IN RE TIFFANY MARIE MICAH MICHELLE KITCHING MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of TIFFANY MARIE MICAH
MICHELLE KITCHING, Minor.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
UNPUBLISHED
December 6, 2007
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 277529
Macomb Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 2006-000004-NA
FENNICE KITCHING,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
MICHELLE KING,
Respondent.
Before: Schuette, P.J., and Borrello and Gleicher, JJ.
PER CURIAM
Respondent-appellant appeals as of right from the trial court order terminating his
parental rights to his minor child pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(c)(i) and (g). For the reasons set
forth in this opinion, we affirm. This appeal is being decided without oral argument pursuant to
MCR 7.214(E).
This Court reviews a trial court’s decision to terminate parental rights for clear error.
MCR 3.977(J); In re Sours, 459 Mich 624, 633; 593 NW2d 520 (1999). If the trial court
determines that petitioner established the existence of one or more statutory grounds for
termination by clear and convincing evidence, the trial court must terminate the respondent’s
parental rights unless it determines that to do so is clearly not in the child’s best interests. In re
Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 353-354; 612 NW2d 407 (2000).
The evidence presented to the trial court established that the grounds for termination
pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) and (g) were met by clear and convincing evidence. The
minor child was taken into care because respondent-appellant was in jail, he did not have a
home, he did not properly supervise the minor child, and the minor child appeared to be
physically neglected. At the time of the termination trial, respondent-appellant was no longer in
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jail, and he had been given the opportunity to work with petitioner on a parent agency agreement.
The trial court did acknowledge that respondent-appellant had met some of the requirements of
his parent agency requirement. He did not, however, address the critical issues of housing and
parenting skills.
During the period of time that the minor child was under petitioner’s supervision,
respondent-appellant was unable to show that he had a stable place to live. He had lived in a
variety of different houses over the course of the year with different friends and relatives. At one
point, he was going to live in the home of a relative for minimal rent but it was not clear who
owned the home and who else was living there. The trial court gave respondent-appellant every
opportunity to show that he had settled down, signed a lease, and was making payments on a
home so that the minor child could have a stable environment where she could grow up.
Respondent-appellant was also required to show that he could properly supervise and
parent the minor child. He did attend parenting classes but was not able to show the trial court
that he would do what was in the best interests of the minor child. An incident occurred that
caused great concern to petitioner and the court when the relative with whom the minor child had
been placed, left the minor child with respondent-appellant, and respondent-appellant did not
report this to petitioner. Apparently, not only did respondent-appellant not report this, but he
then left the minor child with another relative. This relative had been a prior placement for the
minor child, and the child had been removed from that placement because of some problems.
The minor child had been shuffled between relatives for most of her life, and petitioner and the
trial court were very concerned with the minor child’s need for stability.
The evidence established that the conditions that led to adjudication, respondentappellant’s lack of housing, inability to properly supervise the minor child, and failure to provide
her with a stable and safe environment, continued to exist at the time of the termination trial.
After a year of services, respondent-appellant still did not have a place to live and was living
with friends. He was still leaving the minor child with various relatives. The minor child was
five years old at the time of the termination hearing. There was no reasonable likelihood that
these conditions would be rectified within a reasonable time considering the age of the minor
child. Furthermore, with respect to MCL 712A.19b(3)(g), the evidence is also clear that
respondent-appellant failed to provide proper care and custody of the minor child and would be
unable to do so within a reasonable period of time considering the minor child’s age.
The trial court also did not clearly err in its best interests determination. MCL
712A.19b(5). The minor child had been passed from relative to relative for most of her life.
Even during the past year, she had lived in three different relative placements. Respondentappellant was given every opportunity to show the trial court that he could provide the minor
child with a stable and safe environment. The minor child deserved the opportunity to grow up
in a place where she knew who would raise her, who would be there for her, and who she could
rely on. She deserved the opportunity to be in a safe, nurturing environment, and respondentappellant could not provide that for her.
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Affirmed.
/s/ Bill Schuette
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher
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