IN RE CURTIS/FRANKLIN/THOMPSON MINORS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of SHERICE NICOLE CURTIS,
SHAMARRIA FATIMA FRANKLIN,
SHARNELL ALIYAH FRANKLIN, KENNETH
STANLEY THOMPSON, JR., and SHAWN
MONTRELL FRANKLIN, Minors.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
UNPUBLISHED
September 18, 2007
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 275436
Genesee Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 98-110664-NA
STEPHANIE FRANKLIN,
Respondent-Appellant.
Before: O’Connell, P.J., and Murphy and Fitzgerald, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent mother appeals as of right from the order terminating her parental rights to
these minor children pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) and (j). We affirm.
On appeal, respondent argues that the trial court erred by finding that petitioner
established the existence of a statutory basis for termination of her parental rights with clear and
convincing evidence. We disagree. We review for clear error the trial court’s determination that
petitioner established the existence of one or more statutory grounds for termination. MCR
3.977(J); In re Sours, 459 Mich 624, 633; 593 NW2d 520 (1999).
This case has a long, disturbing history. After allegations that respondent was abusing
and severely neglecting her two-month-old son, Shamar, respondent arranged for a family friend
to receive guardianship over him. Respondent had not provided sufficient housing, food, or
medical treatment for the child. In June 1999, respondent’s daughter Sherice was born. When
Sherice was roughly two months old, she and her mother entered a safehouse to escape abuse at
the hands of Sherice’s father. Due to her mother’s neglect and homelessness, Sherice was placed
in foster care about a month later. At that time, a psychological examination determined that
respondent had a low probability of ever providing satisfactory parenting care to her children and
a high probability of neglecting them or exposing them to abuse. Another daughter, Shamarria,
was born in November 2000. Over the next three months, respondent received extensive
training, one-on-one services, and funds to help her learn how to run a home properly.
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Shamarria remained with respondent, and after nearly two years in the foster care system,
Sherice was returned to respondent in August 2001.
In June 2002, another daughter, Sharnell, was born. In August 2002, child protective
services received a report that respondent’s housing was again in deplorable condition. In
January 2003, about five months later, police arrested a woman in whose care respondent had
left her seven-month-old baby, Sharnell, so Sharnell was placed in foster care for three weeks.
In September 2003, respondent gave birth to a son, Kenneth. In December 2003,
investigators arrived at respondent’s residence to find burns and bruises on Sherice, Sharnell, and
baby Kenneth. The serious burns were several hours old, and one of the burns on Kenneth’s
abdomen had only been treated with small bandages even though the skin was peeling. The
floors of the residence were covered in clothing and trash. None of the beds had sheeting, and
the only crib was filled with clothing. A pan full of cold grease was left on the stovetop, and
another burner was still aflame. The bruising on Sherice was consistent with her report that she
had been struck by a belt. The children were removed from the home and placed in foster care.
Despite respondent’s general lack of progress and her flagrant disregard for the trial
court’s rulings limiting her association with unrelated males, the children were reunited with
respondent in December 2004, a few weeks before she gave birth to another son, Shawn.
Respondent continued to receive exhaustive parental services, and caseworkers continued to
report a general lack of progress in developing practical, independent parenting skills. Shawn
was not receiving adequate medication or care from respondent, who left several parenting tasks
to her five-year-old daughter. Nevertheless, respondent’s custody of the children continued until
Shamar made allegations in August 2005 that he saw six-year-old Sherice engaging in sexual
acts with the eight-year-old son of respondent’s live-in boyfriend. Investigators again found the
home in deplorable condition, with dirty diapers, garbage, and clothing again strewn about the
residence and no food in the home. Doctors later found evidence of vaginal penetration of both
Sherice and three-year-old Sharnell.
After their removal from respondent’s care, Shamarria, Sharnell, and Kenneth all
exhibited extensive and precocious familiarity with sexual acts and terms, even acting out
sexually on one another. Sharnell has repeatedly propositioned foster care workers and
attempted to fondle other children. The children all displayed a total lack of control over their
emotions, and during parenting times, respondent would disengage from them while they threw
bitter tantrums. She was repeatedly reminded not to take or make calls on her cellular phone and
that she needed to parent her children. After one of the last parenting-time visits, respondent
insisted on leaving at 5:00 p.m. in the middle of a major emotional meltdown by her children. It
took four caseworkers to subdue the children, who bit, scratched, and screamed through the
hallways after respondent left.
Under these circumstances, the trial court did not clearly err by finding that petitioner
presented clear and convincing evidence of statutory grounds for termination. Because of their
past neglect, each of the children needs extensive personal care, and petitioner has demonstrated
respondent’s inability to provide basic parental needs. According to MCL 712A.19b(3)(g), a
trial court may terminate a parent’s rights to a child if “[t]he parent, without regard to intent, fails
to provide proper care or custody for the child and there is no reasonable expectation that the
parent will be able to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time considering the
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child’s age.” In this case, respondent has not made any reasonable improvement to her parenting
after seven years of intervention and exhaustive services. The children have each spent only a
small fraction of their lives in her care and each has received inadequate care during that time.
All the children have endured the fallout of a life filled with abuse and neglect under their
mother’s care, and none of them could reasonably expect a safe and timely return to her home.
Moreover, petitioner has also clearly established MCL 712A.19b(3)(j), because further harm to
these high-needs children would almost certainly follow if they were returned to respondent’s
care. Because petitioner established each of these statutory grounds for termination with clear
and convincing evidence, the trial court correctly decided that termination of respondent’s
parental rights was appropriate unless it appeared that termination would clearly contravene the
children’s best interests. In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 354; 612 NW2d 407 (2000).
Finally, the record does not reflect that termination was clearly contrary to the children’s
best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5). Under their mother’s care, the children were severely
neglected and abused. Any bond with their mother was plainly superseded by her pronounced
inability to parent and protect them. This case’s history adequately indicates that the children’s
best interests were served by terminating respondent’s rights so that each child could hope to
receive permanent placement and care. Therefore, the trial court correctly granted the petition to
terminate respondent’s parental rights. In re Trejo, supra.
Affirmed.
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
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