PEOPLE OF TWP OF CLAY V NELSON EDWARD TEMPLETON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE TOWNSHIP OF CLAY,
UNPUBLISHED
November 13, 2007
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 271082
St. Clair Circuit Court
LC No. 04-003061-CZ
NELSON EDWARD TEMPLETON, SAINT
EDWARDS ORDER, and GLENN PATRICK
TEMPLETON,
Defendants-Appellants.
Before: Talbot, P.J., and Fitzgerald and Kelly, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendants appeal as of right from a circuit court order denying their motion for attorney
fees and costs under the Right to Farm Act (“RTFA”), MCL 286.471 et seq. We affirm.
The RTFA allows a trial court to award attorney fees and costs to a farm or farm
operation that prevails in a nuisance action. MCL 286.473b provides:
In any nuisance action brought in which a farm or farm operation is
alleged to be a nuisance, if the defendant farm or farm operation prevails, the
farm or farm operation may recover from the plaintiff the actual amount of costs
and expenses determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the
farm or farm operation in connection with the defense of the action, together with
reasonable and actual attorney fees. [Emphases added.]
Thus, a farm or farm operation that prevails is not automatically entitled to attorney fees and
costs. Rather, it is within the trial court’s discretion whether to award such fees and costs.
Accordingly, we review the trial court’s decision for an abuse of discretion. Windemere
Commons I Ass’n v O’Brien, 269 Mich App 681, 682; 713 NW2d 814 (2006). The abuse of
discretion standard acknowledges that there may be more than one reasonable and principled
outcome. Maldonado v Ford Motor Co, 476 Mich 372, 388; 719 NW2d 809 (2006); People v
Babcock, 469 Mich 247, 269; 666 NW2d 231 (2003). An abuse of discretion occurs when the
trial court’s decision is outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes. Maldonado,
supra at 388; Babcock, supra at 269.
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The term “prevails” is not defined in the RTFA and thus must be accorded its plain and
ordinary meaning. Koontz v Ameritech Services, Inc, 466 Mich 304, 312; 645 NW2d 34 (2002).
Although plaintiff and the trial court applied the definition of “prevailing party” articulated in
MCL 600.2591(3)(b), that definition applies to actions or defenses deemed frivolous, and the
Legislature specifically stated that that definition applies as that term is used in that section, i.e.,
§ 2591. Accordingly, the definition of “prevailing party” in MCL 600.2591(3)(b) does not apply
in the context of the RTFA. Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (2001) defines
“prevail” as “to succeed; become dominant; win out.” Because defendants succeeded in
obtaining a dismissal of plaintiff’s nuisance action, they arguably prevailed according to the
plain meaning of that term.
Nonetheless, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendants’ motion for
attorney fees and costs. As the trial court noted, the parties reached a resolution pursuant to
which plaintiff agreed to dismiss the action if defendants’ application for a farmland and open
spaces agreement was approved. Thus, the parties agreed to resolve their dispute in lieu of trial.
Contrary to what defendants argue, it does not appear that plaintiff brought this action merely to
harass defendants. Plaintiff’s contention that the RTFA did not apply to the property appears
well founded. Although tax records listed the property as “agricultural,” this designation does
not necessarily mean that the property was used for farming. Further, defendant Nelson
Templeton’s income tax returns did not reflect any income or loss from farming activities until
he filed an amended 2004 tax return, which was after plaintiff commenced this action. In
addition, defendants’ agreement to use the property for farming for the next ten years pursuant to
the farmland and open spaces agreement did not suggest that the land was used for farming
previously.
Defendants argue that the trial court was biased against them because it commented on
the history of the case, including defendant Nelson’s in propria persona representation. The
court’s comments, however, were not a criticism of the fact that Nelson represented himself, but
rather, remarked on Nelson’s apparent attempt to mislead plaintiff regarding the owner of the
property. After the show cause hearing on January 10, 2005, the trial court allowed plaintiff to
amend its complaint to add Saint Edwards Order and Glenn Patrick Templeton as defendants in
accordance with Nelson’s representations at the hearing. Thereafter, however, Nelson admitted
in his motion for summary disposition that he is the owner and resident of the property.
Therefore, defendant’s, and in particular, Nelson’s, representations regarding the ownership of
the property were unclear at best.
Further, defendants argue that the trial court applied the incorrect standard in deciding
their motion for attorney fees. They assert that the court should have applied the factors
enunciated in O’Neill v Home IV Care, Inc, 249 Mich App 606, 613; 643 NW2d 600 (2002), for
determining an attorney fee award. Defendants’ argument is misplaced because the factors
discussed in O’Neill pertain to determining the reasonable amount of fees to be awarded. Here,
because the court did not award attorney fees, there was no need to consider the factors for
determining the reasonableness of an award.
Finally, defendants contend that the trial court failed to consider the remedial intent of the
RTFA and failed to take into account plaintiff’s conduct. As previously discussed, plaintiff’s
position that the RTFA did not apply appears well founded, and in fact the trial court denied
defendants’ motion for summary disposition after finding that material issues of fact existed.
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Accordingly, the trial court’s denial of defendants’ motion for attorney fees and costs was not
outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes and reversal is not warranted.
Maldonado, supra at 388; Babcock, supra at 269.
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
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