PEOPLE OF MI V ANITA N SYKES DDS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 13, 2007
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 270039
Ingham Circuit Court
LC No. 05-000381-FH
PLYMOUTH ROAD DENTAL, P.C.,
Defendant-Appellee.
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 270040
Ingham Circuit Court
LC No. 05-000382-FH
ANITA N. SYKES, D.D.S.,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Talbot, P.J., and Fitzgerald and Kelly, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In these consolidated cases, plaintiff appeals as of right the circuit court’s order granting
defendants’ motion to quash the information resulting in the dismissal of 16 charges of Medicaid
fraud, MCL 400.607(1). We affirm the dismissal of the one count that plaintiff does not
challenge and reverse and remand this case for trial on the remaining charges.
Defendants, Plymouth Road Dental, P.C. and Anita N. Sykes, D.D.S., were initially
accused in separate complaints of 22 counts of Medicaid fraud, MCL 400.607(1). The counts in
each complaint were identical for each defendant. Defendants were bound over for trial on 16
counts of Medicaid fraud by the district court following the conclusion of the preliminary
examination.1 At the preliminary examination, the office manager of Plymouth Road Dental,
1
Of the initial 22 counts of fraud, plaintiff dismissed six counts and did not seek a bind over on
one count. On appeal, plaintiff concurs that count 10 should not have been bound over to the
(continued…)
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Lisa Chiselom, testified regarding the billing process and the manner for recording services by
Sykes and other dentists in the practice, which entailed the dentist writing on a form the services
rendered and initialing the entry.
Also testifying at the preliminary examination was Dr. Thomas Haupt, a dentist under
contract with the Attorney General to examine Medicaid patients. The evidence of fraud
submitted by plaintiff was based on Haupt’s examination and testimony regarding discrepancies
between invoices submitted by defendants for five patients and the actual dental work or services
that had been performed. Haupt detailed several instances where restoration work that was billed
had not been done or where restorative work completed was less extensive than the records
indicated.
Defendants moved to quash the information in the circuit court following the district
court’s bind over. The circuit court quashed the information and dismissed all charges based on
a failure to meet the probable cause standard. The trial court ruled, in relevant part:
There is no direct evidence of any specific wrongful intent on the part of
the doctor, and none is claimed. I mean, simply, these billings came in; they
violate the act. But given what the statute clearly requires, and it seems to me that
there has to be some modicum of showing that this is something beyond an error,
mistake, and the language given to us by the Legislature is systematic or
persistent tendency to cause inaccuracies.
We don’t have a whole lot. I think I will assume, however, for the
purposes of this motion that Dr. Sykes has more than four or five patients. I
mean, one presumes that the doctor probably sees, you know, 15, 20, 25 patients a
day, if they’re like most of the dentists that I know, which means that over the
period of a year, they probably see four or five thousand patients. Four or five
thousand billings over the period of a year. We have nine here, nine wrongful
billings, if you want to put it in that context.
Emphasizing the limited number of claims involved the trial court implied that it could more
reasonably be inferred that defendants had inadvertently submitted erroneous billings rather than
demonstrating a pattern of error sufficient to establish the knowledge element necessary for
prosecution under the Act. In addition, the trial court found as persuasive, regarding the absence
of wrongful intent, that some of the billings submitted were for lesser amounts than was due for
the services actually rendered.
On appeal, plaintiff contends the trial court erred in quashing the bind over and dismissal
of all the charges. “This Court reviews for an abuse of discretion both a district court’s decision
to bind a defendant over for trial and a trial court’s decision on a motion to quash an
information.” People v Fletcher, 260 Mich App 531, 551-552; 679 NW2d 127 (2004).
Following the conclusion of a preliminary examination, a defendant must be bound over for trial
if probable cause exists that the defendant committed the charged offense. People v Orzame,
(…continued)
circuit court.
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224 Mich App 551, 558; 570 NW2d 118 (1997). Probable cause is determined to exist “where
the court finds a reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong
in themselves to warrant a cautious person to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense
charged.” Id. (citations omitted). The prosecutor is not required to establish guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt at the preliminary examination. Rather, “there must exist evidence of each
element of the crime charged or evidence from which the elements may be inferred. It is not the
function of the magistrate to discharge the accused when the evidence is conflicting or raises a
reasonable doubt with regard to guilt. Such questions are for the trier of fact.” People v
Flowers, 191 Mich App 169, 179; 477 NW2d 473 (1991) (citations omitted).
To establish a claim under the Medicaid False Claim Act, MCL 400.607, a prosecutor
must demonstrate:
(1) the existence of a claim, (2) that the accused makes, presents, or causes to be
made or presented to the state or its agent, (3) the claim is made under the Social
Welfare Act, 1939 PA 280, M.C.L. § 400.1 et seq.; M.S.A. § 16.401 et seq., (4)
the claim is false, fictitious, or fraudulent, and (5) the accused knows the claim is
false, fictitious or fraudulent. [Orzame, supra at 558 (citation omitted).]
The dispute here is whether defendants knowingly submitted false claims under the Act. The
terms “knowing” and “knowingly” are defined in MCL 400.602(f) as meaning “that a person is
in possession of facts under which he or she is aware or should be aware of the nature of his or
her conduct and that his or her conduct is substantially certain to cause the payment of a
[M]edicaid benefit.” The statutory provision also includes a caveat or exception to exclude from
the definition of “knowing” or “knowingly” “conduct which is an error or mistake unless the
person’s course of conduct indicates a systematic or persistent tendency to cause inaccuracies to
be present.” Id.
Both the trial court and defendants emphasize that there are only nine erroneous billings
for four or five patients, totaling slightly in excess of $300 in dispute. The trial court determined
that the minimal number is insufficient to demonstrate either a “systematic or persistent tendency
to cause inaccuracies” in defendants’ billing given the potential number of billings submitted
within a year. In addition, the trial court determined that the undercharges that occurred, when
viewed in the context of the relatively few billing errors, are contrary to an inference that
defendants knowingly engaged in false billing practices.
We disagree. When viewed strictly from a procedural standpoint, the examining
magistrate needed to find only a reasonable ground of suspicion, and not guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. We determine that the evidence presented supports a finding of probable
cause because the record permits a reasonable fact finder to determine that there were nine
instances of purposeful or knowing deceit by defendants in their billings. The actual number of
errors that are alleged, and the relatively small dollar figure they represent, is irrelevant and does
not automatically convert or allow for the assumption, as proffered by the trial court, that the
errors must have comprised only inadvertent mistakes. As previously determined by this Court,
“if a defendant contractually agrees to abide by billing procedures and has access to the
applicable manuals and documentation controlling those procedures, deviations from the
established procedures are presumed to be intentional or provide evidence that the defendant
knew the submitted claims were false.” Orzame, supra at 560. Consequently, if defendants
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“have used billing codes that did not accurately represent the actual services rendered to the
agents at the clinic, defendants are presumed to be ‘in possession of facts under which [they are]
aware or should be aware of the nature of [their] conduct.’” Id. at 562, citing MCL 400.602(f).
“[C]laims submitted for noncompensable services such as unnecessary tests and nonmedical
expenses, as well as billings for services not performed, qualify as fraudulent claims.” Id. at 562,
citing In re Wayne Co Prosecutor, 121 Mich App 798, 802; 329 NW2d 510 (1982). Based on
the evidence presented to the district court, we find that sufficient evidence existed to bind
defendants over on 15 counts of Medicaid fraud.
On appeal, defendants raise an additional argument regarding federal preemption as an
alternative basis for affirmance. Defendants argue that the federal anti-kickback statute, 18 USC
1347, preempts the low mens rea requirement of MCL 400.607. Specifically, defendants cite to
the recent case of State v Harden, 938 So 2d 480 (Fla, 2006) to demonstrate that a state statute
with a lower mens rea requirement is preempted by federal law because it serves to criminalize
conduct which federal law intends to protect or preclude from prosecution. While we are not
required to resolve this issue to dispose of this case, we address defendants’ argument for the
sake of judicial economy as we can anticipate that it will likely arise again on remand or
reconsideration.
Notably, 18 USC 1347 applies only to conduct that is done “knowingly and willfully” as
compared to the commensurate Michigan statute, which only addresses conduct that is
“knowing” or “knowingly” performed. Contrary to defendants’ argument, an important
distinction exists between the Michigan statute and the preempted Florida statute. Unlike the
Florida statute, violation of the Michigan statute cannot be premised on mere negligence due to
the existence of MCL 400.602(f), which defines the terms “knowing” and “knowingly” and
precludes prosecution for inadvertent mistakes unless they indicate a “systematic or persistent
tendency to cause inaccuracies.”
Consequently, Harden is distinguishable from the present case because, unlike the antikickback statutes at issue in Harden, MCL 400.607 does not criminalize conduct which federal
law intends to protect from prosecution and does not present an obstacle to accomplishing the
purpose of the federal law. Although the federal anti-fraud statute does not have a special
definition for the term “knowingly” and, therefore, appears to necessitate a higher mens rea
requirement, this cannot be construed to reflect a congressional intent to immunize from state
prosecution the conduct criminalized by MCL 400.607, as defined by MCL 400.602(f), which
involve a systematic or persistent tendency to over bill Medicaid. We concur that a state statute
criminalizing merely negligent or isolated and inadvertent overcharging of Medicaid could
undermine the congressional purpose in establishing Medicaid by discouraging honest medical
providers from participating in the Medicaid program and the provision of services to lowincome individuals. However, the reach of MCL 400.607 is much narrower because it expressly
excludes conduct that is an error or mistake unless there is demonstrated a systematic or
persistent tendency for repetitive inaccuracies. Thus, isolated or ordinary negligence is excluded
from the reach of MCL 400.607. While it is unrealistic to expect even the most conscientious
medical providers to never inadvertently make a billing error, it is reasonable to expect and
require medical providers to exercise sufficient care and effort in their billing practices to avoid
systematic or persistent problems.
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Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
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