PEOPLE OF MI V WILLIAM BRUCE KNAPPENBERGER
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 4, 2007
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 270572
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 06-000027-01
WILLIAM BRUCE KNAPPENBERGER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Jansen, P.J., and Fitzgerald and Markey, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted, following a jury trial, of second-degree criminal sexual
conduct (CSC II), MCL 750.520c(1)(a), and sentenced to 7 to 15 years’ imprisonment. He
appeals by right. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for resentencing.
Defendant’s conviction arises out of the sexual assault of the complainant, who was six
years old at the time of trial. The complainant testified that defendant pulled down his pajamas
and “licked his butt” while he was playing a game with defendant in his backyard.1 Defendant
denied sexually assaulting the complainant and playing the game with him. Although defendant
was charged with first-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC I), MCL 750.520b(1)(a), the jury
was instructed on CSC II and convicted him of the latter offense.
Defendant first argues that his conviction must be vacated because he was not charged
with CSC II, and the trial court “constructively amended” the information to add this offense
after the close of proofs. He further contends that CSC II is not a necessarily included lesser
offense of CSC I and that, as such, the trial court erred by instructing the jury pursuant to CSC II.
As subsequently discussed further, we hold that defendant has waived appellate review of these
issues by specifically requesting that the jury be instructed on CSC II.
In People v Nyx, 479 Mich 112; 734 NW2d 548 (2007), our Supreme Court recently
addressed whether a defendant charged with CSC I may properly be convicted of CSC II as a
1
The complainant also testified that defendant engaged in similar conduct with the
complainant’s brother, but the jury acquitted defendant of additional charges involving the
complainant’s brother.
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lesser offense. The defendant in Nyx was charged with three counts of CSC I, but, following a
bench trial, was convicted of two counts of CSC II. The defendant appealed, arguing that the
trial court erred by considering the cognate lesser offense of CSC II. Id. at 115-116. Chief
Justice Taylor, joined by Justice Markman, opined that “it is possible to commit CSC I without
first having committed CSC II, and the elements of CSC II are not ‘completely subsumed’ in the
greater offense of CSC I.” Id. at 136. Thus, the lead opinion concluded that CSC II is a cognate
lesser offense, rather than a necessarily included lesser offense, of CSC I, and that MCL
768.32(1) barred the defendant’s CSC II convictions. Id. Justices Cavanagh and Kelly
concurred in the result of the lead opinion, stating that the defendant’s CSC II convictions
violated his due process rights because he did not have adequate notice that he faced such
charges. Id. at 143 (Cavanagh, J).
Unlike in Nyx, defendant in the instant case specifically requested that the jury be
instructed on CSC II and approved the verdict form which allowed the jury to convict him of
CSC II as a lesser offense of CSC I. Moreover, defense counsel expressed satisfaction with the
jury instructions following the trial court’s reading of the instructions. Accordingly, defendant
has waived any error regarding the trial court’s instruction on CSC II and the addition of CSC II
as a possible verdict. People v Carter, 462 Mich 206, 215-219; 612 NW2d 144 (2000). A
waiver extinguishes appellate review of the right waived. Id. at 215.
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred by failing to swear the complainant before
he testified and by failing to determine whether he was competent to testify. Because defendant
did not timely object before the complainant testified, our review is limited to plain error
affecting defendant’s substantial rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130
(1999), reh den 461 Mich 1205 (1999). Reversal is warranted only if the error resulted in
conviction despite defendant’s actual innocence or if it seriously affected the fairness, integrity,
or public reputation of judicial proceedings, independent of his innocence. Id.
MRE 603 provides:
Before testifying, every witness shall be required to declare that the
witness will testify truthfully, by oath or affirmation administered in a form
calculated to awaken the witness’ conscience and impress the witness’ mind with
the duty to do so.
Further, MRE 601 provides:
Unless the court finds after questioning a person that the person does not
have sufficient physical or mental capacity or sense of obligation to testify
truthfully and understandably, every person is competent to be a witness except as
otherwise provided in these rules.
Before the complainant testified, the following colloquy ensued:
THE COURT:
Do you know what it means to tell the truth, [complainant’s
name]?
THE WITNESS:
Yes.
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THE COURT:
And do you know what it means to lie?
THE WITNESS:
Yes.
THE COURT:
What is better, is it better to lie or is it better to tell the
truth?
THE WITNESS:
Better to tell the truth.
THE COURT:
I think the youth understands the difference between telling
the truth and a lie, and that is sufficient for me.
Although MRE 601 did not require the trial court to make a finding of competency, the
court’s discussion with the complainant sufficiently demonstrated his competence and his sense
of obligation to testify truthfully. Defendant contends that the complainant’s testimony was
sometimes contradictory, but any inconsistency in his testimony affected his credibility and not
his competency under MRE 601. People v Watson, 245 Mich App 572, 583-584; 629 NW2d
411 (2001). Moreover, although the trial court did not ask the complainant to affirm that he
would testify truthfully, the trial court’s inquiry whether it is better to lie or to tell the truth, and
the complainant’s response that it is better to tell the truth, was sufficient to impress upon the
complainant his duty to testify truthfully. Thus, the trial court minimally complied with MRE
603, and no plain error occurred. As such, defense counsel’s failure to timely object did not
deprive defendant of the effective assistance of counsel. People v Ackerman, 257 Mich App 434,
455; 669 NW2d 818 (2003). Further, we note that the complainant averred that the events about
which he testified actually occurred and that nobody told him to “make up” the story.
Accordingly, even if the trial court’s failure to swear the complainant constituted plain error,
reversal would not be warranted considering the complainant’s affirmation that he testified
truthfully. Carines, supra at 763.
Defendant next contends that he is entitled to resentencing in part because the sentencing
court failed to articulate substantial and compelling reasons to support its upward departure from
the sentencing guidelines range of 10 to 19 months.2 In reviewing a departure from the
sentencing guidelines range, we review the existence of a particular factor supporting a departure
for clear error, the determination whether the factor is objective and verifiable de novo, and
whether a reason is substantial and compelling for an abuse of discretion. People v Babcock, 469
Mich 247, 264-265; 666 NW2d 231 (2003). We also review the extent of a departure for an
abuse of discretion. People v Abramski, 257 Mich App 71, 74; 665 NW2d 501 (2003).
Under MCL 769.34(3), a trial court may depart from the sentencing guidelines range “if
the court has a substantial and compelling reason for that departure and states on the record the
reasons for departure.” A substantial and compelling reason must be objective and verifiable,
must keenly or irresistibly grab the court’s attention, be recognized as of considerable worth in
deciding the length of a sentence, and exists in only exceptional cases. Babcock, supra at 258,
citing People v Fields, 448 Mich 58, 62, 67-68; 528 NW2d 176 (1995). An “objective and
2
As discussed infra, the trial court properly scored 15 points for offense variable (OV) 10.
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verifiable” reason must be based on “actions or occurrences that are external to the minds of the
judge, defendant, and others involved in making the decision, and must be capable of being
confirmed.” Abramski, supra at 74. Further, a departure may not be based on characteristics
already taken into account in determining the appropriate sentencing guidelines range unless the
court determines from facts in the record that the particular characteristic at issue has been given
inadequate or disproportionate weight. Id.; MCL 769.34(3)(b).
Here, the trial court explained its departure from the sentencing guidelines range as
follows:
The presentence report has recommended a probationary period of two
years. How can I in good conscience impose a two-year probationary sentence on
someone who a jury has found guilty of criminal sexual conduct of a tender child.
I can’t do that. I cannot do that.
***
[T]he substantial and compelling reasons which the court has relied on in
justifying that specific departure are as follows:
The guidelines do not adequately address the psychological injury of the
victim’s family members; and secondly, because remorse has been – because
remorse has not been expressed in regard to the victim’s family and therefore
rehabilitation of the defendant is therefore questionable.
Although the sentencing guidelines take into consideration the psychological injury to a
victim, the trial court specifically determined that the guidelines did not adequately address the
psychological injury to the complainant and his family in this case. The complainant’s mother
discussed the family’s psychological injury at sentencing. Because the trial court determined
that the guidelines did not adequately account for this characteristic, the court did not err by
departing on this basis. MCL 769.34(3)(b); Abramski, supra at 74.
Defendant primarily focuses on the second reason that the trial court articulated for
departing above the guidelines recommended range, i.e., that because he did not express remorse
regarding the victim’s family, rehabilitation is questionable. We agree with defendant that this
factor is not objective and verifiable; therefore, it is not substantial and compelling. Babcock,
supra at 257. Further, resentencing is required because it is unclear from the record below
whether the trial court would have departed to the same extent on the basis of the psychological
injury to the complainant and his family alone. See Babcock, supra at 260. Consequently,
because we must remand this case to the trial court for resentencing or rearticulation of its
substantial and compelling reasons to justify its departure, we need not address defendant’s
argument that his minimum sentence is disproportionate.
Defendant also contends that resentencing is required because his sentence was increased
based on facts that were not proven beyond a reasonable doubt contrary to Blakely v Washington,
542 US 296; 124 S Ct 2531; 159 L Ed 2d 403 (2004). In particular, defendant argues that his
properly scored sentencing guidelines entitled him to an intermediate sanction and that the
sentencing court constitutionally erred by scoring 15 points for offense variable (OV) 10. Our
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Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed that under Michigan’s intermediate sentencing scheme, a
sentencing court does not violate Blakely by engaging in judicial fact-finding to score the OVs to
determine a defendant’s minimum sentence even if the defendant would have been entitled to an
intermediate sanction absent the OV scoring. People v McCuller, 479 Mich 672, 676-678, 698;
739 NW2d 563 (2007). Therefore, the sentencing court’s assessment of 15 points under OV 10
for “predatory conduct” did not violate Blakely. Moreover, for purposes of resentencing, we
note that the trial court properly scored 15 points under OV 10. MCL 777.40(3)(a) defines
“predatory conduct” as “preoffense conduct directed at a victim for the primary purpose of
victimization.” The sentencing court based its scoring decision on the fact that defendant sought
out the complainant before the offense and attempted to see the child while he was taking a bath.
Because the evidence, in particular the testimony of the complainant’s mother, supported the
court’s reasoning, the scoring decision was proper. People v Endres, 269 Mich App 414, 417;
711 NW2d 398 (2006).
Defendant further contends that the sentencing court violated Blakely by departing from
the sentencing guidelines. In People v Harper, 479 Mich 599; 739 NW2d 599 (2007), our
Supreme Court held that Blakely is not offended when a defendant’s sentencing guidelines place
him in an intermediate sanction cell, but the sentencing court departs upward based on
substantial and compelling reasons. The Court stated that “[w]hen a defendant’s minimum
sentence range under the guidelines is in an intermediate sanction cell, the defendant has a
statutory right to an intermediate sanction, conditioned on the absence of substantial and
compelling reasons to depart upward.” Id. at 637 (emphasis in original). The Court further
stated that, “in the intermediate sanction cell context, because the defendant’s sentence never
exceeds the maximum sentence authorized by the jury verdict or the guilty plea, the sentencing
judge may exercise his statutorily granted discretion to depart upward on the basis of facts not
found by a jury.” Id. at 637-638. The same reasoning applies here: defendant’s corrected
minimum sentence range placed him in a “straddle cell,” entitling him to either an intermediate
sanction or to imprisonment with a minimum term within that range absent a departure. MCL
769.34(4)(c). Therefore, the sentencing court did not violate Blakely by departing from the
sentencing guidelines.
We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for resentencing and/or rearticulation of
substantial and compelling reasons for its departure. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Jane E. Markey
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