CENTER CONSTRUCTION CO V LARRY F WHETSTONE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
CENTER CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
UNPUBLISHED
June 19, 2007
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 267835
Genesee Circuit Court
LC No. 03-077881-CZ
LARRY F. WHETSTONE,
Defendant,
and
CAPITAL CROSSING BANK,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
ANTCLIFF WINDOWS & DOORS, INC., D & E
ELECTRIC, INC., SHANK COUPLAND LONG
COMPANY, ELITE EXTERIORS, R & R
POURED WALLS, INC., AUTUMN GLO
FIREPLACE SUPPLY, INC., and TROY JOHNS,
d/b/a TROY JOHNS HARDWOOD FLOORS,
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Cooper, P.J., and Murphy and Neff, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
This appeal involves a priority dispute to the sale proceeds of real property between a
successor mortgagee, Capital Crossing Bank, and several construction lien claimants. Capital
Crossing appeals as of right, challenging the circuit court’s order dividing the proceeds. We
affirm in part and reverse in part. This appeal is being decided without oral argument pursuant to
MCR 7.214(E).
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The determination of this appeal requires interpretation of the Construction Lien Act
(“CLA”), a legal issue that this Court considers de novo. DLF Trucking, Inc v Bach, 268 Mich
App 306, 309; 707 NW2d 606 (2005). “It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that a clear
and unambiguous statute warrants no further interpretation and requires full compliance with its
provisions, as written.” Northern Concrete Pipe, Inc v Sinacola Cos-Midwest, Inc, 461 Mich
316, 320; 603 NW2d 257 (1999). But “[i]t is well settled that the CLA is remedial in nature, and
‘shall be liberally construed to secure the beneficial results, intents, and purposes of (the) act.’”
DLF Trucking, supra at 311, quoting MCL 570.1302(1). “It is similarly well-settled that the
CLA was enacted for the dual purpose of (1) protecting the rights of lien claimants to payment
for expenses and (2) protecting property owners from paying twice for these expenses.” Id.
I. Lots 69 and 70
R & R Poured Walls, Inc., does not dispute that Capital Crossing had a mortgage on lots
69 and 70, which it recorded in April 2002, or that defaulted developer Larry F. Whetstone
received funds pursuant to this mortgage before R & R poured foundations at these lots. The
plain language of MCL 570.1119(4) gives Capital Crossing priority over R & R’s construction
lien interest, leaving no discretion to decide the issue in equity under MCL 570.1118.
Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s award of a share of the proceeds of the sale of lots 69
and 70 to R & R Poured Walls, Inc.
II. Lot 65
On behalf of all other construction lien claimants regarding lot 65, R & R accepts on
appeal, as it did before the circuit court, Capital Crossing’s contention that it had priority to
$98,620.70 in lot 65 sale proceeds (totaling $170,744.15) by virtue of its mortgage on lot 65, and
the fact that the bank had advanced the $98,620.70 pursuant to a line of credit before any
construction work on lot 65 had occurred. MCL 570.1119(3) and (4). Capital Crossing and R &
R dispute who should receive the remaining lot 65 sale proceeds amounting to $72,123.45.
We conclude that the circuit court properly awarded the remaining $72,123.45 in lot 65
proceeds to the contractors. The parties agree that the first improvement of lot 65 occurred on
May 2, 2002, when Throop, Inc., performed excavation work. Capital Crossing does not dispute
that after May 2, 2002, Whetstone received $54,908 in draws on his line of credit purportedly
going toward lot 65. Capital Crossing has offered no objection to R & R’s calculations that,
sometime after the May 2, 2002, excavation, the remaining lien claimants performed
improvements on lot 65 amounting to more than $70,000. Capital Crossing failed to present any
evidence that the bank had sought contractor waivers of priority regarding the post-May 2, 2002,
funds it advanced to Whetstone related to lot 65. Even on appeal, Capital Crossing simply
ignores this issue. Because (1) the bank has ignored the express statutory requirement that it
obtain contractor waivers to maintain the priority of funds advanced after the date of first
improvement, MCL 570.1119(4), and (2) the circuit court likewise considered the facts that (a)
the contractors’ substantial improvements to lot 65 had contributed to its sale price of $190,000,
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and (b) permitting Capital Crossing to retain all lot 65 sale proceeds would unjustly enrich it at
the contractors’ expense, MCL 570.1118, once again we cannot conclude that the circuit court
erred when it awarded the construction lien claimants the remainder of the lot 65 sale proceeds.1
Affirmed in part, reversed in part.
/s/ Jessica R. Cooper
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Janet T. Neff
1
To the extent that Capital Crossing relies on a cross-collateralization claim to support its
entitlement to the remaining lot 65 proceeds, we observe that it has presented on appeal authority
recognizing the concept of cross-collateralization, but no binding authority tending to support the
proposition that by cross-collateralization a bank can effectively avoid the statutory mandate in
§ 119(4) obligating it to obtain contractor waivers to maintain priority of bank funds disbursed
after the date of first improvement. Compare Union Bank & Trust Co, NA v Farmwald Dev
Corp, 181 Mich App 538, 548-549; 450 NW2d 274 (1989).
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