JAMES B ENGEL V BAY WINDS FEDERAL CREDIT UNION
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
JAMES B. ENGEL,
UNPUBLISHED
May 22, 2007
Plaintiff-Appellant,
V
No. 275443
Kent Circuit Court
LC No. 06-003804-NZ
BAY WINDS FEDERAL CREDIT UNION,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Cooper, P.J., and Murphy and Neff, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from the circuit court’s order granting summary disposition in
favor of defendant. We affirm. We decide this appeal without oral argument pursuant to MCR
7.214(E).
This case involves plaintiff’s complaint for conversion of a 1987 Lamborghini. The car
was co-owned by plaintiff, his father, Larry Engel, and his sister, Lisa Engel. According to
defendant, the car was offered as collateral for a loan. On June 27, 2003, the three signed a
“LoanLiner” agreement with defendant. The agreement did not specify the collateral for the loan
as including the Lamborghini. Larry Engel signed the document as a “borrower.” Plaintiff and
his sister also signed the document relative to a handwritten notation under their signatures that
they were “owners of collateral other than borrower.” In addition to this document, the three coowners of the car also allegedly executed an “Application for Michigan Vehicle Title” at the
same time. This form was handwritten, listed the Engels as co-owners, and listed defendant in
the space for first secured party. The stated reason for the application was “lien placement.” All
three of the Engels’ signatures are on the application. This application was allegedly submitted
to the Secretary of State along with a typewritten, unsigned application, with “see att” in the
signature line. This second form contains a “filing date” of July 18, 2003. According to an
affidavit from an employee of defendant who was involved in the transaction, this application
was executed on June 27, 2003.
Larry Engel had difficulty making payments on the loan. On August 13, 2003, he
executed a modification agreement changing the repayment schedule, but subsequently defaulted
on the loan. The modification agreement expressly indicated that the Lamborghini was collateral,
but plaintiff did not sign this agreement. Defendant made a demand for possession of the
automobile because of Larry Engel’s default on the loan. Defendant maintains that Engel
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refused; however, he sent defendant a letter on October 30, 2003, asking that defendant repossess
the car because plaintiff had missed the last six payments on the car and had disappeared with it.
Defendant had the Lamborghini seized and prepared it for sale. However, before the sale
could occur, the car was allegedly stolen. Defendant received insurance proceeds and apparently
applied the proceeds to the loan. Defendant indicates that the car was eventually recovered.
Plaintiff filed a complaint for conversion and a motion for a restraining order. Defendant
moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCL 2.116(C)(8) and (10), maintaining that
plaintiff’s claim was unfounded because it was entitled to possession of the car once plaintiff’s
father had defaulted on the loan. Plaintiff countered with a claim that his signature on the
security agreement was insufficient to create a security interest in the Lamborghini. In response
to defendant’s argument that plaintiff’s signature on the application for a certificate of title
identifying the Lamborghini and defendant as a secured party was itself sufficient to create a
security interest, plaintiff maintained that he had not signed such a document. He contended that
he had signed a “blank” application for title that did not contain this security interest when he
and his family were changing the title of the car from Florida to Michigan. He maintained that
his father had taken this application and, with defendant’s assistance, added the security interest
information to it before submitting it to the Secretary of State. Plaintiff provided his own
affidavit and that of his father in support of this claim. The trial court agreed with defendant,
denied plaintiff’s request for a restraining order, and granted defendant’s motion for summary
disposition. Plaintiff now appeals.
Issues of law, including whether a valid and enforceable security agreement exists under
article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), MCL 440.9101 et seq., are reviewed de novo.
Roan v Murray, 219 Mich App 562, 565; 556 NW2d 893 (1996). Questions of statutory
interpretation are also questions of law and are thus reviewed de novo. Ayar v Foodland
Distributors, 472 Mich 713, 715-716; 698 NW2d 875 (2005). When considering a motion
pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10), the trial court must “review the record evidence, and all
reasonable inferences therefrom, and determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists to
warrant a trial.” Harrison v Olde Financial Corp, 225 Mich App 601, 605; 572 NW2d 679
(1997). The trial court must consider affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, and other
evidence submitted by the parties in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Maiden v
Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 120; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). However, the court may not make factual
findings or weigh the credibility of witnesses. Nesbitt v American Community Mut Ins Co, 236
Mich App 215, 225; 600 NW2d 427 (1999). “A genuine issue of material fact exists when the
record, giving the benefit of reasonable doubt to the opposing party, leaves open an issue upon
which reasonable minds might differ.” West v General Motors Corp, 469 Mich 177, 183; 665
NW2d 468 (2003). “Where the proffered evidence fails to establish a genuine issue regarding
any material fact, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Maiden, supra at
120.
MCL 440.9203 provides in pertinent part:
(1) A security interest attaches to collateral when it becomes enforceable
against the debtor with respect to the collateral, unless an agreement expressly
postpones the time of attachment.
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(2) Except as otherwise provided in subsections (3) through (9), a security
interest is enforceable against the debtor and third parties with respect to the
collateral only if all of the following are met:
(a) Value has been given.
(b) The debtor has rights in the collateral or the power to transfer rights in
the collateral to a secured party.
(c) One or more of the following conditions are met:
(i) The debtor has authenticated a security agreement that provides
a description of the collateral and, if the security interest covers timber to
be cut, a description of the land concerned.
Article 9 defines a “security agreement” as “an agreement that creates or provides for a security
interest.” MCL 440.9102(ttt). MCL 440.9102(bb) provides in pertinent part:
“Debtor” means 1 of the following:
(i) A person having an interest, other than a security interest or other lien,
in the collateral, whether or not the person is an obligor.
The requirements for a security interest to attach, therefore, are relatively straightforward. As
this Court has previously stated, MCL 440.9203 is “essentially a statute of frauds [that] provides
that a security interest is not enforceable against a debtor and does not attach unless . . . the
agreement is in writing, signed by the debtor, and contains a description of the collateral.” Roan,
supra at 565-566.
In the instant case, the parties do not dispute that defendant gave value, or that plaintiff
had ownership rights in the collateral. Plaintiff’s argument that he is not bound by the security
agreement because he did not have a credit union account and was not a “co-borrower” is
without merit. The language of MCL 440.9102(bb) contemplates the attachment of a security
interest to property even when the owner is not an obligor on the loan.
We agree with plaintiff’s assertion that the security agreement is not, by itself, sufficient
to meet the requirements of an “authenticated . . . security agreement that provides a description
of the collateral” under MCL 440.9203. The agreement provides evidence that plaintiff intended
to provide a security interest in some collateral, as evidenced by the fact that plaintiff signed the
document as “owner[] of collateral other than borrower.” But it does not specifically describe
any collateral other than credit union accounts.
Defendant maintains that the title application signed by plaintiff was sufficient to create a
security agreement in the Lamborghini. Such a holding is supported by this Court’s decision in
Roan, supra at 566-567, where this Court held that an application could be so used:
Under Michigan law,
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“[a]greement” means the bargain of the parties in fact as found in
their language or by implication from other circumstances
including course of dealing or usage of trade or course of
performance as provided in this act (sections 1205 and 2208).
[MCL 440.1201(3)].
The Supreme Court has recognized that, although a signed writing
describing the collateral is required, the other requirements of an “agreement”
under the UCC may be established by parol evidence of course of dealings, usage
of trade, or course of performance. See NBD-Sandusky Bank v Ritter, 437 Mich
354, 364-365; 471 NW2d 340 (1991). The application for a certificate of title
showed unequivocally that plaintiff was to have a security interest in the Corvette.
Thus, we conclude that the title application constituted a security agreement that
gave plaintiff a security interest in the vehicle. [Alterations in original.]
On appeal, defendant essentially ignores plaintiff’s claim that he did not, in fact, sign the
disputed application for title presented by defendant in its appellate materials. We note,
however, that affidavits from plaintiff and plaintiff’s father, which we must credit when
reviewing whether defendant was entitled to summary disposition, contend that this document is
essentially a forgery.
Nevertheless, the title history presented by plaintiff below reveals another Application for
Michigan Vehicle Title, identifying plaintiff as the applicant and signed by him, ostensibly to
replace a lost title to the car. This application also identifies defendant as first secured party in
the automobile. Plaintiff’s assertions of fraud, which are specific to the other “jointly signed”
application for title, do not pertain to this second application. We find that this second
application also acts as an authentication of the security agreement and acknowledgement that
plaintiff unequivocally knew about and intended defendant to have a security interest in the
Lamborghini. See Roan, supra at 567.
Under the circumstances, we hold that plaintiff has failed to create a question of fact as to
whether he, his father, and his sister intended the Lamborghini to serve as collateral for the loan.
The evidence presented below unequivocally shows that they did. Because plaintiff does not
dispute that Larry Engel failed to make payments on the loan, or that defendant could not claim
possession of property legitimately given as collateral for the loan, we agree with the trial court’s
grant of summary disposition in defendant’s favor.
Affirmed.
/s/ Jessica R. Cooper
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Janet T. Neff
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