GUARDIAN ALARM CO OF MICH V RICHARD T MAY
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
GUARDIAN ALARM COMPANY OF
MICHIGAN d/b/a GUARDIAN SECURITY
SERVICES,
UNPUBLISHED
December 4, 2007
Plaintiff/Counter-DefendantAppellee,
v
No. 269901
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 1996-525337-CK
RICHARD T. MAY, BERNARD SCHOCH,
DAVID J. MARCUS and MICRONETICS
DESIGN CORPORATION,
Defendants/Counter-PlaintiffsAppellants,
and
MICHAEL MARKS, JOHN SMITH and DON
FAYBRICK,
Defendants.
Before: Markey, P.J., and Saad and Wilder, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendants appeal the trial court’s order that vacated part of an arbitration award and we
reverse the trial court’s order and confirm the arbitration award.
I. Nature of the Case
The narrow and dispositive question raised by the trial court’s holding that the arbitration
panel exceeded its powers is whether, in so ruling, the trial court exceeded its powers under
Michigan law which circumscribes the judiciary’s authority to reverse arbitration awards,
specifically, MCR 3.602 as interpreted by our Supreme Court in DAIIE v Gavin, 416 Mich 407,
434; 331 NW2d 418 (1982). The trial court erred because it (1) wrongly concluded that the
arbitration panel made an error of law on the face of the award, (2) improperly reexamined the
evidence presented to the arbitration panel, and (3) impermissibly speculated about the panel’s
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reasoning in deciding to vacate part of the award. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order
and, for the reasons set forth below, we confirm the arbitration award.
II. Facts and Procedural History
This dispute stems from a 1993 contract between Guardian Alarm Company of Michigan,
a security and alarm company, and Micronetics Design Corporation, a software development
company, and its agents, for the use and support of a security software program called “Genesis.”
Under the contract, Guardian would use the Genesis program for its security services and
Micronetics would sell Genesis to other companies throughout the United States. Further, while
Guardian operated the Genesis program, Micronetics agreed to provide support and maintenance
for Genesis,1 but, importantly and central to this litigation, Micronetics’ obligation to provide
support and service would cease if Guardian used the source code version of Genesis in locations
other than Detroit.2 The purpose of strictly limiting the use of the source code version of a
computer program is to prevent theft or pirating of proprietary information, which would destroy
the software’s commercial value to Micronetics. By agreeing that Micronetics could discontinue
support and maintenance of Genesis if Guardian used the source code in an unauthorized
manner, the parties recognized the significance of this breach of Genesis security. The quid pro
quo here is clear: unfettered use of the source code in various Guardian locations would
compromise security, which could destroy Micronetics’ efforts to market Genesis, while a lack
of Micronetics’ support and maintenance would seriously hinder Guardian’s ability to provide
electronic security services through the Genesis program.
Indeed, on May 16, 1996, Micronetics sent Guardian a letter and stated that Micronetics
was no longer obligated to provide support and maintenance to Guardian because Guardian
breached the contract by, among other things, using the source code version of Genesis outside
of its Detroit location. Thereafter, Guardian filed a complaint against Micronetics and alleged
that Micronetics failed to pay certain commissions under the 1993 agreement and failed to
provide adequate service and support for the Genesis software. Guardian further claimed that
Micronetics stopped providing support services to Guardian altogether and that Micronetics
expressed its intention to transfer service and support responsibilities to a new company.
Micronetics later filed a counter-complaint against Guardian and alleged that Guardian used the
source code version of Genesis in Toledo and Cleveland, a violation of the “Detroit-only”
provision of the contract.3
1
The agreement also provided that Guardian would deliver certain software packages to
Micronetics within 14 days of the agreement.
2
Guardian was given both the “object code” and “source code” version of Genesis. An object
code version is essentially a copy of the software that is not modifiable, while the source code
version contains programming statements and can be modified. The source code is in humanreadable form and reveals program information, designs, algorithms and other work product and
is, therefore, generally made available to users in very limited circumstances.
3
Micronetics also asserted that Guardian failed to deliver its part of the software package to
Micronetics as required by the contract.
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Despite Micronetics’ claim that its obligation to provide service and support to Guardian
terminated when Guardian violated the contract, the trial court granted Guardian’s request for a
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction and ordered Micronetics to continue to
provide service and support.4 Thereafter, the parties agreed to arbitrate their claims, and, on
March 25, 2005, the arbitration panel issued its opinion and award. The arbitral panel ruled that
Guardian was not entitled to any commissions because Guardian failed to comply with the
condition precedent in the contract that Guardian deliver all remaining software packages to
Micronetics. The arbitration panel also ruled that Guardian violated the “Detroit-only”
restriction by using the source code in locations other than Detroit and thus awarded Micronetics
$576,000 in “damages relating to the cost of support and maintenance,” which reimbursed
Micronetics for 72 months of service and support.5
Both Micronetics and Guardian filed motions in the trial court to confirm the arbitration
award in part and to vacate the award in part. The trial court rejected Micrometrics’ argument
that it is entitled to damages for Guardian’s failure to turn over the software packages. The trial
court also reversed the arbitration panel’s damage award to Micronetics. For the reasons
articulated below, we reverse this ruling.
III. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
This case involves a statutory arbitration in which the parties agreed that judgment would
be entered in accordance with the arbitrators’ decision. MCL 600.5001 et seq., governs statutory
arbitration and provides that parties may agree to arbitrate their claims and “agree that a
judgment of any circuit court shall be rendered upon the award made pursuant to such
submission.” MCL 600.5001(1). Moreover, MCL 500.5025 provides that “the circuit courts
4
Guardian later filed a motion to amend its complaint to add a claim that Micronetics is liable
for Guardian’s cost to replace Genesis with another software system. According to Guardian,
because it did not receive adequate updates and support for Genesis, the system became
unusable. However, the trial court ruled that the issue should be litigated in a separate action
because Guardian brought it late in the litigation, and the issue would require further discovery.
The federal district court granted summary judgment to Micronetics on Guardian’s claim for
replacement costs. Guardian Alarm Company of Michigan v May, unpublished order of the
Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, issued April 4, 2000 (Docket No. 9974994). The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s
dismissal of Guardian’s claims in Guardian Alarm Company of Michigan v May, unpublished
opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, issued December 11, 2001 (Docket
No. 00-1489). The import of these federal rulings will be discussed later in this opinion.
5
One of the arbitrators dissented from the panel’s award. Though he agreed that Guardian
breached the condition that it not use the source code outside of Detroit, he concluded that
Micronetics should not be permitted to recover damages for the breach. Specifically, the
arbitrator reasoned that the prohibition on the use of the source code was in the agreement for
confidentiality reasons and, according to the arbitrator, “[u]nder no circumstances . . . did
Micronetics ever intend to charge its joint venture partner, so to speak, with maintenance or
service fees.”
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have jurisdiction to enforce the [arbitration] agreement and to render judgment on an award
thereunder.”
Our courts rarely vacate arbitral awards precisely because the scope of review is narrow,6
and a court is not permitted to speculate about the panel’s reasoning or substitute its own
reasoning in order to overturn an award. As our Supreme Court explained in Gavin, supra at
429:
Arbitration, by its very nature, restricts meaningful legal review in the
traditional sense. As a general observation, courts will be reluctant to modify or
vacate an award because of the difficulty or impossibility, without speculation, of
determining what caused an arbitrator to rule as he did. The informal and
sometimes unorthodox procedures of the arbitration hearings, combined with the
absence of a verbatim record and formal findings of fact and conclusions of law,
make it virtually impossible to discern the mental path leading to an award.
Reviewing courts are usually left without a plainly recognizable basis for finding
substantial legal error. It is only the kind of legal error that is evident without
scrutiny of intermediate mental indicia which remains reviewable, such as that
involved in these cases. In many cases the arbitrator’s alleged error will be as
equally attributable to alleged “unwarranted” fact finding as to asserted “error of
law.” In such cases the award should be upheld since the alleged error of law
cannot be shown with the requisite certainty to have been the essential basis for
the challenged award and the arbitrator's findings of fact are unreviewable.
Here, the trial court ruled that the two arbitrators in the majority exceeded their powers
when they awarded Micronetics $576,000 for the support and maintenance Micronetics provided
6
The Michigan Court rules set forth how a party may challenge an arbitral award in circuit court.
Specifically, MCR 3.602(J) provides:
(1) On application of a party, the court shall vacate an award if:
(a) the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue means;
(b) there was evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral,
corruption of an arbitrator, or misconduct prejudicing a party’s rights;
(c) the arbitrator exceeded his or her powers; or
(d) the arbitrator refused to postpone the hearing on a showing of
sufficient cause, refused to hear evidence material to the controversy, or otherwise
conducted the hearing to prejudice substantially a party’s rights. [Emphasis
added.]
“Generally, issues regarding an order to enforce, vacate, or modify an arbitration award are
reviewed de novo.” Saveski v Tiseo Architects, Inc, 261 Mich App 553, 554; 682 NW2d 542
(2004).
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to Guardian. In reversing the award, the trial judge plainly violated Michigan law that restricts
judicial review of arbitration awards:
Arbitrators exceed their power when they “act beyond the material terms
of the contract from which they primarily draw their authority, or in contravention
of controlling principles of law.” DAIIE v Gavin, 416 Mich 407, 434; 331 NW2d
418 (1982). “ ‘[W]here it clearly appears on the face of the award or the reasons
for the decision as stated, being substantially a part of the award, that the
arbitrators through an error in law have been led to a wrong conclusion, and that,
but for such error, a substantially different award must have been made, the award
and decision will be set aside.’ ” Id. at 443, quoting Howe v Patrons’ Mut Fire
Ins Co of Michigan, 216 Mich 560, 570; 185 NW 864 (1921). [Saveski, supra at
554-556.]
Further, the trial court violated Michigan’s restrictions on the scope of review of arbitration
awards when it searched for errors in the reasoning of the arbitration panel after the panel issued
an apparently valid award:
[A] trial court may not hunt for errors in an arbitrator’s explanation of how it
determined who is liable under the arbitrated contract, and who owes what
damages to whom. Without the authority to modify or vacate a facially valid
award at will, MCR 3.602(J) and (K), the trial court erred when it ordered an
expansion of the record rather than reviewing the award provided. Gavin, supra
at 429. To hold otherwise would allow a dissatisfied court to delve deeper and
deeper into an arbitrator’s factual and legal support until it finally unearthed a
perceived error that could justify the court’s desired outcome. Because the
arbitration award in this case lacks the kind of facial error that would allow the
court to modify or vacate it, the court should have confirmed the award without
demanding the production of more factual and legal support.
Moreover, the trial court impermissibly examined the evidence presented to the arbitration panel
and the panel’s factual conclusions. It is well-established that “[c]laims that quarrel with a
binding arbitrator’s factual findings are not subject to appellate review.” Krist v Krist, 246 Mich
App 59, 67; 631 NW2d 53 (2001). The Krist Court further opined:
In Gavin, our Supreme Court announced that only those awards that
contain an error of law discernible on the face of the very award itself are
reviewable. To that end, the Gavin Court stated that “[i]t is only the kind of legal
error that is evident without scrutiny of intermediate mental indicia which remains
reviewable....” Gavin, supra at 429. Thus the party seeking to vacate or modify
an arbitrator’s award must establish that the arbitrator displayed a manifest
disregard of the applicable law “but for which the award would have been
substantially otherwise.” Id. at 443.
IV. The Trial Court’s Ruling
In vacating the arbitration panel’s damage award, the trial court clearly violated the
mandates of Gavin.
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The trial court agreed with the dissenting arbitrator that the Detroit-only restriction is a
confidentiality provision and the remedy for breach of that restriction is only that Micronetics no
longer had to provide Guardian with support or maintenance of Genesis. The court also relied on
the testimony of Harry Hayden, who maintained that the harm to Micronetics for use of the
source code was related to confidentiality. The trial court concluded:
The Court agrees that these observations compel a finding that the
majority exceeded its authority by awarding damages for breach of the “Detroit
only” provisions based on costs associated with providing support. The essence
of the parties’ agreement was undisputed, and compels the conclusion that such
damages were not contemplated by the parties as the natural and probable result
of the breach. In this context, it is manifest that the majority’s award was based
on an error of law, but for which a substantially different award must have been
made. Therefore, Plaintiff’s motion to vacate this portion of the award is vacated
[sic], and no judgment can be entered on it.
On reconsideration, the trial court judge explained that she “reviewed the evidence presented to
the arbitrators” and reached the same conclusion as the dissenting arbitrator – that the purpose of
the Detroit-only provision was merely to ensure confidentiality.7
V. Analysis
We hold that the trial court erred when it vacated the portion of the arbitration award that
reimbursed Micronetics for its costs to service and support Genesis and that the arbitration panel
correctly concluded that Micronetics is entitled to $576,000 in damages for its support and
maintenance of the Genesis software. Though the trial court found that the arbitrators “exceeded
their powers” by making an error of law, no error of law is apparent on the face of the award. To
the contrary, the trial court’s written opinion vacating the award and its opinion on
reconsideration both reveal that the trial court did not find an error on the face of the award, but
instead exceeded its authority by reviewing the evidence presented to the arbitrators and
reinterpreting the contract to come to the same factual and legal conclusions as the dissenting
arbitrator. It was simply beyond the trial court’s authority “to delve deeper and deeper into an
arbitrator’s factual and legal support until it finally unearthed a perceived error . . . . .” Saveski,
supra at 558.
Furthermore, in addition to seeking damages under the contract, Micronetics also asked
for damages under theories of misrepresentation, quantum meruit, and unjust enrichment. The
arbitration panel was not obliged to nor did it specify the precise theory of recovery, but did find
that Guardian violated the Detroit-only clause and found that Micronetics incurred substantial
costs to continue supporting the Guardian system. Micronetics’ theory was that Guardian lied
about its use of the source code for three years, Micronetics found out about it in 1996 and
stopped support services, and Guardian obtained a court order to force Micronetics to continue
7
The judge noted that she did not rely on the opinion of the dissenting arbitrator, but merely
reached the same conclusions after reviewing the record before the arbitration panel.
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those services until Guardian started using another software program in 1999. Thus, for six
years, Micronetics incurred costs for support services that it was clearly not obligated to provide.
Accordingly, the damage award would be justified under a misrepresentation, unjust enrichment,
or quantum meruit theory, and it was fully within the arbitrators’ powers to grant such an award
when Micronetics asked for this specific relief during the arbitral hearing. Under Michigan law,
if an award may be based on alternative, equally tenable grounds, there is no basis to assume the
arbitrators exceeded their powers. See Henderson v Detroit Auto Inter-Ins Exch, 142 Mich App
203, 206; 369 NW2d 210 (1985), citing Hayman Co v Brady Mechanical Inc, 139 Mich App
185; 362 NW2d 243 (1984).
Again, the face of the award and the reasons given by the arbitration panel reveal no
“plainly recognizable” error of law. Gavin, supra at 429. The trial court impermissibly
speculated about why the arbitration panel ruled as it did, exceeded its authority when it
scrutinized what reasoning may have led to the arbitral decision and whether the record evidence
could support such reasoning. Id. Instead, the trial court should have confirmed the award
because it could cite no error of law with “the requisite certainty to have been the essential basis
for the challenged award.” Id. And, because the arbitrators clearly did not “display[] a manifest
disregard of the applicable law,” the trial court’s decision to vacate the award was improper. Id.
at 443.
Moreover, the trial court’s “no harm no foul” conclusion that Micronetics was not
entitled to damages on the ground that the Detroit-only clause is merely a confidentiality
provision runs contrary to rulings made by the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan and the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Guardian filed
suit in federal court in an attempt to force Micronetics to pay for a replacement software program
that Guardian began to use in 1999. As in this case, Guardian argued to the federal district court
that the Detroit-only source code restriction under section 6.1(i) of the contract was simply a
confidentiality provision and that Micronetics was never harmed by Guardian’s unauthorized use
of the source code outside of Detroit. The district court judge disagreed with Guardian and so
did the Sixth Circuit:
Nothing in the Contract supports this limited reading of section 6.1(i),
however. In fact, the Contract could hardly be more clear: Micronetics’ support
obligation terminates immediately if Guardian uses the central station source code
anywhere other than the company’s Detroit offices. Because the language of the
Contract is not ambiguous or subject to more than one possible construction,
Guardian may not contradict the Contract’s plain meaning merely by asserting
that the parties intended something else. [Guardian Alarm Company of Michigan
v May, unpublished opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,
issued December 11, 2001 (Docket No. 00-1489), slip op at 7-8.]
Thus, not only did the Oakland Circuit Court judge err when she reinterpreted the contract and
speculated about the underlying intentions of the parties, her conclusion that the provision was
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nothing more than a privacy term and that the breach did not harm Micronetics directly conflicts
with these prior federal trial and appellate court rulings.8
For these reasons, we reverse the trial court’s order and confirm the arbitration award.
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
8
Guardian raises alternative grounds to affirm the trial court’s decision to vacate the arbitration
award and, in so doing, encourages this Court to engage in the same analysis of the record
evidence as the trial court. As one example, Guardian argues that insufficient evidence
supported the majority’s award of $576,000 to Micronetics. The arbitration panel ruled on this
issue as follows:
There was substantial evidence to support damages relating to the cost of
support and maintenance including, but not limited to, the Affidavit of Jeffrey S.
Prough, which provided that upon his information and belief the servicing of the
Genesis System would run approximately $8,000.00 per month from August 1993
through September 1999, or 72 months when Guardian discontinued using the
Genesis System, and could “climb higher,” which he proffered was the basis of
his damages in attempting to establish grounds for the issuing of a preliminary
injunction by the court to continue servicing Guardian. Any attempt to establish
other than his written word is mere speculation.
Guardian does not set forth any legal grounds to vacate this ruling. Guardian also claims that
Micronetics waived any argument under the Detroit-only provision. Again, however, it is
beyond the scope of a court’s review powers to engage in an analysis of the evidence presented
to the arbitrators to determine whether the award was justified.
-8-
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