PEOPLE OF MI V FREDERICK DEARMONDE SMITH
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 4, 2007
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 271036
Kent Circuit Court
LC No. 05-009554-FC
v
FREDERICK DEARMONDE SMITH, a/k/a
FREDERICK DEARMOND SMITH,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Donofrio, P.J., and Hoekstra and Markey, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals by right his jury trial conviction of assault with intent to commit
murder, MCL 750.83. We affirm.
Defendant argues that insufficient evidence existed to sustain his conviction. We review
de novo challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence to determine whether, when viewing the
evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could have found all
the elements of the charged crime to have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v
Cox, 268 Mich App 440, 443; 709 NW2d 152 (2005).
The elements of assault with intent to commit murder are: 1) an assault, 2) with an actual
intent to kill, and 3) which, if successful, would make the killing murder. People v Lawton, 196
Mich App 341, 350; 492 NW2d 810 (1992). Circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences
arising from the evidence may constitute satisfactory proof of the elements of the offense. Id.
The intent to kill may be proved by inference from any facts in evidence. Id. Because of the
difficulty of proving an actor’s state of mind, minimal circumstantial evidence is sufficient.
People v McRunels, 237 Mich App 168, 181; 603 NW2d 95 (1999). All conflicts in the evidence
must be resolved in favor of the prosecution, and we will not interfere with the jury’s role of
determining the weight of the evidence or the credibility of the witnesses. Id.
Here, despite conflicting details about what precipitated the incident, the evidence
established that defendant and the victim were in a physical altercation in which defendant was
armed with a knife, and the victim was unarmed. Defendant inflicted two severe injuries on the
victim, cutting to the bone on the victim’s arm and chest. The victim was hospitalized for three
days. The jury could infer defendant’s intent to kill from the extent and severity of the victim’s
injuries. See People v Mills, 450 Mich 61, 71; 537 NW2d 909 (1995). Additionally, evidence of
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defendant’s flight and exculpatory statements to the police indicated his consciousness of guilt.
People v Coleman, 210 Mich App 1, 4; 532 NW2d 885 (1995). Viewing the circumstantial
evidence and reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence in a light most favorable to the
prosecution, a rational trier of fact could have found that the essential elements of assault with
intent to commit murder were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. For these same reasons, we
reject defendant’s claim that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict.
People v Werner, 254 Mich App 528, 530; 659 NW2d 688 (2002).
Defendant next argues that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of
other acts.1 We review for an abuse of discretion a trial court’s decision to admit other acts
evidence. People v McGhee, 268 Mich App 600, 609; 709 NW2d 595 (2005). To be admissible
under MRE 404(b) other-acts evidence generally must be (1) offered for a proper purpose, (2)
relevant, and (3) its probative value must not be substantially outweighed by its potential for
unfair prejudice. People v Knox, 469 Mich 502, 509; 674 NW2d 366 (2004).
Relevant evidence is evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that
is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would
be without the evidence. MRE 401. The challenged evidence was offered, in part, as evidence
of intent and absence of mistake or accident, which was relevant because it negated the
reasonable assumption that the attack was not deliberate. McGhee, supra at 611. The evidence
showed that defendant was involved in numerous confrontations and physical altercations, some
involving a knife, wherein he became enraged, acted aggressively, and threatened violence.
Contrary to defendant’s assertion that the other-acts evidence was irrelevant to defendant’s intent
during the incident at issue, “[t]he more often a defendant acts in a particular manner, the less
likely it is that the defendant acted accidentally or innocently, and conversely, the more likely it
is that the defendant’s act is intentional.” Id.; see People v VanderVliet, 444 Mich 52, 79 n 35;
508 NW2d 114 (1993). Further, where other-acts evidence is offered to show intent, the acts
must only be of the same general category to be relevant. Id. at 80.
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence. MRE 403. “All relevant evidence is prejudicial;
it is only unfairly prejudicial evidence that should be excluded.” McGhee, supra at 613-614.
Unfair prejudice exists when evidence has a tendency to invoke “considerations extraneous to
the merits of the lawsuit, e.g., the jury’s bias, sympathy, anger, or shock.” Id. (citations omitted).
There is no indication that the proposed evidence injected such extraneous considerations. The
evidence, while prejudicial, was highly probative of defendant’s behavior, and its probative
value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Further, the trial court
issued a cautionary instruction, thereby eliminating any danger of unfair prejudice that may have
1
The prosecution sought to introduce evidence to demonstrate that defendant resided in and
habitually frequented the area where the incident occurred, that defendant intended to assault the
victim with the intent to commit murder, to show identity, and to show absence of mistake or
accident. The reasons stated—opportunity, intent, knowledge, identity, and absence of mistake
or accident—are proper non-character inferences. MRE 404(b)(1).
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stemmed from the other-acts evidence. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
allowing the other-acts evidence.
We also conclude trial court did not abuse its discretion by permitting the admission of
testimony that the police were unsuccessful in locating certain witnesses related to the MRE
404(b) evidence. The evidence was relevant to providing the jury with an explanation for why
certain individuals, who would be referred to during testimony, would not testify at trial.
Although he did not specifically object to its admission below, on appeal defendant takes
issue with how the other acts evidence presented at trial was selected. The brief mention that
defendant had 24 contacts with the police since 2003 and that the eight most illustrative of his
conduct were selected to be presented at trial, did not constitute plain error affecting his
substantial rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 759-763-764; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).
Defendant next argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his request to
be unshackled at trial. We review for an abuse of discretion a trial court’s decision concerning
whether a defendant should be shackled during trial. People v Banks, 249 Mich App 247, 256257; 642 NW2d 351 (2002).
The trial court properly exercised its discretion in denying defendant’s request to have his
leg shackles removed. As in People v Williams, 173 Mich App 312, 315; 433 NW2d 356 (1988),
“[d]efendant’s past history of assaultive and disruptive behavior . . . [was a] credible justification
for the court’s decision to restrain defendant for the purpose of having a peaceable trial, despite
the absence of any indication on defendant’s part that he would attempt an escape.” Moreover,
the trial court’s concern that defendant presented a security risk considering the violent nature of
the offense at issue was a credible justification to restrain defendant so he could not injure others.
People v Dunn, 446 Mich 409, 425; 521 NW2d 255 (1994).
Likewise, defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his request
to unshackle his defense witness at trial. On the record, the trial court properly denied
defendant’s request to have the witness’ leg shackles removed. Again, the trial court had
credible justification for its decision: preventing the witness from injuring others in the
courtroom and ensuring an orderly trial. Banks, supra at 256-257. And, as the trial court noted,
defendant was not prejudiced by the ruling because it would be evident to the jury from the
witness’ clothing, handcuffs, and the presence of guards that he was incarcerated.
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in allowing into evidence the statement he
made to the police following his arrest. However, defendant’s statements to the police after his
lawful arrest and waiver of Miranda2 rights was properly admissible under MRE 801(d)(2)(A) as
that of a party-opponent. Defendant has failed to demonstrate plain error affecting his
substantial rights; therefore, he is not entitled to relief on this issue.
Defendant also accuses the prosecutor of various instances of misconduct. Because
defendant failed to make contemporaneous objections and request curative instructions
2
Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966).
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concerning the alleged instances of prosecutorial misconduct, we review only for plain error.
People v Watson, 245 Mich App 572, 586; 629 NW2d 411 (2001). To avoid forfeiture of an
unpreserved claim, defendant must demonstrate plain error that was outcome determinative. Id.
We review the prosecutor’s remarks in context to determine whether the defendant received a
fair and impartial trial. Id.
Defendant argues that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by introducing evidence
under MRE 404(b) and exceeding the scope of the trial court’s ruling regarding such evidence.
A prosecutor’s good faith effort to admit evidence cannot constitute misconduct. People v
Ackerman, 257 Mich App 434, 448; 669 NW2d 818 (2003). Because the evidence was properly
admitted, the prosecutor did not engage in misconduct by introducing it. Further, the prosecutor
did not exceed the scope of the trial court’s ruling.
Defendant next argues that the prosecutor acted improperly by eliciting testimony that
defendant sent a letter to his friend asking her to testify favorably in his behalf and to contact his
attorney regarding another witness’ preliminary examination testimony, and that he introduced
the actual letter as an exhibit. However, defendant’s letter constituted a statement by a partyopponent properly admissible under MRE 801(d)(2), and a prosecutor’s good faith effort to
admit evidence cannot constitute misconduct. Ackerman, supra at 448. Because the evidence
was properly admitted, there is no basis to conclude that the prosecutor acted in bad faith. Id.
Defendant also argues that the prosecutor denigrated defendant and his defense.
Specifically, defendant takes issue with the prosecutor’s comments during his opening statement
and closing argument that defendant was well-known by the police, had a chronic alcohol
problem, was a “terrorist, a racist, a violent, belligerent individual,” “a violent, racist bully,” “a
terror in the community,” and “a violent predator”; that the witnesses “portray[ed] [defendant] as
a dangerous monster”; that defendant’s theory of self-defense was “a sad joke” that was
“ludicrous” and “absurd”; and his query to members of the jury regarding whether they would
rather have defendant or the victim for a neighbor. While a prosecutor may not argue facts that
are not in evidence, he may argue the evidence and reasonable inferences. Id. at 450. The
prosecutor is not constrained to use bland terms when doing so. People v Launsburry, 217 Mich
App 358, 361; 551 NW2d 460 (1996). Evidence was presented that defendant was well known
to the police, had an alcohol problem, had serious anger issues, made racially untoward
comments, and was a violent person who was frequently involved in verbal and physical
altercations. Further, the prosecutor was free to argue from the facts that defendant’s theory of
self-defense, as testified to by the defense witness, was not worthy of belief. Id. Finally, the
prosecutor’s question to the jury regarding whom they would rather have for a neighbor was
clearly rhetorical and designed to induce the jury to compare and contrast the personality and
demeanor of defendant and the victim, to determine which version of events they found to be
credible. The prosecutor’s comments and arguments were based on the evidence and reasonable
inferences.
Defendant next argues that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by arguing facts not in
evidence. We disagree. The prosecutor need not use the least prejudicial evidence available to
establish a fact at issue, People v Fisher, 449 Mich 441, 452; 537 NW2d 577 (1995), and the
prosecutor has wide latitude in arguing the facts and reasonable inferences, People v Bahoda,
448 Mich 261, 282; 531 NW2d 659 (1995). As noted already, the prosecutor need not confine
argument to the blandest possible terms. Launsburry, supra at 361.
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The evidence supported the prosecutor’s statements that the victim was almost killed and
that the victim’s injuries were life threatening. The victim suffered two serious cuts: a ten-inch
long cut to his chest and a six-inch cut to the arm, both to the bone. He spent three days in the
hospital. The prosecutor’s reference to the victim regarding “the incident where [he] got
stabbed” was also supported by the evidence.
The prosecutor’s comment that he had a duty to bring out the MRE 404(b) testimony was
a proper characterization of the law. While a prosecutor’s clear misstatement of the law that
remains uncorrected may deprive a defendant of a fair trial, People v Grayer, 252 Mich App 349,
357; 651 NW2d 818 (2002), “[t]he truth-finding function of our legal system is best served when
as much evidence as possible relevant to the charged crime is submitted to the finder of fact, and
the prosecutor has a duty to the public to present all such evidence of a crime that he obtains.”
People v Stevens, 461 Mich 655, 668; 610 NW2d 881 (2000).
Viewing in context the prosecutor’s remarks during voir dire that real life is not akin to
CSI television shows and that he was not trying to “pull the wool” over the juror’s eyes, Watson,
supra at 586, it is clear that the prosecutor was merely attempting to ensure that the jury not hold
the prosecution to a higher burden of proof than was required. The remarks were entirely proper
and did not prejudice the jurors against defendant.
Defendant argues that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by eliciting a police officer’s
opinion regarding the victim’s credibility. It is generally improper for a witness to comment or
provide an opinion on the credibility of another witness because matters of credibility are to be
determined by the trier of fact. People v Williams, 153 Mich App 582, 590; 396 NW2d 805
(1986). Here, the prosecutor did not ask the officer to offer an opinion on whether the victim
was credible, but rather, he asked whether the victim was ever untruthful to that particular officer
during their interactions. Also, the prosecutor’s question whether it would have been fair for the
investigating officers to think that the witness was intoxicated was not improper because the
question pertained to whether others’ assessments of his own sobriety were accurate.
Defendant argues that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by making improper civic
duty arguments. Specifically, defendant takes issue with the prosecutor’s comments that the jury
should not reward defendant because the victim did not die, because it would make a nullity out
of the crime, that the other acts evidence showed defendant’s intent and gave the jurors a clear
picture of what kind of person the defendant was, what he was capable of doing, what he had
done on a consistent basis, and what he did on the date of the incident; and whether an honest
and reasonable person would rather have defendant or the victim for a neighbor. We conclude
the challenged statements constituted permissible commentary on the evidence and the
inferences drawn from the evidence. McGhee, supra at 636. The case turned on whether the
jury believed that defendant intentionally injured the victim with the knife when the victim tried
to break up the fight between defendant and another man, or whether the victim was injured
when defendant used the knife in self-defense to ward off the victim’s physical attack. The
prosecutor’s comments did not inject issues broader than the guilt or innocence of defendant into
the trial, and no error occurred. Id.
Defendant also takes issue with the prosecutor’s introduction of evidence that the victim
did not have a police record, and the prosecutor’s comment that the jury should not share or
waste its pity on defendant and that it would be better placed with the victims of defendant’s past
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actions. It is improper for a prosecutor to seek the jury’s sympathy for a victim. Watson, supra
at 591. However, when viewed in context, the brief statement defendant challenged does not
appear to have been so inflammatory as to require reversal in light of the trial court instructing
the jury to base its verdict solely on the evidence. Id. at 591-592.
Defendant also takes issue with the prosecutor’s questions during voir dire concerning the
potential jurors’ knowledge about the impact of alcohol on memory and perception of events, as
well as his analogy of purchasing a home with imperfections to the burden of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. We find the prosecutor remarks were proper because it is clear that the he was
merely attempting to ensure that the jury would not hold the prosecution to a higher burden of
proof than was required.
Finally, defendant argues that the cumulative effect of the various instances of alleged
prosecutorial misconduct constitutes error requiring reversal. However, where the prosecutor’s
conduct does not deny defendant a fair and impartial trial, reversal is not warranted. Watson,
supra at 594. Even when viewed cumulatively, defendant has not shown any instances of
misconduct which denied him a fair trial.3 In sum, because defendant failed to demonstrate any
plain error that was outcome determinative, reversal is not required.
Defendant next argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Defendant
failed to move for a new trial or Ginther4 hearing in the trial court; therefore, this issue is
unpreserved, People v Sabin (On Second Remand), 242 Mich App 656, 658-659; 620 NW2d 19
(2000). Our review is limited to mistakes apparent on the record. Id. at 659. To prove
ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must show that his counsel’s performance was
deficient, and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for that deficient performance, the
result of the trial would have been different. Id.
Defense counsel did not object to testimony concerning how the other acts evidence to be
presented at trial was selected but as noted supra, this evidence was properly admissible.
Although defense counsel did not object to the manner in which the specific events were selected
for trial, defendant has failed to overcome the strong presumption that defense counsel’s failure
to object constituted reasonable trial strategy. In light of the brief reference to the selection
process, defense counsel may have reasonably determined that an objection would have drawn
more attention to the fact that defendant had 24 contacts with the police in the two years
preceding the event. People v Rice (On Remand), 235 Mich App 429, 445; 597 NW2d 843
(1999). We will not substitute our judgment for that of counsel regarding matters of trial
strategy, nor will we assess counsel’s competence with the benefit of hindsight. Id. Moreover,
in light of the weight of the evidence produced at trial, no reasonable likelihood exists that the
brief reference to defendant’s other police interactions affected the outcome of the case.
3
For this reason, we likewise reject defendant’s argument that the trial court erred in failing to
take independent action in response to the various instances of alleged prosecutorial misconduct.
4
People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).
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Defense counsel also did not object to the admission of the statement defendant made to
the police. However, defendant’s statement was properly admissible, and defense counsel is not
ineffective for failing to make a futile objection. Ackerman, supra at 455. Defense counsel also
did not object to the prosecutor’s comment that the jury should not share or waste its pity on
defendant, but that it would be better placed with the victims of defendant’s past actions. But as
noted already, this unpreserved allegation of prosecutorial misconduct did not require reversal,
and counsel is not ineffective for failing to raise futile objections. Id. Moreover, the trial court
instructed the jury to base its verdict solely on the evidence, and jurors are presumed to follow
their instructions. People v Graves, 458 Mich 476, 486; 581 NW2d 229 (1998).
Defendant has failed to demonstrate that his counsel’s performance was deficient, and
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for that deficient performance, the result of the trial
would have been different. Accordingly, error meriting reversal did not occur.
We affirm.
/s/ Patrick M. Donofrio
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Jane E. Markey
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