SAVITRI BHAMA MD V CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
SAVITRI BHAMA, M.D.,
UNPUBLISHED
November 29, 2007
Petitioner-Appellant,
v
Nos. 270672; 270673
Ingham Circuit Court
LC Nos. 00-092451-AA
00-092266-AA
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION,
Respondent-Appellee.
Before: Donofrio, P.J., and Hoekstra and Markey, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
These consolidated appeals are before us on remand from our Supreme Court for
consideration as on leave granted. Petitioner originally sought delayed leave to appeal to this
Court two circuit court orders dismissing, pursuant to MCR 7.105(K)(2), administrative appeals
arising from her challenges of two separate adverse employment actions that were affirmed by
respondent. Following this Court’s denial of petitioner’s delayed application, she sought leave to
appeal in our Supreme Court. In lieu of granting the application, the Supreme Court remanded
the matters to this Court for consideration as on leave granted. Because we conclude that MCR
7.105(K)(2) may not be applied to dismiss an administrative appeal for failure to abide by a
supplemental briefing schedule, we reverse.
I. Basic Facts and Procedural History
Following an alleged demotion and subsequent termination that were challenged and
affirmed by respondent, petitioner filed separate appeals of those matters in the circuit court.
Appellate briefs requesting oral argument in both matters were subsequently filed by the parties
and the matters set for hearing.
After oral arguments at the demotion appeal hearing, the circuit court remanded that
matter to respondent for consideration of a particular factual issue but retained jurisdiction over
the appeal. Oral argument in the termination appeal was subsequently held in abeyance pending
a decision on the demotion appeal. Shortly thereafter, the circuit court administratively closed
both appeals.
Several months after the decision on remand was made by respondent and forwarded to
the circuit court, the circuit court placed the termination appeal on its no-progress docket and set
the matter for hearing. At the no-progress hearing, petitioner indicated that the parties had
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agreed that petitioner would file supplemental briefs in both the termination and demotion
appeals within 60 days, that respondent would file responsive briefs within 28 days after
petitioner filed her briefs, and that oral argument would be held afterward. The circuit court
agreed to this schedule and entered handwritten notes memorializing the parties’ agreement.
Petitioner failed to file a supplemental brief for either appeal and, several months later,
the termination appeal was again placed on the circuit court’s no-progress docket. Respondent
failed to appear at the subsequent no-progress hearing, and counsel for petitioner, without
mentioning the prior agreement regarding supplemental briefing, requested entry of a default.
The circuit court granted the request and asked counsel to prepare an order for submission to the
court. However, at a subsequent hearing on respondent’s objections to the order submitted by
petitioner, the circuit court, citing petitioner’s failure to file the agreed upon supplemental briefs,
dismissed both appeals for failure to comply with MCR 7.105(K)(2).
II. Analysis
Petitioner argues that the circuit court erred in applying MCR 7.105(K)(2) to dismiss the
appeals because the rule applies only to the initial appellate briefs required after filing her
appeals in these matters. Petitioner contends that while the parties stipulated to the filing of
supplemental briefs following remand, no supplemental briefs were necessary to comply with the
court rule and the circuit court therefore abused its discretion in relying on the rule to dismiss the
appeals. We agree.
We review the trial court’s decision to dismiss the appeals for an abuse of discretion. See
Zantop Int’l Airlines, Inc v Eastern Airlines, 200 Mich App 344, 359; 503 NW2d 915 (1993).
However, to the extent resolution of the question presented involves interpretation of a court
rule, our review is de novo. Cranbrook Professional Bldg, LLC v Pourcho, 256 Mich App 140,
142; 662 NW2d 94 (2003). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s decision falls
outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes. Maldonado v Ford Motor Co, 476
Mich 372, 388; 719 NW2d 809 (2006). “The principles governing statutory interpretation apply
equally to the interpretation of the court rules.” Richards v Tibaldi, 272 Mich App 522, 532; 726
NW2d 770 (2006). Judicial construction is not permitted if the plain and ordinary meaning of
the language is clear and, unless otherwise defined, every word or phrase should be accorded its
plain and ordinary meaning, considering the context in which the words are used. Yudashkin v
Linzmeyer, 247 Mich App 642, 649-650; 637 NW2d 257 (2001).
MCR 7.105 governs appeals to the circuit court from administrative agencies in contested
cases. Subrule (K) of this rule provides the following with respect to the filing of briefs in those
matters:
(1) Within 28 days after the record is filed with the court . . . , the petitioner shall
file with the court its brief, in the form provided in MCR 7.212(C), serve a copy
on all respondents, and promptly file proof of that service with the court. Within
28 days after petitioner’s brief is served, each respondent shall file with the court
its brief, in the form provided in MCR 7.212(D), serve a copy on all other parties,
and promptly file proof of that service with the court. The petitioner may file and
serve a reply brief within 14 days after service of the respondent’s brief. A 28day extension of the time for filing a brief may be obtained on written stipulation
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of the parties or by order of the court. Further extension of time for filing of a
brief can be obtained only on order of the court on motion for cause shown.
(2) If a party does not timely serve its brief, the court may, after notice and
opportunity to respond, enter an appropriate order, including dismissal of a
petition for review, or affirmance or reversal of the decision appealed from.
[Emphasis added.]
Reviewing the language employed in the subrule, it is plain that the phrase “its brief,” as
used in subsection (2), refers to the appeal and response briefs required of a petitioner and
respondent under subsection (1). It is equally plain that subsection (1), which sets a definitive
and truncated time period for the filing of briefs “after the record is filed with the court,” governs
only the initial briefing schedule following the filing of a petition for review. MCR 7.105(K)(1).
The briefing schedule at issue here, however, concerned supplemental briefing stipulated to by
the parties following remand to respondent and not required under MCR 7.105(K). Thus, while
we acknowledge that supplemental briefs would likely have been helpful in deciding the appeals
following remand, we agree with petitioner that the circuit court abused its discretion in
dismissing the appeals under MCR 7.105(K)(2) because the stipulated briefs were not required
under MCR 7.105(K)(1). Accordingly, the orders dismissing petitioner’s appeals must be
reversed.1
Reversed and remanded to the circuit court for substantive consideration of petitioner’s
appeals. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Jane E. Markey
1
In light of our resolution of this matter, we need not address the remainder of the issues raised
on appeal. We note, however, that respondent’s argument that the circuit court lacked subjectmatter jurisdiction over the demotion appeal following remand is without merit because the court
retained jurisdiction in that matter. As a result, a subsequent petition for review was unnecessary
to invoke the circuit court’s jurisdiction.
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