ALLEN PARK FIRE FIGHTERS ASS'N V CITY OF ALLEN PARK
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
ALLEN PARK FIRE FIGHTERS
ASSOCIATION, a/k/a LOCAL 1410 I.A.F.F., and
MELVINDALE PROFESSIONAL FIRE
FIGHTERS UNION, a/k/a LOCAL 1728 I.A.F.F.,
UNPUBLISHED
November 20, 2007
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v
No. 270713
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 06-608515-CL
CITY OF ALLEN PARK and CITY OF
MELVINDALE,
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Saad, P.J., and Cavanagh and Schuette, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs, Allen Park Fire Fighters Association (“APFFA”) and Melvindale Professional
Fire Fighters Union (“MPFFU”), appeal as of right from an order denying their request for a
preliminary injunction and dismissing their complaint in this labor dispute. We affirm.
I. FACTS
This case arises out of defendant City of Allen Park’s (“Allen Park”) and defendant City
of Melvindale’s (“Melvindale”) adoption of an Intergovernmental Fire and Emergency Service
Aid-Pact and Agreement (“the Pact”). Plaintiffs contend that because they had initiated
arbitration proceedings under MCL 423.231 et seq., commonly known as “Act 312,” before
defendants adopted the Pact, defendants were prevented from adopting the Pact or otherwise
changing the status quo between the parties during the pendency of the arbitration proceedings.
On March 22, 2006, plaintiffs filed suit against defendants, seeking to enjoin them from
implementing the Pact. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants violated MCL 423.243 of Act 312 by
adopting and implementing the Pact while plaintiffs’ petitions for Act 312 arbitration were
pending. Specifically, plaintiffs argued that the Pact changed the status quo between the parties
because the Pact only requires Allen Park to maintain a minimum of 24 firefighters and
Melvindale to maintain a minimum of 12 firefighters, while plaintiffs’ collective bargaining
agreements with defendants require Allen Park to maintain a minimum of 28 firefighters and
Melvindale to maintain a minimum of four employees for each shift (16 firefighters). Plaintiffs
also contended that the Pact adversely affects firefighter safety.
-1-
Defendants opposed plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief, and Melvindale moved to
dismiss plaintiffs’ claims under MCR 2.116(C)(4), (C)(8), and (C)(10). After oral arguments,
the trial court denied plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction and dismissed their
complaint. The trial court reasoned that there was no violation of Act 312 because the Pact did
not alter the status quo between the parties. Plaintiffs now appeal.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition. Spiek v
Dep’t of Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998); Willis v Deerfield Twp, 257
Mich App 541, 548; 669 NW2d 279 (2003). A motion for summary disposition under MCR
2.116(C)(10)1 is properly granted if no factual dispute exists, thus entitling the moving party to
judgment as a matter of law. Rice v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 252 Mich App 25, 31; 651 NW2d 188
(2002). In deciding a motion brought under subrule (C)(10), we consider all the evidence,
affidavits, pleadings, and admissions in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. at
30-31. The nonmoving party must present more than mere allegations to establish a genuine
issue of material fact for resolution at trial. Id. at 31.
We also review de novo issues of contract and statutory interpretation. Wilkie v AutoOwners Ins Co, 469 Mich 41, 47; 664 NW2d 776 (2003); Ford Motor Credit Co v Detroit, 254
Mich App 626, 628; 658 NW2d 180 (2003). “In interpreting a contract, our obligation is to
determine the intent of the contracting parties.” Quality Products & Concepts Co v Nagel
Precision, Inc, 469 Mich 362, 375; 666 NW2d 251 (2003). We must examine the language of
the contract and accord words their ordinary and plain meanings if such meanings are apparent.
Wilkie, supra at 47. If the language is unambiguous, we must interpret and enforce the contract
as written. Quality Products, supra at 375. Likewise, when interpreting a statute, our obligation
is to ascertain the legislative intent that may be inferred from the words of the statute. Koontz v
Ameritech Services, Inc, 466 Mich 304, 312; 645 NW2d 34 (2002). “When the Legislature has
unambiguously conveyed its intent in a statute, the statute speaks for itself, and judicial
construction is not permitted.” Id.
III. ANALYSIS
Section 2 of the public employment relations act (PERA), MCL 423.201 et seq., prohibits
public employees from striking. MCL 423.202; Jackson Fire Fighters Ass’n, Local 1306, IAFF,
AFL-CIO v City of Jackson (On Remand), 227 Mich App 520, 522; 575 NW2d 823 (1998).
Section 15 of the PERA requires public employers to bargain collectively with representatives of
1
It appears that the trial court granted summary disposition to defendants under MCR
2.116(C)(10). Although the trial court indicated on the record that plaintiffs’ complaint failed to
state a valid claim, it based its decision on its determination that the Pact does not affect the
contractual relationships between the parties. Additionally, the trial court relied on documentary
evidence outside the pleadings in rendering its decision. Driver v Hanley, 226 Mich App 558,
562; 575 NW2d 31 (1997).
-2-
employees regarding “wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment . . . .” MCL
423.215(1); Jackson Fire Fighters Ass’n, supra at 522. “Because ‘[c]ompulsory arbitration in
police and fire disputes was seen as a necessary tradeoff for the prohibition against striking,’ the
Legislature enacted the compulsory arbitration statute, [Act 312], MCL 423.231 et seq.”
Jackson Fire Fighters Ass’n, supra at 523, quoting Local 1277, Metropolitan Council No 23,
AFSCME, AFL-CIO v Center Line, 414 Mich 642, 650-651; 327 NW2d 822 (1982). Act 312
provides for compulsory arbitration of police and fire disputes regarding mandatory bargaining
subjects. City of Manistee v Employment Relations Comm, 168 Mich App 422, 426; 425 NW2d
168 (1988).
As our Supreme Court stated in Ottawa Co v Jaklinski, 423 Mich 1, 14; 377 NW2d 668
(1985),
[i]t is helpful to distinguish at the outset between “grievance” and “interest”
arbitration. The former involves arbitration of disputes arising under an existing
collective bargaining agreement; the latter involves arbitration of the terms to be
included in a new collective bargaining agreement after the parties have
negotiated to impasse. Binding interest arbitration is the statutory right of fire
fighters and police officers . . . and their public employers. [Act 312], MCL
423.231[.] [Emphasis in original.]
In other words, “the compulsory arbitration provided for in Act 312 is not available to
individuals with grievances regarding the interpretation of an existing or expired collective
bargaining agreement.” Id. at 15.
Plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that both the M-CBA and the AP-CBA had expired,
but continued to remain in effect until successor agreements are reached. Plaintiffs maintained
that the Pact permits defendants to violate the collective bargaining agreements by specifying
minimum personnel requirements at odds with those in the M-CBA and AP-CBA. Plaintiffs
further alleged that the Pact implicates firefighter safety, a mandatory subject of bargaining.
Violations of MCL 423.210, including the requirement that public employers bargain
collectively with the representatives of public employees, are deemed unfair labor practices.
MCL 423.210(1)(e); St Clair Intermediate School Dist v Intermediate Ed Ass’n, 458 Mich 540,
550; 581 NW2d 707 (1998). Under the PERA, proceedings related to an unfair labor practice
charge must be conducted before the Michigan Employment Relations Commission (MERC).
MCL 423.216(a); Bay City School Dist v Bay City Ed Ass’n, 425 Mich 426, 438-439; 390 NW2d
159 (1986). In fact, MCL 423.216 “vest[s] the MERC with exclusive jurisdiction over unfair
labor practices.” St Clair Intermediate School Dist, supra at 550.
Accordingly, to the extent that plaintiffs’ grievances pertain to the interpretation of their
existing, expired collective bargaining agreements, the MERC has exclusive jurisdiction over
such disputes. St Clair Intermediate School Dist, supra at 550; Ottawa Co, supra at 14-15.
Indeed, the trial court here expressly recognized the propriety of the grievance procedure to
plaintiffs’ claims. Thus, to the extent that plaintiffs’ complaint asserts a violation of Act 312
based on the interpretation of their existing collective bargaining agreements, dismissal under
MCR 2.116(C)(8) was proper.
-3-
Plaintiffs also argue that because they initiated Act 312 proceedings, defendants were
prohibited from adopting and implementing the Pact, or altering the status quo, during the
pendency of those proceedings. As previously stated, arbitration under Act 312 is available only
with respect to successor agreements and is not available for grievances regarding existing or
expired collective bargaining agreements. Ottawa Co, supra at 15.
MCL 423.233 provides:
Whenever in the course of mediation of a public police or fire department
employee’s dispute, except a dispute concerning the interpretation or application
of an existing agreement (a “grievance” dispute), the dispute has not been
resolved to the agreement of both parties within 30 days of the submission of the
dispute to mediation, or within such further additional periods to which the parties
may agree, the employees or employer may initiate binding arbitration
proceedings by prompt request therefor, in writing, to the other, with copy to the
employment relations commission.
In City of Manistee, supra at 426, 428, this Court interpreted this provision not to require goodfaith bargaining to impasse as a prerequisite to Act 312 arbitration. Rather, this Court stated that
“[t]he only prerequisites are those expressly stated in [MCL 423.233] of Act 312,” id. at 428,
which this Court identified as “unsuccessful mediation on an unresolved dispute and a written
request for arbitration by either party,” id. at 426.
Although plaintiffs filed Act 312 proceedings, there is no indication that they first
submitted their dispute to mediation as required under MCL 423.233. Rather, it appears that
plaintiffs filed their Act 312 petitions merely in an attempt to prevent defendants from adopting
the Pact. Under MCL 423.233, plaintiffs were authorized to initiate Act 312 proceedings only
after their dispute failed to be resolved within 30 days after submission to mediation. The record
is devoid of any reference to mediation, and it instead appears that plaintiffs filed Act 312
petitions in an attempt merely to prevent defendants’ adoption of the Pact, which was being
negotiated and discussed at the time that plaintiffs filed their petitions. It does not appear that
plaintiffs had a genuine dispute regarding the terms to be included in successor bargaining
agreements, which Act 312 arbitration was intended to resolve. MCL 423.233; Ottawa Co,
supra at 14-15. Therefore, because plaintiffs apparently failed to satisfy the prerequisites for Act
312 arbitration as provided by MCL 423.233, we question whether they properly initiated Act
312 proceedings.
But even if plaintiffs did properly initiate Act 312 proceedings, the trial court did not err
in granting summary disposition for defendants because the Pact did not alter the status quo
between the parties. Section 13 of Act 312, MCL 423.243, provides:
During the pendency of proceedings before the arbitration panel, existing
wages, hours and other conditions of employment shall not be changed by action
of either party without the consent of the other but a party may so consent without
prejudice to his rights or position under this act.
Allen Park argues that preservation of the status quo was not required at the time that defendants
adopted the pact because there were no proceedings before the arbitration panel. Allen Park
-4-
contends that there was no arbitration panel and no list of arbitrators when the Pact was adopted.
While the language of the statute may suggest that MCL 423.243 requires that an arbitration
panel be in place before the requirement of preservation of the status quo takes effect, our
Supreme Court has interpreted this section as requiring the maintenance of the status quo upon
the mere “invocation” of Act 312 proceedings. See Ottawa Co, supra at 14.
MCL 423.243 requires that the status quo with respect to “existing wages, hours and
other conditions of employment” be maintained during the pendency of proceedings. Plaintiffs
contend that the Pact alters the firefighters’ conditions of employment. “In determining whether
an employer’s unilateral action affects a condition of employment within MCL 423.243, this
Court considers cases [that] define mandatory subjects of collective bargaining.” Detroit Police
Officers Ass’n v Detroit, 142 Mich App 248, 251-252; 369 NW2d 480 (1985). Plaintiffs argue
that firefighter safety is a mandatory subject of bargaining and that the Pact implicates firefighter
safety. Plaintiffs also argue that the Pact provides for manpower reductions that would alter the
terms of their collective bargaining agreements.
The Pact provides that Allen Park “shall maintain not less than twenty-four (24) full-time
Firefighters” and that Melvindale “shall maintain not less than twelve (12) full-time Firefighters .
. . .” Contrary to plaintiffs’ argument, these provisions do not alter the terms of the collective
bargaining agreements. The Allen Park collective bargaining agreement provides for a minimum
of 28 personnel in the fire suppression division while in the “Advance transporting service” and
a minimum of 26 personnel while transporting. Although the minimum number of personnel
required by the Allen Park collective bargaining agreement is higher than that stated in the Pact,
it is not inconsistent with the Pact’s requirement of not less than 24 firefighters. Similarly, the
Melvindale collective bargaining agreement provides that each shift will be manned by a
minimum of four employees. This provision is not inconsistent with the Pact’s requirement that
Melvindale maintain not less than 12 full-time firefighters. Therefore, plaintiffs’ arguments
regarding manpower reductions are unavailing.
Plaintiffs also contend that the Pact implicates firefighter safety. This Court has held that
safety practices constitute a condition of employment. City of Alpena v Alpena Fire Fighters
Ass’n, AFL-CIO, 56 Mich App 568, 575; 224 NW2d 672 (1974), overruled in part on other
grounds Detroit v Detroit Police Officers Ass’n, 408 Mich 410, 483 n 65; 294 NW2d 68 (1980).
Defendants’ entering into the Pact did not alter firefighters’ conditions of employment, however,
because the terms of both collective bargaining agreements permitted defendants to enter into
mutual aid agreements. Specifically, Article 28 of the Melvindale collective bargaining
agreement, entitled “Mutual Aid Agreement,” provides:
It is agreed that the City has the right to enter into aid pacts or agreements
with other communities, but that the City shall not use such a mutual agreement to
furnish manpower to another community in what would amount to a strike
breaking situation in the other community, provided, however, an actual
emergency must be handled by the Department.
A strike breaking situation shall be defined to mean that collective
bargaining efforts and negotiations have been discontinued or terminated.
-5-
Therefore, the Melvindale collective bargaining agreement explicitly allows Melvindale to enter
into mutual aid agreements such as the Pact and contemplates that Melvindale will furnish
manpower to other communities. There is no allegation of a strike situation existing in Allen
Park. Accordingly, Melvindale did not violate the status quo between the parties by entering into
the Pact.
Unlike the Melvindale collective bargaining agreement, the Allen Park collective
bargaining agreement does not explicitly refer to mutual aid agreements. However, Art III, § 3
of the Allen Park collective bargaining agreement implicitly authorizes Allen Park to enter into
such agreements and provides as follows:
A.
The Union recognized other rights and responsibilities belonging
solely to the City, prominent among which, but by no means wholly inclusive, are
the rights to determine the location and number of stations, the manner in which
the stations are to be operated, the equipment to be used, the manner in which
work is to be performed, and the number and type of personnel to be employed,
and the assignment of their duties.
B.
The Union recognizes the right of the City to make such
reasonable rules and regulations, not in conflict with this Agreement, as it may
from time to time deem best for the purpose of maintaining order, safety, and/or
effective operation of the City’s Fire Department and to require compliance
therewith by the employees is recognized. The Union reserves the right to
question the reasonableness of the City’s rules or regulations through the
grievance procedure. [Emphasis added.]
Thus, Allen Park specifically reserved to itself the rights to determine the equipment that the
firefighters use, the manner in which firefighters perform their work, and the assignment of their
duties. Further, Allen Park reserved to itself the right to make rules and regulations not in
conflict with the Allen Park collective bargaining agreement. Other than the manpower
provision discussed previously, plaintiffs fail to identify any provision of the Allen Park
collective bargaining agreement that the Pact offends. The primary procedure implemented by
the Pact requires that both defendants be notified of a situation in the other city and provide
initial response to the other city. Thus, the Pact involves the manner in which work is to be
performed and the assignment of firefighters’ duties, which Allen Park specifically reserved to
itself the rights to determine. Accordingly, defendants’ adoption of the Pact did not alter the
status quo between the parties, and the trial court did not err in failing to hold an evidentiary
hearing or in granting summary disposition for defendants.
Affirmed.
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Bill Schuette
-6-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.