IN RE YONTS-LINDSEY/LINDSEY MINORS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of ANTHONY JAMAR DILLARDLINDSEY, AYANA AALIYAH YONTSLINDSEY, and ASHLEY MARIE YONTSLINDSEY, Minors.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
UNPUBLISHED
July 17, 2007
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 274974
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 05-437815-NA
WILLIE LEE YONTS,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
CARMAIL GLADYS LINDSEY and
FREDERICK DILLARD,
Respondents.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 274975
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 05-437815-NA
CARMAIL GLADYS LINDSEY,
Respondent-Appellant.
and
WILLIE LEE YONTS and FREDERICK
DILLARD,
Respondents.
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Before: Meter, P.J., and Talbot and Owens, J.J.
PER CURIAM.
In these consolidated appeals, respondents appeal as of right from orders terminating
their parental rights to their minor children under MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)(ii), MCL
712A.19b(3)(c)(i), MCL 712A.19b(3)(g), MCL 712A.19b(3)(i), MCL 712A.19b(3)(j), and MCL
712A.19b(3)(k)(i). We affirm.
In order to terminate parental rights, the trial court must find that at least one statutory
basis for termination has been established by clear and convincing evidence. In re CR, 250 Mich
App 185, 194-195; 646 NW2d 506 (2002). Once it makes such a finding, the court must order
termination of parental rights unless it would clearly not be in the children’s best interests. MCL
712A.19b(5). We review the trial court’s findings that grounds for termination exist and the
court’s decision regarding the children’s best interests under the clearly erroneous standard. In
re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 356-357; 612 NW2d 407 (2000).
We find that there was clear and convincing evidence to terminate respondents’ parental
rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) and that termination was not clearly contrary to the best
interests of the children.
MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) states:
The court may terminate a parent's parental rights to a child if the court
finds, by clear and convincing evidence, [that] . . . [t]he parent, without regard
to intent, fails to provide proper care or custody for the child and there is no
reasonable expectation that the parent will be able to provide proper care and
custody within a reasonable time considering the child's age.
Respondents in this case were given a year to establish their ability to provide proper care and
custody for their children and failed to do so. The court had ordered that respondents be given
an opportunity to improve their lives and respondents agreed with the court that one year would
be sufficient to take care of the requirements in their parent-agency agreements (PAAs). The
primary requirements of Lindsey’s PAA were drug screens, individual counseling, parenting
classes, and parenting time with her children. However, the record shows that Lindsey regularly
missed required drug screens. When she did submit screens, she often tested positive for drugs.
She attended counseling and parenting classes but there is evidence that she did not benefit from
either service – she missed roughly two thirds of her scheduled parenting time in 2005, she did
not improve her interaction or bond with her children during the parenting time she did attend,
and she continued to deny the importance of her drug abuse.
When parents are court-ordered to comply with treatment plans, this Court has ruled:
[I]t is not enough to merely go through the motions; a parent must benefit
from the services offered so that he or she can improve parenting skills to the
point where the children would no longer be at risk in the parent's custody. In
other words, it is necessary, but not sufficient, to physically comply with the
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terms of a parent/agency agreement or case service plan. For example, attending
parenting classes, but learning nothing from them and, therefore, not changing
one's harmful parenting behaviors, is of no benefit to the parent or child. [In re
Gazella, 264 Mich App 668, 676; 692 NW2d 708 (2005).]
The record supports the trial court’s conclusion that Lindsey’s compliance with individual
counseling and parenting classes was the insufficient “physical” compliance the Court addressed
in Gazella.
The primary requirements of Yonts’s PAA were drug screens, parenting classes, finding
and maintaining suitable income and housing, and attendance at scheduled parenting time.
Yonts did attend parenting classes. However, he missed two thirds of his scheduled parenting
time in 2005, and the court concluded that he failed to benefit from parenting classes. Yonts also
frequently missed required drug screens and tested positive for 75 percent of the screens he did
submit in 2006. He continued to abuse drugs throughout the duration of the case and had a final
positive screen just days before the termination hearing began. Additionally, there is evidence
that he failed to maintain suitable housing or regular employment.1
Respondents’ failure to comply with their PAAs is evidence of their failure to provide
proper care and custody for their children. In re JK, 468 Mich 202, 214; 661 NW2d 216 (2003).
Also, given that respondents agreed with the court that one year would be sufficient to rectify the
conditions that led to adjudication and then subsequently failed to comply with many of the
requirements in their treatment plans, such as providing drug screens and attending parenting
time, it is unlikely that respondents would be able to provide proper care or custody for their
children at any reasonable time in the future. Thus, the trial court did not clearly err when it
terminated respondents’ parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g). Because termination was
proper under this subsection, we will not address the remaining statutory grounds. See In re
Sours, 459 Mich 624, 640-641; 593 NW2d 520 (1999).
Respondents contend that termination of their parental rights was clearly not in the best
interests of their children. In its order terminating parental rights to Anthony and Ayana, the trial
court concluded:
[T]here is no evidence to show that termination of parental rights is clearly
not in the children’s best interest. These children have been in foster care for a
significant period of time and are at an age where permanent planning is essential
for continued growth and development. Reasonable efforts have been made by
[DHS] to prevent the children’s removal from the home and reasonable efforts
have been made to attempt to rectify the conditions causing such removal. These
efforts have been unsuccessful.
1
We reject Yonts’s argument on appeal regarding the alleged failure of DHS to make reasonable
efforts to reunite him with his children; we note, significantly, that he was dilatory in raising this
claim.
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The trial court came to a similar conclusion regarding Ashley.
The court’s findings regarding the best interests of the children were proper. The two
youngest children had not been in respondents’ care since shortly after the children’s births. The
oldest child, Anthony, was removed from Lindsey’s care six months after his birth. By failing to
comply with their PAAs, respondents failed to establish their ability to parent their children.
Additionally, the caseworker testified that there was little or no bond between respondents and
their children and that termination was in the best interests of the children, and “regard is to be
given to the special opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses who
appeared before it.” In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989). Based on the
record, the trial court did not clearly err in finding that termination of respondents’ parental
rights was not clearly contrary to the best interests of the children.
Affirmed.
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ Donald S. Owens
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