PEOPLE OF MI V DAVID MAURICE JONES
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 15, 2007
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 270895
Muskegon Circuit Court
LC No. 06-052888-FH
DAVID MAURICE JONES,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Murphy, P.J., and Smolenski and Meter, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a bench trial, defendant was convicted of possession with intent to deliver 450
grams or more, but less than 1000 grams, of cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(ii), and possession of
a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b. We affirm.
On appeal, defendant first argues that the trial court erred in ruling that defendant
possessed a firearm during the commission of a felony without finding that he controlled or had
the right to control a firearm. We disagree.
This Court reviews de novo a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence in a bench trial,
examining the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether the
trial court could have found that the essential elements of the crime were proved beyond a
reasonable doubt. People v Wilkens, 267 Mich App 728, 738; 705 NW2d 728 (2005). We
review the trial court's factual findings in a bench trial for clear error. People v Lanzo Constr Co,
272 Mich App 470, 473; 726 NW2d 746 (2005). Further, in reviewing whether a trial court’s
factual findings are sufficient to support a conviction, we must determine whether the trial court
was aware of the factual issues and correctly applied the law to the facts. People v Vaughn, 186
Mich App 376, 384; 465 NW2d 365 (1990).
Possession of a firearm may be actual or constructive, and it may also be joint or
exclusive. People v Hill, 433 Mich 464, 470; 446 NW2d 140 (1989). A person has constructive
possession of a firearm if there is proximity to the firearm and an indicia of control, or, stated
otherwise, constructive possession exists when the location of the weapon is known and it is
reasonably accessible to the defendant. People v Burgenmeyer, 461 Mich 431, 438; 606 NW2d
645 (2000), quoting Hill, supra at 470-471.
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The evidence reflected that defendant completed a drug transaction with an undercover
detective, exchanging approximately two ounces of cocaine for $1,200.1 Defendant was
subsequently apprehended in the rear of his residence, near the kitchen and a back stairway
leading to the basement. In the basement, the money from the drug transaction and a firearm
were recovered. The money and firearm were within six feet of each other. In the front room of
the residence, the police recovered more than 450 grams of cocaine. Also, in the front room in a
drawer of a small table, there were two other firearms, defendant’s old driver’s license, and a
piece of mail addressed to defendant at that residence. Further, there was testimony that
defendant obtained firearms for himself and his associate and that defendant always took a
firearm when conducting drug sales in hotel rooms.
The trial court found that the multiple firearms were constructively possessed by
defendant on the basis of the facts and law recited above. The court specifically stated that the
firearms were readily accessible to defendant. It is clear from the language in Burgenmeyer and
Hill that the indicia of control mentioned therein is satisfied by a showing that the defendant
knew the location of the firearm and that the firearm was readily or reasonably accessible to the
defendant. Under the facts presented at trial, there was sufficient evidence to support the felonyfirearm conviction, and there was no clear error in the court’s finding that defendant possessed
firearms during the commission of a felony. Moreover, the record reveals that the trial court was
aware of the factual issues and correctly applied the law to the facts.
Next, defendant raises several issues in his standard 4 supplemental brief, all of which
lack merit. First, defendant argues that his waiver of a jury trial in favor of a bench trial was
coerced because he was under the impression that he would be forced to wear prison garb,
shackles, and handcuffs in front of the jury, which would prejudice his defense. We have
reviewed the colloquy between the trial court and defendant in which defendant waived his right
to a jury trial, and the discussion reflects that the court clearly and carefully explained to
defendant his rights. The record indicates that defendant voluntarily and knowingly waived his
right to a jury trial and that the court complied with MCR 6.401, MCR 6.402(B), and MCL
763.3. The trial court’s determination that defendant validly waived his right to a jury trial was
not clearly erroneous. People v Leonard, 224 Mich App 569, 595; 569 NW2d 663 (1997).
There is no indication whatsoever in the transcript of the proceedings that defendant was coerced
or that defendant was under the impression that he would be made to wear prison attire, shackles,
and handcuffs during a jury trial. If defendant indeed did have that impression, as claimed in his
self-serving affidavit attached to his appellate brief, he had every opportunity to mention the
issue to the trial court, which, according to the transcript, was polite and patient in addressing
defendant’s waiver.2 Moreover, defendant has not cited any authority in support of his
1
There was evidence of multiple drug transactions between defendant and the undercover
detective.
2
We note that the file includes an “advice of rights” form that was signed by defendant, and the
form informs defendant that at trial he is presumed innocent and that if he has any questions
about his rights he can ask the judge. We further note that defendant’s cursory affidavit makes
no assertion that anyone told him that he would have to wear prison garb, shackles, and
handcuffs during a jury trial.
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argument. See People v Kelly, 231 Mich App 627, 640-641; 588 NW2d 480 (1998). Reversal is
unwarranted. With respect to defendant’s accompanying argument that counsel was ineffective
for failing to explain to him his right to be free from restraints during a jury trial, the record lacks
any rational basis to find that counsel’s performance was deficient. See People v Carbin, 463
Mich 590, 599-600; 623 NW2d 884 (2001); People v Williams, 223 Mich App 409, 414; 566
NW2d 649 (1997).3
Defendant next argues that he was deprived of a fair trial when testimony was improperly
elicited regarding a prior consistent statement made by the prosecution’s chief witness at the
preliminary examination relative to evidence concerning a statement made by defendant to the
witness that defendant had 17 ounces of cocaine. The witness is a detective who was working
undercover when defendant made the statement about the cocaine. The detective forgot to
include the conversation about the 17 ounces of cocaine in his police report, yet he was adamant
at trial that the conversation took place, and the prosecution attempted to bolster that testimony
by eliciting evidence that the detective testified at the preliminary examination in a manner
consistent with his trial testimony. Assuming, without deciding, that the trial court erred in
allowing the testimony or that the prosecution acted in bad faith in eliciting the testimony, see
People v Noble, 238 Mich App 647, 660; 608 NW2d 123 (1999), reversal is unwarranted
because any presumed error was harmless, MCL 769.26; People v Lukity, 460 Mich 484, 495;
596 NW2d 607 (1999). The detective was unequivocal in his position that defendant stated that
he had 17 ounces of cocaine, regardless of the omission in the police report, and the trial court, in
making a credibility determination, chose to believe the detective as to his testimony about
defendant’s statement and his testimony regarding why it was left out of the police report. The
detective’s testimony at the preliminary examination clearly had no bearing on the court’s
findings.4 Additionally, and importantly, another detective heard defendant’s admission about
the 17 ounces of cocaine and testified to the matter at trial. There was no prejudice to defendant,
and for this same reason, defendant’s accompanying argument of ineffective assistance of
counsel, which requires a showing of prejudice, also fails. Carbin, supra at 599-600.
Finally, defendant argues that he was denied a fair trial when the trial court admitted
inaudible audiotape recordings. Defendant failed to provide us with the audiotape recordings or
transcripts. As the appellant below, defendant bore the burden of furnishing the reviewing court
with a record to verify the factual basis of any argument upon which reversal was predicated.
People v Elston, 462 Mich 751, 762; 614 NW2d 595 (2000). Moreover, defendant’s argument
that the audiotape recordings were inaudible is self-serving and speculative. There is no
3
We note that defendant’s affidavit lacks any claim that he even bothered to ask his attorney
about restraints and attire at a jury trial.
4
As noted by this Court in People v Taylor, 245 Mich App 293, 305; 628 NW2d 55 (2001),
judges, unlike jurors, possess “an understanding of the law which allows [them] to ignore
[evidentiary] errors and to decide a case based solely on the evidence properly admitted at trial.”
To the extent that defendant is also arguing error on the basis that he was tried by the trial judge
in prison attire, shackles, and handcuffs, the distinction in Taylor between bench and jury trials
supports affirmance as the trial court understood the presumption of innocence and gave no
weight or consideration to defendant’s attire and restraints.
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indication in the record that the trial court was troubled by any sound quality issues. Further, the
subjects of the recordings, defendant and the detective discussed above, both testified at trial. As
the trier of fact, the trial court was able to pose questions to both witnesses. Additionally, the
trial court did not reference the recordings in its ruling. Reversal is unwarranted. Moreover,
defendant’s accompanying claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on this issue lacks merit for
failure to show deficient performance and prejudice. Carbin, supra at 599-600.
Affirmed.
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
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