IN RE MARIA OSTRANDER MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of MARIA OSTRANDER, Minor.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
UNPUBLISHED
August 23, 2007
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 274901
Oakland Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 03-681541-NA
PATRICIA OSTRANDER,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
ENSON LOPEZ,
Respondent.
Before: Davis, P.J., and Schuette and Borrello, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent Patricia Ostrander appeals as of right from the trial court’s order terminating
her parental rights to the minor child under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j). We affirm.
I. FACTS
Respondent1 is the minor child’s mother. The child suffers from Williams Syndrome, a
condition that causes mental retardation, as well as many other health problems, and which
involves an extraordinary effort to raise a child with the syndrome. At the bench trial, there was
testimony that respondent missed many of the minor child’s therapy and doctor appointments
and that she lacked the ability to care for the child. The trial court terminated respondent’s
parental rights. Respondent now appeals the trial court’s decision.
1
Respondent Enson Lopez is not a party to this appeal.
“respondent” refer to Patricia Ostrander only.
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Therefore, all references to
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Termination of parental rights is appropriate where petitioner proves by clear and
convincing evidence at least one ground for termination. In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 355-356;
612 NW2d 407 (2000). Once this has occurred, the trial court shall terminate parental rights
unless it finds that the termination is clearly not in the best interests of the children. Id. at 364365. This Court reviews the trial court’s findings under the clearly erroneous standard. MCR
3.977(J); In re JK, 468 Mich 202, 209-210; 661 NW2d 216 (2003). A finding of fact is clearly
erroneous if a reviewing court has a definite and firm conviction that a mistake was made, giving
due regard to the trial court’s special opportunity to observe the witnesses. In re Miller, 433
Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989).
III. ANALYSIS
A. Statutory Ground for Termination
The trial court did not clearly err by finding that the statutory ground for termination was
established by clear and convincing evidence. MCR 3.977(J); In re BZ, 264 Mich App 286, 296;
690 NW2d 505 (2004). Under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j), the trial court may terminate a parent’s
rights to a child if the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that “[t]here is a reasonable
likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of the child’s parent, that the child will be harmed if
he or she is returned to the home of the parent.” In this case, the child suffers from Williams
Syndrome, a condition involving various abnormalities including slow brain development,
cardiovascular disease, kidney impairments, eye problems, and mental retardation. According to
the child’s doctor, raising a child with Williams Syndrome involves “a tremendous amount of
time and organization above and beyond that” necessary to raise a normal child. The evidence
established that respondent attended only 38 of 52 doctor appointments and 12 of 142 therapy
appointments. She never asked what skills were addressed in missed classes and stated that she
attended one class weekly in order to give the foster parent a break. However, it was important
for respondent to attend therapy sessions to develop skills necessary to interact with the child.
The evidence also showed that respondent was unable to timely schedule the child’s
doctor appointments, was not knowledgeable regarding the child’s medications, and often relied
on the foster parents to provide necessary information to the child’s doctors. Respondent’s
psychological evaluation indicated that she did not have very strong insight into the child’s
medical issues. Indeed, on one occasion, she attempted to feed the child ice cream even though
the child is lactose intolerant. Respondent’s caseworkers questioned whether respondent
understood the child’s health issues and indicated that despite her apparent good intentions, she
failed to follow through regarding the child’s healthcare needs. Therefore, because the evidence
showed that respondent was either unwilling or incapable of caring for the child, given the
child’s very serious health problems, the trial court did not clearly err in determining that, based
on respondent’s conduct or capacity, a reasonable likelihood of harm existed if the child was
returned to respondent’s care.
B. Best Interests of the Child
Once petitioner presented clear and convincing evidence supporting at least one statutory
basis for termination, the trial court was required to terminate respondent’s parental rights unless
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there existed clear evidence that termination was not in the child’s best interests. MCL
712A.19b(5); In re Trejo, supra at 354; In re CR, 250 Mich App 185, 195; 646 NW2d 506
(2002). The record shows that respondent was not fully cognizant of the child’s condition, was
not able to properly manage the child’s medications and doctor and therapy schedule, and did not
understand the importance of attending therapy sessions. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial
court’s best interests determination was not clearly erroneous.
Affirmed.
/s/ Alton T. Davis
/s/ Bill Schuette
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
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