PEOPLE OF MI V TONY DIMARES MOORE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
October 23, 2007
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 270828
Muskegon Circuit Court
LC No. 05-052358-FC
v
TONY DIMARES MOORE a/k/a TONY
DIMORES MOORE,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Hoekstra, P.J., and Sawyer and Murray, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of two counts of assault with intent to do
great bodily harm less than murder, MCL 750.84, and a single count of carrying a concealed
weapon, MCL 750.227. Defendant was sentenced to concurrent terms of 67 months to 10 years’
imprisonment for the assault convictions, and 18 months to 5 years’ imprisonment for the
carrying a concealed weapon conviction. He appeals as of right. We affirm defendant’s
convictions and sentences, but remand this matter for correction of the judgment of sentence.
I. Jury Instructions
A. Self-Defense
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in declining to instruct the jury on selfdefense. “Questions of law, including questions concerning the applicability of jury instructions,
are reviewed de novo.” People v Perez, 469 Mich 415, 418; 670 NW2d 655 (2003); see also
People v Riddle, 467 Mich 116, 124; 649 NW2d 30 (2002) (the circumstances to which selfdefense may be applied is a question of law subject to review de novo).
“A criminal defendant is entitled to have a properly instructed jury consider the evidence
against him.” Riddle, supra. “When a defendant requests a jury instruction on a theory or
defense that is supported by the evidence, the trial court must give the instruction.” Id.
Generally, a person acts in self-defense if that person is free from fault and, under all the
circumstances, honestly and reasonably believed that he was in imminent danger of death or
great bodily harm and that it was necessary for him to exercise deadly force. Id. at 119. “The
necessity element of self-defense normally requires that the actor try to avoid the use of deadly
force if he can safely and reasonably do so, such as by applying nondeadly force or by using an
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obvious and safe avenue of retreat.” Id. A defendant may not claim self-defense where he used
excessive force or was the initial aggressor. People v Kemp, 202 Mich App 318, 322; 508 NW2d
184 (1993).
The evidence in this case did not support defendant’s requested instruction on selfdefense. Initially, we note that defendant was not free from fault in the altercation between
himself and victim Torrey Day. Riddle, supra at 119. To the contrary, the evidence showed that
defendant entered the home of his former girlfriend, Adell Banks, and specifically sought out
Day in the bedroom of the home while armed with a knife. The evidence presented also did not
support a conclusion that defendant had an honest and reasonable belief that he was in imminent
danger of death or great bodily harm and that it was necessary for him to exercise deadly force.
Id. Rather, the evidence showed that if defendant feared for his safety, he could have refrained
from going into the bedroom or left the house all together, instead of confronting Day. Finally,
even accepting defendant’s assertion that he felt threatened by Day and only then pulled out his
knife, self-defense instructions were not warranted because defendant used excessive force to
repel the physical altercation with Day. Kemp, supra at 322. Indeed, the evidence showed that
defendant stabbed Day multiple times, puncturing Day’s lung. Even though Day was younger
and physically larger than defendant, this far exceeded the force necessary to defend himself
against Day, who was unarmed. For all these reasons, the trial court properly declined to give
defendant’s requested self-defense instructions.
B. Unanimity
Defendant also argues that the trial court erred in failing to give the jury a specific
unanimity instruction with respect to the charge of assault with intent to do great bodily harm to
Banks. However, by expressly approving the jury instructions as given, defendant waived the
issue on appeal. See, e.g., People v Carter, 462 Mich. 206, 215, 612 NW2d 144 (2000).
Regardless, we find no merit to defendant’s assertion that he was entitled to the special
instruction. Indeed, a specific unanimity instruction is required only where “more than one act is
presented as evidence of the actus reus of a single criminal offense.” People v Cooks, 446 Mich
503, 512; 521 NW2d 275 (1994). Here, while the prosecution presented evidence showing that
defendant physically assaulted Banks both at her home and in his truck, it is clear from the
record that the prosecution did not present defendant’s actions at Banks’ home as evidence of the
actus reus element of the assault charge. To the contrary, the record makes clear that the
significantly more brutal assault perpetrated against Banks after leaving the home with defendant
in his truck formed the basis for the assault charge levied and argued by the prosecution.
Accordingly, a specific unanimity instruction was not required.
II. Effective Assistance of Counsel
Defendant argues in his Standard 4 brief that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing
to investigate defense witnesses and certain evidence. To establish these claims, defendant must
demonstrate that his counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness
under prevailing professional norms, and that a reasonable probability exists that but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different. People
v Sabin (On Second Remand), 242 Mich App 656, 659; 620 NW2d 19 (2000). However,
because defendant failed to move for a new trial or request an evidentiary hearing before the trial
court, our review of these challenges is limited to mistakes apparent on the record. Id. at 658-2-
659. If the record does not support defendant’s assertions, he effectively waives the issue. Id. at
659.
A. Witnesses
Defendant first alleges that had they been sought out by counsel, at least two witnesses
would have testified regarding Day’s reputation for violence in the community and for carrying a
weapon. Defendant also alleges that other witnesses would have testified that they heard, from
an unidentified individual, of a plot between Banks and Day to harm defendant.
The failure to reasonably investigate a case can constitute ineffective assistance of
counsel. People v McGhee, 268 Mich App 600, 626; 709 NW2d 595 (2005). However,
decisions regarding what evidence to present and whether to call or question witnesses are
presumed to be matters of trial strategy, which this Court will not second-guess on appeal.
People v Dixon, 263 Mich App 393, 398; 688 NW2d 308 (2004). Further, the failure to call
witnesses only constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel if it deprives the defendant of a
substantial defense. Id. However, defendant fails to provide any proof, by affidavit or other
means, showing how the testimony of those witnesses would have contributed to his defense, or
that the witnesses would have been willing to testify on his behalf. Further, any testimony would
have been hearsay, MRE 801, and defendant has failed to identify any exception allowing its
introduction, MRE 802. Accordingly, defendant has failed to establish that he was denied a
substantial defense because those witnesses were not called to testify.
B. DNA and Bite Mark Evidence
Defendant next argues that after testing failed to reveal Day’s DNA on the knife
recovered from defendant’s truck, defense counsel should have conducted further investigation
to find a second knife, which defendant asserts would have yielded Day’s DNA. In support of
this claim, defendant posits that Day had his own knife during the altercation in the bedroom,
that the knives were mixed up during the struggle, that Day was ultimately stabbed by defendant
with his own knife, that the knives were switched again, and that Day fled the scene with his own
knife. We do not find that defense counsel was constitutionally ineffective for having failed to
investigate this theory. The prosecution’s DNA expert testified that it was possible that if the
knife had been used to stab other people, their DNA would not be on the knife. The expert also
testified that if the knife used to stab Day had been wiped off and then bled on by someone
else—in this case, defendant—the expert would likely not be able to detect Day’s DNA because
the remaining amount would fall below the threshold level for testing. In light of this testimony,
and considering the unsupported and highly implausible nature of the theory now posited by
defendant, we find that defendant has failed to overcome the presumption that the theory of selfdefense presented by defense counsel constituted sound trial strategy. Dixon, supra at 398.
Indeed, there is nothing in the record to suggest “that counsel was ‘deficient’ in making this
choice or that the selection significantly affected the outcome of the trial.” People v LaVearn,
448 Mich 207, 216; 528 NW2d 721 (1995).
Defendant also asserts that counsel was ineffective for having failed “to check” the bite
wound suffered by him on the night of this incident “to assure that it was done while Banks was
on his back.” We note, however, that defendant’s claim that he received the wound from Banks
during the altercation with Day was before the jury. Further, defendant has failed to articulate
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what further investigation regarding bite marks would have revealed or otherwise contributed to
the defense of these charges. Consequently, he has failed to establish this claim. Sabin, supra.
C. Prior Convictions
Defendant next argues that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the use
of two prior misdemeanor convictions for domestic violence, which formed the basis for
defendant’s score of 5 points for prior record variable (PRV) 5, MCL 777.55(1)(d). Defendant’s
argument that the convictions were “too distant and too prejudicial” are irrelevant considerations
for sentencing purposes. Indeed, nothing in the plain language of MCL 777.55 restricts the use
of a prior misdemeanor conviction on the basis of time or prejudice. Moreover, while MCL
777.50 requires that a defendant’s prior convictions be disregarded for purposes of scoring PRV
5 if they precede a ten-year period in which the defendant had no convictions, the record reflects
that no prior conviction preceding such a ten-year period was considered by the trial court in
scoring PRV 5. It follows that trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to object to the scoring
of PRV 5 on this basis. People v Hawkins, 245 Mich App 439, 457; 628 NW2d 105 (2001) (“[a]
trial attorney need not register a meritless objection to act effectively”).
Further, while defendant asserts that one of his two convictions was had without the
benefit of representation by counsel, we note that there is no constitutional right to counsel in a
misdemeanor prosecution where no incarceration is ultimately imposed. See People v Richert
(After Remand), 216 Mich App 186, 194; 548 NW2d 924 (1996). Here, the presentence
investigation report indicates that the sentence imposed for the conviction in question was
“unknown,” and defendant has failed to proffer any other evidence to show that the prior
conviction was obtained in violation of his constitutional right to counsel. Defendant has thus
not shown that it was improper for the trial court to consider this conviction in scoring PRV 5.
Cf. People v Hannan (After Remand), 200 Mich App 123, 128; 504 NW2d 189 (1993) (a
sentencing court may not consider a defendant’s prior convictions obtained in violation of a
person’s constitutional right to counsel to enhance the defendant’s sentence).
III. Sentencing
Defendant next contends that he is entitled to resentencing because the trial court
improperly assessed points for offense variables based on facts that he did not admit and which
had not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, contrary to Blakely v Washington, 542 US 296;
124 S Ct 2531; 159 L Ed 2d 403 (2004). However, as defendant concedes, our Supreme Court
has held that judicial fact-finding to determine only the minimum sentence of an indeterminate
sentence does not violate Blakely, which pertains only to sentences imposed beyond the statutory
maximum. See People v Drohan, 475 Mich 140, 159-164; 715 NW2d 778 (2006).
Defendant further argues, however, that the trial court erred in awarding him credit for
only 229 days served in jail before sentencing. On this, we agree. It is well settled that a
defendant who is unable to post bond is entitled to credit for all time “served in jail prior to
sentencing.” MCL 769.11b; see also People v Seiders, 262 Mich App 702, 705-706; 686 NW2d
821 (2004). The presentence investigation report prepared in this matter indicates that defendant
was taken into custody on October 3, 2005, and was jailed continuously until his sentencing on
May 22, 2006. As conceded by the prosecution on appeal, the period of time between these
dates entitles to defendant to a credit of 231 days against his sentence.
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Accordingly, we affirm defendant’s convictions and sentences, but remand for the
ministerial task of correcting the judgment of sentence to award defendant credit for 231 days
served in jail and transmission of the corrected judgment to the Department of Corrections. We
do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
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