PEOPLE OF MI V JOHNNY LEON MONTGOMERY
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
October 23, 2007
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 269682
Allegan Circuit Court
LC No. 05-014257-FH
JOHNNY LEON MONTGOMERY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Hoekstra, P.J., and Sawyer and Murray, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was charged with possession of a chemical or laboratory equipment for the
purpose of manufacturing methamphetamine, MCL 333.7401c(2)(f), and fourth-degree fleeing
and eluding, MCL 257.602a(2). Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted only of fourthdegree fleeing and eluding, and he was sentenced as an habitual offender, fourth offense, MCL
769.12, to 3 to 15 years’ imprisonment for that conviction. Defendant appeals as of right. We
affirm.
Defendant and his friend, John Copen, left a trailer park in Gun Plain Township,
Michigan, at approximately 3:00 a.m. on April 10, 2005, with defendant driving his black Trans
Am. Unknown to defendant or Copen, undercover police officers had them under surveillance.
Defendant became aware that his vehicle was being pursued, and he took evasive actions by
pulling into a driveway. One of the undercover police officers spotted defendant’s vehicle
pulling into the driveway and pulled in front of it. The undercover police officer clearly
observed defendant in the driver’s seat. Defendant then darted around the unmarked police
vehicle, fleeing at a high rate of speed. Meanwhile, a sheriff’s deputy was proceeding in the
other direction to render support to the undercover police officers. The deputy pulled over to the
side of the road, and he activated his radar, which indicated that defendant’s vehicle was
speeding at a rate of 89 mph. The deputy turned on his marked vehicle’s flashing lights,
performed a u-turn, and pursued defendant’s vehicle. Defendant’s vehicle was discovered later,
wedged between some trees in a two-track road behind the residence of his parents. The police
discovered a large quantity of pseudoephedrine tablets in a bag, which was cast aside from the
vehicle. One police officer heard two distinct sounds crashing through the wooded area in
different directions heading away from the abandoned vehicle. A deputy with a canine unit
apprehended Copen shortly thereafter.
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Defendant first argues that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting statements
from a non-testifying informant through a police officer. Defendant claims that the challenged
statements violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause. We generally review a trial
court’s ruling to admit evidence under a hearsay exception for an abuse of discretion. People v
Geno, 261 Mich App 624, 631-632; 683 NW2d 687 (2004). Pertinent issues of law, i.e., the
Confrontation Clause1 issue, are generally reviewed de novo. See Kelly v Builders Square, Inc,
465 Mich 29, 34; 632 NW2d 912 (2001). However, defendant’s allegation of error related to the
Confrontation Clause is not preserved. Therefore, absent plain error requiring reversal,
defendant is not entitled to relief. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763-764; 597 NW2d 130
(1999).
Testimonial hearsay is inadmissible unless the declarant is unavailable and the defendant
had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. Crawford v Washington, 541 US 36, 68;
124 S Ct 1354; 158 L Ed 2d 177 (2004); People v Shepherd, 472 Mich 343, 347; 697 NW2d 144
(2005). The Confrontation Clause “does not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes
other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted.” Crawford, supra at 59 n 9. The United
States Supreme Court did not delineate a “precise articulation” of what constitutes testimonial
evidence. Id. at 68. However, the Court outlined the following three broad categories of
testimonial statements:
ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent—that is, material
such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was
unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would
reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially
extrajudicial statements . . . contained in formalized testimonial materials,
such as affidavits, prior testimony, or confessions
statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an
objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for
use at a later trial. [Id. at 51-52 (citations omitted).]
The sixth circuit has held that “statements by a confidential informant are testimonial and
are thus subject to the dictates of the Confrontation Clause . . . .” United States v Cromer, 389
F3d 662, 675 (CA 6, 2004). Our Supreme Court, in dicta, had previously acknowledged that a
nontestifying informant’s tip had confrontation implications. People v Wilkins, 408 Mich 69, 74;
288 NW2d 583 (1980). This Court has also held previously that “[t]he content of a confidential
informant’s tip is generally inadmissible as hearsay.” People v Starks, 107 Mich App 377, 383;
309 NW2d 556 (1981). Admission of the substance of an informant’s tip “is not justified to
show an officer’s state of mind, since the state of mind is not relevant.” Id. at 383-384.
In this case, the prosecution examined the undercover police officer as follows:
1
The Confrontation Clause provides in pertinent part that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” US Const,
Am VI.
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Q. Now, my understanding is that you were on duty on April 10th of 2005. Is
that correct?
A. That’s correct
Q. And, sometime in the early morning hours? Do you remember what time
approximately this incident started?
A. This incident started approximately 3:00 a.m. in the morning.
Q. How did it get started? What led you to the area that you went to?
A. I was actually I guess in the late hours of the night before out on a meth lab,
and during that investigation I was given the information that [defendant] was
in Gun River East Trailer Park and in possession of a large amount of
pseudoephedrine tablets which he was going to make meth with.
Q. Okay. Did you try to go and check out that information you were given?
A. Yes, the information further described that he was going to be in a black
Firebird or Trans Am at that—in this trailer park, and I went to the trailer park
at about 3:00 in the morning.
It can be reasonably inferred that this was an out-of-court statement by an unnamed
declarant, who did not testify at trial. Clearly, the undercover police officer responded to this tip
by going to the trailer park, looking for defendant. However, the undercover police officer was
also provided with defendant’s name, a description of defendant’s vehicle, information that
defendant possessed a quantity of methamphetamine precursor, and information that defendant
planned on manufacturing methamphetamine. Under the circumstances, we find the challenged
statement to be testimonial in nature. Crawford, supra at 51 (“an accuser who makes a formal
statement to government officers bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual
remark to an acquaintance does not”). In failing to recognize the confrontation implications
under Crawford, supra, the trial court did not afford the prosecution an opportunity to argue
whether any of the exceptions may have applied under the circumstances. The prosecution did
not have an opportunity to provide any reason for the third party’s unavailability or set forth
whether the statement was being offered for some purpose other than to prove the truth of the
matter asserted. See Crawford, supra at 57-58, 59 n 9. The prosecution may have been able to
explain that the third party was unavailable to testify as a result of improper conduct on the part
of defendant. Id. at 62. However, on the record before us, we cannot speculate with respect to
what could have been shown. We therefore conclude that the challenged statement was
testimonial and inadmissible.
Further, the statement was inadmissible hearsay. Starks, supra at 383. Hearsay is an outof-court statement offered for the truth of the matter asserted. MRE 801(c). Hearsay statements
are inadmissible unless a specific exception applies. MRE 802. Even though the undercover
police officer’s testimony was vague in that he merely stated that he was given information, the
admission of some unknown declarant’s statements that defendant possessed methamphetamine
precursor with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine was clearly offered for the truth of
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the matter asserted and was improper hearsay evidence. Starks, supra at 383. The statement
bolstered the prosecution’s case, as it pointed to defendant’s guilt of the charge for possession
with intent to manufacture methamphetamine. Wilkins, supra at 74.
Thus, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting that testimony as
violative of defendant’s confrontation rights. Crawford, supra at 51-52. However, reversal is
not warranted in this case. Defendant asserts that this testimony “convincingly explained why
[defendant] might run from police,” and that the prosecution “infected” the trial with “the
informant’s inflammatory allegations.”
However, these contentions are self-serving.
Significantly, defendant failed to explain how the plain error affected his substantial rights,
Carines, supra at 763-764, and we find that it did not. The undercover police officer’s testimony
regarding what he learned from an alleged informant can be characterized as brief, and it related
to the charge for which defendant was acquitted. Further, defense counsel used the alleged
informant’s tip to demonstrate bias by the police against defendant. The challenged statement
had no effect on the outcome of trial. As to the fleeing and eluding charge, the jury, as
factfinder, determined the credibility of witnesses. People v Williams, 268 Mich App 416, 419;
707 NW2d 624 (2005). The informant’s information was unrelated to that. And, in this case,
there is no basis for reversal, because there was no showing that “the defendant is actually
innocent or the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.” Carines, supra at 774.
Next, defendant contends that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. He claims
that defense counsel’s conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, when defense
counsel drew the jury’s attention to the substance of the previously discussed informant’s tip
during opening statement. Because no hearing was held and no findings were made, this Court’s
review is limited to apparent errors on the record. People v Matuszak, 263 Mich App 42, 48; 687
NW2d 342 (2004).
To sustain a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must prove that trial
counsel’s “performance was deficient” and that deficiency “prejudiced the defense.” Strickland
v Washington, 466 US 668, 687; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984). To prove defense
counsel’s deficient performance, the defendant must show that defense counsel’s performance
“fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 688. A defendant must also
demonstrate that, but for defense counsel’s conduct, there is a reasonable probability that the
outcome of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, supra at 694; People v
Carbin, 463 Mich 590, 600; 623 NW2d 884 (2001). A defendant must overcome “a strong
presumption that [defense] counsel’s performance constituted sound trial strategy.” Id. This
Court will not substitute its judgment for that of counsel regarding matters of trial strategy, nor
will it assess counsel’s competence with the benefit of hindsight. People v Rockey, 237 Mich
App 74, 76-77; 601 NW2d 887 (1999).
In this case, defendant’s claim attacks defense counsel’s trial strategy, which disclosed
the substance of an informant’s tip during opening statement. Moreover, defendant asserts that
“[t]here could have been no strategic reason for trial counsel to introduce this inadmissible
testimony into the proceedings.” Defense counsel advanced a theory that defendant did not
possess (or even know of) the pseudoephedrine and that defendant was not driving the vehicle
that fled from Deputy Horton. During opening statement, defense counsel stated “[t]hat [the
police officers] receive a tip from somebody else that possibly there’s meth or methamphetamine
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components or something of that nature in [defendant’s] possession.” Defense counsel
underscored this point by stating that “[the police] wanted to believe [the informant’s tip]
therefore they acted over zealously. That they went into this, their beliefs are that [defendant]
was involved and therefore they never are going to come away from that belief. But . . . the
evidence is going to show, was not involved in this.” Defense counsel concluded that
“[defendant] wasn’t there, [defendant] never possessed these things and [defendant] never tried
to flee and elude the officer.” During closing argument, defense counsel emphasized this theory,
contending that the detectives had been overzealous. “They believed the tip that [defendant] had
these pills therefore it’s true and we’ve got to lead along to that. The version has got to lead to
somehow [defendant] being guilty of having these pills. The reality is it’s Mr. Copen who had
the pills.” The strategy worked and defendant was acquitted of the charge related to the pills.
With appellate review limited to the existing record, Matuszak, supra at 48, defendant has
not overcome the presumption that defense counsel referenced the informant’s statements as a
matter of trial strategy. Rockey, supra at 77. The record, as well as the outcome of defendant’s
trial, demonstrates that defense counsel rendered effective assistance of counsel. Defendant has
not shown that defense counsel’s performance “fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness.” Strickland, supra at 690-691. We reject defendant’s ineffective assistance of
counsel argument based on defense counsel mentioning the informant’s tip during opening
statement because we will not substitute our judgment for that of defense counsel on matters of
trial strategy. Rockey, supra at 76-77.
Affirmed.
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
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