evidence regarding the distance of the gun from the
victim.” We disagree. Defense counsel’s failure to investigate and call a witness does not
amount to ineffective assistance of counsel unless the defendant shows prejudice as a result.
People v Caballero, 184 Mich App 636, 640-642; 459 NW2d 80 (1990). In other words, defense
counsel’s failure to call an expert witness in this case can only constitute ineffective assistance of
counsel if it deprived defendant of a substantial defense. People v Dixon, 263 Mich App 393,
398; 688 NW2d 308 (2004); People v Hyland, 212 Mich App 701, 710; 538 NW2d 465 (1995),
vacated in part on other grounds 453 Mich 900 (1996). A substantial defense is one which might
have made a difference in the outcome of the trial. Hyland, supra at 710. Moreover, the
decision whether to call a witness is presumed to be a matter of trial strategy, Dixon, supra at
398, and we will not substitute our judgment for that of counsel regarding matters of trial
strategy, People v Matuszak, 263 Mich App 42, 58; 687 NW2d 342 (2004).
Defendant asserts that his trial counsel should have called a firearms expert to rebut Dr.
Pasquale-Styles’ testimony that the perpetrator shot Franklin from a distance of four to six feet,
but defendant has failed to establish the factual predicate for his claim. See People v Hoag, 460
Mich 1, 6; 594 NW2d 57 (1999). Defendant did not identify a firearms expert who would testify
on his behalf and the record does not disclose to what extent, if any, counsel considered calling
an expert to testify, or his reasons for deciding not to do so. Therefore, defendant has failed to
overcome the presumption that counsel’s failure to call an expert was anything but sound trial
strategy. Henry, supra at 146. Moreover, there is no basis on which we can conclude that
defense counsel’s failure to call an expert was outcome determinative. Id.; Hyland, supra at 710.
Because the record does not indicate that there was any expert witness who would have refuted
the prosecution’s theory regarding the distance of the gun from the victim, this case is
distinguishable from cases where trial counsel failed to present witnesses who could actually
have directly contradicted the prosecution’s case. See, e.g., People v Johnson, 451 Mich 115,
118; 545 NW2d 637 (1996).
Defendant also argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call additional
defense witnesses. Defendant has not identified the witnesses who would testify on his behalf or
demonstrated that his trial counsel was even aware of any potential witnesses. “[C]ounsel cannot
be found ineffective for failing to pursue information that his client neglected to tell him.”
People v McGhee, 268 Mich App 600, 626; 709 NW2d 595 (2005). Furthermore, because
defendant provided no information regarding the alleged witnesses, there is no basis on which to
find that defense counsel’s failure to call them denied defendant a substantial defense. Dixon,
supra at 398; Hyland, supra at 710. Defendant has failed to overcome the presumption of
effective assistance of counsel.
On appeal, defendant asks for a remand for further fact finding on his claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, but he did not comply with MCR 7.211, which provides a means for
requesting a hearing in the trial court to develop evidence. Even on appeal, defendant has not
presented evidence or an affidavit demonstrating that facts elicited during an evidentiary hearing
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would support his claim. See MCR 7.211(C)(1)(a)(ii). Thus, we decline to order a remand on
that basis.
VI
Finally, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in ordering him to contribute to the
cost of his court-appointed attorney without first assessing his ability to pay. Defendant failed to
properly present this issue by including it in the statement of the questions presented as required
by MCR 7.212(c)(5). Despite the error in presentation, we will consider the merits of the issue
because we have all of the pertinent facts and law before us, and it is a significant issue. Health
Care Ass’n Workers Comp Fund v Dir of Bureau of Worker’s Comp, 265 Mich App 236, 694;
NW2d 761 (2005); People v Brown, 239 Mich App 735, 748; 610 NW2d 234 (2000). Because
defendant did not object to the imposition of attorney fees at sentencing or raise this issue in a
motion for resentencing, we review for plain error affecting his substantial rights. People v
Dunbar, 264 Mich App 240, 251; 690 NW2d 476 (2004), citing Carines, supra at 763.
A defendant may be required to reimburse the county for the cost of his court-appointed
attorney. Dunbar, supra at 251. Unless the defendant specifically objects to the reimbursement
amount at the time it is ordered, the trial court is not required to make specific findings on the
record regarding the defendant’s ability to pay. Id. at 254. The court does, however, “need to
provide some indication of consideration, such as noting that it reviewed the financial and
employment sections of the defendant’s presentence investigation report or, even more generally,
a statement that it considered the defendant’s ability to pay.” Id. at 254-255. The reimbursement
amount should also correspond to the defendant’s foreseeable ability to pay. Id. at 255. Here,
the trial court plainly erred by ordering defendant to pay $1,820 in court-appointed attorney fees
without providing any indication that it considered defendant’s ability to pay. Accordingly, we
vacate the portion of the judgment of sentence requiring defendant to pay attorney fees and
remand for the trial court to reconsider its reimbursement order in light of defendant’s present
and future ability to pay.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for reasons consistent with this opinion.
We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
/s/ Jane M. Beckering
-10-
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