PEOPLE OF MI V GARY DONNELL WARD
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
September 6, 2007
Plaintiff-Appellee,
V
No. 271641
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 04-005072-01
GARY DONNELL WARD,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Cavanagh, P.J., and Donofrio and Servitto, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a bench trial, defendant was convicted of assault with intent to murder, MCL
750.83, armed robbery, MCL 750.529, possession with intent to deliver marijuana, MCL
333.7401(2)(d)(iii), and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL
750.227b. The trial court sentenced defendant to serve two years’ imprisonment for felonyfirearm, consecutive to concurrent terms of imprisonment of ten and one-half to 16 years for the
assault conviction, three and one-half to seven years for the robbery conviction, and one to four
years for the marijuana conviction. Defendant appeals as of right, arguing that he was convicted
without the benefit of effective assistance of counsel, and that the trial court erred in denying
trial counsel’s motion for a continuance or to withdraw. We affirm. This case is being decided
without oral argument in accordance with MCR 7.214(E).
I. Basic Facts
The prosecutor presented evidence that on March 11, 2004, defendant’s accomplice
robbed and nonfatally shot defendant’s prospective marijuana customer, and that as the customer
fled, defendant and others continued shooting at him.
At the start of trial, defense counsel asked the trial court for a continuance, or to allow
him to withdraw from the case, on the grounds that a lack of communication with defendant left
him unprepared for trial. Defendant protested that counsel had been in touch only for the
purpose of demanding money. The trial court advised defendant, “today is the day set for trial.
We’re going to have the trial. [Defense counsel] has already indicated his objection to going
forward . . . . You can continue with [defense counsel] or if you want to represent yourself you
can do that, but we’re going to go to trial.” Defendant elected a bench trial, and defense counsel
represented defendant.
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Before sentencing, defendant engaged substitute counsel who successfully sought an
evidentiary hearing on the question of effective assistance of counsel. People v Ginther, 390
Mich 436, 443; 212 NW2d 922 (1973). This proceeding, which took place before a different
judge from the one who heard the trial, resulted in a decision concluding that defendant’s
attorney’s performance in fact met or exceeded normal professional standards.
II. Standards of Review
We review a trial court’s decisions on a motion to withdraw and a motion for a
continuance for an abuse of discretion. People v Bauder, 269 Mich App 174, 193; 712 NW2d
506 (2005); People v Williams, 386 Mich 565, 575; 194 NW2d 337 (1972). Review of a trial
court’s decision following a Ginther hearing presents a mixed question of fact and law. People v
LeBlanc, 465 Mich 575, 579; 640 NW2d 246 (2002). The factual aspect is reviewed for clear
error, and the legal aspect is reviewed de novo. See id.
III. Assistance of Counsel
The United States and Michigan constitutions guarantee a criminal defendant the right to
the effective assistance of counsel. US Const, Ams VI and XIV; Const 1963, art 1, § 20; United
States v Cronic, 466 US 648, 654; 104 S Ct 2039; 80 L Ed 2d 657 (1984); People v Pubrat, 451
Mich 589, 594; 548 NW2d 595 (1996). To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a
defendant must show that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness under prevailing professional norms. People v Daniel, 207 Mich App 47, 58;
523 NW2d 830 (1994). A defendant seeking a new trial for this reason must further show that
there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s error, the result of the proceedings would
have been different, and that the attendant proceedings were fundamentally unfair or unreliable.
People v Poole, 218 Mich App 702, 718; 555 NW2d 485 (1996).
A. Motion to Withdraw or for Continuance
Defendant emphasizes that, when moving to withdraw or for a continuance, defense
counsel reported that he been only superficially in touch with defendant since the final
conference three months earlier, and stated, “I have had no communication with him. I have no
defense. I have no idea what I’m doing whatsoever.” These remarks, considered in isolation
and taken at face value, seem to suggest that proceeding to trial meant wholly depriving
defendant of the benefit of assistance of counsel, a structural constitutional deficiency
demanding reversal. See Cronic, supra at 658-659. But, viewed in context, it is apparent that
defense counsel came to court with an operable grasp of the case, and only resorted to such
emphatic language to emphasize his frustration over defendant’s having failed to make himself
available for its preparation.
Defense counsel complained that in 15 or 20 attempts he was unable to reach defendant
by telephone until just days before trial, at which time defendant refused to appear at counsel’s
office. Counsel further reported that defendant’s “attitude toward me is totally negative,” and
that defendant “does not and will not cooperate.” We point out that defense counsel was
retained, not appointed, and that defendant never indicated he wished to fire him, or otherwise
arrange for substitute counsel, up to and continuing through trial. Counsel had appeared on
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defendant’s behalf at the arraignment, preliminary examination, and the final conference, and
apparently had succeeded in having defendant await trial at large on bail.
In denying the motion to withdraw, the trial court stated, “apparently he’s satisfied with
whatever representation you can give him with the understanding that you have not talked with
him. It appears to me that [defendant] understands the process and he’s . . . trying to avoid
coming to trial but that is not going to happen.” The trial court was within its rights in refusing
to allow defendant to gain the benefit of his own intransigence. We are loathe to grant appellate
relief over an irregularity for which the appellant was initially responsible. See People v Baines,
68 Mich App 385, 388-389; 242 NW2d 784 (1976).
Defendant’s protestation that counsel contacted him only to pressure him for more money
seems a dubious attempt to avoid responsibility for the lack of communication. It strains at
credulity to suggest that, even on the eve of trial, counsel would demand that defendant bring
money to his office while making clear that nothing else in furtherance of the representation was
in the offing. For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
holding defendant responsible for the lack of communication between himself and counsel, and
for insisting that defendant proceed to trial, either with counsel or as his own attorney.
B. Counsel’s Performance
Defendant characterizes defense counsel’s displays of impatience with him, and his
occasional revelations in connection with what few communications he and defendant had, as
driven by counsel’s desire to appear blameless for his lack of preparation, and asserts that
counsel’s incentive in this regard created a conflict of interest with defendant. We reject this
argument. Counsel’s desire to make the court understand his frustration could hardly have
compelled counsel to betray his office entirely and sabotage his representation of defendant. See
MRPC 1.7(b). Nor does our review of counsel’s performance cause us to doubt that defense
counsel did his best in the event.
Defendant protests that he had waived his right to a jury trial without advice from defense
counsel in the matter. But defendant did not take advantage of the trial court’s offer to allow him
and counsel a private conference, or otherwise express any need for legal advice beyond what the
trial court spelled out in accepting his waiver.
Defendant complains that defense counsel demonstrated his personal impatience with
defendant even while defendant was on the stand, citing the following exchanges:
Q: When you say “these people,” what people are you talking about?
A: The people that did that whatever they did to him that was from Flint, because
I wasn’t there. I pulled off after he got in that car.
Q: See, I asked you a simple question.
A: Okay.
Q: You got to just answer my question, okay?
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***
Q: What happens at that location?
A: When I got to the location he got out his car and he got in the Suburban.
Before he got in the Suburban he told me “I’m good.”
Q: Okay, now—
A: I was on my way to the bar so he said he’ll get with me tomorrow and
whatever I was, whatever he was gon [sic] give me he’ll give it to me
tomorrow and I pulled off and I left.”
Q: You’ll allow me to ask you a question, won’t you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Just for the heck of it?
***
Q: Mr. Ward, you’re never going to believe this, but in a court there’s a question
and there’s an answer.
A: Okay.
Q: And you respond slowly.
A: All right.
Q: Okay?
A: Okay.
We find nothing adverse about the representation in these examples. In striving to hold
defendant to directly responsive answers to his questions, defense counsel was promoting
efficiency in the matter of getting defendant’s version of the events before the factfinder, which
was less likely to put defendant in a poor light than to please the trial court in this bench trial.
Defendant asserts that counsel failed to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful
adversarial testing. See Cronic, supra at 656-657. But defendant specifies no situation where
defense counsel overlooked some advantage that might have been gained through more rigorous
cross-examination. Defendant’s cursory assertion merits no further consideration. See People v
Mackle, 241 Mich App 583, 604 n 4; 617 NW2d 339 (2000); People v Jones (On Rehearing),
201 Mich App 449, 456-457; 506 NW2d 542 (1993).
Defendant complains about his lack of contact with defense counsel in the months
preceding trial, and cites authority for the proposition that denial of the opportunity to work with
counsel in the preparation of a defense constitutes denial of effective assistance of counsel.
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Defendant then acknowledges that the trial court held defendant, not counsel, responsible for that
lack of communication, but argues that “even if [defendant] were to blame for the breakdown in
communication, [defendant’s] non-communication cannot explain and should not justify his
attorney’s inability of fulfill his duties to his client.” But defendant cites no authority for the
proposition that a criminal defendant can willfully make himself unavailable to counsel, and then
cite that lack of communication in support of a claim of ineffective assistance. The caselaw in
fact holds otherwise. See People v Luster, 44 Mich App 38, 41-42; 205 NW2d 78 (1972).
Defendant also complains that counsel did not investigate his case well enough. See
People v Kimble, 109 Mich App 659, 663; 311 NW2d 446 (1981). But defendant does not
specify what counsel might have discovered in the way of witnesses, evidence, or theories of
defense, from more aggressive investigation that would have benefited the defense. We decline
to speculate on how further investigation might have improved defendant’s position. See
Mackle, supra; Jones, supra.
At the Ginther hearing, trial counsel boasted of his 38 years’ experience as an attorney.
When asked if he had conducted any investigation in this case, counsel answered in the
affirmative, elaborating, “[t]alked to my client once or twice. Probably more so by phone
because he refused to come to the office. Held a preliminary exam. Got the discovery. As best I
could, prepared to [sic] trial without a client.” Counsel denied refusing to meet with defendant
unless the defendant paid him. Counsel recounted talking with defendant before the preliminary
examination, and reviewing the transcript of that examination, along with the victim’s medical
records, before trial. Counsel reported that defendant had personally chosen to testify on his own
behalf, overriding counsel’s advice in the matter. The court below, in its written opinion,
concluded as follows:
The court does not find that the Defendant in this case was afforded
ineffective[] assistance of counsel. The defendant was afforded extremely
capable counsel and received effective assistance of counsel at the time the
charges were tried that had been brought against him. The conduct and
performance of [trial counsel] did in fact meet or exceed the objective standard of
reasonableness under prevailing professional norms . . . . There has been no
factual presentation or argument basically premised upon any fact that has come
out during the course of this Ginther Hearing that would lead to a reasonable
probability that the conduct of [trial counsel] would have resulted in a different
outcome . . . . [Italics supplied.]
The court additionally noted, “Often . . . defense attorneys are confronted with recalcitrant,
obstinate, noncommunicative clients,” but that such a situation “does not therefore mean that the
defense attorney is rendering ineffective assistance of counsel at the time of trial.”
We agree with the circuit judge that, in light of defendant’s uncooperative posture,
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defense counsel performed admirably. This record and defendant’s arguments bring to light no
error in those findings or conclusions.
Affirmed.
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
/s/ Deborah A. Servitto
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