PEOPLE OF MI V ANTHONY JUNIOR JOHNSON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 15, 2007
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 272823
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 02-011051-01
ANTHONY JUNIOR JOHNSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Wilder, P.J., and Cavanagh and Fort Hood, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted of second-degree murder, MCL 750.317, two counts of assault
with a dangerous weapon, MCL 750.82, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a
felony, MCL 750.227b. He was sentenced to 450 to 720 months’ imprisonment for the seconddegree murder conviction, two to four years’ imprisonment for the felonious assault convictions,
and two years’ imprisonment for the felony-firearm conviction. Defendant appeals as of right.
We affirm.
Defendant was convicted by a jury in his first trial on December 16, 2002, of first-degree
murder, MCL 750.316, two counts of felonious assault, and felony-firearm. He appealed his
convictions, and this Court reversed and remanded based on the trial court’s error in “requiring
defendant to choose between jury instructions on lesser included offenses and an alibi defense on
the ground that they were inconsistent theories.” People v Johnson, unpublished opinion per
curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued October 14, 2004 (Docket No. 246937). The instant
appeal was filed after defendant’s second trial in 2006.
Defendant argues on appeal that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress
his confession. We disagree. This Court reviews a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress de
novo. People v Van Tubbergen, 249 Mich App 354, 359-360; 642 NW2d 368 (2002). The trial
court’s factual findings are reviewed for clear error, “giving deference to the trial court’s
resolution of factual issues.” People v Bolduc, 263 Mich App 430, 436; 688 NW2d 316 (2004).
“A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if, after a review of the entire record, an appellate court is
left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Id. (quoting People v
Swirles (After Remand), 218 Mich App 133, 136; 553 NW2d 357 (1996)).
On appeal, the prosecution concedes that police violated defendant’s Fourth Amendment
rights by arresting him without probable cause. Therefore, the issue is whether police obtained
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defendant’s confession as the result of the unlawful arrest. Whether evidence should be
suppressed after an unlawful arrest is analyzed under Wong Sun v United States, 371 US 471,
487-488; 83 S Ct 407; 9 L Ed 2d 441 (1963), and, in particular, whether a confession should be
suppressed after an unlawful arrest is analyzed under Brown v Illinois, 422 US 590, 603; 95 S Ct
2254; 45 L Ed 2d 416 (1975). See People v Mallory, 421 Mich 229, 243 n 8; 365 NW2d 673
(1984).
Under Wong Sun, the question a court must ask is “whether, granting establishment of the
primary illegality, the evidence to which the instant objection is made has been come at by
exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the
primary taint.” Wong Sun, supra at 487-488. Brown further holds that Miranda1 warnings do
not always break the causal connection between an unlawful arrest and subsequent confession.
Brown, supra at 603. The Brown Court opined that no single fact is dispositive, and the facts of
each case must be considered when determining whether a confession obtained after an illegal
arrest should be suppressed. Id. Under the factors delineated in Brown, a court should consider
whether Miranda warnings were given, the “temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession,
the presence of intervening circumstances, and, particularly the purpose and flagrancy of the
official misconduct.” Id. at 603-604 (internal citations omitted). Intervening circumstances
break the causal connection where police have “uncovered evidence sufficient to establish
probable cause to arrest the defendant before the challenged custodial statement was given.”
People v Kelly, 231 Mich App 627, 635; 588 NW2d 480 (1998).
Defendant was arrested at 4:00 a.m. and gave the statement at issue to the officer in
charge, Barbara Simon, sometime after 12:30 p.m. the same day, for an elapsed time of eight and
one-half hours between his arrest and confession. He was given his Miranda warnings. The
record was not sufficient to determine whether Simon knew that defendant’s cousin, J.B. Brown,
gave a statement that implicated defendant such that probable cause was established before she
started her interview of defendant. Last, given that the trial court found that police had probable
cause to arrest defendant and there were no complaints of any flagrant police conduct, we
conclude that the police acted in good faith. Consequently, defendant’s confession was
sufficiently attenuated from the unlawful arrest such that it was purged of the taint of the
unlawful arrest, and therefore, the trial court did not err by denying defendant’s motion to
suppress his confession.
We note that the trial court did not analyze the issue under Wong Sun and Brown since it
found that the arrest was lawful. However, as in Brown, the record was sufficient for this Court
to make a determination of whether the confession was admissible, making a remand for further
factual findings unnecessary. See Brown, supra at 604.
Defendant further argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress
evidence of the gun, which he asserts was obtained through an illegal search. We disagree.
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Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 536; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966).
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The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizure. US Const,
Am IV; People v Cartwright, 454 Mich 550, 557-558; 563 NW2d 208 (1997). A warrantless
search of a dwelling or surrounding property, where a citizen has a reasonable expectation of
privacy, is generally unreasonable absent specific exigent circumstances. Id. at 558; People v
Taylor, 253 Mich App 399, 404; 655 NW2d 291 (2002). The “exigent circumstances” exception
to the Fourth Amendment allows warrantless searches to prevent the imminent destruction of
evidence, protect the police officer or others, or prevent the escape of a suspect, as long as police
have probable cause to believe that a crime recently was committed on the premises, or that they
will find evidence or the person who committed the suspected crime. Cartwright, supra at 558559. Additionally, police can remain on a crime scene for a reasonable time without a warrant
in order to investigate a crime. Michigan v Tyler, 436 US 499, 510-511; 98 S Ct 1942; 56 L Ed
2d 486 (1978) (“[O]fficials need no warrant to remain in a building for a reasonable time to
investigate the cause of a blaze after it has been extinguished.”).
According to defendant, since Officer Brett Riccinto remained on the scene waiting for a
tow truck to tow a car suspected to be involved in an unrelated crime, Riccinto was not legally
on the premises beyond the time it took to investigate the firebombing. However, Riccinto stated
that, in addition to waiting for a tow truck, he was finishing up paperwork. Thus, Riccinto was
completing his investigation and was lawfully permitted to be on the premises until his
investigation was completed.
Riccinto followed Brown onto defendant’s property because he was concerned that
Brown might tamper with the car in defendant’s driveway, thus the exigent circumstance
exception of preventing imminent destruction of evidence was applicable. Defendant argues that
Riccinto should have departed from the premises once he saw that Brown walked past the car
without doing anything to it. However, assuming no one could enter the house because of the
fire, Riccinto would have been suspicious of Brown’s presence anywhere on the property, and if
Riccinto would have walked back to his scout car at that point and left Brown behind the house,
Brown could have approached the car in the dark without being observed.
Defendant further argues that Riccinto did not have an expectation that following Brown
onto defendant’s property would reveal incriminating evidence. Defendant contends that without
a belief that an immediate search will produce specific evidence of a crime, the exigent
circumstances exception remains inapplicable to justify an entry onto a citizen’s property. See
People v Jordan, 187 Mich App 582, 586-587; 468 NW2d 294 (1991) (“Generally, a search
conducted without a warrant is unreasonable unless there exists both probable cause and exigent
circumstances establishing an exception to the warrant requirement.”) However, the firebombed
house and the car with bullet holes in it already gave Riccinto “probable cause to believe that a
crime recently was committed on the premises.” Therefore, Riccinto was lawfully on
defendant’s property because of an exigent circumstance and the gun was in plain view. We
hold that the court did not err by denying defendant’s motion to suppress evidence of the gun.
Defendant next argues that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the gun into
evidence when there was only nominal evidence linking the gun to the shooting. We disagree.
This Court reviews preserved evidentiary issues for an abuse of discretion. People v Katt, 468
Mich 272, 278; 662 NW2d 12 (2003). A trial court abuses its discretion when it chooses an
outcome that is outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes. People v Babcock, 469
Mich 247, 269; 666 NW2d 231 (2003).
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Defendant quotes from People v Burrell, 21 Mich App 451, 456-457; 175 NW2d 513
(1970), where this Court stated:
To justify admission, a proper foundation must be laid, and such articles must be
identified as the articles they are purported to be, and shown to be connected with
the crime or with the accused; however, such identification is not required to be
positive, absolute, certain, or wholly unqualified, and where there is some
evidence for this purpose, objections to its sufficiency go to the weight rather than
the admissibility of the articles in question.
In the instant case, the gun was recovered from defendant’s property, and therefore, is
connected to defendant. Additionally, both the recovered gun and the gun used to kill Bishop
had lasers. Thus, defendant’s objections regard the weight rather than the admissibility of the
gun. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the gun into evidence.
Defendant’s next claim on appeal is that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel
because his counsel conceded that defendant made the inculpatory statement admitting to the
shooting. We disagree. When reviewing an unpreserved claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, this Court’s review is limited to mistakes apparent on the record. People v Rodriguez,
251 Mich App 10, 38; 650 NW2d 96 (2002). A trial court’s factual findings are reviewed for
clear error, while its constitutional determinations are reviewed de novo. People v LeBlanc, 465
Mich 575, 579; 640 NW2d 246 (2002).
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that counsel’s
performance was below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional
norms, and that this performance was so prejudicial that it denied the defendant a fair trial.
People v Toma, 462 Mich 281, 302; 613 NW2d 694 (2000) (quoting Strickland v Washington,
466 US 668, 687; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984)). A defendant must overcome the
strong presumption that his counsel was effective and engaged in sound trial strategy. Id.;
People v Matuszak, 263 Mich App 42, 58; 687 NW2d 342 (2004). “This Court will not
substitute its judgment for that of counsel regarding matters of trial strategy, nor will it assess
counsel's competence with the benefit of hindsight.” People v Garza, 246 Mich App 251, 255;
631 NW2d 764 (2001).
Defendant relies on Earl Wiley v Sowders, 647 F2d 642, 650 (CA 6, 1981), for the
proposition that “in the “rare cases” where counsel thinks it is advisable to admit his client’s
guilt, “the client’s knowing consent to such trial strategy must appear outside the presence of the
jury on the trial record.” However, when Earl Wiley’s brother Elmer appealed, the Sixth Circuit
concluded, “[A]n on-the-record inquiry by the trial court to determine whether a criminal
defendant has consented to an admission of guilt during closing arguments represents the
preferred practice. But we did not hold in [Earl] Wiley, and we do not now hold, that due
process requires such a practice.” Elmer Wiley v Sowders, 669 F2d 386, 389 (CA 6, 1982).
This Court opined in People v Wise, 134 Mich App 82, 97; 351 NW2d 255 (1984), “Even
if the evidence is overwhelming, defense counsel will often not be allowed to argue the
functional equivalent of a guilty plea to the highest possible charges absent any evidence on the
record that defendant consented to this tactic.” (Emphasis added.) This Court held that “arguing
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that the defendant is merely guilty of the lesser offense is not ineffective assistance of counsel.”
Id. at 98.
Here, there was nothing on the record indicating that defendant consented to his counsel’s
tactic. Counsel stated on the record that he thought the best strategy would be to ask for a
conviction on the lesser offenses of second-degree murder or involuntary manslaughter rather
than risk a conviction of first-degree murder. Defense counsel stated on the record that
defendant was convicted of first-degree murder in his first trial, one of the alibi witnesses could
not place defendant away from the scene of the murder, and defendant gave an inculpatory
statement to police.
Therefore, an alibi defense was foreclosed, and defense counsel was conceding the
inevitable by agreeing that defendant gave an inculpatory statement. Simon testified that
defendant gave a statement and defendant’s signed statement was admitted into evidence. By
defense counsel agreeing that defendant gave the statement, he was also buttressing his lesser
offense argument because, in the statement defendant gave Simon, defendant explained that he
just “started shooting.” He stated, “I was – I was just shooting. I didn’t mean for anyone to get
hurt. I’m sorry.” Such statements would make a finding of premeditation and deliberation less
probable. Consequently, defendant has not overcome the presumption that his counsel engaged
in sound trial strategy, and therefore, defendant was not denied the effective assistance of
counsel.
Defendant’s last argument on appeal is that the prosecution failed to meet its burden of
showing that reasonable, good-faith efforts were made to locate witnesses James Robinson and
Eugene Fisher. We disagree. This Court reviews a trial court’s determination to admit evidence
for an abuse of discretion and its findings of due diligence for clear error. People v Adams, 233
Mich App 652, 656; 592 NW2d 794 (1999); People v Briseno, 211 Mich App 11, 14; 535 NW2d
559 (1995). A trial court abuses its discretion when it chooses an outcome that is outside the
range of reasonable and principled outcomes. Babcock, supra at 269.
Prior recorded testimony is admissible under MRE 804(b)(1) if a witness gave testimony
in a former proceeding and the party against whom the testimony is now offered had an
opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony, and the witness is unavailable. People
v Meredith, 459 Mich 62, 66-67; 586 NW2d 538 (1998). A witness is unavailable under MRE
804(a)(5) if the proponent of the testimony has been unable to procure the witness’s attendance
by reasonable means and has shown due diligence to locate the witness. People v Bean, 457
Mich 677, 684; 580 NW2d 390 (1998). “The test is one of reasonableness and depends on the
facts and circumstances of each case.” Id.
The record in the instant case does not indicate that Robinson and Fisher were difficult to
locate for the first trial, and the prosecutor did not have reason to know in advance that they
would be difficult to locate. The police only learned of Fisher’s reluctance to come to court
when they initially attempted to locate him for the second trial. The prosecution started its
efforts to locate both witnesses approximately one month before the second trial, and the police
efforts to locate them were reasonable and in good faith. Simon served subpoenas on individuals
in the witnesses’ households. Simon placed follow up calls to both witnesses’ homes and visited
the witnesses’ homes on two occasions while she was working the midnight shift. Consequently,
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the court did not err by finding due diligence, and it did not abuse its discretion by allowing the
prior testimony of Fisher and Robinson to be read to the jury.
Affirmed.
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
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