PEOPLE OF MI V MATTHEW WAYNE OWENS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 6, 2007
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 272351
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 06-003636-01
MATTHEW WAYNE OWENS,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Zahra, P.J., and White and O’Connell, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
The prosecutor appeals as of right from a circuit court order dismissing charges of
possession of a “Taser” electric-shock device, MCL 750.224a(1), and driving on a suspended
license, MCL 257.904(3)(a). The dismissal followed the trial court’s grant of defendant’s
motion to suppress the evidence that he possessed the device. We reverse and remand. This
appeal is being decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
Defendant was arrested for driving on a suspended license following a traffic stop that
occurred at a gas station. The arresting officer radioed for a truck to come and tow the car, and
he conducted a search of the car before the truck arrived. The shock device was found between
the driver’s-side seat and the console. The trial court held that the departmental policy regarding
impoundment was overly broad and that impoundment of a car parked on private property was
improper, especially because defendant was not given an opportunity to make alterative
arrangements to secure the car.
“This Court’s review of a lower court’s factual findings in a suppression hearing is
limited to clear error, and those findings will be affirmed unless we are left with a definite and
firm conviction that a mistake was made.” People v Marcus Davis, 250 Mich App 357, 362; 649
NW2d 94 (2002). However, we review de novo the court’s ultimate decision on the motion and
any legal issues that affected that decision. People v Garvin, 235 Mich App 90, 96-97; 597
NW2d 194 (1999).
A valid inventory search is an exception to the warrant requirement. People v Houstina,
216 Mich App 70, 77; 549 NW2d 11 (1996). “[S]uch a search is considered to be an
administrative function rather than a part of a criminal investigation.” Id. The purposes of an
inventory search of an impounded vehicle are “(1) protection of the owner’s property while in
police custody, (2) protection of police against claims of lost or stolen property, and (3)
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protection of the police from potential physical danger.” People v Toohey, 438 Mich 265, 284;
475 NW2d 16 (1991). “[T]he validity of the inventory search depends on whether there were
standardized criteria, policies, or routines regulating how inventory searches were to be
conducted.” People v Poole, 199 Mich App 261, 265; 501 NW2d 265 (1993). “An inventory
search that is conducted pursuant to standardized police procedure is considered reasonable
because the resulting intrusion will be limited to the extent it is necessary to fulfill the caretaking
function.” Toohey, supra at 275-276. “The goal is to prevent inventory searches from being
used as ‘a ruse for general rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence’ and,
therefore, the applicable policy ‘should be designed to produce an inventory.’” Poole, supra at
266, quoting Florida v Wells, 495 US 1, 4; 110 S Ct 1632; 109 L Ed 2d 1 (1990).
Although the relevant facts of this case closely match the facts in Poole, the trial court
did not find that the officer’s inventory procedure fit within the inventory exception to the
warrant requirement.1 However, it did not find that the officer violated police procedure.
Instead, it found that the procedure itself was unreasonable, holding that a police policy of
impounding a car whenever a legal driver could not remove it to a secure location was overly
broad. In reaching its result, the trial court took constructive notice of the unproved proposition
that gas stations usually allow individuals to park their cars and leave them unattended, and it
ruled that the impoundment was improper because the car was already legally parked on private
property.
We disagree with the trial court’s unsupported factual findings and its legal conclusion in
this case. Defendant did not own the private property on which the car was parked, so the trial
court’s reliance on People v Siegel, 95 Mich App 594; 291 NW2d 134 (1980), is unjustified.
Defendant’s own testimony demonstrated that he had no reasonable expectation that he could
simply leave the car at the gas station. See People v Krezen, 427 Mich 681, 687-688; 397 NW2d
803 (1986). The car was in a parking place designated for temporary parking while patronizing
the gas station. Defendant’s testimony demonstrated that gym bags containing various
possessions were in plain sight inside the passenger compartment, and there was no one present
to take custody of the car or protect it from vandalism or theft. Id. Under the circumstances, we
reject the trial court’s blanket finding that the police procedure for impoundment under such
circumstances was unreasonable. Id. Although the officer could have offered defendant an
opportunity to make alternative arrangements for his car, the failure to do so does not render the
impoundment unreasonable. Colorado v Bertine, 479 US 367, 373-374; 107 S Ct 738; 93 L Ed
2d 739 (1987).
Although there may be some situations in which impoundment under such a broad policy
would violate the Fourth Amendment, that possibility does not justify suppression when the facts
of the defendant’s case indicate that the impoundment decision was reasonable. Krezen, supra at
685-686. Because the impoundment under the circumstances of this case was reasonable, and
1
We note that the trial court did not find that the search was justified as a search incident to
defendant’s valid arrest, even though the shock device was found immediately adjacent to the
defendant’s driver’s-side seat. Poole, supra at 264.
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the officer carried out the inventory search pursuant to departmental policy, the trial court erred
in granting defendant’s motion to suppress. Poole, supra at 265.
Reversed and remanded for reinstatement of the charges. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
I concur in result only.
/s/ Helene N. White
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