IN RE WILLIAM MICHAEL MOORE MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of WILLIAM MICHAEL MOORE,
a/k/a WILLIAM MICHAEL BREWER, Minor.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
UNPUBLISHED
October 23, 2007
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 276466
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 06-461120-NA
GENNA MARIE BREWER,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
JOHN STAVER,
Respondent.
Before: Zahra, P.J, and White and O’Connell, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent mother appeals from the trial court order terminating her parental rights to
the minor child pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i), (g), (i), (j), and (l). We affirm. This appeal
has been decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
On October 28, 2006, respondent gave birth to the minor child, William. William tested
positive for opiates (heroin) at birth, and for 12 days thereafter he suffered withdrawal symptoms
that included projectile vomiting, tremors, “balling up and stretching out,” and unabated
screaming. On November 2, 2006, petitioner Department of Human Services (DHS) obtained an
order removing William from respondent’s care pending a preliminary hearing, and William was
placed with his maternal uncle. DHS then filed a petition for permanent custody, seeking
termination of parental rights with respect to respondent and her estranged husband, John
Staver.1
1
Staver did not participate in the termination proceedings and is not a party to this appeal.
-1-
At respondent’s bench trial, DHS presented evidence that respondent used heroin for
several months after discovering her pregnancy. Respondent, who was required to submit to
random drug screening as a condition of bond on pending federal criminal drug charges, tested
positive for heroin in August 2006 and was treated at an inpatient drug treatment facility.
Following several negative drug tests, in December 2006 respondent again tested positive for
heroin.2 The trial court in this case ordered random drug screens as a condition of visitation with
William. Respondent failed to call her DHS case manager daily as required, she missed several
required drug screens, and on one occasion she was observed to have large, raised needle marks
on her arm when she appeared for visitation. Respondent admitted that she was a heroin addict
and that she continued to use heroin during her pregnancy, maintaining that doing so was
necessary to prevent a possible miscarriage or preterm labor.
It was also established at trial that in February 2006, a Texas court had terminated the
parental rights of respondent and Staver to William’s older brother, four-year-old Scott.
Respondent admitted to her DHS caseworker that the Texas termination proceeding had resulted
in part from her drug use and that she had received services including drug treatment, parenting
classes, and counseling prior to the termination. The termination order in that case reflects that
the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services had, for a period of at least six months,
made reasonable efforts to return Scott to respondent’s care, and that respondent had not
regularly visited him or maintained significant contact with him.
On appeal, respondent contends that termination was against William’s best interests
because the trial court failed to first implement reunification efforts. We disagree.
To terminate parental rights, the trial court must find that at least one of the statutory
grounds for termination set forth in MCL 712A.19b(3) has been met by clear and convincing
evidence. In re Sours, 459 Mich 624, 632-633; 593 NW2d 520 (1999). If a statutory ground for
termination is established, the trial court must terminate parental rights unless there exists clear
evidence, on the whole record, that termination is not in the child’s best interests. MCL
712A.19b(5); In re Trejo Minors, 462 Mich 341, 353-354; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). The trial
court’s decision terminating parental rights is reviewed for clear error. MCR 3.977(J); Trejo,
supra at 355-357; Sours, supra at 632-633. A finding is clearly erroneous if, although there is
evidence to support it, this Court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
been made. In re JK, 468 Mich 202, 209-210; 661 NW2d 216 (2003); In re Miller, 433 Mich
331, 337; 455 NW2d 161 (1989). Regard is to be given to the special opportunity of the trial
court to judge the credibility of the witnesses who appeared before it. MCR 2.613(C); Miller,
supra at 337.
Contrary to respondent’s assertion, DHS was not required to provide her with further
opportunities to rehabilitate and to prove herself worthy of reunification prior to the termination
2
Respondent’s bond supervisor in the federal case testified that respondent admitted she had
relapsed and used heroin in December 2006; however, at trial in this case respondent denied
having relapsed and speculated that the positive test could have resulted from medication she
received for a kidney infection or from eating poppy seeds.
-2-
of her parental rights. DHS is permitted to seek permanent custody at the initial disposition
hearing, as it did in this case, without offering reunification services when its goal is termination
and no service plan is anticipated or required. MCL 712A.19b(4) and (5). Because DHS sought
termination at the initial dispositional hearing, services were to be provided to facilitate
permanent placement, and services for respondent were not required because William was not to
be returned to her care. See MCL 712A.18f(3)(d). In any event, the evidence demonstrated that
reunification services would have been futile. Respondent made little effort to comply with
visitation requirements, and she was unable to remain drug-free despite treatment, the threat of
bond revocation, and the prospect of losing her child. Moreover, respondent received extensive
reunification services in connection with the Texas termination proceedings, and these services
proved unsuccessful. Accordingly, the trial court did not clearly err in its best interests
determination. MCL 712A.19b(5); Trejo, supra at 352-353.
Affirmed.
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ Helene N. White
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
-3-
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