PEOPLE OF MI V JAMES WILLIAMS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
July 17, 2007
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 269794
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 05-011964-01
JAMES WILLIAMS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Meter, P.J., and Talbot and Owens, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his jury trial convictions for first-degree criminal sexual
conduct, MCL 750.520b(1)(c), and first-degree home invasion, MCL 750.110a(2). Defendant
received concurrent sentences of 55 to 100 years’ imprisonment for the first-degree criminal
sexual conduct conviction and 8 to 20 years’ imprisonment for the first-degree home invasion
conviction, with credit for 148 days served. We affirm.
I. Facts
About 1:00 a.m. on May 11, 2005, the 13-year-old victim was sleeping in her bed in her
Detroit home. Her mother had just left the house to deliver spare keys to a friend who had
locked herself out of her car. Defendant, who was not known by either the victim or her mother,
entered the home without permission. Defendant began choking the victim as she slept,
awakening her. When the victim tried to speak, defendant pushed her on her back, put his hand
over her mouth, and put a pillowcase over her face. He removed the victim’s shorts and
underpants and placed his penis in her vagina. He then licked and kissed her breasts and
attempted to place his penis in her anus. Defendant heard the victim’s mother returning and fled
from the house. The victim was transported by ambulance to the hospital. She was then taken to
a sexual assault clinic, where a forensic nurse collected physical evidence from her body. DNA
found on the victim’s body matched defendant’s DNA.
The trial court granted the prosecution’s motion to admit other acts evidence of a sexual
assault that defendant allegedly committed against a 17-year-old woman in 2001. This woman,
in her early 20s at the time of trial, testified that she was living with a friend in December 2001.
On the night of December 15, 2001, the woman was sleeping in a bedroom on the first floor of
the home. The woman awoke when an unknown male moved her on her back and attempted to
smother her by placing his hands around her neck and nose. The perpetrator removed her sleep
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pants and underwear, licked her vagina and anus, and penetrated her vagina with his penis. The
perpetrator then ran from the room and left the house. The woman could not identify the
perpetrator and did not know defendant. Nobody at the house where the woman was staying in
December 2001 had permitted the perpetrator to enter. DNA found on the woman’s body also
matched defendant’s DNA.
II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
First, defendant argues that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective
assistance of counsel at a critical stage of the proceedings because his trial attorney failed to meet
with him until the day before trial. We disagree. Because defendant failed to move for a new
trial or a Ginther1 hearing, this issue is unpreserved. People v Cox, 268 Mich App 440, 453; 709
NW2d 152 (2005). Therefore, our review of this claim of error is limited to mistakes apparent
on the record. Id.
Whether defendant has been denied effective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of
fact and constitutional law. People v LeBlanc, 465 Mich 575, 579; 640 NW2d 246 (2002). We
must first determine the facts and then decide whether these facts constitute a violation of
defendant’s constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. Id. We review a trial court’s
findings of fact for clear error, but we review constitutional determinations de novo. Id.
Effective assistance of counsel is presumed, and the defendant bears a
heavy burden of proving otherwise. [LeBlanc, supra at 578]. In order to
overcome this presumption, defendant must first show that counsel’s performance
was deficient as measured against an objective standard of reasonableness under
the circumstances and according to prevailing professional norms. Strickland v
Washington, 466 US 668, 687-688; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984);
People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 312-313; 521 NW2d 797 (1994). Second,
defendant must show that the deficiency was so prejudicial that he was deprived
of a fair trial such that there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors the trial outcome would have been different. Id. at 314;
People v Toma, 462 Mich 281, 302-303; 613 NW2d 694 (2000). [People v
Solmonson, 261 Mich App 657, 663-664; 683 NW2d 761 (2004).]
However, if defendant was denied counsel during a critical stage of the proceedings, these
proceedings are presumed to have been unfair. United States v Cronic, 466 US 648, 659; 104
S Ct 2039; 80 L Ed 2d 657 (1984). In this case, the conviction would be constitutional error and
no showing of prejudice would be required. Id. at 659 n 25.
On appeal, defendant alleges that he was denied the assistance of counsel throughout the
pretrial stage of the proceedings and that, pursuant to Cronic, this error alone establishes that his
conviction was unconstitutional. However, other than defendant’s claim during his motion for
self-representation that the first time defense counsel came to see him was the day before the trial
1
People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436, 443; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).
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began, there is no evidence on the record indicating the number of times that defense counsel
met with defendant. Defendant cannot rely merely on a self-serving statement made to the trial
court, but not under oath, claiming that his counsel failed to see him until the day before trial
began in order to establish that he was denied counsel during the pretrial process. Further, the
record indicates that counsel assisted defendant during the pretrial proceedings. Defendant’s
trial counsel appeared before the trial court on two dates in connection with the prosecution’s
motion to admit other acts evidence under MRE 404(b). Further, in the process of arguing
against the admission of MRE 404(b) evidence, defense counsel discussed an anticipated defense
of consent based on information likely acquired through discussions with defendant.2 Further,
defense counsel competently argued during these pretrial motion hearings that evidence of the
prior alleged sexual assault should not be admitted because it would be more prejudicial than
probative. Defense counsel provided the assistance ordinarily expected during the pretrial
period, and defendant was not denied the right to effective assistance of counsel.
III. Admission of MRE 404(b) Evidence
Next, defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted evidence
of the 2001 sexual assault under MRE 404(b). We disagree. We review the trial court’s decision
to admit evidence for an abuse of discretion. People v Johnson, 474 Mich 96, 99; 712 NW2d
703 (2006). “[A] trial court’s decision on a close evidentiary question ordinarily cannot be an
abuse of discretion.” People v Hine, 467 Mich 242, 250-251; 650 NW2d 659 (2002).
MRE 404(b)(1), which governs the admission of other acts evidence, provides as follows:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may,
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, scheme, plan, or system in doing an act, knowledge, identity,
or absence of mistake or accident when the same is material, whether such other
crimes, wrongs, or acts are contemporaneous with, or prior or subsequent to the
conduct at issue in the case.
MRE 404(b) is a rule of inclusion. People v Pesquera, 244 Mich App 305, 317; 625 NW2d 407
(2001). Relevant other acts evidence does not violate MRE 404(b) unless offered only to show
the criminal propensity of an individual and to establish that he acted in conformity therewith.
People v Katt, 248 Mich App 282, 304-305; 639 NW2d 815 (2001), aff’d 468 Mich 272 (2003).
2
During the MRE 404(b) motion hearings, defense counsel presented defendant’s alternate
theory of the case. Defendant claimed that he and the victim’s mother had an ongoing sexual
relationship, and that the victim’s mother had planted his semen (taken from a used condom) on
the victim in order to frame defendant for sexual assault. Defendant claimed that his sexual
encounter with the 17-year-old had been consensual. Insufficient evidence was presented at trial
to support this theory of the case. The victim, her mother, and the 17-year-old each denied
knowing defendant or having a relationship or consensual interaction with him.
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Our Supreme Court developed a four-part test to determine if other acts evidence is admissible
pursuant to MRE 404(b):
First, the prosecutor must offer the other acts evidence under something
other than a character to conduct or propensity theory. MRE 404(b). Second, the
evidence must be relevant under MRE 402, as enforced through MRE 104(b), to
an issue of fact of consequence at trial. Third, under MRE 403, a “‘determination
must be made whether the danger of undue prejudice [substantially] outweighs
the probative value of the evidence in view of the availability of other means of
proof and other facts appropriate for making decisions of this kind under
Rule 403.’” Finally, the trial court, upon request, may provide a limiting
instruction under MRE 105. [People v Sabin (After Remand), 463 Mich 43, 5556; 614 NW2d 888 (2000), quoting People v VanderVliet, 444 Mich 52, 75; 508
NW2d 114 (1993), amended on other grounds 445 Mich 1205 (1994) (internal
citation omitted).]
Evidence offered to prove identity must meet an additional test. This Court has affirmed
that the test articulated by our Supreme Court in People v Golochowicz, 413 Mich 298; 319
NW2d 518 (1982), “‘remains valid’ when the proponent of the other acts evidence uses it ‘to
show identification through modus operandi.’” People v Smith, 243 Mich App 657, 671; 625
NW2d 46 (2000), remanded on other grounds 465 Mich 931 (2001), quoting People v Ho, 231
Mich App 178, 186; 585 NW2d 357 (1998). Under the Golochowicz test, four circumstances
must be present in order to offer evidence to prove identity:
(1) [T]here must be substantial evidence that the defendant actually
perpetrated the bad act sought to be introduced; (2) there must be some special
quality or circumstance of the bad act tending to prove the defendant’s identity or
the motive, intent, absence of mistake or accident, scheme, plan or system in
doing the act or opportunity, preparation and knowledge; (3) one or more of these
factors must be material to the determination of the defendant’s guilt of the
charged offense; and (4) the probative value of the evidence sought to be
introduced must not be substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice. [Golochowicz, supra at 309.]
The trial court correctly determined that the evidence that defendant sexually assaulted
the 17-year-old in 2001 satisfied both the VanderVliet and Golochowicz tests. Because DNA
evidence linked defendant to both incidents, the evidence that defendant committed the 2001
sexual assault was relevant to show that defendant also sexually assaulted the victim in the
instant case, that he entered her home with the intent to commit a sexual assault, and that his
DNA was found on her because he sexually assaulted her, rather than for some other reason. In
essence, the evidence was material to the determination of defendant’s guilt to rebut the
anticipated defense theory that the victim’s mother planted the physical evidence on the victim.
With regard to the first Golochowicz factor, the DNA evidence linking defendant to the 2001
sexual assault constitutes substantial evidence that defendant actually committed that prior bad
act. See Smith, supra at 672 (finding a “distinct possibility” that substantial evidence that the
defendant committed the other bad act existed where the victim in the prior case was able to
describe the perpetrator to police, the description matched the defendant, and the victim
immediately identified the defendant as her attacker when she saw his photograph in the
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newspaper). The unusual nature of both attacks, in which the perpetrator would enter a house
late at night and rape a teenage girl asleep in her bed, tend to prove that defendant committed
both acts and to disavow the proposed defense theory that defendant was framed.
In addition, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the probative
value of the evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect. Although the evidence was prejudicial to
defendant, it was also highly probative. “Whether other-acts evidence is more prejudicial than
probative is best left to the contemporaneous assessment of the trial court.” People v McGhee,
268 Mich App 600, 614; 709 NW2d 595 (2005). The probative value of this evidence is not
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
Finally, the jury was properly instructed to only consider the testimony of the woman
who was sexually assaulted in 2001 to show that the person who committed that offense also
sexually assaulted the victim. Jurors are presumed to follow their instructions. People v Graves,
458 Mich 476, 486; 581 NW2d 229 (1998). Accordingly, we assume that the jurors only
considered this evidence for a proper purpose.
IV. Denial of Defendant’s Request for Self-Representation
Finally, defendant argues that the trial court improperly denied defendant’s request to
represent himself, violating defendant’s state and federal constitutional right of selfrepresentation. We disagree. “Although we review for clear error the trial court’s factual
findings regarding a defendant’s knowing and intelligent waiver of [Sixth Amendment
rights], . . . the meaning of ‘knowing and intelligent’ is a question of law. We review questions
of law de novo.” People v Williams, 470 Mich 634, 640; 683 NW2d 597 (2004), citing People v
Daoud, 462 Mich 621, 629-630; 614 NW2d 152 (2000). An erroneous denial of the right to selfrepresentation is a structural error requiring reversal of defendant’s conviction. United States v
Gonzalez-Lopez, ___ US ___; 126 S Ct 2557, 2564; 165 L Ed 2d 409, 419 (2006).
A criminal defendant’s right to represent himself is implicitly guaranteed by the United
States Constitution, US Const, Am VI, and explicitly guaranteed by both the Michigan
Constitution, Const 1963, art 1, § 13, and by statute, MCL 763.1. Because the right to selfrepresentation is not absolute, several requirements must be met before a defendant may
represent himself. People v Russell, 471 Mich 182, 190-191; 684 NW2d 745 (2004). First, a
defendant’s request to represent himself must be unequivocal. Williams, supra at 642. Second,
“the trial court must be satisfied that the waiver [of the right to counsel] is knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily made.” Id. “Third, the trial court must be satisfied that the
defendant will not disrupt, unduly inconvenience, and burden the court or the administration of
court business.” Id. Finally, the trial court must comply with the requirements of MCR 6.005 by
advising the defendant of the charge, the maximum possible prison sentence for the offense, any
mandatory minimum sentence required by law, and the risks of self-representation, and by
offering the defendant the opportunity to consult with a lawyer. MCR 6.005(D); Russell, supra
at 190-191.
In order to determine whether a defendant has knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily
asserted his right to waive assistance of counsel, the trial court may consider defendant’s
competence. People v Dennany, 445 Mich 412, 432; 519 NW2d 128 (1994), quoting People v
Anderson, 398 Mich 361, 368; 247 NW2d 857 (1976). “But his competence does not refer to
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legal skills, ‘[f]or his technical legal knowledge, as such, [is] not relevant to an assessment of his
knowing exercise of the right to defend himself.’” Dennany, supra at 432, quoting Anderson,
supra at 368, quoting Faretta v California, 422 US 806, 835; 95 S Ct 2525; 45 L Ed 2d 562
(1975).
The trial court appears to have considered defendant’s “technical legal knowledge” when
denying his request to represent himself at trial, although it should not have considered this in
determining whether defendant knowingly and intelligently asserted his right to selfrepresentation. However, because the trial court based its assessment on defendant’s “questions
and comments,” it appears that the court also weighed defendant’s general competence and
concluded that defendant did not intelligently assert his right to self-representation. The trial
court’s conclusion was not clearly erroneous because defendant’s statements suggest that he was
confused about basic issues involved in the case. For example, defendant seemed confused
about the relationship between the victim’s consent and DNA evidence. After defendant told the
court that his attorney had not made a motion “for an Evidentiary Hearing on the DNA
evidence,” the trial court asked what the purpose of such a motion would be given the defense
theory that the victim’s mother planted defendant’s DNA on the victim. Defendant responded,
Well, I said from the beginning there was consent and can’t be any DNA from
me, and they keep saying it is, and it was. So, I’m saying that’s the only way it
could have got there if it was there. I’m not saying it was. I’m saying if it was
though, that’s the only way it could have got there. That’s what I’m saying.
In light of defendant’s failure to competently articulate his reasons for wanting to represent
himself and his confusion regarding the purpose and effect of the DNA evidence, it was not clear
error for the trial court to find that defendant had not knowingly and intelligently asserted his
right to self-representation.
Further, defendant only requested to represent himself after trial had begun. Although
the fact that trial has already begun does not preclude a defendant from asserting his right to selfrepresentation, “the potential for delay and inconvenience to the court may be greater if the
request [for self-representation] is made during trial.” Anderson, supra at 368. It was not
improper for the trial court to consider whether a change in representation during the trial would
cause delay or inconvenience and to conclude that defendant’s self-representation would be
disruptive, inconvenient, and burdensome for the court.
Affirmed.
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ Donald S. Owens
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