PEOPLE OF MI V DAVID DEMOND BRYANT
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
April 12, 2007
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 265908
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 05-005175-01
DAVID DEMOND BRYANT,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Wilder, P.J., and Sawyer and Davis, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a bench trial, defendant was convicted of felonious assault, MCL 750.82, felon
in possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f, carrying a concealed weapon, MCL 750.227, and
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b. Defendant was
sentenced to concurrent prison terms of one to four years for the assault conviction, one to five
years each for the felon in possession and CCW convictions, and a consecutive five-year term for
the felony-firearm conviction. Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm.
I. Underlying Facts
In April 2005, the complainant lived in a Detroit home with his wife Louise Scott-Curry,
their children, his stepdaughter Tamicka Scott, and his niece Kevina Scott. Defendant was
Tamicka’s boyfriend, intermittently. Kevina indicated that on April 8, 2005, defendant and
Tamicka had an argument. The complainant testified that on April 9, 2005, he called defendant’s
parole officer and defendant’s sister because he believed that defendant had poured gasoline
around his house. The complainant indicated that defendant later called and threatened him.
The complainant further indicated that at approximately 8:00 p.m., Kevina told him that
defendant had been driving around the block. Kevina testified that defendant circled the block
three or four times.
The complainant explained that between 8:30 and 9:00 p.m., he went to retrieve a phone
number from his car in order to call into work because he was afraid to leave his house. As he
was walking toward the house, he heard a car tire squeal, and saw defendant get out of a car with
a gun in his hand. Kevina testified that defendant was driving a tan car, and she saw the trunk
pop open before defendant emerged from the car pointing a black handgun at the complainant.
The complainant indicated that defendant pointed a nine-millimeter handgun at him from less
than ten feet away, and threatened to kill him. Both the complainant and Kevina testified that
-1-
defendant then went to the trunk of his car and brandished a long gun, which the complainant
described as an AK-47. The complainant was in shock and backed onto his porch, and Kevina
pulled him into the house. The complainant gathered his family, and subsequently called the
police.
At trial, defendant testified and denied any wrongdoing. Defendant admitted that he was
at the complainant’s house between 8:30 and 9:00 p.m., but denied possessing any weapons or
circling the block. He claimed that the complainant had called him, and requested that he come
over so they could talk. He stayed there for two to three minutes, but left at Tamicka’s urging
after the complainant yelled and “cussed” at him.
Tamicka testified on defendant’s behalf. She indicated that when defendant arrived, he
and the complainant had a verbal exchange. The complainant allegedly told defendant that he
knew he was on parole, and he was going to get defendant’s “a** locked back up.” Tamicka
testified that defendant did not have any weapons, and did not act in a threatening or aggressive
manner. On rebuttal, Scott-Curry testified that at the time of the incident, Tamicka was sleeping
in a back bedroom of the house.
II. Waiver of Trial by Jury
Defendant first argues that his waiver of his right to a jury trial was not voluntarily,
intelligently, and understandingly made. Defendant claims that his waiver was based on defense
counsel’s coercion, “emotional pressure,” and false claims that no jurors were available and that
he would have to wait two months for a jury trial.
A trial court’s determination that a defendant validly waived his right to a jury trial is
reviewed for clear error. People v Leonard, 224 Mich App 569, 595; 569 NW2d 663 (1997). A
finding is clearly erroneous where, after reviewing the entire record, we are “left with a definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” People v Parker, 230 Mich App 337, 339;
584 NW2d 336 (1998).
A defendant’s waiver of his constitutional right to trial by jury must be made voluntarily,
intelligently, and knowingly. People v Godbold, 230 Mich App 508, 512; 585 NW2d 13 (1998);
People v Reddick, 187 Mich App 547, 549; 468 NW2d 278 (1991). MCR 6.402(B) sets forth the
procedure for securing a proper jury trial waiver:
Before accepting a waiver, the court must advise the defendant in open
court of the constitutional right to trial by jury. The court must also ascertain, by
addressing the defendant personally, that the defendant understands the right and
that the defendant voluntarily chooses to give up that right and to be tried by the
court. A verbatim record must be made of the waiver proceeding.
Here, after being advised that the defendant wished to waive his right to a jury, the trial
court questioned defendant to confirm that wish. Defendant confirmed that he freely and
voluntarily, without any threats or promises, wished to waive his right to a jury trial.
The record demonstrates that the trial court complied with the requirements of MCR
6.402(B), and that defendant unequivocally testified on the record that he made the decision
-2-
freely and voluntarily. Defendant’s claim that his waiver was based on coercion, “emotional
stress,” and false information is contrary to the record made in open court and, therefore, must be
rejected. See People v Gist, 188 Mich App 610, 611-612; 470 NW2d 475 (1991). Further, a
trial court is not required to engage in a colloquy with a defendant to determine whether a jury
waiver is predicated on misleading statements. People v Shields, 200 Mich App 554, 560-561;
504 NW2d 711 (1993); People v Margoes, 141 Mich App 220, 223-224; 366 NW2d 254 (1985).
In addition, defendant completed a waiver form, as prescribed by MCL 763.3.1
Defendant suggests that the waiver form was ineffective because it lists an incorrect charge, i.e.,
bank robbery. But defendant fails to cite any authority for his argument. This Court will not
search for authority to support or reject a party’s claim. People v Smielewski, 214 Mich App 55,
64 n 10; 542 NW2d 293 (1995).2 We find no authority for the proposition that where a party
clearly waives his right to a jury trial in open court, an error in the charge stated in the written
waiver form vitiates the voluntariness of the waiver made in open court.
Consequently, the trial court did not clearly err by accepting defendant’s waiver of jury
trial.
III. Improper Questioning by the Trial Court
We reject defendant’s claim that the trial court’s questioning of a witness deprived him of
a fair trial. Defendant claims that the trial court impermissibly reversed its previous ruling
1
MCL 763.3 provides:
(1) In all criminal cases arising in the courts of this state the defendant
may, with the consent of the prosecutor and approval by the court, waive a
determination of the facts by a jury and elect to be tried before the court without a
jury. Except in cases of minor offenses, the waiver and election by a defendant
shall be in writing signed by the defendant and filed in the case and made a part of
the record. The waiver and election shall be entitled in the court and case, and in
substance as follows: “I, ______________________, defendant in the above case,
hereby voluntarily waive and relinquish my right to a trial by jury and elect to be
tried by a judge of the court in which the case may be pending. I fully understand
that under the laws of this state I have a constitutional right to a trial by jury.”
_______________________
Signature of defendant.
(2) Except in cases of minor offenses, the waiver of trial by jury shall be
made in open court after the defendant has been arraigned and has had
opportunity to consult with legal counsel.
2
This argument is also waived because it was not raised in defendant’s statement of questions
presented. MCR 7.212(C)(5); People v Miller, 238 Mich App 168, 172; 604 NW2d 781 (1999).
-3-
precluding the prosecutor from adding a witness, the complainant’s wife Louise Scott-Curry, and
called and questioned the witness on rebuttal.
Because defendant failed to object to the trial court’s questioning of the witness, we
review this claim for plain error affecting substantial rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750,
752-753, 763-764; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).
Initially, “[t]he trial court’s decision to permit the prosecutor to add or delete witnesses to
be called at trial is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” People v Callon, 256 Mich App 312,
325-326; 662 NW2d 501 (2003). To establish that the trial court abused its discretion, a
defendant must demonstrate that the court’s ruling resulted in prejudice. People v Williams, 188
Mich App 54, 59-60; 469 NW2d 4 (1991).
At the beginning of trial, the prosecutor moved to amend the witness list to add ScottCurry to testify that she observed defendant pour gasoline around their house on the day before
this incident. In denying the prosecutor’s motion, the trial court explained that defendant was
not given proper notice of the proposed evidence under MRE 404(b), and thus it would not allow
“that testimony” of Scott-Curry. During the defendant’s case, credibility issues arose regarding
Tamicka’s whereabouts during the incident, and Curry’s actions. The trial court thereafter
allowed the prosecutor to call Scott-Curry as a rebuttal witness to testify about those matters,
which were unrelated to the MRE 404(b) uncharged conduct. The trial court did not abuse its
discretion by allowing the witness to testify on rebuttal.
Further, a trial court may question witnesses in order to clarify testimony or elicit
additional relevant information. People v Davis, 216 Mich App 47, 50; 549 NW2d 1 (1996);
MRE 614(b). A trial court’s discretion to question witnesses “is greater in bench trials than in
trials before juries.” People v Meatte, 98 Mich App 74, 78; 296 NW2d 190 (1980). Here, the
trial court briefly questioned Scott-Curry regarding Tamicka’s location and Curry’s actions after
he came into the house. The court’s questioning was limited in scope, material to the issues in
the case, posed in a neutral manner, and neither added to nor distorted the evidence. See Davis,
supra. The fact that the testimony elicited may have damaged defendant’s case does not
demonstrate that the trial court’s questioning was improper. Id. Further, the trial court’s
questions were not “intimidating, argumentative, prejudicial, unfair, or partial,” People v
Sterling, 154 Mich App 223, 228; 397 NW2d 182 (1986), and it cannot reasonably be argued
that the trial court was improperly influenced by its questioning of the witness. People v Wilder,
383 Mich 122, 125; 174 NW2d 562 (1970). Consequently, this unpreserved claim does not
warrant reversal.
IV. Prosecutorial Misconduct
Defendant also argues that he was denied a fair trial because the prosecutor
impermissibly questioned defendant’s credibility by commenting on his presence during trial.
We disagree.
Because defendant failed to object to the prosecutor’s conduct, we review this claim for
plain error affecting substantial rights. Carines, supra.
During closing argument, the prosecutor stated:
-4-
When you listen to the testimony of the Defendant again, he testified that
he just went around and argued, and [the complainant] was clowning on him. I
mean, that testimony is just, it, it - he’s been sitting here the whole time again. It
- you have to question his credibility.
In People v Buckey, 424 Mich 1, 14; 378 NW2d 432 (1985), our Supreme Court held that
it was proper for a prosecutor to comment on a defendant’s opportunity to conform his testimony
to that of the other witnesses because he sat through the trial and heard their testimony. The
prosecutor in Buckey commented that the defendant had reviewed the police reports, sat through
the preliminary examination, and sat through the witnesses’ testimony at trial. Id. at 6-7. The
Court held that opportunity and motive to fabricate testimony are permissible areas of inquiry of
any witness. Id. at 15. The Court also stated that the prosecutor’s comments only indirectly
related to the defendant’s right to be present at the trial and that any resulting inference was not
directly of guilt, but rather that the defendant had the opportunity to conform his testimony
because he heard other witnesses testify. Id. at 14. The Court held that a prosecutor may not
argue that a defendant fabricated testimony in every case where a defendant sits through the trial,
but when the evidence supports that inference, the argument is a “perfectly proper comment on
credibility.” Id. at 16.
Here, defendant’s credibility was clearly at issue. As such, the prosecutor properly could
comment on the inference that defendant tailored his testimony to what was contained within
Tamicka’s testimony. But even if the prosecutor’s remark was improper, we are not persuaded
that it affected this bench trial verdict. “A judge, unlike a juror, possesses an understanding of
the law which allows him to ignore such errors and to decide a case based solely on the evidence
properly admitted at trial.” See People v Jones, 168 Mich App 191, 194; 423 NW2d 614 (1988).
A review of the record shows that the trial court found defendant guilty on the basis of properly
admitted evidence. Consequently, reversal is not warranted on this basis.
V. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Defendant contends that a new trial is required because defense counsel was ineffective,
or alternatively, that remand is necessary to enable him to develop this claim.
Because defendant failed to raise this issue in the trial court in connection with a motion
for a new trial or an evidentiary hearing, this Court’s review is limited to mistakes apparent on
the record. People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436, 443; 212 NW2d 922 (1973); People v Sabin (On
Second Remand), 242 Mich App 656, 658-659; 620 NW2d 19 (2000).
Effective assistance of counsel is presumed, and the defendant bears a heavy burden of
proving otherwise. People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 302-303; 521 NW2d 797 (1994); People v
Effinger, 212 Mich App 67, 69; 536 NW2d 809 (1995). To establish ineffective assistance of
counsel, a defendant must show that counsel’s performance was below an objective standard of
reasonableness under prevailing norms and that the representation so prejudiced the defendant
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, the result of the proceedings
would have been different. Id.
-5-
A. Bench Trial
We reject defendant’s claim that he is entitled to a new trial because defense counsel
coerced him into waiving trial by jury, as discussed in part II of this opinion. On this record,
defendant has failed to meet his burden of showing that defense counsel coerced him to waiving
his right to a jury trial. Even if this Court assumes that defendant relied on defense counsel’s
advice in making his decision, we must assume defense counsel had a legitimate reason for
waiving trial by jury and that defendant agreed with the position because, in the final analysis,
the decision to waive a jury ultimately rests with the defendant. MCR 6.402(B). Indeed,
defendant definitively stated that it was his decision to proceed with a waiver trial, and that he
was doing so freely and voluntarily. Given defendant’s definitive statements on the record,
defendant cannot now complain of an error. To hold otherwise would allow defendant to harbor
error as an appellate parachute. See People v Carter, 462 Mich 206, 214; 612 NW2d 144
(2000). Defendant is not entitled to a new trial on this basis.
B. Failure to Produce an Eyewitness
Defendant further argues that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to call Michael
January to testify on his behalf. January averred in an affidavit that he saw defendant arrive at
the complainant’s house, get out of the car, and walk back to his open trunk before leaving. He
did not see defendant hold or brandish any firearm, or say or do anything.
The failure to call a supporting witness does not inherently amount to ineffective
assistance of counsel, and there is no “unconditional obligation to call or interview every
possible witness suggested by a defendant.” People v Beard, 459 Mich 918, 919; 589 NW2d
774 (1998). “Ineffective assistance of counsel can take the form of a failure to call a witness or
present other evidence only if the failure deprives the defendant of a substantial defense.”
People v Hyland, 212 Mich App 701, 710; 538 NW2d 465 (1995), mod on other grounds 453
Mich 902 (1996). A defense is substantial if it might have made a difference in the outcome of
the trial. Id.
Although the proposed evidence may have supported defendant’s claim that he did not
have a firearm, it does not fully coincide with defendant’s testimony at trial. Defendant testified
that when he arrived at the complainant’s house, he got out of the car, and the complainant
immediately approached him while cussing and yelling. He cussed back at the complainant, but
then left upon Tamicka’s urging. He explained that he “left as soon as [he] got there.”
Defendant did not indicate that he had popped his trunk, or that he stood by the trunk for some
minutes while he was in front of the house. But the proposed evidence placed defendant at the
rear of his car next to the open trunk for a couple of minutes. Also, defendant admitted that he
cussed back at the complainant, while January averred in his affidavit that defendant “did not say
or do anything.” Given the weight of the evidence in this case, and the discrepancy created by
the proposed evidence, it is highly unlikely that defense counsel’s failure to call the potential
witness deprived defendant of a substantial defense. Consequently, defendant has not
demonstrated that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to call the witness.
-6-
C. Introduction of Damaging Evidence
Defendant further argues that defense counsel was ineffective for eliciting the damaging
evidence that on the day before the incident defendant poured gasoline around the complainant’s
house, after the trial court had previously precluded that evidence. Decisions about what
questions to ask are matters of trial strategy. People v Rockey, 237 Mich App 74, 76; 601 NW2d
887 (1999).
Defendant has not overcome the presumption that defense counsel’s decision was
reasonable trial strategy, nor has he shown that the evidence affected the outcome of the
proceedings. During defense counsel’s cross-examination of the complainant, he elicited
evidence that the complainant was scared of defendant because he had poured gasoline around
his house. Defense counsel was apparently attempting to discredit the complainant’s testimony
by providing a reason why the complainant would falsely accuse defendant of threatening him
with a firearm. Indeed, this coincided with defendant’s trial testimony that the complainant said
that he was “gonna get [him] locked up with [his] parole agent.” Given that the complainant’s
testimony was the chief evidence against defendant, attacking his testimony was crucial.
Defendant’s complaint is that counsel was “ineffective” in doing so. But this Court will not
second-guess counsel in matters of trial strategy. People v Stewart, 219 Mich App 38, 42; 555
NW2d 715 (1996). The fact that the strategy chosen did not work does not constitute ineffective
assistance of counsel. Id. Further, given the weight of the evidence produced at trial, no
reasonable likelihood exists that defendant would not have been convicted if defense counsel had
not questioned the complainant about the matter. Effinger, supra. Consequently, defendant
cannot establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
D. Personal Protection Order
Defendant argues that he is entitled to a new trial because defense counsel was ineffective
for failing to discover that a personal protection order (“PPO”) that Tamicka obtained against
defendant was not issued until two months after the incident, and therefore any reference to the
PPO during trial was improper. We disagree.
At trial, the complainant testified that Tamicka “had a PPO on [defendant].” On crossexamination, Tamicka testified that she had obtained a PPO against defendant, but could not
recall if it was obtained before or after this incident. Defendant testified that at the time of the
incident the PPO “wasn’t, didn’t go through,” and he and Tamicka “were still together” and had
“reconciled their differences.”3
Given the weight of the unchallenged evidence introduced at trial, it is unlikely that the
challenged evidence affected the outcome of the case. There was unchallenged evidence that
defendant and Tamicka had a tumultuous relationship. Tamicka, who testified for the defense,
indicated that she and defendant had problems in the past, and that she had made police reports
against him The complainant testified that he had accompanied Tamicka to the police station “a
3
According to the presentence report, the PPO was issued on June 9, 2005.
-7-
few times” concerning defendant. Consequently, even if defense counsel failed to discover the
issuing date of the PPO, defendant has failed to demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s failure, the outcome would have been different. Effinger, supra.
E. Failure to Object to Reopening the Proofs
We reject defendant’s claim that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object to
the prosecutor’s motion to reopen the proofs to present evidence of defendant’s ineligibility to
possess a firearm. After the proofs were reopened, the parties stipulated that defendant was
convicted of a specified felony, and thus, was ineligible to possess a firearm.
On appeal, defendant does not claim that the prosecutor gained an undue advantage, that
he was surprised by the evidence, or that he would have done anything differently had the
evidence been presented timely. See People v Herndon, 246 Mich App 371, 420; 633 NW2d
376 (2001) (relevant considerations for reopening proofs are whether the moving party would
take any undue advantage and whether the nonmoving party can show surprise or prejudice).
Defendant only argues that defense counsel should have objected. But defendant has failed to
demonstrate, or even argue, that, had defense counsel objected to the prosecutor’s motion, it
would have been successful. The trial court had discretion to allow the prosecutor to reopen the
proofs, id. at 419, given that the prosecutor’s inaction was an obvious oversight, she moved to
reopen the proofs moments after she rested her case, defendant had not yet commenced the
defense, and defendant was undoubtedly aware of the charge against him. Indeed, mere
negligence of the prosecutor is not the type of egregious case for which the extreme sanction of
precluding relevant evidence is reserved. See, e.g., People v Callon, 256 Mich App 312, 328;
662 NW2d 501 (2003). Because there was no reasonable basis to object, defendant cannot
establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. See People v Snider, 239 Mich App 393,
425; 608 NW2d 502 (2000) (counsel is not required to make a futile objection).
F. Failure to Object to the Prosecutor’s and Trial Court’s Misconduct
We reject defendant’s claim that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object to
the unpreserved claims of error discussed in parts III and IV of this opinion. In light of our
conclusion in part III that the trial court was allowed to question the witness, and our conclusion
in part IV that the prosecutor’s remark did not deny defendant a fair trial, defendant cannot
demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s inaction, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. Effinger, supra.
For these reasons, we reject defendant’s claim that defense counsel was ineffective and
are not persuaded that a remand is necessary.
VI. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Defendant also argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction of
felony-firearm because there was no evidence that he possessed an operable firearm. We
disagree.
When ascertaining whether sufficient evidence was presented at trial to support a
conviction, this Court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution and
-8-
determine whether a rational trier of fact could find that the essential elements of the crime were
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 515; 489 NW2d 748 (1992),
amended 441 Mich 1201 (1992). It is well established that this Court will not interfere with the
trier of fact’s role of determining the weight of evidence or the credibility of witnesses. Id. at
514. “[A] reviewing court is required to draw all reasonable inferences and make credibility
choices in support of the [trier of fact’s] verdict.” People v Nowack, 462 Mich 392, 400; 614
NW2d 78 (2000).
The elements of felony-firearm are that the defendant possessed a firearm during the
commission or attempted commission of any felony other than those four enumerated in the
statute. MCL 750.227b(1); People v Avant, 235 Mich App 499, 505; 597 NW2d 864 (1999).
Possession of a weapon may be proved by circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences
arising from the evidence. People v Hill, 433 Mich 464, 469-470; 446 NW2d 140 (1989);
People v Truong (After Remand), 218 Mich App 325, 337; 553 NW2d 692 (1996).
The evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient to
enable a rational trier of fact to find that defendant possessed a firearm. Two witnesses testified
that defendant possessed two different weapons during the incident. Both Kevina and the
complainant testified that defendant pointed a black handgun at the complainant, and then
retrieved a long gun from the trunk of his car. The complainant testified that the black handgun
looked like a nine-millimeter weapon, and the long gun looked like an AK-47. The complainant
explained that he was in the military for seven years, and was familiar with guns. Contrary to
defendant’s argument, the prosecution was not required to prove that the firearms were operable.
“Operability is not and has never been an element of felony-firearm.” People v Thompson, 189
Mich App 85, 86; 472 NW2d 11 (1991); see also People v Peals, 476 Mich 636, 638, 650, 653655; 720 NW2d 196 (2006) (the offense of felony-firearm “do[es] not require proof that the
firearm was “operable” or “reasonably or readily operable.”). In sum, the evidence was
sufficient to sustain defendant’s conviction of felony-firearm.
VII. Cumulative Error Theory
We reject defendant’s final argument that the cumulative effect of several errors deprived
him of a fair trial. Because no cognizable errors warranting relief have been identified, reversal
under the cumulative error theory is unwarranted. People v Mayhew, 236 Mich App 112, 128;
600 NW2d 370 (1999).
Affirmed.
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Alton T. Davis
-9-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.