IN RE EMERSON OLLIE MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of EMERSON OLLIE, Minor.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, f/k/a
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY, and
OAKLAND COUNTY PROSECUTOR’S
OFFICE,
UNPUBLISHED
June 14, 2007
Petitioners-Appellees,
No. 269029
Oakland Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 99-616811-NA
v
KATHERINE OLLIE, a/k/a KATHERINE
FESSLER,
Respondent-Appellant.
Before: Servitto, P.J., and Jansen and Schuette, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent appeals as of right from the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights
to the minor child pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j). Because the trial court had
the court had subject-matter jurisdiction over this matter, the statutory grounds for termination
were established by clear and convincing evidence, and the evidence did not clearly show that
termination of respondent’s parental rights was not in the child’s best interests, we affirm.
A petition seeking temporary custody of the minor child was filed shortly after his birth
in 2002. During her pregnancy with the minor child, respondent failed to provide proof of
prenatal care, and did not visit with her obstetrician despite the fact that the child was several
weeks overdue. At that time, the minor child’s five older siblings were already in temporary
custody due to allegations of neglect.
Respondent’s parental rights to her five older children were ultimately terminated. After
several hearings occurring over more than three years, respondent’s rights to the minor child
were terminated as well.
Respondent first challenges the trial court’s jurisdiction over the child. To the extent that
respondent challenges the trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, we review this issue de novo.
Ryan v Ryan, 260 Mich app 315, 331; 677 NW2d 899 (2004).
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A court’s subject-matter jurisdiction may be challenged at any time, even collaterally. In
re Hatcher, 443 Mich 426, 438; 505 NW2d 834 (1993). Subject-matter jurisdiction is
established initially by the pleadings, such as the petition, and exists “when the proceeding is of a
class the court is authorized to adjudicate and the claim stated in the complaint is not clearly
frivolous.” Id. at 444.
Here, the initial petition alleged that the minor child’s home, by reason of respondent’s
neglect, was an unfit place to live. The petition included allegations that respondent’s other
children were already court wards, as well as allegations concerning respondent’s improper
parenting techniques during visitations with her other children, and deficient prenatal care during
her pregnancy with the instant minor child. A child may come within the court’s jurisdiction on
the basis of a parent’s treatment of other children. In re Gazella, 264 Mich App 668, 680; 692
NW2d 708 (2005). Because the petition included allegations bringing this case within the class
of cases the court is authorized to adjudicate under MCL 712A.2(b), the court had subject-matter
jurisdiction over the case.
To the extent that respondent also challenges the trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction, she
is precluded from raising such a claim in this appeal. As this Court explained in In re Gazella,
supra at 679-680,
[m]atters affecting the court’s exercise of its jurisdiction may be challenged only
on direct appeal of the jurisdictional decision, not by collateral attack in a
subsequent appeal of an order terminating parental rights.
See also, In re Hatcher, supra at 444. Respondent failed to appeal the trial court’s initial
dispositional order, see MCR 3.993(A)(1), and is barred from collaterally attacking the trial
court’s exercise of jurisdiction in this subsequent appeal from the order terminating her parental
rights. In re Hatcher, supra at 444; In re Gazella, supra at 680.
Next, respondent argues that the statutory grounds for termination were not established
by clear and convincing evidence. We disagree.
The petitioner must establish a statutory ground for termination under MCL 712A.19b(3)
by clear and convincing evidence. In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 356-357; 612 NW2d 407 (2000).
We review the trial court’s decision for clear error. Id. at 356. A trial court’s decision to
terminate parental rights is clearly erroneous if, although there is evidence to support it, the
reviewing court on the entire record is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake
has been made. In re JK, 468 Mich 202, 209-210; 661 NW2d 216 (2003). Once the court finds
that a statutory ground for termination has been established, MCL 712A.19b(5) requires that it
terminate the respondent’s parental rights to the child unless it finds that termination is clearly
not in the child’s best interests. In re Trejo, supra, at 364-365.
Here, more than 182 days had elapsed since the court issued its November 12, 2004,
initial dispositional order for the child. The evidence showed that five other children were
removed from respondent’s care because of neglect, and respondent’s parental rights to those
children were eventually terminated after she failed to benefit from services. While proceedings
involving the other children were pending, respondent became pregnant with the child at issue in
this case, and failed to obtain recommended prenatal care. Despite completion of some parenting
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skills training, respondent continued to display poor parenting skills, and failed to regularly
attend or benefit from therapy designed to address issues of self-esteem, anger management, and
domestic violence. Respondent was not receptive to services necessary for a successful
reunification and her emotional deficits prevented proper parenting of her special needs child.
Considering respondent’s past history and failure to benefit from services, it was not reasonably
likely that she would be able to adhere to the requirements of her treatment plan within a
reasonable time considering her child’s age. Thus, the trial court did not clearly err in finding
that § 19b(3)(c)(i) was established by clear and convincing evidence. Similarly, considering
respondent’s failure to provide any care for the child during his lifetime and her repeated failure
to comply with her treatment plan requirements or benefit from services, termination was also
warranted under § 19b(3)(g).
Additionally, because the child was a special needs child with a seizure disorder, and
there was evidence that respondent would not be able to recognize the child’s special needs, or
place the child’s interests above her own, the trial court did not clearly error in finding that
termination was also justified under § 19b(3)(j).
Finally, the child was removed from respondent’s care shortly after his birth and there
was little evidence of a bond, if any, between respondent and the child. The evidence did not
clearly show that termination of respondent’s parental rights was not in the child’s best interests.
MCL 712A.19b(5); In re Trejo, supra at 356.
Affirmed.
/s/ Deborah A. Servitto
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Bill Schuette
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