WILLIAM CARLESS V PAROLE BOARD
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
WILLIAM CARLESS,
UNPUBLISHED
November 29, 2007
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 270616
Ingham Circuit Court
LC No. 06-000085-AW
PAROLE BOARD,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Donofrio, P.J., and Hoekstra and Markey, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right the trial court’s denial of his request for a default judgment
and summary dismissal of his complaint for superintending control alleging various violations by
defendant in its denial of his request for parole. Because we conclude that the actions of which
plaintiff complains are discretionary in nature and that his complaint therefore fails to state a
claim on which relief can be granted, we affirm.
Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that various actions taken by defendant in deciding to deny
him parole violated various constitutional and statutory rights. After review de novo, and
considering the legal sufficiency of and factual support for plaintiff’s claims, we find that the
trial court properly dismissed plaintiff’s complaint. See By Lo Oil Co v Dep’t of Treasury, 267
Mich App 19, 25-26; 703 NW2d 822 (2005).
Judicial review of the denial of parole is unavailable to prisoners in Michigan absent
circumstances giving rise to a complaint for habeas corpus, or a writ of mandamus to compel
compliance with a statutory duty. Morales v Parole Bd, 260 Mich App 29, 39-42, 52; 676
NW2d 221 (2003). Here, plaintiff filed a complaint for superintending control. “A
superintending control order replaces . . . the writ of mandamus when directed to a lower court
order.” MCR 3.302(C). Thus, we evaluate this case as though plaintiff filed a writ of
mandamus. Plaintiff bears the burden to prove his entitlement to the extraordinary remedy of a
writ of mandamus. Citizens for Protection of Marriage v Bd of State Canvassers, 263 Mich App
487, 492; 688 NW2d 538 (2004). A writ of mandamus “will not lie to review or control the
exercise of discretion vested in a public official or administrative body.” Morales, supra at 4142. The grant or denial of parole is discretionary and defendant possessed that discretion
exclusively. Hopkins v Parole Bd, 237 Mich App 629, 637; 604 NW2d 686 (1999).
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Plaintiff alleges that because he had a high probability of parole he could not, pursuant to
MCL 791.233e(6), be denied parole absent substantial and compelling reasons stated in writing.
We note, however, that in its written denial of parole defendant expressly cited plaintiff’s
inability “to demonstrate any kind of insight into his highly deviant behavior during his
[interview]” and the need for such in order to reduce the risk of reoffending as substantial and
compelling reasons for departing from the parole guidelines and denying plaintiff parole. Thus,
defendant complied with its statutory duties under MCL 791.233e(6). Morales, supra.
Plaintiff further argues that the reasons cited do not constitute a substantial and
compelling reason for parole denial. However, whether the reason provided is a sufficient and
compelling reason is a question involving the manner in which defendant has exercised its
discretion and, therefore, not the proper basis for seeking a grant of mandamus. See Teasel v
Dep’t of Mental Health, 419 Mich 390, 409-410; 355 NW2d 75 (1984).
Plaintiff’s assertions that defendant improperly relied on his proclamations of innocence
as a basis for denying him parole suffer from this same defect—namely that a claim for
mandamus will not lie because the issues rely on the manner in which defendant has exercised its
discretion. Id. Thus, the trial court properly dismissed plaintiff’s complaint on those issues.
Regardless, we note that defendant is permitted to consider any factor determined by the
department of corrections to be “relevant” to the parole decision, “if not otherwise prohibited by
law.” MCL 791.233e(2)(e); see also MCL 791.233e(1). That the department finds a potential
parolee’s acknowledgment of responsibility for the circumstances of his incarceration relevant to
the parole decision is not disputed, and the cases relied on by plaintiff to assail such
considerations as improper simply do not hold that such considerations are unlawful in the
context of parole. Plaintiff has thus failed to show that defendant improperly relied on his
continued claim of innocence as a basis for denying him parole.
Plaintiff’s remaining argument is that the trial court erred in not entering a default
judgment against defendant because its response was untimely filed. Having determined that
plaintiff’s complaint for superintending control did not state a claim upon which relief could be
granted, the denial of default judgment was appropriate because such a complaint cannot support
a judgment. Lindsley v Burke, 189 Mich App 700, 702-703; 474 NW2d 158 (1991). Because we
find that the trial court’s denial of default judgment was proper based on plaintiff’s failure to
state a claim, we do not address plaintiff’s claim that the trial court improperly applied MCL
600.5509(3).
Affirmed.
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Jane E. Markey
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