PEOPLE OF MI V MICHAEL RICHARD BRAY
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 20, 2007
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 278374
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2007-212383-FH
MICHAEL RICHARD BRAY,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Saad, P.J., and Jansen and Beckering, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
After a preliminary examination, defendant was bound over to the circuit court on four
counts of second-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC), MCL 750.520c(1)(b)(iii) (victim at least
13 but less than 16 years of age and defendant in position of authority), and four alternative
counts of fourth-degree CSC, MCL 750.520e(1)(a) (victim at least 13 but less than 16 years of
age and defendant five or more years older than the victim). Defendant filed a motion to quash
the second-degree CSC charges, alleging there was no evidence that defendant actually used his
position of authority to coerce the complainant to submit to sexual contact. The circuit court
granted the motion to quash, and the prosecution appeals by leave granted the circuit court’s
order. We reverse and remand.
We review a circuit court’s decision to grant or deny a motion to quash charges de novo
to determine whether the district court abused its discretion in binding the defendant over for
trial. People v Libbett, 251 Mich App 353, 357; 650 NW2d 407 (2002). The circuit court may
reverse the district court’s bindover decision only if it appears on the record that the district court
abused its discretion. People v Crippen, 242 Mich App 278, 281-282; 617 NW2d 760 (2000).
An abuse of discretion occurs when a court chooses an outcome that is outside the range of
reasonable and principled outcomes. People v Babcock, 469 Mich 247, 269; 666 NW2d 231
(2003).
A court must bind a defendant over for trial if, after a preliminary examination, there
exists probable cause to believe that the defendant committed a felony. People v Cervi, 270
Mich App 603, 616; 717 NW2d 356 (2006); MCL 766.13. Probable cause requires “evidence
‘sufficient to cause a person of ordinary prudence and caution to conscientiously entertain a
reasonable belief’ of the accused’s guilt.” People v Yost, 468 Mich 122, 126; 659 NW2d 604
(2003), quoting People v Justice (After Remand), 454 Mich 334, 344; 562 NW2d 652 (1997).
The court need not, however, be without doubts regarding guilt. Id. The prosecution must
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present admissible evidence regarding each element of the crime or evidence from which those
elements may be reasonably inferred. People v Goeke, 457 Mich 442, 469; 579 NW2d 868
(1998). Finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is the province of the jury. Id. at 469-470.
A person is guilty of second-degree CSC if the victim is at least 13 but less than 16 years
of age, the person is in a position of authority over the victim, and the person “used this authority
to coerce the victim to submit.” MCL 750.520c(b)(iii); People v Knapp, 244 Mich App 361,
368; 624 NW2d 227 (2001).
In this case, the complainant testified to numerous sexual encounters during his early
teenage years with defendant, who was an adult associate pastor of his church. The sole issue on
appeal is whether defendant used his position of authority to coerce the complainant to submit.
The coercion required under MCL 750.520c(1)(b)(iii) “can be shown through evidence of the
exploitation of a victim’s special vulnerability,” or by showing that “the defendant abuse[d] his
position of authority to constrain a vulnerable victim by subjugation to submit to sexual contact.”
Id. at 369-370, citing People v Reid, 233 Mich App 457, 469-472; 592 NW2d 767 (1999) and
People v Premo, 213 Mich App 406, 410-411; 540 NW2d 715 (1995).
We conclude that the complainant was in a position of special vulnerability by virtue of
his parishioner-pastor relationship with defendant, and because of evidence that his parents
entrusted their minor son with defendant based upon his position with the church. Defendant
was as an associate pastor at the complainant’s church for four years. The complainant’s parents
were actively involved in the church during that time, and were friends with all of the church
leaders. Complainant’s mother performed janitorial services at the church, and often brought her
son with her or dropped him off at the church when defendant was the only person there. The
complainant testified that he trusted and respected defendant as a pastor and called him “Pastor
Mike.” Complainant thought highly of defendant and asked him, as a pastor, for advice. Thus,
there is sufficient evidence to find that the complainant was in a position of special vulnerability
with respect to defendant and susceptible to abuse.
Regarding whether defendant exploited the complainant’s vulnerability, we observe that
the abuse occurred on church property when defendant and the complainant were alone. Some
of the abuse occurred after the complainant visited defendant in his office to ask for his advice as
his pastor and some of it occurred when defendant found the complainant alone in other parts of
the church. On many occasions, defendant wrestled with the complainant, showed photographs
of himself in his bathing suit and talked about his body, or made sexually provocative comments
to complainant before initiating the sexual contact. Furthermore, the complainant testified that
he masturbated defendant because defendant physically pushed his hand down to defendant’s
penis, and the complainant was confused. He “didn’t know, like, what was okay in the
situation,” and “didn’t know whether it was right or not or whether it’s what we should’ve been
doing.” It could reasonably be concluded that defendant on the other hand, as an adult pastor,
knew whether his actions with the minor parishioner were right or wrong. Thus, there is
probable cause to believe that defendant used his position of authority to exploit the
complainant’s special vulnerability and coerce him to submit to sexual contact.
Defendant relies on our Supreme Court’s summary decision in People v Usman, 428
Mich 902; 406 NW2d 824 (1987), in which the Court reversed the defendant’s second-degree
CSC conviction “because there was no evidence that the defendant used a position of authority to
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coerce the 14-year old complainant to submit to sexual contact.” We are unpersuaded by
defendant’s argument. As this Court articulated in Reid, supra at 473:
. . . the brief summary discussion in Usman does not include factual background
concerning the allegations in that case and, thus, does not explain why the
evidence in that case was insufficient to support a finding that the defendant used
a position of authority to coerce submission to sexual contact.
In reviewing the district court’s bindover decision for an abuse of discretion, the circuit
court must consider the entire record of the preliminary examination. Crippen, supra at 281.
We find that the circuit court failed to consider the entire record of the preliminary examination
in concluding that defendant did not use his position of authority to coerce submission. The
circuit court opined that there was no evidence that “[d]efendant had any sort of counseling or
mentoring role with respect to the complainant,” but the complainant testified that the sexual
contact sometimes occurred when he was in defendant’s office asking him for advice. While the
complainant testified that defendant was not his primary mentor at the church, the fact that the
complainant respected defendant as his pastor, called him “Pastor Mike,” and asked him for
advice demonstrates that defendant had a mentoring role with respect to the complainant.
The evidence presented at the preliminary examination was sufficient for a person of
ordinary prudence to entertain a reasonable belief that defendant used his position of authority to
coerce the complainant to submit. Accordingly, we find that the district court’s decision to bind
over defendant on second-degree CSC charges was within the range of reasonable and principled
outcomes and, therefore, that the circuit court erred in quashing the second-degree CSC charges.
Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain
jurisdiction.
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Jane M. Beckering
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