PEOPLE OF MI V SANDEEP NARENDRAN SABAPATHY
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 27, 2007
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 272955
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2005-201281-FC
SANDEEP NARENDRAN SABAPATHY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Kelly, P.J., and Meter and Gleicher, JJ.
GLEICHER, J. (concurring).
I concur with the majority in result, but write separately to set forth my reasons for doing
so, and to emphasize the impact of People v Schaefer, 473 Mich 418; 703 NW2d 774 (2005), on
my decision.
Defendant argues on appeal that “[t]his case is [all] about causation.” According to
defendant, if the trial court improperly admitted the opinion testimony of Officer Schultz that
defendant was speeding when the accident occurred, the prosecution has no “alternative theory
of causation.” Defendant also contends that an inherent and unrecognized problem with the
victim’s seat belt constituted an intervening proximate cause of her death, and that his trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to present this evidence to the jury.
In the context of a prosecution brought under MCL 257.625(4), the Michigan Supreme
Court explained in Schaefer, supra at 435-436, that factual causation is determined by analyzing
whether “‘but for’ the defendant’s conduct,” the result would have occurred. “If the result would
not have occurred absent the defendant’s conduct, then factual causation exists.” Schaefer, supra
at 436 (footnote omitted). Defendant does not dispute that his decision to drive while intoxicated
qualifies as a factual cause of the victim’s death, and the law as announced in Schaefer requires
no additional proof of factual cause. Therefore, it does not matter whether defendant in the
instant case was “drag racing” or engaging in “horse play.” Nor is the actual speed of
defendant’s vehicle necessarily relevant to a conviction under the statute.
The Michigan Supreme Court in Schaefer also addressed the proximate cause element of
the offense of OUIL causing death. Proximate cause, the Supreme Court explained, “is a legal
construct designed to prevent criminal liability from attaching when the result of the defendant’s
conduct is viewed as too remote or unnatural.” Schaefer, supra at 436. If the victim’s injury was
“‘a direct and natural result’ of the defendant’s actions,” proximate causation exists. Id.
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However, a cause that intervenes and “supercedes” the defendant’s conduct may sever
the proximate causation link between a criminal act and the victim’s injury. “If an intervening
cause did indeed supersede the defendant’s act as a legally significant causal factor, then the
defendant’s conduct will not be deemed a proximate cause of the victim’s injury.” Schaefer,
supra at 437 (emphasis in original). Whether an intervening cause truly supersedes generally
involves a question of reasonable foreseeability. If the intervening cause or conduct was
reasonably foreseeable, it does not supersede the defendant’s initial criminal act as a matter of
law. Id.
Defendant argues that the victim’s seat belt either malfunctioned or was defectively
designed, and that slack in the belt allowed the victim’s head to strike the pavement. According
to defendant, the victim would have survived if her seat belt had worked properly, and thus the
seat belt malfunction qualifies as an intervening cause that superseded his intoxicated driving,
breaking the chain of causation. This argument is unpersuasive, however, because the failure of
the victim’s seat belt to function properly, whether due to negligence in its design, breach of
warranty, or damage, was foreseeable as a matter of law. See Rutherford v Chrysler Motors
Corp, 60 Mich App 392; 231 NW2d 413 (1975) (observing that injuries caused by a vehicle
manufacturer’s failure to exercise reasonable care “‘are readily foreseeable as an incident to the
normal and expected use of an automobile’”), quoting Larsen v General Motors Corp, 391 F2d
495, 502 (CA 8, 1968). While some theories of superseding cause may be properly submitted to
a jury in a prosecution brought under MCL 257.625(4), an injury or death caused by a
malfunctioning seat belt is not one of them. For this reason, a Ginther1 hearing was and is
unnecessary.
Defendant’s reliance on People v Moore, 246 Mich App 172; 631 NW2d 779 (2001), is
similarly misplaced. In Moore, the defendant’s truck was stopped or proceeding very slowly
when it was struck by the victim’s vehicle, which was traveling at a speed of about 25 miles an
hour. The victim, whose blood tested positive for recent marijuana use, lost control of his car,
which caromed off the defendant’s truck, crossed several lanes of traffic, and hit another car
head-on, resulting in the victim’s death. Id. at 173. The defense expert opined that because the
victim was not wearing a seat belt, he was “thrown in his vehicle and struck his head on the
window” when he collided with the defendant’s truck, causing him to lose control of his vehicle.
This Court concluded, “Consequently, such evidence is clearly relevant to whether the
decedent’s death was the natural and necessary result of defendant’s act.”2
The facts of the instant case are readily distinguishable from those underlying Moore.
The passenger victim here was wearing a seat belt when defendant lost control, his vehicle
became airborne, and rolled several times before landing upright. The victim’s seat belt in the
instant case did not contribute to defendant’s impaired driving or the rolling of his vehicle.
1
People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).
2
Cases decided before and after Moore have held that evidence of a victim’s failure to use a seat
belt was properly excluded. People v Werner, 254 Mich App 528, 540-543; 659 NW2d 688
(2002); People v Richardson, 170 Mich App 470; 428 NW2d 698 (1988).
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While the Moore victim’s loss of control of his car at a relatively slow speed may have been
unforeseeable, the failure of the seat belt to prevent the instant victim’s fatal head injury was not.
Furthermore, defendant’s conduct need only be a proximate cause of the victim’s death to justify
the imposition of criminal liability. People v Tims, 449 Mich 83, 99; 534 NW2d 675 (1995).
Therefore, Moore does not control this case. Because expert testimony regarding the victim’s
seat belt would have been irrelevant to the jury’s determination of defendant’s guilt, his claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel must fail.
/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher
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