PEOPLE OF MI V FREDERICK TED SPENCER
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 20, 2007
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 271844
Isabella Circuit Court
LC No. 05-000059-FC
FREDERICK TED SPENCER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Owens, PJ, and Bandstra and Davis, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
After a jury trial, defendant Frederick Ted Spencer was convicted of one count of arson
(preparation to burn property), MCL 750.77(1)(d)(i), arising from the fire in his home on
January 30, 2000, and one count of felony murder, MCL 750.316(b), arising from the death of
Kathy Sytek in the fire. The trial court sentenced defendant to concurrent sentences of life
imprisonment for the felony murder conviction and two to ten years’ imprisonment for the arson
conviction, with 524 days’ credit for time served. He now appeals as of right. We affirm.
I. Facts
Defendant Fred Spencer owned an old farmhouse on Deerfield Road outside Shepherd,
Michigan. In 1999, Kathy Sytek, who was unemployed and had been forced to move from her
apartment, began living rent-free in defendant’s home. Defendant and Kathy began a
relationship soon thereafter, and defendant supported Kathy financially. Both defendant and
Kathy were alcoholics. Although some witnesses claimed that Kathy and defendant had a good
relationship, others testified that their relationship became volatile when they drank.
Around 8:45 p.m. on January 30, 2000, Tracy Carpenter was driving west on Deerfield
Road when she noticed that defendant’s house was on fire and called 911. Soon after she began
talking to the dispatcher, defendant ran toward her, distraught, and told her that his “woman” was
inside the burning house. A few minutes later, defendant ran back to the house and entered the
front porch, collapsing just inside the door. Firefighters arriving at the scene soon thereafter
rescued defendant. He was transported to Saginaw St. Mary’s Hospital and admitted to the burn
trauma intensive care unit. Defendant received severe burns to his face and arms, requiring skin
grafts, and was hospitalized for two-and-a-half weeks.
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Other firefighters at the scene eventually put out the fire. They discovered Kathy’s body
in the dining room, lying facedown in a fetal position in front of a couch. An autopsy revealed
that she died from asphyxia caused by carbon monoxide poisoning as a result of the fire. Her
blood alcohol concentration at the time of death was 0.30 grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of
blood. Greg Proudfoot, a detective sergeant and state fire marshal for the Fire Marshal Division
of the Michigan State Police, investigated the cause and origin of the January 30 fire. He
determined that defendant started separate fires in the basement and garage of the house, and that
the fire that he started in the garage destroyed the house.
II. Sufficiency/Great Weight of the Evidence
Defendant argues that the prosecution presented insufficient evidence to support his
convictions, and that his convictions are against the great weight of the evidence. We disagree.
We review de novo a claim of insufficient evidence in a criminal trial. People v Lueth, 253
Mich App 670, 680; 660 NW2d 322 (2002). We review the trial court’s decision to deny
defendant’s motion for a new trial on the ground that the verdict is against the great weight of the
evidence for an abuse of discretion. People v McCray, 245 Mich App 631, 637; 630 NW2d 633
(2001).
When reviewing a claim that the evidence presented was insufficient to support a
conviction, we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution to determine if a
rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the essential elements of the crime
were established. People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 515; 489 NW2d 748 (1992), amended 441
Mich 1201 (1992). We are required to draw all reasonable inferences and to make credibility
determinations in support of the jury verdict. People v Nowack, 462 Mich 392, 400; 614 NW2d
78 (2000). However, to establish that the evidence presented was sufficient to support
defendant’s conviction, “the prosecution need not negate every reasonable theory consistent with
innocence.” Id. “The evidence is sufficient if the prosecution proves its theory beyond a
reasonable doubt in the face of whatever contradictory evidence the defendant may provide.”
People v Wolford, 189 Mich App 478, 480; 473 NW2d 767 (1991).
A prosecutor need not present direct evidence linking a defendant to the crime in order to
provide sufficient evidence to support a conviction; “[c]ircumstantial evidence and reasonable
inferences arising from the evidence may constitute satisfactory proof of the elements of the
offense.” Id. Further, a fact-finder may infer a defendant’s intent from all the facts and
circumstances provided. Id. “Questions of credibility are left to the trier of fact and will not be
resolved anew by this Court.” People v Avant, 235 Mich App 499, 506; 597 NW2d 864 (1999).
“[I]t is for the trier of fact, not the appellate court, to determine what inferences may be fairly
drawn from the evidence and to determine the weight to be accorded those inferences.” People v
Hardiman, 466 Mich 417, 428; 646 NW2d 158 (2002).
To establish defendant’s conviction for arson (preparation to burn property),
MCL 750.77(1)(d)(i), the prosecution must present evidence indicating that defendant (1) used,
arranged, placed, devised, or distributed an inflammable, combustible, or explosive material,
liquid, or substance or any device (2) in or near a building or other property whose combined
value exceeded $20,000 (3) with the intent to willfully and maliciously set fire to or burn the
building. Direct eyewitness testimony is not necessary to establish these elements; arson is often
proven through circumstantial evidence because it is rare to have eyewitnesses to the crime.
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Nowack, supra at 403 n 2, quoting People v Horowitz, 37 Mich App 151, 154; 194 NW2d 375
(1971). Our Supreme Court explained:
[T]here is rarely direct evidence of the actual lighting of a fire by an
arsonist; rather, the evidence of arson is usually circumstantial. Such evidence is
often of a negative character; that is, the criminal agency is shown by the absence
of circumstances, conditions, and surroundings indicating that the fire resulted
from an accidental cause. [Nowack, supra at 402-403, quoting Fox v State, 179
Ind App 267, 277; 384 NE2d 1159 (1979).]
The prosecution presented sufficient evidence to support defendant’s conviction for arson
(preparation to burn property), MCL 750.77(1)(d)(i). First, the evidence presented at trial
indicates that defendant used flammable liquids and combustible materials to set two separate
fires in his house. Proudfoot’s expert testimony establishes that the fire that destroyed the house
was intentionally set in the garage. Admittedly, Proudfoot could not explain exactly how the fire
started, although he found no indication that the garage fire was accidental. However, Proudfoot
noted that two doors of the car parked in the garage were open. Further, the door to the gasoline
tank of the car was open, and Proudfoot found a small piece of wood propping open the interior
flap of the gasoline tank. Essentially, Proudfoot indicated, the car doors were positioned in a
manner that would make it easier for the combustible interior of the car to burn and the gasoline
tank door and flap were propped open in a manner that would permit gasoline fumes to escape.
This circumstantial evidence indicates that someone was trying to involve the car in the fire that
started in the garage.1 A reasonable juror could then infer that someone who wanted the garage
(and house) to burn intentionally started the fire in the garage and prepared the car in a manner
that would facilitate accelerating the fire with the combustible and flammable materials in the
car.
The evidence at trial also establishes that defendant started another fire near the water
heater in the basement. Proudfoot’s testimony, supplemented by photographs and videotape of
the house, indicates that one side of the water heater burned on January 30. The bubbled paint
on the burned area of the water heater had not blistered when Proudfoot initially photographed
the water heater on January 31, indicating that the burning on the water heater had only recently
occurred. Proudfoot found a gasoline container on top of the water heater and a container of
matches nearby.
Further, the evidence presented at trial supports Proudfoot’s conclusion that three
attempts were made to ignite the water heater. Proudfoot found two matches aligned in a zigzag
pattern on the water heater, with the edge of one match resting under the gasoline container. He
also found a foot-long wooden shim with a burned edge on top of the water heater and a foldedup piece of cardboard with a burned edge on the ground underneath the burned side of the water
1
Defendant claimed that he did not normally keep the door to the gasoline tank open. It would
also be reasonable to infer that someone would not park his car in his garage, yet leave both
doors and the gasoline tank door open and prop open the interior flap of the gasoline tank with a
piece of wood, unless he wanted to involve the car in a fire.
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heater. Further, the burn pattern on the water heater was consistent with the burn pattern that
typically develops if gasoline is poured down the side of a painted metal surface and then
ignited. Proudfoot suspected that after defendant failed to start a fire by arranging and lighting
matches in a manner that would burn a hole in the gasoline container and ignite the gasoline
inside, he splashed gasoline on the side of the water heater and used the wooden shim and
cardboard to ignite the gasoline. Proudfoot explained that gasoline is not particularly “sticky,”
so if gasoline were splashed on the water heater and then ignited, the paint on the water heater
would only burn over the short period in which the fire consumed the gasoline.
Further, the evidence presented at trial indicates that defendant set the fires in the
basement and garage. The parties do not dispute that defendant and Kathy were the only people
at defendant’s home on the night of January 30, and Proudfoot found no evidence indicating that
someone broke into defendant’s house that evening. Kathy was highly intoxicated that evening,
but the parties do not argue or provide evidence indicating that she was responsible for setting
either fire. Conversely, the prosecution presented evidence indicating that defendant received
the burns to his face and arms when he ignited the gasoline on the water heater.2 Both Proudfoot
and Wilcox explained that the burns to defendant’s face and arms were consistent with injuries
that are typical of an individual who received a flash burn, and that the brief, intense flame that
causes a flash burn was likely produced when he ignited the gasoline on the water heater.
The evidence presented at trial also establishes that in 1998, defendant insured his house
for $65,000 and the personal property inside the house for $32,000. The parties do not dispute
that defendant’s house and property involved in the January 30 fire had a combined value in
excess of $20,000.
Finally, a reasonable juror could infer from the evidence presented at trial that defendant
willfully and maliciously set fire to his house. Again, it is improbable that a car would simply be
parked in the garage with its doors open, the door to the gasoline tank open, and the gasoline
tank flap propped open with a piece of wood. Instead, a reasonable juror could infer that
defendant positioned the car in this manner with the intention of starting a fire in the garage and
using the combustible materials in the car as a fuel source for the fire, and that defendant’s three
attempts to use gasoline to set fire to the water heater indicate that he willfully and maliciously
intended to start that fire. Accordingly, the evidence that defendant made several attempts in at
least two locations to start a fire in his home indicates that he willfully and maliciously set fire to
his house on January 30.
The prosecution also presented sufficient evidence to support defendant’s felony murder
conviction.
The elements of felony murder are: (1) the killing of a human being,
(2) with the intent to kill, to do great bodily harm, or to create a very high risk of
2
Although firefighters found defendant and rescued him from the front porch of his house that
night, both their testimony and Proudfoot’s investigation indicated that the front porch was not
burning when defendant was rescued, so defendant would not have received his burns there.
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death or great bodily harm with knowledge that death or great bodily harm was
the probable result [i.e., malice], (3) while committing, attempting to commit, or
assisting in the commission of any of the felonies specifically enumerated in [the
statute, including (arson)]. [People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 758-759; 597
NW2d 130 (1999), quoting People v Turner, 213 Mich App 558, 566; 540 NW2d
728 (1995).]
“The facts and circumstances of the killing may give rise to an inference of malice. A jury may
infer malice from evidence that the defendant intentionally set in motion a force likely to cause
death or great bodily harm.” Carines, supra at 759.
Again, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable juror to
conclude that defendant committed arson in violation of MCL 750.77(1)(d)(i) when he set fire to
his house on January 30. Further, the evidence presented at trial indicates that Kathy died from
carbon monoxide poisoning as a result of the fire. Finally, the prosecution presented sufficient
evidence to indicate that defendant intended to kill or otherwise harm Kathy when he set fire to
the house. Defendant admitted that Kathy was in the house with him on January 30 and that she
had been drinking that evening. Further, Kathy had a BAC of 0.30 at the time of her death.
Defendant and Kathy often fought and defendant resented that he had to support Kathy
financially. A reasonable juror could assume that when defendant intentionally set fire to the
house, he was aware that Kathy was inside and was likely incapacitated. Therefore, a reasonable
juror could also assume that defendant intended to kill or harm Kathy by setting fire to the house
when she was inside, or that he knew when he set fire to the house that Kathy was inside and
would likely be injured or killed in the fire.
Defendant also argues that his convictions are against the great weight of the evidence
and that, accordingly, his convictions should be reversed and his case remanded for a new trial.
For a verdict to be contrary to the great weight of the evidence, the evidence must preponderate
so heavily against the verdict “that it would be a miscarriage of justice to allow the verdict to
stand.” People v Musser, 259 Mich App 215, 218-219; 673 NW2d 800 (2003). To determine
whether a verdict is contrary to the great weight of the evidence, we review the whole body of
proofs. People v Herbert, 444 Mich 466, 475; 511 NW2d 654 (1993), overruled on other
grounds People v Lemmon, 456 Mich 625; 576 NW2d 129 (1998). We may only vacate a
conviction because it is against the great weight of the evidence if the verdict “‘does not find
reasonable support in the evidence, but is more likely to be attributed to causes outside the record
such as passion, prejudice, sympathy, or some extraneous influence.’” People v DeLisle, 202
Mich App 658, 661; 509 NW2d 885 (1993), quoting Nagi v Detroit United R, 231 Mich 452,
457; 204 NW 126 (1925). “‘Conflicting testimony, even when impeached to some extent, is an
insufficient ground for granting a new trial’” based on the weight of the evidence. McCray,
supra at 638, quoting Lemmon, supra at 647.
Essentially, defendant argues that the expert testimony presented by the prosecution was
unreliable and had been debunked by his experts, and he maintains that the circumstantial
evidence used to convict him was weak and failed to establish that arson was the cause of the
January 30 fire. At trial, defendant’s expert, Jack Hughes, explained the reasons for his
conclusion that the January 30 fire had only one point of origin, described the weaknesses in
Proudfoot’s investigation, and determined that the investigation was insufficient to conclude that
defendant intentionally started the fire. However, Proudfoot explained why he did not agree with
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Hughes’ conclusion that the fire originated in the garage, spread to the basement, and burned the
water heater. In particular, he described burn patterns in the ceiling joists of the basement
indicating that a separate fire originated near the water heater. He also noted that Hughes’ theory
that fall-down from the ceiling ignited cardboard located below the water heater, which in turn
burned the water heater, was inconsistent with both the burn patterns on the water heater and the
absence of ashes below the water heater. Although these expert witnesses presented conflicting
testimony, both witnesses provided support for their conclusions, and Proudfoot opined
regarding the weaknesses in Hughes’ theory. The jurors apparently agreed with Proudfoot’s
theories regarding the origins of the fire, and we will not interfere with their credibility
determinations. See Avant, supra at 506.
The prosecution presented additional evidence that conflicted with evidence that
defendant presented to support his acquittal. Although defendant consistently maintained that he
did not start the January 30 fire, his statements are inconsistent with each other and with the
other evidence presented at trial. For example, defendant initially claimed that he saw a fire in
the basement near the furnace, but he later claimed that he saw the fire in the garage and not the
basement. Further, defendant claimed that the door between the kitchen and breezeway locked
behind him when he left the house, although forensic evidence indicated that the door was
unlocked and ajar during the fire. Although defendant named other possible suspects, these
suspects had alibis. Defendant’s testimony that he and Kathy had a loving relationship and
planned to marry was contradicted by other testimony indicating that his relationship with Kathy
was violent and that she thought of leaving him.
Although defendant presented testimony that conflicted with evidence presented by the
prosecution, this conflicting testimony is insufficient to grant a new trial based on the weight of
the evidence. See McCray, supra at 638. Further, in the face of this conflicting testimony, the
jury chose to believe the prosecution witnesses and the prosecution’s theory of the case. Again,
this Court may not interfere with the jury’s credibility determinations. See Avant, supra at 506.
Although defendant provided some evidence to support his acquittal, the evidence presented at
trial did not preponderate so heavily against the verdict that it would be a miscarriage of justice
to allow the verdict to stand. See Musser, supra at 218-219. Defendant’s convictions are not
against the great weight of the evidence, and remand for a new trial is not necessary.
III. Admission of Defendant’s Statements to Proudfoot
Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it admitted evidence regarding his
statements to Proudfoot on February 10 and 12, and that his counsel was ineffective for failing to
move to suppress the admission of this evidence. We disagree. Because defendant failed to
move to suppress the admission of this testimony at trial, this question is not preserved for our
review. We review unpreserved claims for plain error affecting defendant’s substantial rights.
Carines, supra at 763-764.
Because the trial court did not grant defendant’s post-trial motion for a new trial or a
Ginther3 hearing, review of defendant’s claim that his counsel was ineffective is limited to errors
3
People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436, 443; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).
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apparent on the record. People v Nantelle, 215 Mich App 77, 87; 544 NW2d 667 (1996).
Whether defendant has been denied effective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of fact
and constitutional law. People v LeBlanc, 465 Mich 575, 579; 640 NW2d 246 (2002). We first
determine the facts and then decide whether these facts constitute a violation of defendant’s right
to effective assistance of counsel. Id. We review factual findings for clear error, and review
constitutional determinations de novo. Id. “Effective assistance of counsel is presumed, and the
defendant bears a heavy burden of proving otherwise.” People v Rodgers, 248 Mich App 702,
714; 645 NW2d 294 (2001). In reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, “[t]his
Court will not substitute its judgment for that of counsel regarding matters of trial strategy, nor
will it assess counsel’s competence with the benefit of hindsight.” People v Rockey, 237
Mich App 74, 76-77; 601 NW2d 887 (1999).
Defendant argues that the statements that he made to Proudfoot on February 10 and 12
constituted an involuntary confession and should not have been admitted at trial. However,
defendant did not confess to anything in either interrogation. Instead, he maintained throughout
both conversations with Proudfoot that he did not start the January 30 fire. Accordingly, the
admission of his statements did not violate his due process rights.
Although a confession must be given voluntarily in order to be admissible, “where the
defendant’s statements were admissions of fact, rather than a confession of guilt, no finding of
voluntariness is necessary.” People v Gist, 190 Mich App 670, 671; 476 NW2d 485 (1991).
“An admission of fact is distinguished from a confession of guilt by the fact that an admission, in
the absence of proof of facts in addition to those admitted by the defendant, does not show guilt.”
Id. at 671-672. In Gist, although the defendant claimed that his statements to the police that
“The white guy that ran across the grass can’t identify me.” and “Where are the six money bags
that were taken?” constitute an involuntary confession, this Court determined that “defendant’s
statements [did] not show that he committed the crime of which he was convicted,” and,
therefore, were mere admissions of fact. Id.
Similarly, defendant’s statements to Proudfoot on February 10 and 12 did not constitute a
confession. During both interviews, defendant maintained that he and Kathy were in the back
bedroom when they heard a loud noise and saw smoke roll into the bedroom, that he left Kathy
in the bedroom to investigate the incident, and that he went to the basement, only to discover that
it was full of smoke and that either the furnace or something near it was on fire. Defendant also
maintained that he then went upstairs, tried to reenter the kitchen through the breezeway door,
and discovered that the door was locked. He then claimed that he ran outside and to the front
porch in an attempt to reenter the house, suddenly turned, ran to the road, waved down a passing
motorist, told her to call 911, and then ran back to the front porch, which he entered before
losing consciousness. Defendant never admitted to Proudfoot that he started the January 30 fire,
nor did he make any statement to indicate that he caused the fire, either intentionally or
unintentionally.
Accordingly, in the absence of additional evidence, his statements to Proudfoot do not
indicate that he was guilty of starting the January 30 fire; in fact, these statements support
defendant’s argument that he was not responsible for the fire. Defendant’s statements to
Proudfoot constitute an admission of fact, not a confession of guilt, and no finding of
voluntariness is necessary. See Gist, supra at 671-672. Therefore, the trial court did not violate
defendant’s due process rights when it admitted recordings of the statements that defendant made
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to Proudfoot on February 10 and 12 and permitted Proudfoot to testify regarding their contents.
Defendant provided no other rationale to support his argument that the trial court should not have
admitted evidence concerning these statements. Accordingly, the trial court did not err when it
admitted this evidence.
Defendant also argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress
these statements, but he fails to provide a successful argument to support his contention that the
trial court’s admission of these statements was in error. “Ineffective assistance of counsel cannot
be predicated on the failure to make a frivolous or meritless motion.” People v Riley (After
Remand), 468 Mich 135, 142; 659 NW2d 611 (2003). Accordingly, defendant’s counsel was not
ineffective for failing to move to suppress this testimony.
IV. Admission of Proudfoot’s Expert Witness Testimony
Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it admitted Proudfoot’s testimony
concerning his theory that defendant started the fire in the basement by pouring gasoline down
the side of the water heater and igniting it, and that he received flashback burns when he ignited
the gasoline. Apparently, defendant claims, Proudfoot’s expert testimony was not supported by
the evidence and constituted “a naked opinion outside of [his] expertise.” We disagree.
Defendant did not challenge Proudfoot’s qualification as an expert witness regarding the cause
and origin of fires or the admission of his testimony at trial. Accordingly, this issue is not
preserved, and we review it for plain error affecting defendant’s substantial rights. See People v
Pipes, 475 Mich 267, 277; 715 NW2d 290 (2006); Carines, supra at 763-764.
“Before permitting expert testimony, a trial court must find that the evidence is from a
recognized discipline, relevant and helpful to the trier of fact, and presented by a qualified
witness.” People v Daoust, 228 Mich App 1, 9-10; 577 NW2d 179 (1998). MRE 702 governs
the circumstances under which expert testimony is admissible:
If the court determines that scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a
fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise if
(1) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the
product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the
principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.
Although the party offering the expert testimony has the burden of establishing its admissibility,
the trial court has an obligation to ensure that any expert testimony admitted at trial is reliable.
Gilbert v DaimlerChrysler Corp, 470 Mich 749, 780; 685 NW2d 391 (2004); People v Dobek,
274 Mich App 58, 94; 732 NW2d 546 (2007).
MRE 702 mandates a searching inquiry, not just of the data underlying
expert testimony, but also of the manner in which the expert interprets and
extrapolates from those data. Thus, it is insufficient for the proponent of expert
opinion merely to show that the opinion rests on data viewed as legitimate in the
context of a particular area of expertise (such as medicine). The proponent must
also show that any opinion based on those data expresses conclusions reached
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through reliable principles and methodology.
Gilbert, supra at 782.]
[Dobek, supra at 94, quoting
Proudfoot’s expert testimony regarding the cause and origin of the January 30 fire was
properly admitted pursuant to MRE 702. The trial court properly concluded that in this arson
case, testimony explaining the forensic evidence found at the scene and how it indicated the
cause and origin of the fire would help the jury understand this evidence. Further, Proudfoot was
qualified to testify as an expert regarding the cause and origin of fires. He was a detective
sergeant and fire marshal for the Fire Marshal Division of the Michigan State Police, had
completed both basic and advanced fire school, was certified as a fire investigator through the
Michigan State Police certification program, and was a member of the International Association
of Arson Investigators at the time he started the investigation. Accordingly, he had sufficient
experience, training, and education to testify as an expert regarding the cause and origin of fires
pursuant to MRE 702.
Proudfoot’s theory that defendant started a fire by pouring gasoline down the side of the
water heater and igniting it and that he received flashback burns when the gasoline ignited, is
based on sufficient evidence that Proudfoot reliably applied to fire investigation principles and
methods. Not only did Proudfoot testify regarding his observations concerning the damage
caused by the January 30 fire, but he provided photographs and videotape to show the jury
images of the forensic evidence he studied when conducting his investigation. Further,
Proudfoot provided explanations at trial regarding burn patterns for different types of
accelerants, the manner in which a fire spreads, and how debris, smoke, and other residue can be
used to determine the location and positioning of people and objects at the time of the fire.
Proudfoot then described at trial how he used this information to determine that the burns
on the water heater likely occurred when gasoline was splashed on the water heater and then
ignited, and that the burns to defendant’s arms and face were consistent with flashback burns that
he likely received when he ignited the gasoline. He based his opinions regarding the cause and
origin of the January 30 fire on reliable principles and methods, and he explained how his
conclusions were based on the application of these principles and methods to the facts of the
case. Accordingly, Proudfoot’s testimony was proper pursuant to MRE 702, and the trial court
did not plainly err when it permitted Proudfoot to testify concerning his theory regarding the
cause and origin of the fire.4
V. Admission of Defendant’s Threatening Remark
Defendant claims that the trial court erred when it admitted an audiorecording of a phone
conversation that occurred between defendant and his son, Steve, when defendant was in jail as
evidence of defendant’s consciousness of guilt. We disagree. We review the trial court’s
4
To the extent that defendant argues that Proudfoot’s theories were not based on reliable data
and other information, we note that considerations regarding the weight to be given this evidence
are properly left to the jury. People v Fletcher, 260 Mich App 531, 561; 679 NW2d 127 (2004).
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decision to admit evidence for an abuse of discretion. People v Manser, 250 Mich App 21, 31;
645 NW2d 65 (2002).
“A defendant’s threat against a witness is generally admissible. It is conduct that can
demonstrate consciousness of guilt.” People v Sholl, 453 Mich 730, 740; 556 NW2d 851 (1996).
Although a threatening remark might simply “reflect the understandable exasperation of a person
accused of a crime that the person did not commit,” our Supreme Court has determined that “it is
for the jury to determine the significance of a threat in conjunction with its consideration of the
other testimony produced in the case.” Id.
Defendant argues that he was denied a fair trial when the trial court permitted the jury to
listen to an audiorecording of his phone conversation with Steve. He claimed that during this
conversation, he neither threatened to prevent Dan Devoid from testifying nor adopted the
alleged death threats made by Steve and, therefore, his statements did not constitute a threat
against Devoid.
However, defendant’s statements, taken in context, constitute threats against Devoid.
Defendant began the conversation with Steve by using disparaging names to describe Devoid.
After Steve told him that he saw recently Devoid at a flea market but quickly left in order to
prevent Devoid from seeing him, and commented that he did not want to see Devoid because he
feared that he would “end up committing a crime,” defendant responded by stating in an ominous
voice, “Oh, I want to see him. I’m going to be looking for him when I get out.” The portion of
the audiorecording following defendant’s comment is difficult to make out, but defendant and
Steve apparently discussed “tak[ing] care of” something. Defendant then stated, “I know guys
who don’t like him too much either. He’s pretty stupid ‘cause he took us all out to where his
parents live. That’s, you know? That’s just dumb.” Steve immediately responded by noting,
“500 will probably get something taken care of.”
Defendant’s statements, taken in the context of the entire conversation and in light of the
fact that Devoid planned to testify at defendant’s trial that defendant was at his house
immediately before the February 18 fire began, indicate that defendant was angry at Devoid and
wanted to confront him or to find someone to “take care of” him. Further, the conversation
indicates that defendant and Steve considered implementing a plan to find someone to “take care
of” Devoid. Accordingly, the trial court did not err when it determined that defendant’s
statement that he would be “looking for” Devoid when he was released from jail constituted a
threat. Further, it did not err when it determined that the rest of the conversation, including
Steve’s statements, was admissible for a non-hearsay purpose, namely, to put defendant’s threat
in context.
This evidence of defendant’s threat against Devoid was relevant under MRE 401 to
determine defendant’s consciousness of guilt. At the time defendant made these remarks,
Devoid had already testified at the preliminary examination that that he, Steve, and defendant
were at defendant’s house immediately before the February 18 fire. A reasonable juror could
infer from defendant’s threatening remarks against Devoid that defendant wanted to harm
Devoid for testifying because Devoid’s anticipated testimony, which placed defendant at his
house immediately before the February 18 fire, was true and indicated that defendant
intentionally set fire to the remains of his house that day. Further, although the admission of
defendant’s threatening remarks is prejudicial because it might induce jurors to infer that
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defendant had a bad character, the probative value of these remarks to determine defendant’s
consciousness of guilt is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
Accordingly, these statements are admissible pursuant to MRE 403.
In addition, the trial court properly instructed the jury to only consider defendant’s
statements during the conversation to determine his consciousness of guilt. Jurors are presumed
to follow their instructions, and instructions are presumed to cure most errors. People v Graves,
458 Mich 476, 486; 581 NW2d 229 (1998). Accordingly, we conclude that the jury did not
consider this evidence for an improper purpose and that the trial court’s decision to admit this
audiorecording did not constitute error requiring reversal.
VI. Prosecutorial Misconduct
Defendant argues that three comments made by the prosecutor during his closing
argument constitute instances of prosecutorial misconduct requiring reversal of his convictions
and remand for a new trial. We disagree. Because defendant failed to challenge the propriety of
the prosecutor’s remarks at trial, he failed to preserve this issue for our review. People v
Stanaway, 446 Mich 643, 687; 521 NW2d 557 (1994). We review unpreserved claims of error
for plain error affecting defendant’s substantial rights. Carines, supra at 763-764.
“The test of prosecutorial misconduct is whether the defendant was denied a fair and
impartial trial (i.e., whether prejudice resulted).” People v Abraham, 256 Mich App 265, 272;
662 NW2d 836 (2003). To determine if a prosecutor committed misconduct, “the reviewing
court must examine the pertinent portion of the record and evaluate a prosecutor’s remarks in
context.” Id. at 272-273. “‘Prosecutors are accorded great latitude regarding their arguments
and conduct.’” People v Bahoda, 448 Mich 261, 282; 531 NW2d 659 (1995), quoting People v
Rohn, 98 Mich App 593, 596; 296 NW2d 315 (1980), overruled on other grounds People v
Perry, 460 Mich 55; 594 NW2d 477 (1999). Although a prosecutor may not make a statement of
fact to the jury that is unsupported by the evidence, he is “free to argue the evidence and any
reasonable inferences that may arise from the evidence.” People v Ackerman, 257 Mich App
434, 450; 669 NW2d 818 (2003). During closing argument, the prosecutor is also permitted to
comment on the evidence presented at trial and on the witnesses’ credibility. People v Green,
131 Mich App 232, 236-237; 345 NW2d 676 (1983). “A prosecutor may also argue that the
evidence was uncontradicted even though the defendant is the only person who could have
contradicted the evidence.” Id. at 237. However, the prosecutor “may not imply in closing
argument that defendant must prove something or present a reasonable explanation for damaging
evidence because such an argument tends to shift the burden of proof.” Id.
To determine if a prosecutor’s comments during his closing argument were improper, we
evaluate the prosecutor’s remarks in context, in light of defense counsel’s arguments and the
relationship that these comments bear to the evidence admitted at trial. People v Brown, 267
Mich App 141, 152; 703 NW2d 230 (2005). “The propriety of a prosecutor’s remarks depends
on all the facts of the case.” People v Rodriguez, 251 Mich App 10, 30; 650 NW2d 96 (2002).
Defendant argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct by telling the jury during his
closing argument that defendant had to disprove the prosecution’s theory that he started a second
fire at the water heater and that defendant failed to produce evidence during the trial to establish
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his innocence. In particular, he challenges the following portion of the prosecution’s closing
argument:
Obviously, the big question is how do we know the Defendant did it in
this case and, on January 30th of 2000, I, I would be interested to see if, if
Mr. Barberi has any evidence that he thinks points to anyone but the Defendant in
this case because I, I just don’t see it. I don’t see anything that indicates that
anyone else did this.
You heard testimony yesterday and, and before about the water heater fire
and, clearly, they have to disprove the water heater fire. It’s the essence of their
defense. They have to disprove it because clearly there’s a fire in the garage and
if they, if there’s a fire in the basement, it just, it’s impossible to believe their
defense.
The prosecutor’s argument in the first paragraph of the cited passage was proper. The
prosecutor merely discussed the evidence presented at trial indicating that defendant set fire to
his home and the lack of evidence indicating that another person or source caused the fire. This
statement constitutes permissible commentary regarding the evidence presented at trial. See
Green, supra at 237.
Whether the prosecutor’s comments in the second paragraph of the cited passage
constituted misconduct is a close question. The prosecutor argued that defendant had to
“disprove the water heater fire.” This statement, taken alone, would impermissibly shift the
burden of proof by implying that defendant must “present a reasonable explanation for damaging
evidence.” Id. at 237. However, to determine if this statement by the prosecutor constitutes
misconduct, his statements must be evaluated in context. See Brown at 152. The prosecutor’s
remarks could be viewed as a response to the following portion of defense counsel’s opening
argument:
As our learned Trial Judge Chamberlain has already told you, neither
Mr. Spencer nor myself have to prove anything and that you cannot, you cannot
return a verdict of guilty on any of the charges that have been brought by the State
unless the Prosecutor proves each and every element of all the crimes charged
beyond a reasonable doubt and that my client is presumed as he sits here today to
be innocent. I could rely on that. But I’m going to tell you right now I’m not
going to rely on the presumption of innocence. I’m not going to rely on the
Prosecutor’s burden of proof. My client, Fred Spencer, sits here this morning in
this very courtroom an innocent man and I am going to prove that to you during
this trial.
By claiming that defendant had to “disprove the water heater fire” to support his contention that
he was not guilty of the charged offenses, the prosecutor could have been responding to defense
counsel’s assertion in his opening argument that he would “prove” defendant’s innocence at trial.
However, we need not address on the merits the question whether the aforementioned
comment by the prosecutor was proper, because any error was harmless. This brief comment,
stated at the beginning of an otherwise proper argument explaining that the evidence presented at
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trial did not lead to the conclusion that an unknown individual entered the house and set fire to
the water heater, did not deny defendant the right to a fair and impartial trial. Further, the trial
court’s instructions to the jury cured any potential error. Although a defendant may be denied a
fair trial if the prosecutor makes a clear misstatement of the law that remains uncorrected, even
an erroneous legal argument made by the prosecutor can potentially be cured if the jury is
correctly instructed on the law. People v Grayer, 252 Mich App 349, 357; 651 NW2d 818
(2002). In the jury instructions, the trial court properly instructed the jury that defendant was
presumed to be innocent and did not have to prove that he did not commit the charged offenses.
Further, the trial court properly instructed the jury that the prosecution’s closing statement is not
evidence. See MCR 6.414(G). “It is well established that jurors are presumed to follow their
instructions.” Graves, supra at 486. Therefore, we conclude that the jury did not consider the
prosecutor’s closing statement as evidence when deliberating and disregarded any assertions and
arguments unsupported by the evidence. The court’s instructions were sufficient to protect
defendant’s substantial rights and to ensure that any potential error caused by the prosecutor’s
comment did not deny defendant a fair and impartial trial.
Defendant also argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct by responding to
defense counsel’s assertions during closing argument of a lack of evidence in the case with the
comment that the “only lack of evidence in the case is the lack of evidence that anybody else did
this other that [sic] the Defendant.” However, defense counsel repeatedly stated during his
closing argument that there was a lack of evidence in the case. The prosecutor’s statement
constituted permissible commentary on the evidence in response to defense counsel’s closing
argument and did not impermissibly suggest to the jury that defendant failed to prove his
innocence. See Green, supra at 237.
Finally, defendant argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the
aforementioned instances of alleged prosecutorial misconduct. Because the prosecutor’s
arguments did not constitute misconduct, defendant’s claim that his counsel was ineffective for
failing to object to the prosecutor’s arguments lacks merit. See Riley, supra at 142.
VII. Prearrest Delay
Finally, defendant argues that he was denied due process because he was arrested five
years after these fires occurred. We do not agree. “A challenge to a prearrest delay implicates
constitutional due process rights, which this Court reviews de novo.” People v Cain, 238
Mich App 95, 108; 605 NW2d 28 (1999).
Both the United States Constitution, US Const, Am VI, and the Michigan Constitution,
Const 1963, art 1, § 20, guarantee the right to a speedy trial. People v Cleveland Williams, 475
Mich 245, 261; 716 NW2d 208 (2006). Generally, a defendant must be arrested to invoke the
speedy trial guarantee. United States v Marion, 404 US 307, 320; 92 S Ct 455; 30 L Ed 2d 468
(1971). Restrictions on prearrest delay are primarily governed by the applicable limitation
periods adopted by the Legislature. Id. at 322. However, “due process provides limited
protection against oppressive prearrest delay.” People v Tanner, 255 Mich App 369, 414; 660
NW2d 746, rev’d on other grounds 469 Mich 437 (2003).
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To establish a due process violation meriting dismissal of the charges, a defendant must
first “demonstrate both actual and substantial prejudice that impairs the defendant’s right to a fair
trial.” Id.
Substantial prejudice is prejudice of a kind or sort that the defendant’s
ability to defend against the charges was so impaired that it likely affected the
outcome of the trial. Actual prejudice is not established by general allegations or
speculative claims of faded memories, missing witnesses, or other lost evidence.
[Id. (citations omitted).]
To establish whether actual and substantial prejudice impairs a defendant’s right to a fair trial,
the court must balance the actual prejudice to the defendant against the state’s reasons for the
delay. United States v Lovasco, 431 US 783, 790; 97 S Ct 2044; 52 L Ed 2d 752 (1977); Cain,
supra at 108. The defendant bears the initial burden of demonstrating prejudice; then, the
prosecutor “bears the burden of persuading the court that the reason for the delay was sufficient
to justify whatever prejudice results.” Cain, supra at 109, quoting People v McIntire, 232
Mich App 71, 93; 591 NW2d 231 (1998), rev’d on other grounds 461 Mich 147 (1999).
However, defendant cannot merely present general allegations in order to establish that
prejudice occurred. Instead, he must present “specific references to instances of prejudicegenerating occurrences” and “specific allegations of actual prejudice resulting therefrom.”
People v Loyer, 169 Mich App 105, 119-120; 425 NW2d 714 (1988). Otherwise, “the
prosecution would be at an insuperable disadvantage indeed in attempting to show how such
unspecified prejudice was in fact justified.” Id. at 120. A defendant must also show that “the
prosecution intended to gain a tactical advantage by delaying formal charges.” Tanner, supra at
414-415.
Initially, we note that Proudfoot and Carter, the two investigators in this case, kept this
case open for five years to gather enough evidence to arrest defendant. The evidence supports
their claims that they worked on this case regularly and periodically (at least every few months)
from the time of the January 30 fire until defendant’s arrest.
Defendant claims that the five-year “delay” before his arrest compromised his right to a
fair trial. First, defendant claims that the prearrest delay “erode[d] [his] ability to discover
exculpatory evidence and present it at trial” by precluding his arson investigator from
investigating the scene of the fire and forcing him to rely on photographs alone. However,
defendant fails to identify evidence that his arson investigator hoped to find at the scene that he
could not have garnered from the photographs. Further, defendant fails to explain if, and to what
extent, the remains of the burned house still existed or, alternately, the extent to which the
February 18 fire destroyed evidence integral to the investigation of the January 30 fire, hindering
the investigation for both parties. Because defendant failed to establish that he suffered
outcome-determinative prejudice because his arson investigator allegedly could not investigate
the burned home and that the investigator’s inability to investigate the burned home was a result
of the prearrest delay, he failed to establish the substantial prejudice needed to support his
allegation of a due process violation.
Defendant also alleged that the five-year prearrest delay gave the investigators the
opportunity to “attempt[] to mold witnesses’ memories to fit the preconceived notion,
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unsupported by the evidence, that Defendant was guilty.” Defendant alleged that the
investigators were “ultimately successful” at getting Devoid to change his testimony, and Devoid
testified at trial that defendant was at his house on February 18, 2000, just before the house again
caught on fire. However, the jury acquitted defendant of arson with respect to the February 18
fire, and defendant fails to explain how Devoid’s allegedly altered testimony affected the jury’s
determination that defendant was guilty of arson and felony murder with respect to the
January 30 fire. Accordingly, defendant failed to establish that the five-year delay affected the
outcome of the trial and denied him of his right to due process.
Affirmed.
/s/ Donald S. Owens
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Alton T. Davis
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