PEOPLE OF MI V BOBBY JAMAR YOUNGER
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
September 20, 2007
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 269299
Genesee Circuit Court
LC No. 05-017032-FC
BOBBY JAMAR YOUNGER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Borrello, P.J., and Jansen and Murray, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of two counts of assault with intent to
commit murder, MCL 750.83, armed robbery, MCL 750.529, possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b, and felon in possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f.
He was sentenced as an habitual offender, second offense, MCL 769.10, to concurrent prison
terms of 30 to 50 years for one assault conviction and 20 to 40 years for the other assault
conviction, 20 to 40 years for the armed robbery conviction, and 5 years to 90 months for the
felon in possession conviction, to be served consecutive to a two-year term of imprisonment for
the felony-firearm conviction. Defendant appeals of right, and we affirm.
Defendant’s convictions arise from a shooting incident that occurred on Labor Day in
2004, in front of Debra Wood’s house where relatives were gathered for dinner. Garner Wood
was shot and severely injured. Another shot was fired at Regina Wood, but she was not hit.
Three prosecution witnesses positively identified defendant as the shooter. Defendant asserted
that he was not present during the incident and presented two witnesses in support of an alibi
defense.
I. Loss of Evidence
Defendant first argues that he was denied a fair trial by the loss of physical evidence, a
baseball cap, because DNA testing of the cap may have exonerated him. Defendant further
argues that he was entitled to an adverse inference jury instruction and that counsel was
ineffective for failure to make such a request.
Several witnesses testified at trial that the shooter wore a baseball cap. The police
recovered a cap from the scene, but a week later it could not be located in the police property
room. The cap was lost prior to defendant’s motion for discovery and the evidence indicates that
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the police and prosecution conducted a search for the missing cap but could not find it.
Defendant did not raise this issue below; therefore, we review the issue for plain error affecting
defendant’s substantial rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763-764; 597 NW2d 130
(1999).
The failure to preserve evidence that may potentially exonerate a defendant does not
constitute a denial of due process unless the police acted in bad faith. Arizona v Youngblood,
488 US 51, 58; 109 S Ct 333; 102 L Ed 2d 281 (1988); People v Hunter, 201 Mich App 671,
677; 506 NW2d 611 (1993). An adverse inference instruction need not be given where the
defendant has not shown that the prosecutor acted in bad faith in failing to produce evidence.
People v Davis, 199 Mich App 502, 515; 503 NW2d 457 (1993). In this case, defendant has
failed to raise any issue that could have led the trier of fact to find that the baseball cap found at
the scene constituted exculpatory evidence. Defendant’s assertion that the baseball cap could
have contained DNA is speculative for at least several reasons. Thus as mere speculation, we
could conclude that the baseball cap fails to qualify as exculpatory evidence. At the very least,
defendant’s arguments regarding the baseball cap lead us to the conclusion that the baseball cap,
was at best, a potentially exculpatory piece of evidence for defendant. In Youngblood, supra, the
United States Supreme Court held:
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as interpreted in Brady,
makes the good or bad faith of the State irrelevant when the State fails to disclose
to the defendant material exculpatory evidence. But we think the Due Process
Clause requires a different result when we deal with the failure of the State to
preserve evidentiary material of which no more can be said than that it could have
been subjected to tests, the results of which might have exonerated the defendant.
Part of the reason for the difference in treatment is found in the observation made
by the Court in Trombetta, supra, at 486, that “[w]henever potentially exculpatory
evidence is permanently lost, courts face the treacherous task of divining the
import of materials whose contents are unknown and, very often, disputed.” Part
of it stems from our unwillingness to read the “fundamental fairness” requirement
of the Due Process Clause, see Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941),
as imposing on the police an undifferentiated and absolute duty to retain and to
preserve all material that might be of conceivable evidentiary significance in a
particular prosecution. We think that requiring a defendant to show bad faith on
the part of the police both limits the extent of the police’s obligation to preserve
evidence to reasonable bounds and confines it to that class of cases where the
interests of justice most clearly require it, i. e., those cases in which the police
themselves by their conduct indicate that the evidence could form a basis for
exonerating the defendant. We therefore hold that unless a criminal defendant
can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful
evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law. 488 US at 57- 58.
In this case, defendant has been unsuccessful in attempting to produce evidence
demonstrating that the police acted in bad faith when they lost the seized baseball cap. In
accordance with Youngblood, supra, we are compelled to hold that defendant cannot demonstrate
plain error by the failure of the prosecution to produce the baseball cap for testing. Additionally,
because defendant cannot demonstrate that the government acted in bad faith in failing to
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produce the evidence, an adverse jury instruction was not warranted. People v Davis, supra at
515. Consequently, counsel was not ineffective by failing to request such an instruction. See,
People v Mack, 265 Mich App 122, 130; 695 NW2d 342 (2005).
II. Right of Confrontation
Defendant argues that evidence of a non-testifying witness’s identification of defendant
as the shooter was improperly admitted through the testimony of Officer Fowlkes. Officer
Fowlkes testified that Alvin Hicks told him that the shooter’s name was “Bobby” or “Little
Bobby.” Defendant asserts that his right of confrontation was violated because the declarant,
Alvin Hicks, was not previously subjected to cross-examination. Because defendant did not
object to this testimony at trial, we review this issue for plain error affecting defendant’s
substantial rights. Carines, supra at 763-764.
Under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, testimonial statements of
witnesses absent from trial may not be admitted against a criminal defendant unless the declarant
is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. People
v Shepherd, 472 Mich 343, 347; 697 NW2d 144 (2005), citing Crawford v Washington, 541 US
36; 124 S Ct 1354; 158 L Ed 2d 177 (2004). There is no dispute that Hicks was unavailable for
trial and had not been previously subjected to cross-examination about his identification of the
shooter. Thus, defendant was denied his opportunity for cross-examination of this witness in
violation of Crawford, supra. However, such a finding does not, by necessity, warrant reversal.
“[O]nce a defendant satisfies these three requirements, an appellate court must exercise its
discretion in deciding whether to reverse. Reversal is warranted only when the plain, forfeited
error resulted in the conviction of an actually innocent defendant or when an error ‘seriously
affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings’ independent of the
defendant’s innocence.” (Carines, supra at 763, quoting US v Olano, 507 US 725, 736-737; 113
S Ct 1770; 123 L Ed 2d 508 (1993)]. While we find that defendant was denied his opportunity
of cross examination, because the testimony was brief and at least three other witnesses
positively identified defendant at trial as the shooter, we are not persuaded that the error resulted
in the conviction of an actually innocent defendant, nor can we find that defendant’s substantial
rights were affected. Carines, supra.
III. Effective Assistance of Counsel
Defendant presents a myriad of ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Because he did
not raise these claims in a motion for a new trial, our review is limited to mistakes apparent from
the record. People v Wilson, 242 Mich App 350, 352; 619 NW2d 413 (2000). The
determination whether a defendant has been deprived of the effective assistance of counsel
presents a mixed question of fact and constitutional law. People v LeBlanc, 465 Mich 575, 579;
640 NW2d 246 (2002). To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show
that counsel’s deficient performance denied him the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and that,
but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different. Mack, supra at
129. Effective assistance of counsel is presumed, and the defendant bears a heavy burden of
proving otherwise. People v Solmonson, 261 Mich App 657, 663; 683 NW2d 761 (2004).
Defendant argues that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to interview and call
Jaron Brown as an alibi witness. Brown averred in an affidavit that he was present during that
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shooting and that defendant was not present or involved. Decisions whether to call or question
witnesses are presumed to be matters of trial strategy. People v Dixon, 263 Mich App 393, 398;
688 NW2d 308 (2004). The failure to call a witness can constitute ineffective assistance of
counsel only when it deprives the defendant of a substantial defense. Id. In this case, it is
apparent that Brown would have presented credibility problems. Witnesses identified Brown as
being with defendant and as also being armed with a gun. Additionally, Brown’s account of the
shooting in his affidavit differed from that of other witnesses at trial. More significantly, defense
counsel raised an alibi defense at trial and presented two witnesses in support of that defense.
Thus, the failure to call Brown did not deprive defendant of a substantial defense.
We also reject defendant’s claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate
defendant’s case. Defendant bases this claim only on counsel’s failure to call Brown as a
witness, which we have concluded did not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel.
Defendant also argues that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to
suppress a photographic lineup, which defendant asserts was unduly suggestive because the
witness’s identification was tainted by Hicks’s influence. However, the suggestiveness of a
lineup involves the procedure itself. People v Kurylczyk, 443 Mich 289, 306 (Griffin, J.), 318
(Boyle, J.); 505 NW2d 528 (1993). Defendant contends that the identification was tainted by an
outside influence, not the procedure itself. Because a motion to suppress would have been futile,
counsel was not ineffective for failing to move for this relief. Mack, supra at 130. The
reliability of the witness’s identification at trial was a question for the jury to resolve. People v
Johnson, 202 Mich App 281, 285-286; 508 NW2d 509 (1993).
Additionally, we reject defendant’s assertion that defense counsel was ineffective for
failing to move for a Wade1 hearing. The right to a Wade hearing stems from a claim that an
identification procedure is constitutionally improper. Johnson, supra at 285. Defendant does not
contend that the lineup procedure was constitutionally infirm. Therefore, defense counsel was
not ineffective for failing to make a futile motion. Mack, supra at 130.
Defendant also argues that defense counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the
admission of a photograph of the baseball cap that was recovered from the scene, because it was
not established that the cap belonged to defendant. However, the prosecutor did not need to
prove that the cap belonged to defendant in order for the photograph to be admissible. At trial,
several witnesses testified that the shooter wore a baseball cap and a cap was recovered at the
scene. The jury was free to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence. People v Hardiman,
466 Mich 417, 428; 646 NW2d 158 (2002). Defendant also argues that defense counsel should
have objected to the photograph because the physical cap, not the photograph, was the best
evidence of the cap. However, the best evidence rule only applies to documentary evidence.
People v Leuth, 253 Mich App 670, 686; 660 NW2d 322 (2002). Accordingly, any objection on
this basis would have been futile. Mack, supra at 130.
1
United States v Wade, 388 US 218; 87 S Ct 1926; 18 L Ed 2d 1149 (1967).
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Defendant’s claims that defense counsel failed to engage in plea negotiations or request a
jury instruction on witness credibility are not supported by the record. The record discloses that
defense counsel conveyed the prosecutor’s plea offer to defendant, which he rejected, and that
the trial court instructed the jury on how to assess witness credibility.
Defendant’s remaining ineffective assistance of counsel claims are not properly presented
because defendant fails to develop his arguments or identify the factual basis for his claims, and
we decline to consider them further for this reason. See People v Matuszak, 263 Mich App 42,
59; 687 NW2d 342 (2004) (an appellant may not merely announce his position and leave it to
this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for his claims). Defendant asserts that defense
counsel should have filed a motion for a continuance in order to properly prepare for trial, but
defendant does not explain how counsel was unprepared or what else defense counsel could have
done had more time been available. Defendant’s other ineffective assistance of counsel claims
do not provide support for this one because the mere fact that counsel failed to file certain
motions does not mean that he did not have time to do so.
Also, defendant asserts that defense counsel failed to adequately attack the credibility of
witnesses at the preliminary examination and at trial, but he does not identify specific witnesses
or instances in support of this claim. Defendant also fails to explain the basis for his claim that
“Defense counsel fail (sic) to file a pre-trial motion for defendant to afford a corporal line-up.”
Additionally, the extent of defendant’s argument that defense counsel was ineffective for failing
to move for a directed verdict is that such a motion was warranted because the prosecution’s
evidence was weak and non-conclusive. Defendant presents no basis for concluding that a
motion for a directed verdict would have been successful.
For these reasons, we reject defendant’s claim that he was denied the effective assistance
of counsel.
Affirmed.
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
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