PEOPLE OF MI V ERIC TAYLOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 29, 2007
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 273443
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 06-003811-01
ROBERT LEE KING,
Defendant-Appellant.
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 273543
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 06-003811-02
MARLON SCARBER,
Defendant-Appellant.
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 273955
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 06-004613-01
v
ERIC TAYLOR,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Zahra, P.J., and White and O’Connell, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendants appeal as of right their convictions following their jury trial for the
kidnapping and murder of a man named Fate Washington. A jury found defendant King guilty
of second-degree murder, MCL 750.317; first-degree felony murder, MCL 750.316(1)(b); armed
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robbery, MCL 750.529; kidnapping, MCL 750.349; and felony firearm, MCL 750.227b. The
same jury found defendant Taylor guilty of second-degree murder, first-degree felony murder,
kidnapping, and felony firearm. The jury found both these defendants not guilty of committing
premeditated murder and also found defendant Taylor not guilty of armed robbery. The trial
court sentenced defendant King to life imprisonment on the felony murder conviction; 25 to 80
years’ imprisonment on the second-degree murder, armed robbery, and kidnapping convictions;
and two years’ imprisonment on the felony firearm conviction, to be served consecutively to the
other sentences. The trial court vacated defendant Taylor’s second-degree murder conviction,
but sentenced him to life imprisonment on his first-degree murder conviction. The trial court
also sentenced him to 25 to 80 years in prison for kidnapping and a consecutive two years in
prison for felony firearm.
A separate jury heard defendant Scarber’s case during the predominantly joint trial
proceedings, and it returned a guilty verdict against defendant Scarber for first-degree
premeditated murder, MCL 750.316(1)(b); felony murder; armed robbery; kidnapping; felony
firearm; and felon in possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f. At sentencing, the trial court
vacated the felony murder conviction, and it also inexplicably dismissed the felon in possession
conviction.1 The trial court sentenced defendant Scarber to life imprisonment for premeditated
murder and 35 to 80 years in prison for the armed robbery and kidnapping convictions. It also
imposed a consecutive two-year term of imprisonment for felony firearm.
The victim, Fate Washington, was sitting in the driver’s-side seat of his Ford Expedition
on the street outside his house. He had just finished speaking with a neighbor when defendant
Scarber and an unidentified man, both clad in black, approached the vehicle and forced
Washington, at gunpoint, further into the vehicle. Both the neighbor and Washington’s adult
son, who was near a window inside the house, witnessed the scene. Washington scuffled with
the men long enough that the neighbor was able to run home, retrieve a handgun, and open fire
on the vehicle from his front porch. The eyewitnesses verified that Scarber climbed into the
driver’s seat while a second vehicle driven by defendant King, rolled up and opened fire on the
neighbor with an automatic rifle. Other witnesses confirmed that the tandem of vehicles sped off
through the streets after the shots were fired. Soon afterward, defendant King forced
Washington to make a series of calls demanding ransom in return for his life.
A former friend of Scarber’s and associate of all defendants, Troy Ervin, provided a
detailed account of events after Washington was taken captive. The group took Washington to a
house owned by Ervin’s sister, and defendant King persuaded Ervin to trade cars with him for a
while. When Ervin visited the house, he was initially denied access into the home. Scarber later
called him and told him that he and the other defendants had kidnapped Washington and held
him at the house. Scarber explained that Taylor had helped and that King had shot at the man’s
defenders. Scarber also admitted that he almost blew himself up burning the man’s vehicle.
1
The record does not contain the trial court’s factual and legal basis for dismissing the felon-inpossession conviction, but neither does it contain any indication that the prosecutor ever objected
or otherwise challenged the ruling. Moreover, the prosecution did not raise the issue or
challenge the ruling in its appellate brief, so the dismissal’s validity is simply not before us.
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This information was confirmed at trial by a witness who heard a large explosion that night and
saw a vehicle, later identified as Washington’s Expedition, on fire outside her home. Ervin
visited the house again and found Washington lying on the floor of a back room wearing nothing
but a sheet. Taylor guarded the man with an automatic rifle like the one described by witnesses
to Washington’s capture, and King was armed with a handgun like the one Scarber had used.
While Ervin was there, he heard Taylor deny Washington’s request to use the phone again to
make more ransom calls.
Ervin left, but returned again later after Scarber called and told him that King had shot
Washington in the legs and he had bled to death. Ervin was agitated at finding that Washington
was killed in his sister’s house, because it associated him with the murder. He saw the dead
body in the back room, and then he went to the hardware store for King and purchased tools for
burying the body. After he dropped off the tools, he was again called and informed that the
group had buried the body in the back yard of the property. Ervin was again agitated at the use
of his sister’s property, but Taylor assured him that the burial site was inconspicuously concealed
by the doghouse and the body was secure under a layer of concrete. Searchers later found the
body buried as Ervin described it. The body was found with two gunshot wounds, one through
each leg.
Upon hearing that Ervin, who was not charged with a crime, had made a statement to
police about Washington’s murder, defendant Scarber also decided to make a statement. Except
for Scarber’s self-serving insistence that he participated in the crimes under duress and tried to
care for Washington by bandaging his first gunshot wound and bringing him water, Scarber’s
statement to police was remarkably consistent with Ervin’s. Scarber’s statement confirmed the
details of a successful ransom recovery that involved a peculiar delivery method, a particular
mailbox, and a relatively small amount of money and drugs. Scarber’s statement described
defendant King as Washington’s killer, and explained that, before he shot Washington a second
time, King expressed a frustrated lack of concern with Washington’s life and an unabashed
willingness to kill him. Because the prosecutor wanted to place defendant Scarber’s statement
into evidence, Scarber received a separate jury for the purpose, isolating defendant King’s and
defendant Taylor’s jury from Scarber’s blame-shifting account of Washington’s captivity.
As an initial matter, each defendant has double jeopardy issues that arise from their
several convictions and sentences. Defendant King correctly argues that his punishments for
both second-degree and first-degree murder violate double jeopardy. People v Clark, 243 Mich
App 424, 429; 622 NW2d 344 (2000). In situations where one first-degree murder conviction
and one second-degree murder conviction stem from the death of one victim, the proper
procedure is to set aside the second-degree murder conviction and sentence. See id.
Defendant King also argues that retaining his conviction and sentence for first-degree
felony murder necessitates the dismissal of his armed robbery and kidnapping felonies because
they are the predicate felonies supporting his felony murder conviction. Although King is
correct about the need to set aside one of the felonies, see People v Williams, 475 Mich 101, 104;
715 NW2d 24 (2006); People v Bigelow, 229 Mich App 218, 221-222; 581 NW2d 744 (1998),
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his argument fails to acknowledge that the jury did not specify which felony predicated its
verdict for felony murder. Instead, the jury simply found that defendant King committed both of
the lesser felonies. In this case, Washington’s murder most clearly occurred “in the perpetration
of” his kidnapping. MCL 750.316(1)(b); MCL 750.349.2 Therefore, setting aside King’s
conviction and sentence for kidnapping prevents him from being punished twice: once for the
kidnapping alone and again for the same kidnapping in its capacity as the predicate for the felony
murder conviction. Once defendant King’s convictions are pared down so that he is only
receiving one punishment for the kidnapping (specifically, the punishment he received by his
conviction and sentence for felony murder) double jeopardy is satisfied. He may then receive a
separate punishment for his separate, but factually interrelated, crime of armed robbery without
any risk that he has been punished twice for that crime. See People v Smith, 478 Mich 292, 316318; 733 NW2d 351 (2007). Therefore, we set aside defendant King’s conviction and sentence
for kidnapping, but leave defendant’s armed robbery conviction and sentence intact.
Although defendant Taylor fails to raise the issue on appeal, his conviction and sentence
for both kidnapping and felony murder, together with his acquittal for armed robbery, present a
nearly identical double jeopardy problem. Bigelow, supra. In the interests of justice and
consistency, we set aside defendant Taylor’s kidnapping conviction and sentence as well. MCR
7.216(A)(7); LME v ARS, 261 Mich App 273, 287; 680 NW2d 902 (2004).
We reject the prosecution’s appellate argument that we do not need to set aside any
predicate felony convictions or sentences to affirm defendant King’s punishment for felony
murder. The prosecution’s reliance on Smith, supra, is unavailing. In Smith, the Supreme Court
ruled that it was unnecessary to dismiss a felony conviction. Smith, supra at 318. In this case,
both the felony murder conviction and its predicate felony received punishment, so we are
required to set aside the redundant punishment to satisfy double jeopardy. Bigelow, supra;
Williams, supra.
We likewise reject the prosecution’s improperly raised argument regarding the
reinstatement of defendant Scarber’s felony murder conviction. We agree that the trial court
erroneously vacated defendant Scarber’s felony murder conviction. There are two distinct legal
aspects to the one crime of first-degree murder: premeditated murder and felony murder.3 MCL
750.316(1)(a). These separate concepts, or theories, provide two different and independent legal
grounds to support a defendant’s prosecution and conviction for first-degree murder. Bigelow,
supra at 220. In this case, the prosecutor proved that defendant Scarber’s single conviction for
first-degree murder was legally justified and factually valid under either legal theory. Therefore,
the trial court’s judgment should have upheld defendant’s single first-degree murder conviction,
noting that the one conviction was independently substantiated by the separate legal grounds of
premeditated murder and felony murder. See id. at 220, 222. However, if we reinstated the
2
We note that this statute was amended after the instant offense to allow separate punishments
for kidnapping and any crime arising from the victim’s confinement, but this amendment came
too late to affect our double jeopardy analysis. People v Sinistaj, 184 Mich App 191, 202; 457
NW2d 36 (1990).
3
A third distinct aspect, murder of a peace officer, is not relevant to this case.
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felony murder aspect of defendant’s first-degree murder conviction, then the Supreme Court’s
current double jeopardy jurisprudence would require us to set aside another one of the defendant
Scarber’s valid felony convictions as a predicate to the conviction’s superfluous legal basis. See
id.; Williams, supra. Justice is better served in this instance by leaving well enough alone. See
People v Farquharson, 274 Mich App 268, 279; 731 NW2d 797 (2007); MCR 7.207; MCR
7.212(G); MCR 7.216(A)(7).
Next, defendants King and Scarber raise issues challenging Scarber’s various out-ofcourt statements. Defendant King challenges Scarber’s statements made to Ervin, which Ervin
repeated to the juries. The statements implicated defendant King in the participation in the
kidnapping and named him as the shooter in Washington’s death. Defendant Scarber challenges
the recitation of his custodial interview to his jury. We reject both challenges.
Defendant King argues that Scarber’s descriptions to Ervin about how the group captured
Washington and how King shot him were unadulterated hearsay statements that should have
been excluded from trial. However, in People v Washington, 468 Mich 667, 671; 664 NW2d
203 (2003), our Supreme Court held that such statements fell within the hearsay exception of
statements against the declarant’s penal interest, so our evidentiary rules do not prevent the outof-court statements’ reiteration at trial. See also MRE 804(b)(3). Furthermore, because the
statements at issue were provided in a narrative, both those portions that inculpated Scarber
alone and those that inculpated his codefendants were admissible. See People v Poole, 444 Mich
151, 161; 506 NW2d 505 (1993).
Defendant King further argues that the trial court erred by failing to consider the
reliability of defendant Scarber’s out-of-court statements before holding that Ervin’s recitation of
the statements would not violate the confrontation clause, notwithstanding the fact that defendant
King could not cross-examine Scarber about the statements. See Washington, supra at 671-672.
Although the record does not indicate that the trial court analyzed the issue of the statements’
inherent trustworthiness at length, the statements at issue clearly contain sufficient indicia of
reliability, so any error in the trial court’s decision is harmless.
Addressing the issue of reliability, our Supreme Court provided the following standards
in Poole, supra at 165:
In evaluating whether a statement against penal interest that inculpates a
person in addition to the declarant bears sufficient indicia of reliability to allow it
to be admitted as substantive evidence against the other person, courts must
evaluate the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement as well as its
content.
The presence of the following factors would favor admission of such a
statement:
whether the statement was (1) voluntarily given, (2) made
contemporaneously with the events referenced, (3) made to family, friends,
colleagues, or confederates—that is, to someone to whom the declarant would
likely speak the truth, and (4) uttered spontaneously at the initiation of the
declarant and without prompting or inquiry by the listener.
On the other hand, the presence of the following factors would favor a
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finding of inadmissibility: whether the statement (1) was made to law
enforcement officers or at the prompting or inquiry of the listener, (2) minimizes
the role or responsibility of the declarant or shifts blame to the accomplice, (3)
was made to avenge the declarant or to curry favor, and (4) whether the declarant
had a motive to lie or distort the truth.
Defendant Scarber’s first statement regarding the group’s participation in Washington’s
capture was freely offered to a friend and confederate who had de facto control over the house
where Washington was confined and eventually buried. The statement did not equivocate about
Scarber’s role or shift any blame for the kidnapping, which was ongoing at the time of the
statement, and nothing indicates that Scarber made the statement at Ervin’s prompting.
Therefore, the statement about the kidnapping contained all of the factors favoring admission and
none of the factors warranting inadmissibility. Id. Furthermore, Scarber made the statement to a
friend for personal and conspiratorial reasons, not to an interrogator or other official for the
purposes of trial, so the statement was not testimonial. See Crawford v Washington, 541 US 36,
68; 124 S Ct 1354; 158 L Ed 2d 177 (2004). Therefore, although the trial court did not analyze
the first statement’s indicia of reliability, it clearly does not offend the Confrontation Clause, and
any analytical omission in the trial court’s determination was harmless. MRE 103.
The second statement, however, requires a more extensive analysis. That statement
shifted the blame of shooting Washington to defendant King. In a related vein, it is arguable that
defendant Scarber’s desire to disassociate himself from the murder provided him with a motive
to lie about the identity of the individual (perhaps Scarber himself) who actually shot
Washington. However, the statement was volunteered, contemporaneous with the shooting,
spoken to a friend and confederate, spontaneously provided, and was not delivered to police or
used to curry favor with Ervin. Poole, supra at 165. In context, the statement formed a pattern
of impugning communications that Scarber made to Ervin without reservation and without any
apparent secondary motivation other than the desire to maintain the benefits of the relationship’s
confidence and trust—and, according to the record, to brag. Therefore, Scarber’s statements to
Ervin constituted a “narrative of events,” so the statements were admissible at trial in their
entirety. Id. at 161. Again, because the statements clearly complied with the strictures of the
confrontation clause, any failure by the trial court to scrutinize properly the various indicia of
reliability was harmless. MRE 103.
Defendant Scarber challenges the use of his own statements against him by arguing that
the trial court should have suppressed the custodial interview on constitutional grounds.
Defendant Scarber argues that he did not voluntarily waive his right to remain silent, but was
improperly threatened and induced to break his silence. We disagree. “When reviewing a trial
court’s determination of the voluntariness of inculpatory statements, this Court must examine the
entire record and make an independent determination, but will not disturb the trial court’s factual
findings absent clear error.” People v Shipley, 256 Mich App 367, 372-373; 662 NW2d 856
(2003). “[D]eference is given to the trial court’s assessment of the weight of the evidence and
credibility of the witnesses.” Id. at 373.
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In this case, the trial court held a Walker4 hearing and, after listening to the different
accounts of the police interview from defendant Scarber and the officers, the trial court reviewed
the factors in People v Cipriano, 431 Mich 315, 334; 429 NW2d 781 (1988), and held that
defendant voluntarily waived his right to remain silent. The trial court found that the
interviewing officers were much more credible compared to defendant, and it discounted many
of defendant’s factual assertions regarding his claims of coercion and inducement. Although the
officers admitted telling defendant Scarber that they did not want him—they wanted King, this
fact is, at most, a vague promise of leniency, which is only one factor in determining whether a
defendant’s right to remain silent was voluntarily waived. People v Givans, 227 Mich App 113,
119-120; 575 NW2d 84 (1997). Scarber did not make any inculpating statements after police
tried to assure him of their interest in a more desirable target, and instead he only opened up
about his participation after he saw that Ervin had made the crime’s detection and prosecution
inevitable. Therefore, any argument that his will was overborne by a veiled promise of leniency
is highly suspect. See People v Conte, 421 Mich 704; 365 NW2d 648 (1984). Moreover, the
record otherwise reflects defendant Scarber’s seasoned familiarity with the justice system, and
the written statement contains a plea in Scarber’s own hand imploring the future reader to refrain
from using the statement against him. In the end, the trial court had an adequate basis to find
that defendant, despite his protests to the contrary, was not sufficiently influenced by the
officers’ expression of disinterest in him that it undermined his previously unshakable
determination to remain silent, and we defer to the trial court’s superior ability to resolve such
credibility questions. Shipley, supra.
Next, defendants Taylor and King raise several arguments regarding the sufficiency of
the evidence presented at trial. However, all the arguments require us to revisit the jury’s
determination that Ervin truthfully testified about their involvement in the crime. We will not
second-guess a jury’s resolution of a credibility contest. People v Nowack, 462 Mich 392, 400;
614 NW2d 78 (2000). In this case, eyewitnesses placed defendants Scarber and King at the
scene of Washington’s capture, and defendant Taylor’s conviction for Washington’s murder and
kidnapping was supported by Ervin’s eyewitness testimony that he stood guard and would not
allow Washington to use his phone. Therefore, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to the prosecution, the prosecutor presented sufficient evidence to sustain the convictions, and
the great weight of the evidence does not militate against the guilty verdicts in these cases.
People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 515; 489 NW2d 748, amended 441 Mich 1201 (1992); People v
Lemmon, 456 Mich 625, 643-647; 576 NW2d 129 (1998).
Defendant Scarber raises similar arguments, but stresses that the evidence did not support
a finding of premeditated murder, so his conviction on that charge cannot stand. We disagree.
Scarber correctly argues that the crime of premeditated murder requires that the defendant act
with the intent to kill, rather than merely injure, the victim. People v Dykhouse, 418 Mich 488,
495-497; 345 NW2d 150 (1984); People v Milton, 81 Mich App 515; 265 NW2d 397, modified
on other grounds 403 Mich 821 (1978). However, the evidence in this case, when viewed in a
light most favorable to the prosecution, supported the jury’s finding of deadly intent.
4
People v Walker (On Rehearing), 374 Mich 331; 132 NW2d 87 (1965).
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Whether an individual specifically intended to kill a victim is determined by considering
all the facts surrounding the crime, and as with other proof of mental state, intent to kill may be
inferred from a minimal amount of evidence. People v McRunels, 237 Mich App 168, 181; 603
NW2d 95 (1999). According to one of the witnesses who received a ransom call, one of the
kidnappers threatened to kill Washington if they did not receive money in an hour. In other calls
Washington told his family that his captives were going to kill him. Scarber himself told police
that defendant King shot a defenseless Washington, expressed his lack of care for Washington’s
life and a willingness to kill him, and then shot Washington again. Although defendant Scarber
points to the evidence that Washington only received wounds in his legs, this evidence alone
does not require reversal. Instead, the placement of the fatal injury is only one factor in
determining intent. People v Coddington, 188 Mich App 584, 600; 470 NW2d 478 (1991).
Moreover, the jury could have reasonably inferred that King shot Washington twice in the legs
intending that he would die slowly enough that he would still be able to procure the ransom.
This inference is supported by the fact that the kidnappers did not release Washington or provide
him with any medical care even after some ransom arrangements were finally made. The power
of the weapon used and the severity of the injuries strongly suggest that the shooter intended to
kill Washington with the second shot. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, the evidence supported the jury’s finding that the shooter specifically intended to
kill Washington. Wolfe, supra. Because the jury properly found that Washington’s killing was
intentional, premeditated, and deliberate, and because the first-degree murder was undeniably a
“natural and probable” consequence of taking Washington captive and holding him ransom at
gunpoint, the jury’s verdict on this charge was supported by sufficient evidence. People v
Robinson, 475 Mich 1, 9, 15; 715 NW2d 44 (2006).
We next turn to issues raised by each defendant regarding Ervin’s references to a
polygraph examination during defendant Taylor’s cross-examination of the witness. Although
none of the defendants objected at the time the witness mentioned the polygraph test, they all
joined in a motion for mistrial. We review for abuse of discretion a trial court’s decision on a
defendant’s motion for mistrial. People v Coy, 258 Mich App 1, 17; 669 NW2d 831 (2003). In
People v Rocha, 110 Mich App 1, 9; 312 NW2d 657 (1981), the following factors were
considered to determine whether the mention of a polygraph examination required a reversal:
(1) whether defendant objected and/or sought a cautionary instruction; (2)
whether the reference was inadvertent; (3) whether there were repeated
references; (4) whether the reference was an attempt to bolster a witness’s
credibility; and (5) whether the results of the test were admitted rather than
merely the fact that a test had been conducted.
In this case, no objection was immediately lodged, and the trial court correctly found that the
three volunteered references were the inadvertent product of Taylor’s defense counsel vaguely
and confusingly prodding Ervin about different statements he had made to police. The
statements were not the result of prosecutorial misconduct, and we find nothing to discredit the
trial court’s finding that they were not intended to bolster the witness, but instead sought to
clarify defense counsel’s inquiry. The second and last time Ervin mentioned the word
“polygraph,” the trial court sua sponte struck the testimony, admonished the witness to focus on
the question asked, and told the jury to disregard Ervin’s response. Defendants rejected the trial
court’s invitation to issue a curative instruction directly addressing the issue, and never moved to
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introduce the fact that Ervin failed his polygraph examination. Applying the factors in Rocha,
we are persuaded that the inadvertent references to the examination do not necessitate reversal,
and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendants’ motions for mistrial.
Defendant Scarber argues that the trial court erred by failing to provide a jury instruction
regarding the prejudicial accomplice testimony provided by Ervin. We disagree. The record
reflects that defense counsel waived any error in the jury instructions by expressly agreeing with
their contents. People v Lueth, 253 Mich App 670, 688; 660 NW2d 322 (2002). Moreover, we
do not find that Scarber’s trial attorney provided ineffective assistance by avoiding the
instruction, because the decision to forego the instruction was most likely trial strategy. People v
Riley (After Remand), 468 Mich 135, 140; 659 NW2d 611 (2003). An accomplice instruction
would have directed the jury to view statements made by accomplices with an additional
measure of skepticism, especially those portions of a statement that tended to cast the accomplice
in a favorable light. See CJI2d 5.6. In this case, Scarber, too, was an accomplice to the crime,
and his statement to police painted him as a compassionate man who was coerced into
participating in the kidnapping. Any instruction denigrating Ervin’s accomplice testimony
would necessarily have applied to Scarber’s exculpatory statements to police. Therefore,
defendant fails to persuade us that the decision to forego the instruction was anything other than
a strategic attempt to persuade the jury that Scarber told the police the truth when he shifted the
blame to the other defendants and denied any voluntary role in the crimes. Riley, supra.
Next, defendant Taylor raises a pair of issues that arise from the prosecutor’s anticipated
presentation of a witness, Craig Ellis, who would presumably testify that Taylor tried to hire him
to kill Ervin. Taylor first argues that the trial court erred by holding that the evidence was
admissible, because the evidence was not sufficiently similar to the charged crime to demonstrate
a similar plan or scheme. This argument fails for two reasons. First, the evidence never was
admitted because Ellis decided to exercise his privilege against self-incrimination. Therefore,
the testimony was never presented to the jury. Second, MRE 404(b), on which defendant relies,
does not exclude evidence of other acts that directly incriminate a defendant. The rule is that a
court may allow evidence of threats against witnesses because they generally prove
consciousness of guilt for the crime charged. People v Sholl, 453 Mich 730, 740; 556 NW2d 851
(1996). Therefore, defendant’s argument lacks factual and legal merit.
Defendant Taylor also argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct by mentioning
that she would introduce Ellis’s testimony about Taylor’s solicitation of Ervin’s murder. We
disagree. Because defendant failed to raise a timely objection to the statement, “[n]o error
requiring reversal will be found if the prejudicial effect of the prosecutor’s comments could have
been cured by a timely instruction.” People v Leshaj, 249 Mich App 417, 419; 641 NW2d 872
(2002). However, defendant Taylor raised the issue of the questionable evidence in a motion for
mistrial the next day and renewed that motion at the end of trial. We will review for abuse of
discretion the trial court’s decision on that motion. Coy, supra.
The controlling case is People v Wolverton, 227 Mich App 72, 76-77; 574 NW2d 703
(1997), which holds that reversal on the basis of a prosecutor’s unfulfilled promise to produce
evidence at trial is not necessary unless the defendant demonstrates bad faith or so much
prejudice to the defendant that he did not receive a fair trial. In this case, the trial court had
preliminarily and correctly granted the prosecutor permission to call Ellis and elicit the
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testimony. See Sholl, supra. Therefore, defendant fails to demonstrate any bad faith in the
prosecutor’s statements.
Regarding prejudice, a timely curative instruction explaining that the prosecutor’s
opening statements are not evidence would have gone a long way to minimize any innuendo
stirring in the minds of the jurors. Moreover, the facts suggest that any prejudice from the
opening statements was minimal anyway. The prosecutor’s promise of proof in this case did not
relate directly to an element of the charged crime, so this case is factually distinguishable from
Wolverton. Instead, the testimony related to an indirect indication of defendant’s knowledge of
his guilt, so the facts of this case more closely resemble the poison-pen letter sent to the victim in
People v King, 215 Mich App 301, 306; 544 NW2d 765 (1996). In King we found that the
prosecutor’s good-faith mention of the inadmissible letter in his opening statement did not
prejudice the defendant enough that the fairness of the entire proceedings were cast into doubt.
Moreover, in her closing arguments in this case, Taylor’s defense counsel harped on the absence
of the witness, the lack of testimony, and the prosecutor’s broken promise to prove the egregious
and incendiary accusation, so the failure to present the witness likely prejudiced the prosecutor
as much as the defense. See Wolverton, supra at 76; People v Swift, 172 Mich 473, 483; 138
NW 662 (1912). Under the circumstances, defendant fails to demonstrate that he suffered so
much incurable prejudice that his trial’s fairness was hopelessly denigrated, and the trial court
did not abuse its discretion when it accordingly denied defendant’s motion for mistrial.
Finally, defendant Taylor argues that the trial court erred by preventing him from crossexamining a jailhouse informant about the informant’s differing statements he made to police
and his probation officers about his level of culpability for his own crimes. We disagree. “The
decision whether evidence is admissible is within the trial court’s discretion and should only be
reversed where there is a clear abuse of discretion.” People v Starr, 457 Mich 490, 494; 577
NW2d 673 (1998). “A party is free to contradict the answers that he has elicited from his
adversary or his adversary’s witness on cross-examination regarding matters germane to the
issue. As a general rule, a witness may not be contradicted regarding collateral, irrelevant, or
immaterial matters.” People v Vasher, 449 Mich 494, 504; 537 NW2d 168 (1995).
Ordinarily, a witness may not be impeached by extrinsic evidence and factual
development of specific prior incidents of untruthfulness. MRE 608(b). This rule prevents a
trial from devolving into a limitless series of mini-trials about the past truths and untruths told by
each witness over the witness’s lifetime. Instead, veracity may be tested directly by asking the
witness if he or she lied on a particular occasion, see People v Lester, 232 Mich App 262, 274276; 591 NW2d 267 (1998), or by introducing evidence of a witness’s reputation through
another witness. MRE 608(a). If a party seeks to impeach a witness directly with past untruthful
words or deeds, then the party must take the witness’s affirmation or denial without inquiring
further into the facts of the specific event. See Lester, supra at 276. In this case, defendant
Taylor’s counsel elicited plenty of information on cross-examination regarding the informant’s
criminal past and his self-interest in providing incriminating information against defendant.
While asking the informant about statements he had made in his own case, defendant Taylor did
not follow the pattern in Lester. Instead, he first sought to delve into the specific account
provided to police upon the informant’s arrest, and then sought to inquire about the statement
provided later to the informant’s probation officer. Because defendant Taylor never directly
questioned the witness about his veracity, but instead sought to circumvent a direct approach and
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get more detail before the jury, the trial court properly exercised its discretion and precluded
further inquiry into the collateral matter. MRE 608(b); People v Crawford, 232 Mich App 608,
620-621; 591 NW2d 669 (1998).
We set aside defendant King’s convictions and sentences for second-degree murder and
kidnapping. We likewise set aside defendant Taylor’s conviction and sentence for kidnapping.
We affirm all the other convictions and sentences in all other respects.
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ Helene N. White
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
-11-
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