PEOPLE OF MI V JULINA ROSE HOWELL
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 20, 2007
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 271038
Kent Circuit Court
LC No. 05-007626-FH
JULINA ROSE HOWELL,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Murphy, P.J., and Smolenski and Meter, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from her jury trial convictions of assaulting, resisting, or
obstructing a police officer, MCL 750.81d(1), and assault and battery, MCL 750.81. The trial
court sentenced defendant to two days in jail and 18 months’ probation for both of her
convictions. We affirm.
On July 14, 2005, Deputies Kelly Vitton and Mandy Trevino parked in front of an
apartment complex in Grand Rapids, Michigan, after responding to a noise complaint involving
defendant’s daughter’s apartment. At approximately 2:00 a.m., Patricia Dalman arrived at the
complex with her friends, Kallyn Sheler and Lindy Lane. Sheler entered Dalman’s apartment,
while Dalman and Lane remained in the parking lot. When Sheler heard loud banging and
shouting outside the apartment, she telephoned Dalman. Dalman then reported the situation to
Deputies Vitton and Trevino, who agreed to follow Dalman back to the apartment. At that time,
Dalman telephoned Sheler and asked her to come outside. According to Sheler, as soon as she
exited the apartment, defendant approached her, grabbed her cellular telephone, and then
grabbed her face and pushed it away. Both Dalman and Lane observed defendant grab Sheler’s
telephone and strike her in the face.
Deputies Vitton and Trevino testified that, when they arrived at the apartment, Sheler
informed them that defendant assaulted her and took her telephone. The deputies subsequently
attempted to arrest defendant. Testimony indicated that defendant responded by yelling, calling
the deputies names, refusing to put her hands behind her back, and repeatedly kicking the
deputies. Deputy Vitton warned defendant four or five times that, if she failed to cooperate, the
deputies would use pepper spray on her. Because defendant continued to kick the deputies, and
then spit in Deputy Vitton’s face, Deputy Vitton sprayed defendant with pepper spray. After
defendant continued to struggle, the deputy sprayed her a second time.
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At trial, defendant testified that she did not touch Sheler and that Sheler gave her the
cellular telephone. Defendant further claimed that, when the deputies arrested her, she
cooperated with them fully. Additionally, four of defendant’s friends and relatives testified that
defendant acted appropriately during the arrest and that Deputy Vitton administered pepper spray
for no reason.
Defendant argues on appeal that she was denied her constitutional right to a unanimous
jury verdict because the trial court gave only a general unanimity instruction. Because defendant
did not request a special unanimity instruction at trial or object to the general unanimity
instruction given by the trial court, we review her claim of instructional error for plain error
affecting her substantial rights. People v Gonzalez, 468 Mich 636, 642-643; 664 NW2d 159
(2003). To obtain relief, defendant must demonstrate the existence of a “clear or obvious” error.
People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). Moreover, “[t]o avoid forfeiture
under the plain error rule, a defendant must show actual prejudice.” People v Pipes, 475 Mich
267, 274; 715 NW2d 290 (2006). The defendant bears the burden with respect to establishing
prejudice and must show that the error affected the outcome of the lower court proceedings.
Carines, surpa at 763. Additionally, reversal is only warranted if the error resulted in the
conviction of an actually innocent defendant or if the error seriously affected the fairness,
integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id. at 763-764.
Defendant was charged with one count of assault and battery upon Sheler and with one
count of assaulting, resisting, or obstructing Deputy Vitton while she performed her duties as a
police officer. Defendant claims that, because the prosecution presented more than one act as
evidence for each of the charged offenses, the trial court was required to give a special unanimity
instruction. We disagree. “A defendant has the right to a unanimous verdict and it is the duty of
the trial court to properly instruct the jury on this unanimity requirement.” People v Martin, 271
Mich App 280, 338; 721 NW2d 815 (2006). In most cases, a general unanimity instruction is
sufficient to protect the defendant’s right to a unanimous verdict. People v Cooks, 446 Mich
503, 524; 521 NW2d 275 (1994). A specific unanimity instruction is only required when there is
evidence of alternative acts allegedly committed by the defendant, each satisfying the actus reus
element of the charged offense, and
“1) the alternative acts are materially distinct (where the acts themselves are
conceptually distinct or where either party has offered materially distinct proofs
regarding one of the alternatives), or 2) there is reason to believe the jurors might
be confused or disagree about the factual basis of defendant’s guilt.” [Martin,
supra at 338, quoting Cooks, supra at 524.]
In the instant case, the acts surrounding each of the charged offenses occurred so closely
in time that they constituted single, continuous offenses against each of the victims. See Cooks,
supra at 519-529 (discussing the “continuing offense” exception to the need for a specific
unanimity instruction). Defendant committed a continuous series of assaultive acts against
Sheler and then a continuous series of assaultive, non-cooperative acts against Deputy Vitton.
Furthermore, defendant did not present materially distinct defense theories with regard to any of
these individual acts but merely maintained that she acted lawfully throughout the period in
question. The jurors simply had to decide whether to believe defendant and her supporting
witnesses or whether to believe the prosecutor’s witnesses. Additionally, there is no evidence
that the jury was confused about the factual basis for defendant’s guilt. Under the circumstances,
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we conclude that defendant has not met her burden of demonstrating a “clear or obvious” error
and resulting prejudice with regard to the court’s instructions or with regard to the prosecutor’s
unobjected-to statements regarding unanimity during opening arguments. Carines, supra at 763.
Defendant further argues on appeal that the prosecutor committed misconduct by stating,
during his closing argument, that an acquittal meant that Deputies Vitton and Trevino committed
a crime against defendant. Specifically, defendant claims that, in making this statement, the
prosecutor impermissibly shifted the burden of proof. We review defendant’s unpreserved claim
of prosecutorial misconduct under the plain error doctrine. Carines, supra at 763-764; People v
Ackerman, 257 Mich App 434, 448; 669 NW2d 818 (2003). Where a curative instruction could
have alleviated any prejudicial effect, reversal is not warranted. Ackerman, supra at 449; People
v Watson, 245 Mich App 572, 586; 629 NW2d 411 (2001).
The test for prosecutorial misconduct is whether the defendant was denied a fair and
impartial trial. Watson, supra at 586. Prosecutorial comments must be read as a whole and
evaluated in light of defense arguments and the relationship they bear to the evidence admitted at
trial. People v Brown, 267 Mich App 141, 152; 703 NW2d 230 (2005). A prosecutor must
never shift his burden to prove that a defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, People v
Rosales, 160 Mich App 304, 312; 408 NW2d 140 (1987), but he is free to comment on the
improbability of a defendant's theory, see People v Fields, 450 Mich 94, 115; 538 NW2d 356
(1995). A prosecutor may draw inferences from the testimony and argue that witnesses are not
worthy of belief. People v Buckey, 424 Mich 1, 14-15; 378 NW2d 432 (1985); People v
Thomas, 260 Mich App 450, 455; 678 NW2d 631 (2004).
Viewed in context, the prosecutor’s statement did not impermissibly shift the burden of
proof. Witnesses for the prosecution testified that defendant resisted arrest and that Deputy
Vitton used her pepper spray only after repeatedly warning defendant. On the other hand,
witnesses for the defense testified that defendant was fully cooperative during the arrest,
implying that the deputies acted inappropriately. During his closing argument, the prosecutor
highlighted this discrepancy. He argued that, because police officers generally do not administer
pepper spray without cause, defendant’s version of the arrest was highly unlikely. The
prosecutor’s closing remarks were not designed to shift the burden of proof to defendant.
Rather, his remarks constituted a permissible attack on the probability of defendant’s theory,
Fields, supra at 115, and on the defense witnesses’ credibility, Buckey, supra at 14-15; Thomas,
supra at 455. Moreover, the trial court cured any potential for error by instructing the jury, more
than once, that the lawyers’ statements and arguments were not evidence and that the prosecution
had the burden to prove each element of the charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt.
Therefore, defendant cannot establish that the prosecutor’s statement affected the outcome of the
trial, and reversal is not required. Carines, supra at 763.
Affirmed.
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
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