PEOPLE OF MI V MELVIN WILLIS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 4, 2007
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 269836
Washtenaw Circuit Court
LC No. 04-002107-FH
MELVIN WILLIS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Donofrio, P.J., and Hoekstra and Markey, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted by jury of two counts of accosting a child for an immoral
purpose, MCL 750.145a, for having asked two young sisters with whom he was acquainted to
“suck his nipples.” Defendant was sentenced to serve 1 to 4 years in prison and appeals as of
right. Because we conclude that MCL 750.145a is not unconstitutionally vague, that defendant’s
rights were adequately protected by the instructions given the jury, that defendant was not denied
his right to present a defense, and that the trial court’s reasons for departing from the
intermediate sanction recommended by the sentencing guidelines were both substantial and
compelling, we affirm.
I. Constitutional Challenge of MCL 750.145a
Defendant first claims that his conviction is invalid because the statute under which he
was convicted is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. The constitutionality of a statute is a
question of law that this Court reviews de novo. People v Piper, 223 Mich App 642, 645; 567
NW2d 483 (1997). Statutes are presumed constitutional and “[a] party challenging the
constitutionality of a statute has the burden of proving its unconstitutionality.” People v Sands,
261 Mich App 158, 160-161, 680 NW2d 500 (2004).
A statute may be challenged for vagueness on the grounds that it does not provide fair
notice of the conduct proscribed, or that it is so indefinite that it confers unstructured and
unlimited discretion on the trier of fact to determine whether the law has been violated. People v
Hill, 269 Mich App 505, 524; 715 NW2d 301 (2006). The constitutionality of a statute may also
be challenged on the ground that it is overbroad and impinges on First Amendment freedoms.
See People v Hayes, 421 Mich 271, 283; 364 NW2d 635 (1984); Hill, supra. Here, defendant
challenges the constitutionality of MCL 750.145a on each of these three grounds.
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A. Vagueness
In arguing that MCL 750.145a is unconstitutionally vague, defendant asserts that certain
phrases in the statute could be ascribed different meanings depending upon the moral beliefs of
the trier of fact. To evaluate this challenge, we must examine the entire text of the statute and
give the words of the statute their ordinary meanings. Hill, supra at 524. MCL 750.145a
provides, in pertinent part, that
[a] person who accosts, entices, or solicits a child less than 16 years of age,
regardless of whether the person knows the individual is a child or knows the
actual age of the child, or an individual whom he or she believes is a child less
than 16 years of age with the intent to induce or force that child or individual to
commit an immoral act, to submit to an act of sexual intercourse or an act of gross
indecency, or to any other act of depravity or delinquency, or who encourages a
child less than 16 years of age, regardless of whether the person knows the
individual is a child or knows the actual age of the child, or an individual whom
he or she believes is a child less than 16 years of age to engage in any of those
acts is guilty of a felony . . . .
Defendant argues that terms such as “immoral act” and “depravity” violate due process
and are therefore unconstitutionally vague because they could be defined to include legal acts by
persons of certain religious or ethical beliefs. Thus, defendant argues, the statute does not
provide fair notice of the conduct proscribed and provides unfettered discretion to the trier of fact
in determining whether the statute has been violated. On the facts of this case, we do not agree.
See People v Lino, 447 Mich 567, 575; 527 NW2d 434 (1994) (vagueness challenges that do not
involve First Amendment freedoms must be examined in light of the facts of the particular case).
1. Fair Notice
To afford constitutionally fair and proper notice, a statute must give a person of ordinary
intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited or required. Sands, supra at
161; see also People v Noble, 238 Mich App 647, 652; 608 NW2d 123 (1999). Thus, a statute
cannot use terms that require persons of common intelligence to guess at its meaning and differ
as to its application. Sands, supra. However, to pass constitutional muster a statute need not
define an offense with mathematical certainty. See Grievance Administrator v Fieger, 476 Mich
231, 255; 719 NW2d 123 (2006). Rather, a statute is sufficiently definite if its meaning can be
fairly ascertained by reference to judicial interpretations, the common law, agency rules,
dictionaries, treatises, or the commonly accepted meanings of the words. Hill, supra at 525.
When read in the context of the statute, the challenged terms provide a person of ordinary
intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited. Sands, supra at 161.
Defendant argues, inter alia, that because drinking certain beverages, for instance, is an
“immoral act” for a person of the Mormon faith because it is contrary to church doctrine, a
statute that includes this term would encompass this legal act. However, as the prosecutor notes,
defendant’s reading of the statute fails to consider the challenged terms in context. Sandwiched
between the phrases cited by defendant is an express prohibition against accosting, enticing, or
soliciting a child “to submit to an act of sexual intercourse or an act of gross indecency.” MCL
750.145a. Read in this context, the terms cited by defendant are fairly ascertainable by persons
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of ordinary intelligence as reasonably encompassing conduct of a sexual nature between an adult
and a child under the age of 16. Indeed, in Lino, supra at 576, our Supreme Court, without
explicitly defining “gross indecency,” stated that the defendant in that case could not “plausibly
claim that he could not have known his conduct was prohibited.” Although the defendant in
Lino solicited minors for purposes of engaging in conduct designed to sexually arouse his
codefendant, see id. at 573-574, and defendant in the instant case argues on appeal that his
request was not necessarily sexual in nature, the circumstances testified to by complainants
suggest otherwise. According to the complainant’s testimony, defendant pulled the girls onto his
bed with him while raising his shirt and asking them to suck his nipples. We conclude that
defendant should have known that the act he requested of the children could reasonably be
construed as immoral, or an act of gross indecency or depravity, as in Lino. Accordingly, the
statute did not fail to provide him fair notice that the charged conduct was prohibited.
2. Unfettered Discretion
Nor did the statute give the jurors in this matter unstructured and unlimited discretion to
determine whether it was violated. To adequately limit the discretion of the trier of fact in its
application, a statute must provide standards for enforcing and administering the law sufficient to
ensure that enforcement is not arbitrary or discriminatory. See People v Boomer, 250 Mich App
534, 539-540, 655 NW2d 255 (2002), quoting Grayned v City of Rockford, 408 US 104, 108109; 92 S Ct 2294; 33 L Ed 2d 222 (1972). As already discussed, it is apparent that the statute
limits its application to sexually oriented conduct with minors. Moreover, it is well settled that
the inclusion of a scienter requirement serves to prevent arbitrary, and thus unconstitutional,
enforcement or application of a statute. See People v Tombs, 260 Mich App 201, 220, 679
NW2d 77 (2003). MCL 750.145a plainly provides for such limits by requiring that the trier of
fact find an “intent to induce or force” the child or individual to engage in the prohibited
conduct.
3. Overbreadth
Defendant also argues that the statute is facially overbroad because it could proscribe
conduct constitutionally protected under the First Amendment. However, defendant does not
cite any instances of this or any similar statute being applied to the conduct set forth in his
hypothetical example. The mere fact that one can conceive of an impermissible application of a
statute is not sufficient to render it overbroad; rather, “‘there must be a realistic danger that the
statute itself will significantly compromise recognized First Amendment protections of parties
not before the Court for it to be facially challenged on overbreadth grounds.’” People v Rogers,
249 Mich App 77, 96; 641 NW2d 595 (2001), quoting Los Angeles City Council v Taxpayers for
Vincent, 466 US 789, 801; 104 S Ct 2118; 80 L.Ed.2d 772 (1984). The constitutional framework
underlying defendant’s challenge simply is not sufficiently developed to persuade us that there is
a realistic danger that the statute is unconstitutionally overbroad.
II. Jury Instructions
Defendant next argues that his due process rights were violated because the trial court
included terms in the jury instructions which were vague, had no common meaning, and which
encompassed conduct not at issue in the case.
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This Court reviews a claim of instructional error de novo. People v Marion, 250 Mich
App 446, 448; 647 NW2d 521 (2002). In doing so, we examine the instructions given the jury in
their entirety to determine whether the trial court committed error requiring reversal. People v
Canales, 243 Mich App 571, 574; 624 NW2d 439 (2000). Even if somewhat imperfect,
instructions do not create error if they fairly presented the issues for trial and sufficiently
protected the defendant’s rights. Id.
In challenging the instructions given by the trial court, defendant first argues that the
inclusion of the terms “accosted, enticed, solicited, or encouraged,” and “gross indecency or an
act of depravity or delinquency,” as elements of the offense was error, as these terms were not
defined by the instruction and have no common meaning. However, “accosted,” “enticed,”
“solicited,” and “encouraged” are part of common English. These words are not so unusual as to
require special explanation by the trial court, and defendant has not proven otherwise. Thus, this
claim lacks merit. See People v Martin, 271 Mich App 280, 352; 721 NW2d 815 (2006) (no
error warranting reversal in trial court’s failure to define a term “generally familiar to lay
persons” and “susceptible of ordinary comprehension”). Further, as already discussed, whatever
meaning might be attributed to the term “depravity,” or for that matter “gross indecency” or
“delinquency,” the terms reasonably encompassed the acts in which defendant requested the
complainants to participate. Accordingly, we conclude that the instructions fairly presented the
issues for trial and sufficiently protected defendant’s rights under the facts of this case.
Defendant additionally argues that the trial court’s instruction was inappropriate insofar
as it referenced “gross indecency,” because this term refers to a sexual act in a public place.
However, in Lino, supra at 578, our Supreme Court indicated that an act of gross indecency may
be found “regardless of whether the conduct is performed in public.” (Emphasis added). Based
on the foregoing precedent, it was not in error for the trial court to include the term “gross
indecency” in its instructions to the jury.
III. Right to Present a Defense
Defendant next contends that he was deprived of his constitutional right to present a
defense when the trial court refused to reopen the proofs to allow the jury to hear testimony from
a witness who had been subpoenaed to appear during the trial, but arrived after the close of
proofs and closing arguments. Defense counsel stated that the witness, Brenda Roszkowski, had
originally been subpoenaed to impeach the complainants’ testimony at the preliminary
examination that they lived in the same apartment complex as defendant and prosecution witness
Nsombi Clairborne. The day after she was scheduled to appear, however, counsel was
apparently made aware that Roszkowski had “newly discovered” information that would
contradict a portion of Clairborne’s testimony. Roszkowski claimed that she had a conversation
with Clairborne soon after the incident in which Clairborne commented that “she thought it was
funny that both of the young ladies had 20 dollars” when they were at her apartment. Clairborne
testified at trial that she did not see money on the person of either of the complainants while they
were in her apartment.
After hearing Roszkowski’s testimony and questioning her under oath, the trial court
denied defendant’s request to admit her testimony before the jury, stating that the evidence was
not newly discovered, and thus untimely. “More importantly,” the trial court concluded,
defendant sought merely to impeach a prosecution witness on a collateral matter.
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Defendant argues on appeal that the issue of whether the girls stole his money was not a
collateral matter but rather the key to his defense, which he was denied the opportunity to present
by the trial court’s ruling on Roszkowski’s testimony. Generally, this Court reviews a trial
court’s decision on a motion to reopen proofs for an abuse of discretion. People v Collier, 168
Mich App 687, 694; 425 NW2d 118 (1988). However, we review de novo the question whether
a defendant was denied his constitutional right to present a defense. People v Kurr, 253 Mich
App 317, 327; 654 NW2d 651 (2002).
Defendant argues that his defense centered on his claim that the complainants fabricated
the story about defendant’s illegal conduct to detract attention from their theft. Therefore,
defendant argues, it was essential that Roszkowski be permitted to testify in order to corroborate
his story and contradict Clairborne’s testimony that she did not see the girls with money. Our
review of the record, however, shows that one of the complainants plainly testified at trial that
defendant gave both her and her sister twenty dollars. Accordingly, the jury possessed all the
information necessary to evaluate defendant’s claim that the complainant’s stole money from his
apartment, as it was essentially undisputed that the complainants had the money. Defendant was
not, therefore, denied his constitutional right to present a defense as a result of the trial court’s
decision not to reopen the proofs.
IV. Sentencing Guidelines Departure
Finally, defendant claims that the trial court erred in departing from the sentencing
guidelines by sentencing defendant to prison after scoring him within an intermediate sanction
cell. We disagree.
The guidelines recommended a minimum term range of zero to 17 months. Pursuant to
MCL 769.34(4)(a), because the upper limit of the recommended minimum sentence range was
18 months or less, the trial court was required to impose a jail term not to exceed 12 months
unless it stated on the record that a substantial and compelling reason existed to commit
defendant to the Department of Corrections. The trial court stated that it departed from the
guidelines for the following reasons:
[T]he guidelines do not sufficiently take into account the depravity of the
defendant’s conduct. [T]his is not simply a- - a solicitation from afar. This was a
confrontation in a bedroom where the defendant . . . lifted up his shirt and then
asked these young girls to suck on his nipples. Also I take into account the fact
that . . . the defendant subsequently, and very publicly, blamed the children and
accused them of a crime [in] what I find was an effort to cover his own . . .
misconduct.
Our Supreme Court has stated that “substantial and compelling reasons” justifying
departure from the sentencing guidelines are those that “keenly or irresistibly grab our attention,
and we should recognize them as being of considerable worth in deciding the length of a
sentence.” People v Babcock, 469 Mich 247, 257; 666 NW2d 231 (2003) (citations and
quotation marks omitted). The Court has additionally noted that “the Legislature intended
substantial and compelling reasons to exist only in exceptional cases.” Id. Further, a court may
not depart from the guidelines based “on an offense characteristic or offender characteristic
already taken into account in determining the appropriate sentence range unless the court finds
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from the facts contained in the court record, including the presentence investigation report, that
the characteristic has been given inadequate or disproportionate weight.” MCL 769.34(3)(b).
The determination that substantial and compelling factors merited departure from the guidelines
is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Babcock, supra at 264-265.
Defendant first argues that the trial court erroneously departed based on its perception
that the guidelines did not take the depravity of defendant’s conduct into account because
“depravity” is an element of the offense and had thus presumably already been fully considered
by the guidelines. We conclude, however, that the trial court reasonably viewed the depravity of
defendant’s conduct as inadequately accounted for by the guidelines. MCL 769.34(3)(b). While
the general depravity of soliciting a child for an immoral purpose may have been accounted for
by the guidelines, the additional degeneracy of doing so in the confines of one’s bedroom while
exposing one’s nipples and asking the children involved to “suck” them was not. This is a factor
that keenly grabs our attention.
The trial court’s second reason for departing from the sentence was that defendant “very
publicly” accused the complainants of a crime in an effort to cover his misconduct. This also
keenly grabs our attention. “Blaming the victim” is not an element of MCL 750.145a and is not
contemplated by the sentencing guidelines for this offense. Falsely accusing the young victims
of committing theft and fabricating the charged crimes is reasonably viewed as egregious
conduct.
Accordingly, defendant has not established an abuse of discretion in the trial court’s
upward departure from the sentencing guidelines.
Affirmed.
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Jane E. Markey
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