PEOPLE OF MI V MICHAEL LOGAN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 4, 2007
Plaintiff-Appellee,
V
No. 273402
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2006-207338-FH
MICHAEL LOGAN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Schuette, P.J., and Borrello and Gleicher, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from his jury-based convictions of possession with intent to
deliver less than 50 grams of, respectively, heroin and cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv), for
which the trial court sentenced defendant, as a fourth habitual offender, MCL 769.12, to serve
concurrent terms of imprisonment of 46 months to 30 years. For the reasons set forth in this
opinion, we affirm. This appeal is being decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR
7.214(E).
I. Facts.
The prosecutor presented evidence that the police executed a search warrant for a motel
room in Ferndale, in February 2006, and there discovered defendant sleeping on a bed, along
with an aerosol can whose false bottom contained heroin and cocaine. A police witness testified
that defendant told him that he was selling drugs because Detroit police officers were threatening
to kill members of his family if he did not sell drugs. Defendant took the stand at his trial and
reiterated his theory of duress. Defendant testified that while he was in prison, he encountered
some fellow inmates, including one who told him he had relatives, including a son, with the
Detroit Police Department who sold drugs. According to defendant, these inmates offered to
involve him in that business when he won parole, but when defendant declined, the offer turned
into threats against his family. Defendant continued that he sought assistance from federal
authorities, as well as Michigan’s attorney general, but that when the inmates issued a plausible
threat against defendant’s sister, defendant agreed to work for them.
Defendant admitted that the heroin and cocaine were in the motel room with him, but
denied that they were in the aerosol can. Defendant testified that the drugs belonged to another
person, and that he neither possessed nor intended to sell them.
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An agent with the Federal Bureau of Investigation testified in rebuttal that he had
investigated defendant’s allegations, but could neither locate any inmate or Detroit police officer
whose name corresponded to that given by defendant, nor otherwise verify any of defendant’s
other allegations concerning a plot between prison inmates and Detroit police officers to traffic
in illegal drugs.
The trial court instructed the jury on the affirmative defense of duress. The jury found
defendant guilty as charged. On appeal, defendant argues that his convictions must be reversed
because his defense of duress was unrebutted, and, alternatively, because he was convicted
without effective assistance of counsel.
II. Duress.
“A successful duress defense excuses the defendant from criminal responsibility for an
otherwise criminal act because the defendant was compelled to commit the act; the compulsion
or duress overcomes the defendant’s free will and his actions lack the required mens rea.”
People v Luther, 394 Mich 619, 622; 232 NW2d 184 (1975). Once a defendant has presented
evidence of a valid duress defense, the prosecutor bears the burden of disproving it beyond a
reasonable doubt. See People v Mendoza, 108 Mich App 733, 739; 310 NW2d 860 (1981).
Defendant argues that the prosecutor failed to present sufficient evidence to rebut the
duress defense. Whether the prosecutor presented sufficient evidence to support a verdict of
guilty is a question of law, calling for review de novo. People v Herndon, 246 Mich App 371,
415; 633 NW2d 376 (2001). In reviewing a sufficiency claim, the appellate court must view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. People v Jaffray, 445 Mich 287, 296;
519 NW2d 108 (1994).
Again, the prosecutor called an F.B.I. agent as a rebuttal witness, who testified that he
investigated defendant’s allegations about drug dealer inmates allied with members of the Detroit
Police Department, but could find no corroboration of any of it. Defendant does not address that
rebuttal testimony directly, let alone explain why it did not constitute a complete rebuttal of his
duress theory, but instead merely asserts that, “the prosecution failed to successfully rebut the
presumption of duress.”
We conclude that the rebuttal testimony in this instance provided the jury with a basis for
discrediting defendant’s entire duress theory. The jury was free to believe the rebuttal testimony
and to disbelieve defendant’s own assertions. See People v Lemmon, 456 Mich 625, 637; 576
NW2d 129 (1998) (“It is the province of the jury to determine questions of fact and assess the
credibility of witnesses.”).
Because the prosecutor presented sufficient evidence to disprove defendant’s theory of
defense, defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence must fail.
III. Assistance of Counsel.
“In reviewing a defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the reviewing
court is to determine (1) whether counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable and (2)
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whether the defendant was prejudiced by counsel’s defective performance.” People v Rockey,
237 Mich App 74, 76; 601 NW2d 887 (1999).
Defendant argues that his trial lawyer was ineffective because he did not request a jury
instruction on the lesser included offense of simple possession. A defendant pressing a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel must overcome a strong presumption that counsel’s tactics were
matters of sound trial strategy. People v Henry, 239 Mich App 140, 146; 607 NW2d 767 (1999).
Although an instruction on simple possession would have allowed for the possibility that
defendant might have been convicted of a less serious offense, it also would have made it all the
easier for the jury to find him guilty. That defense counsel elected to strive for acquittal, at the
expense of mitigating the conviction to simple possession, was sound strategy.
Moreover, in setting forth his affirmative defense of duress, defendant testified that he
had agreed to act as a drug seller. Although defendant testified that he was not engaged in such
sales on the occasion of his arrest, that alternative theory of innocence was marginalized in favor
of a heavy emphasis on the duress theory. An instruction on simple possession would have
emphasized the alternative theory that was wholly incompatible with the highlighted theory of
duress. Sound strategy in not seeking such an instruction is thus apparent. We will not
substitute our judgment for that of counsel regarding matters of trial strategy, nor will we assess
counsel’s competence with the benefit of hindsight. People v Barnett, 163 Mich App 331, 338;
414 NW2d 378 (1987).
Defendant also argues in passing that counsel was ineffective for failing to request an
instruction to the effect that when material evidence in control of a party is not produced at trial,
the opposing party is entitled to an adverse inference instruction. See People v Davis, 199 Mich
App 502, 514-515; 503 NW2d 457 (1993). However, this brief assertion fails to specify what
evidence defendant is referring to, and includes no allegation that the prosecutor acted in bad
faith in any event. See id. Moreover, defendant did not deny that heroin and cocaine, and some
drug paraphernalia, were in the motel room with him on the occasion in question, but instead
attempted to offer innocent explanations for how that came to be. For these reasons, we must
reject defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Affirmed.
/s/ Bill Schuette
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher
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