PEOPLE OF MI V PHILANDO SLAUGHTER
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
October 23, 2007
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 273787
Saginaw Circuit Court
LC No. 05-026111-FC
PHILANDO SLAUGHTER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Owens, P.J., and Bandstra and Davis, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals by delayed leave granted from his plea-based convictions of, and
sentences for, third-degree fleeing and eluding a police officer, MCL 750.479a(3), and
unlawfully driving away a motor vehicle, MCL 750.413, for which the trial court sentenced
defendant, as a habitual offender fourth, MCL 769.12, to serve concurrent terms of imprisonment
of 46 months to 25 years for each count. On appeal, defendant argues that he should be allowed
to withdraw his plea and proceed to trial, on the ground that the trial court coerced him to accept
the plea agreement, and, alternatively, that the trial court erred in the scoring of two sentencing
variables. We affirm.
I. Facts
On the day set for trial of this matter, the prosecutor informed the trial court that
defendant was charged with carjacking and fleeing and eluding, reminded the court that
carjacking exposed defendant to consecutive sentencing, and stated that an agreement had been
offered according to which defendant would plead guilty to unauthorized driving away and
fleeing and eluding, which would guarantee concurrent sentencing, and, considering defendant’s
habitual-offender status, bring a range for defendant’s minimum sentence under the sentencing
guidelines of seven to forty-six months’ imprisonment. The prosecutor further reported that
defendant had rejected the offer and intended to proceed to trial.
Defense counsel stated on the record that he had advised defendant to accept the plea
offer, which defendant acknowledged while reiterating that he wished to go to trial. The
prosecutor reported that the range for carjacking would be eighty-one to two hundred seventy
months, and that he would be seeking a sentence at the top of that range. The trial court advised
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defendant that his habitual-fourth status would normally bring a minimum sentence at the high
end of the guidelines range, and reminded defendant that the sentencing implications under the
plea agreement were much milder than what he faced if convicted of carjacking. Defense
counsel in turn conceded that there was no defense to the fleeing and eluding charge. The trial
court reiterated that the lack of a defense in that regard exposed defendant to a sentencing range
equal to what awaited in the plea proposal even if he won acquittal of the carjacking charge at
trial. Defendant eventually relented and agreed to accept the plea bargain.
Defendant then admitted that, on April 10, 2005, he arranged to borrow a car for a limited
time, but did not return it as promised. Defendant further admitted that early the next morning
the State Police attempted to stop his vehicle, but that because he was driving without a license
he attempted to flee, inducing the police to chase him through the city of Saginaw with sirens
and lights engaged, which ended when a police car struck defendant’s vehicle. Defendant
additionally confirmed that he had sufficient earlier convictions to have earned the offender
status of habitual fourth.
I. Plea Proceeding
Defendant argues that the trial court failed to remain impartial, and otherwise improperly
injected himself personally, in encouraging defendant to accept the plea agreement.
A trial court’s general conduct of trial is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See People
v Ramano, 181 Mich App 204, 220; 448 NW2d 795 (1989). An abuse of discretion occurs
where the trial court chooses an outcome falling outside a “principled range of outcomes.”
People v Babcock, 469 Mich 247, 269; 666 NW2d 231 (2003). A trial judge must act as a
neutral and detached judicial officer. See Cain v Dep’t of Corrections, 451 Mich 470, 509; 548
NW2d 210 (1996). If a trial judge’s conduct pierces the veil of judicial impartiality, a
defendant’s conviction must be reversed. Ramano, supra, quoting People v Collier, 168 Mich
App 687, 698; 425 NW2d 118 (1988).
We have reviewed the transcript, and conclude that the trial court’s remarks in
encouraging defendant not lightly to eschew the opportunity that the plea agreement provided
reveal neither bias, nor undue coercive pressure, on the part of the court. Instead, we find a
display of sincere concern that defendant did not fully appreciate that he had nothing to gain, but
much to lose, from going to trial.
The trial court did not personally evaluate, then disparage, defendant’s chances of
winning acquittal of the fleeing and eluding charge. Instead, both defendant and his attorney
stated frankly that they had no defense to it. The trial court’s acknowledgement of that lack of
defense was thus merely responsive, and deferential, to defendant’s own position.
As the parties and court acknowledged, were defendant convicted of carjacking, his
guidelines range would have been much higher than what he faced for fleeing and eluding.
Moreover, sentences for carjacking may be made to run consecutively to other sentences
stemming from the same incident. MCL 750.529a(3).
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Any coercive pressure defendant may have felt in the matter originated with the facts of
the case, not from the trial court’s attempts to ensure that defendant understood them. The judge
showed himself to be a friend of justice, and of defendant, in ensuring that defendant was fully
able to calibrate his self-interest in deciding whether to offer a plea or stand on his rights.
For these reasons, defendant’s argument that the trial court coerced his plea must fail.
III. Sentencing
Defendant argues that the trial court failed to resolve satisfactorily a dispute he had with
information contained within his PSIR, and how the latter affected his guidelines’ scoring. In
particular, at sentencing, defendant objected to the scoring of offense variables (OV) 1 and 2,
which were scored to reflect that defendant used a firearm in connection with the sentencing
offense. OV 1 was scored at fifteen, and OV 2 at five.
Subsection (1)(c) of MCL 777.31, which concerns aggravated use of a weapon, directs a
sentencing court to assess fifteen points for OV 1 if a “firearm was pointed at or toward a victim
. . . .” Subsection (1)(d) of MCL 777.32, which concerns the lethal potential of the weaponry
involved, directs a sentencing court to assess five points for OV 2 if the offender “possessed or
used a pistol . . . .”
At sentencing, the defense protested that defendant never had a weapon on the occasion
in question. The prosecutor replied that the victim reported that defendant had produced a
handgun while taking the automobile, and the trial court noted that the presentence investigation
report (PSIR) included a statement to that effect. The court stated, “I’ll put defendant disputes
this. . . . I’ve so noted, but I’ll decline changing the guidelines.”
Defendant quotes discussions later in the sentencing proceeding in which the court
suggested that it would review some matter and possibly revisit it, thus suggesting that the court
was referring to the dispute over whether defendant had used a gun. But the transcript makes
plain that the court was referring to a different matter. There was in fact no further discussion
concerning the scoring of OVs 1 and 2.
“If any information in the presentence report is challenged, the court must allow the
parties to be heard regarding the challenge, and make a finding with respect to the challenge or
determine that a finding is unnecessary because it will not take the challenged information into
account in sentencing.” MCR 6.425(E)(2). In this case, despite defendant’s attempt to
characterize the trial court has having left unresolved the dispute over whether the sentencing
offenses involved a firearm, it is apparent from the transcript that the court in fact simply
resolved that issue in favor of the prosecution.
A scoring decision will not be reversed if any evidence exists to support the score.
People v Hornsby, 251 Mich App 462, 468; 650 NW2d 700 (2002). Information relied upon for
purposes of sentencing may come from several sources, including a PSIR. People v Potrafka,
140 Mich App 749, 751-752; 366 NW2d 35 (1985). In this case, the agent’s description of the
offense in defendant’s PSIR includes that “the defendant pulled out a handgun from under his
shirt and ordered [the victim] out of the vehicle.” The trial court thus had a sufficient evidentiary
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basis for scoring OVs 1 and 2 to reflect that defendant produced a firearm when committing his
crimes.
For these reasons, defendant’s sentencing challenges must fail.
We affirm.
/s/ Donald S. Owens
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Alton T. Davis
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